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ABSTRACT
This study describes and assesses the problems associated
with the development of the new broadcasting media in the
United Kingdom, France and Luxembourg in 1981-1986. It
also examines the implications associated with the new
broadcasting media in both the audiovisual landscape and
the public policies concerning broadcasting. It describes
and analyses the audiovisual policy initiated by the
Commission of the European Community.
This study believes that the impact of the the new
broadcasting media on the audiovisual environment has been
mostly indirect because of their very slow development. In
all three countries, the development of the new
broadcasting media has taken on an industrial dimension in
terms of assisting the restructuring of their mature
economies. The strongest impression to emerge from this
project is a profound confusion and uncertainty about the
media developments. A situation including an increased
number of actors, involved both in conventional and new
broadcasting media adversely influenced the latter's
development.
Even though the United Kingdom and France followed a
different policy path, the outcome was the same: small
growth. While France followed a state-led policy, the
United Kingdom favoured private initiative and the market
forces. This project also stresses that although economic
pressures and challenges have been a driving force for
policy adjustment, technology and markets do not themselves
dictate specific and institutional arrangements.
Additionally, it describes the state policy on broadcasting
in Luxembourg and the anxiety of its politicians to
maintain the Grand Duchy's traditional role as the location
for international broadcasting. Finally, the European
Community's broadcasting policy is discussed in terms of
another attempt to harmonise diversified national
legislations for the satellite age of television and
1992's Single Market.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in broadcasting technology have
significantly changed the potential for television
transmission. Satellite-to--cable television and the
universality of the TV set have created the prospect of a
world market for both hardware equipment and programmes.
Within this context, the United Kingdom, France and
Luxembourg - as well as the EC through its Commission- have
tried, despite various problems, to formulate their
respective television policies. Although national
particularities have sometimes been less evident with
respect to the development and regulation of the new media,
the political debate has remained nationally distinctive.
Moreover, the new media developments have not only been
related to legislative and regulatory provisions but also
to political ideology and institutional politics.
Consequently, Tunstall's conclusion in 1977 that the 'media
are politics, business and technology' seems to fit
perfectly a decade later, in the new media scene. Their
relationship appears to be symbiotic and pragmatic.
We clearly live in an era of television change. Currently,
people try to adjust their TV sets in a new audiovisual
landscape. This study is about television policy, the
development of cable and satellite television and its
impact on terrestrial television and vice versa. All three
countries examined must adapt their broadcasting structures
to the new European environment.
At this level, the EC, and its Commission in particular,
has finally proposed an audiovisual policy for the whole
European television landscape after much discussion and
many draft reports and consultative documents over a period
of years (1982-88). This policy has been achieved by
coordinating and harmonising national broadcasting
activities in the 12 member states, sweeping away
obstacles impeding freedom of broadcasting across them.
The basic idea of the policy comes from the Commission's
Green Paper, Television Without Frontiers, and the final
Directive, which are based on the principle that all
broadcasts should comply with the law applicable in the
state in which they originate. To this end, the Commission
has defined a framework that reconciles the required free
movement of goods and services with the need to maintain a
number of laws and other standards, including a degree of
1
cultural quality in programme content.
In May 1979, Margaret Thatcher was elected in the UK to
lead a Conservative Government that was very critical of
growing state intervention in the economy. In May 1981, the
French elected Francois Mitterrand and the first Socialist
Government in the history of the Fifth Republic. Both
Governments were asked to bring back the prosperity of the
past but their economic policies were opposed. Their
broadcasting policies were somewhat similar to their
general economic ones. In the UK, the Conservatives sought
to open broadcasting up to market forces, attempting to
expose previously regulated institutions to competition
from potentially powerful new media services. They pushed
forward a privatised communications system that would lead
to the traditional broadcasters' disappearance of the
monopoly. In France, the Socialists mixed three lines of
action. On one hand they wanted to defend - but also
reinforce - the public service threatened by increasing
pressure from private groups and professional unions; on
the other, they wanted to privatise. Moreover, new
technology led the Socialists to engage in an ambitious
programme of 'cabling' the country, but with much state
involvement in addition to a private element. The outcome
was highly unsatisfactory. However, terrestrial
frequencies, where people were used to a public monopoly,
were deregulated, adding three more channels.
Luxembourg, with its reputation as an international
broadcaster, was in a difficult situation since
liberalising television, on both terrestrial frequencies
and through satellite broadcasting, 'was threatening its
comparative advantage as a source of international an3.
private television. Regardless of its smallness, it played.
an important role in the 'satellite saga' of the l9Os.
This study describes and assesses the problems of re'w
broadcasting media development in the above-mentioned
countries, examining their , impact on the public service
broadcasters and state broadcasting policies. It is divided
into five parts. The first deals with contemporary analyses
of policy-making, exploring ways of fitting communications
into the fields of policy studies and sociology. The
introduction defines the project's outline.
The second part examines the three countries' policies on
terrestrial television and, in a separate section, the EC
Commission's audiovisual policy. Surprisingly, the UK
2
adopted a policy of reinforcing the public broadcasting
service, whereas France deregulated its system haphazardly
by introducing low-quality TV channels. Luxembourg's
realisation of its lack of control over its single
broadcaster is also analysed.
The third part covers the policies adopted for, and the
politics associated with, developing the new broadcasting
media. It concludes that 1981-86 was a period of depression
and discouragement for governments and players who realised
that developing new media industries was going to be a long
process.
In the fourth part, the industrial dimension of television,
especially the new media, is examined, for both hardware
and the associated consumer electronics and programme
production. In both cases, it seems that there is little
room left to compete with Japanese or US firms in hardware
and software (programmes).
Finally, part five sums up the whole project and concludes
by drawing s me lessons for future developments in the
sector.
3
PART ONE: TOWARDS A COMMUNICATIONS POLICY THEORY - IN
SEARCH OF A CONCEPT
INTRODUCTION
One of this project's central themes is to investigate why
the new media in the UK and France, and to a lesser extent
in Luxembourg, have had an indirect impact on conventional
(or terrestrial or over-the-air) broadcasting. It also
explains how the new media have challenged the old and
what their political, economic or regulatory impact has
been.
This study argues that the new media's impact on
conventional television was indirect because of ,their slow
development. However, their entry has made traditional
broadcasters to respond to this potential threat by
adopting more competitive policies. This readjustment of
traditional broadcasters seems to have given them an
advantage rather than to newcomers. The situation is
reminiscent of the introduction of other technologies such
as television or VCRs. The VCRs lead to another major theme
of this study: focusing on policy-makers' perceptions
concerning the potential and capability of new
technologies.
Technology became tremendously credible in the late 1970s
and early 1980s - not only in the UK and France but almost
everywhere, Converging technologies and their significance
for the economic and industrial development of a country
on one hand necessitated adapting a communications policy,
transferring the focus of broadcasting policy. As McQuail
(1987a; 1-4) pointed out, policy-makers had treated
broadcasting as something special or different, leading it
away from the study of other communications systems and
phenomena and, finally, leaving it outside the public
policy sphere. He also noted that until recently,
broadcasting predominantly meant dissemination off the air
for reception under the norms laid down by society, whereas
cable and point-to-point communication were generally for
private use, being subject only to technological and non-
content regulation. This change, already under way, was
accelerated by concrete proposals for new, integrated,
hybrid networks to provide all kinds of communication
services.
Broadcasting in general, and television in particular, have
4
always been under the government's shadow; the political
context in which they function makes heavy use of such
terms as	 'public interest', 'freedom of broadcasting',
etc. McQuail (1987a; 5-6) also points out that
broadcasting policy has, until recently, been considered a
national domestic affair, a social policy matter. In
contrast, telecommunications have been the exclusive
domain of industrial and economic policies. Converging
technologies have changed this broadcasting policy content.
Television has once again taken on industrial and economic
significance as it did in the first stages of its
development. It would not be an over-simplification to say
that policy-makers viewed the development of cable and
satellite television and the associated electronics
hardware as a boost for their mature, uncompetitive
industries. They therefore initially paid greater attention
to technology and the electronics hardware industry (
medium), rather than to the content and the programmes
message) . Because both medium and message are
interdependent, the latter, especially its programming
production dimension, also seemed important because both
are essential to the development of cable and satellite
channels.
The policy-makers went from having active policies for
hardware and passive ones for programming to a balance
between the two. New actors, mainly from the private
sector, have entered the market while the traditional
policy actor's role has changed. For example, the previous
public service broadcasters do not feel as powerful today;
they have adopted a more commercial attitude to compete
with the new, potentially threatening entrants. They no
longer influence policy decisions as they did before. The
relationship between different levels of government has
changed. New bodies, including the Haute Autorité or its
successor the Conseil Supérieur de 1' Audiovisuel in France
have been created to oversee the new environment. Other
bodies with limited power, such as the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) in the UK, have increased their
influence, while previously influential bodies such as the
UK Home Office, have lost their power.
Governments have clearly seen broadcasting as an
opportunity in the face of economic constraints and
uncompetitive industries. This situation has not only led
to new players but also to the sectorisation of policy-
making. Decision-making is now fragmented because of the
reallocation of power between various actors, especially
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within the administrative machine. Nevertheless, the market
for policy ideas has not widened: rather, incremental
confusion has been irnposd on the field.
The strongest impression to emerge from this study, is
profound confusion, uncertainty and insecurity surrounding
a complexity of actors and issues. This project examines
whether this fragmentation resulted from government
policies or something else. It also considers how the large
number of actors involved in both old and new media has
adversely influenced the new media's development. Financial
constraints and government confusion about policy
formulation and the policy-lines adopted at both the
political/administrative and technical levels have
aggravated the problem. Executing policies with respect to
developing new media has been a central problem. Confusion
arose because governments had to adopt policies in an era
of increasing cominercialisation. There was pressure to
abandon the public service principles while, concurrently,
technology changed rapidly. It is therefore difficult to
trace a policy that relied heavily on technology.
Although satellite technology has increased,
cominercialisation of the services it offers has faltered.
Optimism and pessimism have alternated, colouring the
perception of satellite television's prospects. Technology
and the pressure for a quick response to gain a competitive
advantage and national prestige have constituted a
tremendous and highly complex policy agenda. Because
technological options are complicated (cable or DBS), the
order is difficult (tree or star), and the adopted policy
(state- or market-led) difficult to execute.
The UK and France followed different policies for
developing their new media. France has moved
optimistically, but somewhat incoherently, in all
directions at the same time to inodernise the country, as
promised by the Socialists. The UK, on the other hand, has
followed a persistent line towards privatisation, with a
broad but uncommitted support among interested parties in
the private sector. In both cases, however, the results
were negative. Although economic pressures and challenges
have been a driving force for policy adjustment, technology
and markets do not dictate specific political and
institutional arrangements by themselves.
It is more striking to attempt to explain how Socialist-
governed France went rapidly commercial while Conservative-
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governed Britain hesitated. This project takes the view
that politics played the most important part in this
outcome --in conjunction with the general external
supranational environment -- considering that although the
government remains an influential actor and the policy
process remains the same, the government (or state action)
is not only within a 'state-society' relationship, but also
a 'state-international environment' context. Diffusion of
policy ideas (such as deregulation and privatisation) has
crossed national boundaries, especially within
communications. During the 1980s in western Europe, there
has been a tendency to open up the territory of new media,
such as cable and satellite, to commercial forces rather
than to dismantle the structures of public service
broadcasting which have survived and, to a large extent,
adapted themselves to the new environment. This study
adopts a European dimension to find a balanced, rather than
British-biased, perspective on the media. Looking at the
Community level however, there is a gap between aspiring to
European unity and pursuing self-interested goals.
Broadcasting, as we shall see later, presents a suitable
example of national versus international.
That European unity is no longer a matter for ideologues,
but one for international competitiveness, is equally
important. Communications in general, and broadcasting in
particular, illustrate the European states' need to compete
in world communications technology markets where a unified
European market is seen as a necessary condition for
economies of scale. Although we cannot presently see
concrete results, an impetus has been given to the forces
of commercialisation and a favourable place to multimedia,
multinational actors, such as Murdoch, Maxwell, Berlusconi,
Hersant and Bertelsmann. This has already resulted in
commercialisation of new territories and the rise of a
market model over the previous public trustee. Although a
kind of 're-regulation' has been introduced in many cases,
scepticism abounds on the effectiveness of the new
regulations, their institutional structures, and how
politicians can apply these rules. Although the new media
revolution has failed to have a great effect on consumer
policy, it has had a large impact on terrestrial
broadcasting policy in the l980s, causing a restructuring
of the broadcasting system through existing, rather than
new, technology.
To discover the factors that influence television policy,
one has to go beyond the conventional view of media studies
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that tend to see media as a cultural affair. This project
looks at television policy primarily as a response to
economic and industrial needs 2,/But such a view is
incomplete. Television policy is also a product of
governments, but governments are political creatures, so
television policy must be seen within the political
process. As a result, this thesis covers the political and
economic dimension of television management. It takes the
view that political and economic variables have a
definitive impact on the character and direction of
television policy. The former, of course, involves asking
how we can conceptualise a range of political variables and
factors that influence television policy.
Consequently, we need a specific theory to help us
understand the general determinants of state action. We
look first at the interaction of interests, institutions
and ideas in the policy process before addressing the
critical role played by institutions in performing
government policy. This section is devoted to the
contemporary analyses of various political models and tries
to find ways of fitting media sociology and policy studies
into these frameworks.
1.1.0 COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND POLITICS: IN SEARCH OF
DEFINITIONS
'Policy' can refer to a set of explanations and intentions,
to a series of actions and their consequences, or to all of
these together (Kerr:1973; 73). The same problem occurs
when one tries to define 'policy analysis'. As Wildavsky
(1979; 15) points out, there can be no single definition of
policy analysis. Indeed, there are many, such as 'the
output of policy-making', ' a pattern of responses', 'a
cluster of decision-making' and 'a structure or confluence
of values behavior' (Kerr: 1976; 351). Hofferbert (1974;
23) adds that policy is made in a variety of different
contexts, each producing different policies. Downs and
Rocke (1981; 281-88) see policy as a medicine, more
clinical than theoretical, and more inductive than
deductive. In this study, policy analysis is defined as a
general description of the subject matter under scrutiny.
This avoids an unnecessary review of what policy is (and
could be), as well as trivial repetition of the literature
(1)
It is difficult to conceptualise policy, even as a term,
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because it usually involves a wide range of issues, actors
and aspects. An open-ended definition leaves the scope wide
but also has the advantage of seeing a programme or policy
as a means to an end. Although this could be seen as a
simplification, it avoids even more serious simplifications
of trying to combine the mechanisms of decision-making,
evaluation and supervision that eventually involve us in a
continuous discussion of analysis of policy and policy for
analysis (Hamm and Hill: 1984; 1-7, ortega and Romero:
1977; 6-9). With communications policy, the whole matter
becomes more complicated: on one hand, we are dealing with
a total communication process (Halloran :1986; 45), and on
the other, a national communications policy as a set of
principles and norms established to guide the behaviour of
a communications system within a country (Unesco: 1974; 3).
Halloran (1986; 47) also points out that the term
'communications policy' has not been widely used. Such
policy tended to be latent and fragmented, rather than
overt and articulated. Mahie and Richter (1974; 9), quoting
Rogele, agree with Halloran when he points out that the
development of communications policy into a separate field
or concept resulted from social problems arising out of
increasingly complex communications. It is also true that
the concept of communications policy is still in its
infancy and has as many variations as policy has
definitions (2).
Communications policy nowadays has not only been necessary
for governments, but also subject to greater policy change
than other area. Considerable progress in communications
systems and technology has made many countries reconsider
their views on using, developing and allocating
communication resources. Moreover, converging technologies
and their significance for a country's economic and
industrial development made it necessary to adopt
communications policy. A growing number of countries see
the need for widening the scope of their decisions and
integrating different sectors to extend the clarity that
policy brings to the whole communications system (Dias:
1979; 3).
In theory, there are many descriptions of the policy
process; in practice, according to Richardson and Jordan
(1983: 251), two main features dominate. This difference in
government approach to solving a problem is often
characterised in terms of the incrementalist (or deductive)
and rationalist debate. The incrementalist approach a
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conflict over values, analysis at the margins, mutual
adjustments, consultation, agreements, bargaining and
successive limited comparisons, low coercion, 'managerial'
change, and so on. Rationalism is central authority, high
coercion, ability, limited conflict over values, wide
search for options, clear objectives, a possibility of
radical change and so on.
Even though Etzioni (1976) has invented a 'mixed scanned',
i.e. medium approach between the two opposites, most policy
analysts use these terms to clarify the opposites in their
analyses. This study takes a similar approach. I adopt
what Rose (1973; 74-76) notes: that understanding the
policy process does not require the invention of a new
repertoire of concepts or taxonomies, but that it can begin
by integrating the existing stock of knowledge, albeit from
a perspective that emphasises government action. If this is
correct, there is a new problem concerning the relationship
of a government to the other actors of policy-making,
leading us to politics. Castoriadis (1984; 1-15, 1987; 3-
53) insists that politics is not a technique, rather that
it belongs to the domain he calls praxis. It is the
activity that does not distinguish between ends and means
but, instead, posits an internal relationship between what
is intended, and what has already been intended. This helps
clarify the politics underlying the French Socialist's
policy of going ahead with the new terrestrial channels
instead of insisting on the previous cabling programme.
Here Hall (1986; 4) points out that politics enters the
policy process in many ways: interest groups press for
congenial policies, politicians and civil servants jockey
for influence over the outcome, and political problems
occur during policy implementation. Politics could
therefore be seen as an interaction between the
government's approach to problem-solving and the
relationship between government and other actors or
political factors in the policy process. Because the policy
process is subject to political influence, taking a
position on the determinants of broadcasting policy is
implicitly to endorse a particular understanding of
politics. Therefore, any theory claiming to explain
communications or broadcasting policies must be grounded in
a broader view of the general determinants of state action.
Implementing a policy is not easy and critiquing an
implemented policy is equally difficult. May and Wildavsky
(1978; 13) note that past policies become an important-
sometimes the most important part of the environment to
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which the future must adapt. Moreover, Hogwood and Peters
(1982; 226-8) suggest that most 'new' policies in
contemporary western political systems in fact replace old
ones. New policies are not written on a tabula rasa, but
rather on a well-occupied, or even crowded, tablet of
existing laws, organisations and clients. Therefore most
policy-making is actually policy-succession: replacing an
existing policy or programme with another. This policy
succession is recognised in broadcasting policies,
especially regarding the introduction and absorption of new
media and communications technologies. Even though the Plan
Cable is viewed as a programme from France's Socialist
Administration, the plan and its perception are quite
similar to the proposals of the Nora-Minc report,
commissioned by the previous Conservative Government.
Similarly, Channel Four was envisioned by the Labour
Government in Britain, although it only became a reality
under the Conservatives.
Implementation is an important phase in the policy process.
The problem of modern society, according to Crozier (1982;
5), is its complexity, reshaping the patterns of social
control, and the relations of power. We suffer, he points
out, more from confusion than oppression. Our actions no
longer produce results. That is why there is no point
choosing objectives that may be good but are impossible to
achieve. Communications require joint action by those
involved in the social, economic, political, cultural and
foreign affairs of a country (Dias et al.: 1979; 25). This
leads directly to a lack of coordination, which is one of
the problems discussed in this study. Coordination at the
administrative political level is essential, according to
Hood (1976; 6). The conflict of authority, he notes, could
weaken control, making compartmentalism unavoidable.
However, as we shall see later, the external parameter is
important in decision-making and in policy implementation
because, as Hyder (1984; 24) points out, international
obligations may specifically constrain implementation.
The environment - mainly the adininistrative-organisational
context - is increasingly important for implementation.
Deregulation does not necessarily reduce, still less
remove, the difficulties of implementing policies. Rather,
it alters a set of instruments available for implementing
other policies, perhaps making inter-organisational
relations in a given field even more difficult. For
instance, deregulation has changed the relationships
between the Cable Authority and Oftel in the UK, and the
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rest of the broadcasting authorities in general.
Additionally, deregulation is itself a long-term government
policy within a wider field of application.
This study's critique of government choices is, to some
extent, related to evaluating adopted policy. For example,
'retrospective' analysis usually comes too late. Evaluation
can be done through controlled experimentation or
retrospective evaluation, but there are many possible
techniques which could be followed (Wildavsky: 1978; 5-7,
Jenkins: 1978; 226-230). This study evaluates a policy on
the basis of the relationship between an official
statement's initial goal and the final outcome. Finally,
evaluation and implementation have sometimes been seen as
an alternative because they overlap, but they are not
identical. Both are related to political influence in the
policy arena, as this study shows. The final section
examines the interaction of interests, institutions and
ideas, looking again at a view of political action that
particularly stresses the critical role played by
institutions, the dissemination of ideology into policy and
the determination of polity.
1.1.1 COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIOLOGY
Harold Laswell, in 1951, regarded policy science as closely
associated with communications policy (3). However, it is
also closely linked to social science. Therefore, one of
the field's main characteristics is its multidisciplinary
approach (Laswell: 1951, Brewer: 1974, de Leon: 1981, 1984)
(4). sociological theory is given priority in this study
because policy issues mature within a societal context,
determining the nature of political actors, decision-making
structures and processes, as well as policy outcome. In
similar societies, we expect to find similar policies for
the same issues across political systems and varied
policies across issues within the same system (Kitschell:
1986)
The multidisciplinary character of policy analysis permits
anybody from any discipline to be involved in the field
(5) . Economists, lawyers, sociologists and political
scientists have contributed and interpreted policy science
and/or analysis. Laswell urged the application of social
sciences to policy questions; the term 'policy science'
was clearly carefully chosen to encompass all the
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disciplines pertinent to a particular subject or issue
area, as a means of coping with the complexity of problems
(de Leon: 1984; 589). Practice supports this argument since
the conditions of complexity and uncertainty require a true
multidisciplinary approach, with each discipline's
contributions epistemologically integrated into the study
as a whole. At this point, Dror (1971; ix) distinguishes
himself by arguing that policy analysis is a 'new
discipline'. I endorse Wildavsky's view (1979; 15)that
policy analysis is an applied subfield whose content cannot
be determined by disciplinary boundaries, but by whatever
appears appropriate to the circumstances and nature of the
problem. This is because the problems concerning policy
analysis are simply too complex to permit solution by a
single discipline's biases (de Leon:1981, Weiss: 1977).
Communications policy is multidimensional by nature because
it covers various faces of a society's thinking, actions,
values and needs in a given time and space. The influence
of economics in policy analysis, and particularly in
communications policy, has greatly contributed to policy-
making (Stigler:1971, Littlechild:l979, Hirschman: 1970).
As Rowland(1986:173-75) notes, lawyers have played an
important role in broadcasting and common-carrier policy
studies in the US. Their research however, either conducted
or commissioned, tends to be guided by prior interests of
contending private parties and the rules of prestructured
administrative practice (6). Their perspective lacks
ideological appreciation, inevitably leading their research
into an ahistorical, and sometimes asocietal, dimension.
A similar argument could be used against the economics
literature involved in communications policy-making. But
the help provided by the economic factors has not yet
improved policy-making; a serious 'policy-making gap'
remains between most government practices and the enormous
challenges their societies face. In his recent book, Dror
(1983; 301) puts it vividly: 1 .contemporary policy-making
is not good enough to deal. with the increasingly complex,
difficult, and critical problems that are being generated
by the constantly accelerating technological and social
revolution'. The economists - and in our case the
communications economists, by using more 'hard data' than
other social scientists - have been able to fold
information into general economic notions about matters
such as market theory, efficiency, elasticity and public-
versus-private goods (Rowland:1986; 173). Their models and
suggestions lack 'sociological imagination', however. They
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are also only partial because they adopt an administrative
and economist rationale without relating it to the general
societal context (7).
I have given preference to the environment embracing the
policy process. The need for, as Jenkins puts it (1978;24-
29), 'an ecological approach to policy' is adequate. This
demands a perspective that not only considers actors and
their preferences, but also the historical and social
framework in which they function (discussed later). This is
provided by a synthesis between the multidisciplinary
character of communications policy and sociology. A
sociological perspective provides us with a framework for
understanding the logic of policy arenas so that models
based on either 'economic' or 'organisation man' are
sometimes proven insufficient to explain the paradoxes in
the policy process. Different styles of rationality emerge
in particular administrations, depending on the policy
arena, and different areas of state activity correlate with
different organisational structures of policy-making (Offe:
1984, Therborn:1978, Kitschelt: 1986).
Sociological theory, moreover, helps communications policy
students explain meaning located elsewhere (8). Sociology -
especially media sociology - has either directly or
indirectly engaged itself in the relationship between
broadcasting, the state, and policy-making issues. Studies
like those by McQuail (1987a), Carey (1978), Tunstall
(1970, 1983, 1986), Robinson (1980), Rowland (1986), wright
(1986), Golding and Murdoch (1977), Golding and Elliot
(1979), Halloran (1986) and King (1976), provide us with a
macro-perspective on media matters by addressing
broadcasting and policy within society and the social
process (Middleton: 1980). The broadness of sociological
theory can concurrently accommodate a variety of theories
from other fields (Kinlach: l977;35-6).
Because communications policy is an exceptionally
interdisciplinary field, it needs sociological guidance.
The involvement of sociology in communications and policy
matters is not new. For example, the Chicago School of
Sociology worked, in the early 1920s, on communications
policy topics that sound modern today (Wright:l986,
Rowland:1986, Carrey:l975). Modern media sociology has
encompassed various approaches, such as the media effects
approach (Blumler and Gurrevitch: 1977), Marxist tradition
(Golding and Murdoch: 1977, Garnham: 1979), and individual
case studies, such as those of Robinson (1969), Gerbner
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(1977), and Brown (1970). Policy matters have also been
researched in depth by media sociologists such as Tunstall
(1977, 1983, 1986), Weddel (1968), Boyd-Barret (1980),
Schiller (1969) and Burns (1977). sociological analyses,
however, have generally been thwarted by a fragmented
approach, leaving little room to develop a sociological
communications policy theory (9).
There were two main problems with sociology: the general,
stereotyped accusation that such a theory would
oversimplify social structure; and the tendency, or
arrogance, of sociology to see the other social sciences as
derivatives of sociology, or its colonial dependents (Dowie
and Hughes:l985; 7-9). The problem was less acute with
early social scientists, when the disciplines of economics,
law, political science and sociology were not an issue
(14). It could be argued that apart from converging
technologies, communications policy represents a
convergence between grand theoretical disciplines. This is
definitely not the issue here, but as Bottoniore (1972; 315-
20) informs us, the contribution of descriptive sociology
to social policy during formulation and introduction, and
the clinical role of applied sociology, has been widely
recognised - especially after World War II (Castels:l981).
As Garnhain (1983; 314-15) argues, "in order to avoid the
traps of asocial and ahistorical theories that move toward
idealismat the expense of concrete analysis, media studies
must re-establish its links with the mainland of social
science" and - I would add - of sociological theory. Its
role must be to assist policy analysis by placing it within
a broader social process. As Pod (1977; 131-33) notes, in
developed societies, an integrated conununications system
serves many processes. Thus, broadcasting cannot function
in isolation from other media; it is only one of the many
kinds of communication that a society needs.
1.1.2 FROM COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY...
Because this study deals with the new broadcasting media,
it has a certain view of technology in general, and
technological change in particular.
Rowland (1986; 167) argues that one of the significant
problems with historical research backdrops for
contemporary policy research is that most communications
policy literature has been associated with, if not
dominated by, problems of technological change. It is
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equally true that communications criticism has put
technological change in terms of capital investment because
often the technologies adopted are quite well established
and it is a matter of choosing between the existing
products of Research and Development (R&D). As Lyon (1988;
4-35) argues, a technological revolution does not
necessarily add up to a social revolution, but the idea of
an information society fits in neatly with the western myth
of progress via technology. He also argues that much of
technological revolution's popularity comes from the
widespread belief that technology proceeds almost
autonomously, and that its effects are beneficial until
proven otherwise. There have been three main approaches to
the relationship between technology and communications.
The first looks at technology as an autonomous variable and
is frequently labelled 'technology-abundance' literature;
the second sees technology as a medium of the change about
to occur; and the third views technology as an outcome of
social and historical needs.
The 'technology of abundance' literature has mainly been
adopted by administrative agency reports and argues that
the new technologies would alter the structures of
communications access, production and distribution. Their
assumptions were influential in the practical political
sphere in the late l970s and early 1980s. These hypotheses
were derived from the so-called 'technology push or pull'
views (11) and have been closely related to what McQuail
(1986) calls 'media-centred theory'. This approach tends to
dominate most government policy towards technology,
particularly those departments related to scientists and
engineers. Its position is nothing more than the
technological determinism thesis, which argues that new
technologies are discovered by a particular internal
process of R&D that, in turn, sets the conditions for
social change and progress. R&D has been considered self-
generating and new technologies belong to an independent,
autonomous sphere (Williams: 1974; 11-16). Vogler (1981)
argues that this technological perspective tends to
disembody technology from its social context regarding by
political factors as consequences, rather than catalysts,
of technological change.
This approach is closely related to the American tradition,
especially in the media field linked to the 'Toronto
School'. It also reflects deregulatory ideas and breaking
up the 'natural monopoly' concept within the communications
domain. Starling (1983; 197) describes the argument quite
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simply: a constant and prolific merging of technology
generates the breakthroughs in the communications industry.
These technological breakthroughs are, in turn, blurring
boundaries, i.e. the old industrial paradigm that assumed
separate technologies and boundaries between
telecommunications, computing and television no longer
holds. As industrial boundaries blur, regulation becomes
difficult, and often unnecessary. The government response
to this interindustria]. rivalry has been a move toward
deregulation (see Table 1 and Parts 3 and 4).
In broadcasting, the argument is that new technology such
as cable and DBS, will lead to a plethora of new channels.
This proliferation will destroy or break up the monopoly
status enjoyed by public broadcasters (see also Parts 2 and
3). It is true that IT'S impact is to cause restructuring
of social and global relations. Few economists would
disagree that we shall see further accumulation in the IT
sectors; centralisation in media and iiformation and
hardware and distribution interests; as well as a new class
system centred upon stocks, flows and contributions to
information (Locksley:l985; 81-3). It is also true that
high-tech developments made scientists believe in progress
through technology (Bunce: 1976; 2). Although this is
contradicted by historical developments, it persists.
Bell(1973) stresses 'intellectual technology' as the
primary tool of post-industrial society. Rosembloom
(1985;l95-6) points out that broadcasting industries today
display consequences of post-innovations in information
technologies; the continuing technology advances will make
new products and services possible, creating new
situations.
de Sola Pool (l983b) , however, does not share such a
'deterministic' view, giving technology a less autonomous
status. Pool believes that the least accurate predictions
were made by those prognosticators who focused solely on
technology itself. On the other hand, those who placed
technology in a context of market analysis, comparing cost
and demand for a product's alternatives, such as telephone,
were accurate. After all, technology not only has
consequences, but its introduction is often a function of
other factors. Compaine (1984; 8) adds that new technology
depends upon customer needs and the, existing offering in
the marketplace. This constitutes a less deterministic view
of technology, since it deems that new technologies become
available as an element of change that is, in any case,
about to occur. In other words, this thesis emphasises
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other causal factors in social change: technologies are
symptoms of other changes. Any particular technology is,
therefore, a by-product of social process that is otherwise
determined (Williams: 1974; 13).
It is sometimes true that a product made possible by
technology is not produced, first because it requires other
technological development and, second, the elimination of
either political or institutional barriers. It is also true
that technological determinism as a theoretical framework
in general, and as a tool for communications policy
analysis in particular, has been proposed or adopted by
scholars from the US and Japan - the two countries most
advanced in communications technologies and industry. There
is, therefore, an interrelationship between the development
of material conditions in a society, the intellectual
pursuit of knowledge and the political concern for the
application of knowledge. This study has, to a certain
extent, regarded technology as a direct product of its
society. Technology must not be allowed to determine social
needs (Halloran: 1986; 56). The study considers mass media
an outcome of historical change and consequence of the
industry's needs to respond to demands serving social needs
(Williams:1974; 13-4). It adopts the view that cable and
satellite have resulted from the needs of an 'industrial-
military complex' that interlinks the needs of the military
to communicate, the restructuring of the industrialised
mature industries and the need of these societies to
maintain dominant communication roots in the world (see
also Part 4).
Winston (1986) argues that there is no information
revolution and that information technology history reveals
gradual, uncataclysmic, business-like progress, far from
revolution. Although he overemphasises the continuities
between old and new information technologies, his main
point is to provide us with a framework, largely adopted in
this study, in which technology is assumed to be a
dependent variable of the sociopolitical forces, rather
than an independent variable adopted by the technological
deterministic school.
1.1.3 ...TO INFORMATION SOCIETY THEORIES
The influence of communication technologies on the shape of
economy, on profits, productivity and industrial relations
has led to the theory of information on post-industrial
society. These theories, led mainly by Bell", focus on the
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increased power of information professionals, and how this
liberates workers from the drudgery of transnational
industrial labour. In response to enormous growth in the
communications sector and the social, as well as political,
problems that have emerged, academic research has been
determined to search for a new rationale, concepts and
methods for analysing the pooling and planning of
communications systems (Rahin and Edgar: 1983; 3-4).
For Bell (1973), an information society is characterised by
a service economy, the shift from mechanical fabrication to
processing and recycling; the pre-eminence of professional
and technical groups who replace the financial capital and
machine technology of the profit-oriented industrialist
with their theoretical knowledge and 'intellectual
technology' ('game' theory, systems analysis). Touraine
(1971) is less optimistic, calling this a 'technocratic
society', while Williams (1974) argues that the belief in
technological power tends to distort our social
understanding. Mass media are considered important to the
information society, and vice versa, because they are
expanding and becoming more efficient at producing and
distributing information ( McQuail: l987b)- McLuhan's
medium is the message.
Machiup (1962), Bell (1973) and Porat's (1976) analyses,
however, provide a concept for a new paradigm of policy
research and analysis. Porat (1976) argues that because
communication ability is closely linked to the power and
wealth of society, it is essential for public policy to
deal effectively with emerging communication problems;
therefore, we must give these issues high priority. Since
the technological revolution is creating great potential
for expansion and change in the communications
infrastructure, communications policy should focus on the
level of the infrastructure ( Edgar and Rahin: 1983; 4-7).
In 1978, Porat provided a very useful and attractive
framework for policy analysis by arguing that the crucial
communication factors do not belong to the cultural
superstructure of society, but to the basic technological
and economic foundations of the information society.
However, he, like other information society theorists, was
influenced by a technological determinism that naturally
overestimated the role of new technology in economic and
social change, concurrently minimising the significance of
the cultural import of new technology. Nevertheless, with
some alterations, especially on the role of technology in
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policy-making, this approach could be used as a framework
for policy analysis because it sees distinctions between
communications media, such as television and telecoins, as
outmoded.
1.1.4 COMMUNICATIONS THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS
The founders of policy studies, especially in the US, such
as Laswell, Lerner and Lazarsfeld, also greatly influenced
the first steps of American communication research (12)
because they were principal actors in both fields.
According to Rowland (1986; 165), key elements in each
field were influenced by the behavioural, normative theory
for a full generation. Although both fields have been
distinguished in more self-conscious fields, communications
theory and policy models have converged (Rowland:1986;166).
Communications research was established and developed
mainly as a response to the perceived needs of the media
industries (13). This kind of research has been associated
with so-called administrative communications theory; a
whole methodology has been formulated to study the media.
It is not strange that this approach - widely called
administrative research - has been developed in North
America and is strongly related to the functionalist
sociology. It was especially influential after the New
Deal, when the use of radio, re-expansion of popular films,
and the full circulation of popular commercial press
stressed the need for co-operation (14) between state,
business and academic community (Rowland: l986;166-8,
Halloran: 1986; 55-8). By and large, American communication
studies have also been involved in the media effects
debates (15) . As Carey (1977; 408) notes, this
communication research situation mirrors general patterns
in social science (16).
In Europe, communications theory has been influenced by the
Marxist tradition and its new bodies of thought, such as
structuralisni. It has adopted a more critical perspective
on communications issues and is frequently called critical,
or qualitative, research and analysis. These two approaches
- with some variations - have been the main currents in
communications theory (17). The debate between the two
ideologies (18) has also rerlected communication policy
issues debated intensively in various international fora,
especially in Unesco and the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) in the last 20 years.
Debates such as the New World Information Order and/or the
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decrease of imbalance between international communications
are examples.
Nevertheless, there has been a lack of interest concerning
policy action. In the early 1970s, Nordensteng (1972; 38)
notes that television and mass communications, previously
dominated by their technical characteristics and daily
journalistic problems, were discussing the role of the
media and communications institutions by emphasing greater
social and political importance. Two years later, Pool
(1974; 31-38) proclaimed the existence of a communications
policy research field, but his description only narrowly
appreciated the implications of change in its celebration
of technological change and 'academic entrepreneurship'. A
little later, Katz's report on British broadcasting (1977)
centred on: (1) the nature of policy research and the BBC,
(ii) the history of mass communication research, and (iii)
the isolation of proposals from any infant social theory.
In commenting on Katz's approach, Carey (1978;114-6) argues
that formulating research priorities in terms of policy
research is not likely to improve the research situation,
which is grounded in institutional needs, rather than on
theoretical dispute or persistent ideological dilemmas. He
also notes that mass communications research history must
include, as a parallel, a history of the changing world of
mass communications, of these institution's purposes, the
audiences that gather to them and the social structures
they more or less shape. But these suggestions obscure,
rather than clarify, the extent to which communications
theory assists policy-making and analysis.
Balle and Rogers (1985; 293) point out that the Europeans,
particularly through the critical approach, have correctly
given much more emphasis to policy issues. Two main schools
of European thought have come from France and Germany. As
Flichy (1980b; 179-182) notes, French mass communication
research for the last 12 years has focused largely upon
semiological work, and only very recently on economic and
political communications. Scholars like Souchon (1980),
Flichy (1983, 1984), Attali and Stourdze (1977), Walton and
Missika (1983), Ledos et al. (1986), Miege (1986), Nora and
Minc (1978) and Matterlart and his colleagues (1984, 1986)
have only recently presented work that tries to interlink
communications with policy issues and problems.
Nevertheless, the French school has been more famous for
its semiological research on content analysis, rather than
for research on policy issues. Baudrillard (1972, 1978),
for example, regards the audience as not being manipulated
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by the media, arguing that the masses resist the media by
their silence and their blind existence. The Germans, on
the other hand, look at policy issues from a legal
perspective. For example, Scherer (1986) and Kubler (1979)
provide useful overviews concerning both broadcasting and
telecommunications policy issues, but with a legal slant in
their analyses.
McQuail (1986; 27) asks whether communications theory is
adequate or offers guidance in future choices concerning
the media. He notes that the existing theory seems to offer
a choice between monolithic media (such as state-run) or a
neutral arena in which power struggles are played out
between more-or-less equal competitors. Finally, McQuail
argues that although there are some deficiencies, the
existing theory provides a framework regarding relations
between media, society and their audience. Similarly, Rice
and Williams (1984; 5-12) point out that much existing
theory is still relevant to the study of new media, but
that it must be modified to take their unique
characteristics into account. I certainly agree that
communications theory provides us with a framework for
analysis in the policy domain. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to know how, and to what extent, one can transfer
theories/concepts from communications to the policy process
without basic modifications. However, relying on analogy,
one can draw on constructs or relationships that are
already known, helping us understand difficult situations
in the communications process and, most importantly,
predict some future developments (Steinfield and Fulk:
1987; 479-82)
But this is not easy. Despite arguing that a policy is a
movement towards liberalisation, denationalisation or
privatisation of broadcasting, policy analysis cannot be
solely based on these assumptions. The conceptual framework
provided by communications theory, if transformed to policy
analysis as it is, will generalise and lead to false
positive findings, thereby losing the gains provided by
communications analysis and research. On the other hand,
assuming that the policy process operates identically
whatever the policy area, findings from any other area
could be equally generalised. I want to stress that
communications theory provides us with a framework that
facilitates our understanding of communications policy-
making. Yet policy science provides us with a further
understanding of public policy. To the extent that both
fields of communications theory and policy science managed
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to produce a conceptual interaction between them,
communications policy studies were in position of providing
with a reliable analysis. By relating one theory to
another, in a parallel fashion, there is reciprocity
between the two. Therefore, relying on only one field of
thought may lead to one-sided explanations regarding the
complex communications policy issues. It would be better to
apply one field to another. This synergy could lead to
valuable modifications in our original understanding of the
theories of both fields.
1.1.5 COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH AND POLICY
The debate between administrative and critical research has
a long history, originating from the opposition between
empiricism and rationalism concerning the purposes of
social science and knowledge. I do not describe or analyse
the arguments of one approach against the other, but
attempt to see whether the findings of either 'stream' help
policy and policy analysis, providing useful guides or
suggestions for the policy-maker facing an uncertain
future. An example is the potential of new media. Various
research agencies, private and government, have submitted
estimates. CIT Research reckons that BSB can expect 150,000
subscribers after 5 years of operation. BSB, on the other
hand, expects that 5 million will be receiving its channels
by 1997. SES estimates 6.8 million, 40 per cent higher than
BSB estimates. Pan European Television Audience Research
(PETAR) showed in 1987 that satellite channels had a 35 per
cent share viewing in West Germany, 28 per cent in Britain
and 27 per cent in Scandinavia in households able to
receive them (Cable and Satellite: February 1988).
If the results do not correspond with reality, a completely
false strategy could be set up. It is true that market-
forecasting in any sphere is not exact. However, it is
closely related to the so-called administrative
(market/quantitative) research. The fact that there are
such wide variations in predicting the likely penetration
of satellite channels is symptomatic of a wider failure to
grasp what current research, especially administrative
research into television viewing, has to say about the
prospects for new channels. Regardless of the great expense
of such projects, the level of audience understanding
remains too limited. For example, the above-noted PETAR
research was conducted among cable subscribers who have
already demonstrated a greater - than - average tendency
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to want more choice. Therefore, it fails to take into
account the many potential viewers who decide not to
subscribe to cable when given the chance. Eighty-four per
cent of households in the UK that come within reach of
cable chose not to subscribe. In other words, satellite
channels' share of their total potential audience is not 29
per cent, but rather less than 5 per cent. On the other
hand, there has been little synthesis, integration or
development of explanations in these research findings.
Ironically, most studies have concluded that more data are
needed. The policy-maker, therefore, is trapped in a
methodological quagmire that permits him to see whatever is
good for the planned business. In relying on administrative
research, he has to proceed inductively, generating
observations and depending on post hoc explanations.
Moreover, his policy-making becomes hypothesis-driven,
typically drawing predictions from the findings of
quantitive research and becoming fragmented (Carey: 1978;
408-10, Smythe and Dim: 1983; 117-120).
On the other hand, although critical communications
research is, to some extent, more appropriate as a dominant
mode of inquiry (since it is driven by the logic of
theory), it is weak in many respects. It often fails to
meet empirical criteria for causality, interference and
explanation (Pool: 1983, Stevenson: 1983). Because it
sometimes suffers from 'ecological fallacy' (Stevenson:
1983; 72-4), it avoids measurement and illustrates, rather
than tests (Reel: 1984). In the example above, a critical
communication researcher would ask about cable and
satellite channels 'for whom and under what terms these new
channels' - a question that often leaves no space for
alternative answers. He would also ask whether the findings
correspond to industry interests, rather than to those of
the viewer.
It will be difficult if the policy-maker wants only one
approach. The first is efficient, but without conceptual
orientation; the second explanatory, but less manageable.
In dealing with the complexities of the socioeconomic
problems, he will attempt to find solutions from a range of
complementary approaches. Not surprisingly, there has been
a recent trend in the communications field to follow a
middle path between these two approaches (see Blunder:
1977, Brown:1970, Tunstall:l983, Balle and Rogers:1985,
Stevenson: 1983, Smythe and Dim: 1983, Curran et al.:
1982)
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It is not strange that theorists from policy science, such
as Lazarsfeld (1941), have asked for a compromise.
Hirschmann(1976) asks whether adherence to any model might
not constrain, rather than guide, especially when dealing
with uncertainties that pervade public policy issues. If
this is right, then the appropriate stance for judging an
underlying communications policy theory is more modest.
This means a gradual Kuhnian accession of workable
approaches (Laswell and Kaplan: 1950; xxiii, Kuhn: 1972).
When these two approaches enter the policy field,
cooperation between them and constant understanding within
the spirit of synergy that communications policy and theory
can provide is needed. This mutual attraction must also
attend to the relationship between communications policy
and research because, as Crozier (1982, 4-36) argues, the
problem of modern society is one of reshaping the pattern
of social controls and relations of power.
1.1.6 THE VALUE OF A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
According to Edeistein (1982;12), a comparative study
compares two or more nations with respect to common
activity. This study is concerned with a comparison of the
broadcasting system - and particularly television policy.
Every western European government has some sort of problem
with its broadcasting system that will keep communications
scholars busy for decades.
The new communications revolution is important for the most
modern, and particularly western, societies. Relationships
between new technologies and societies give different
values, cultures, political systems and legal institutional
arrangements for developing and managing communications
technologies (Dutton et al.: 1987; 3-6). Pool (1977; 130-1)
notes that there is no 'state of the art' concerning the
organisation of a broadcasting system. But comparative
studies of television in various countries that deal with
questions of monopoly, government or commercial control,
taste, quality - and recently some regarding 'new media'
and 'old media'- can provide us with cross-national
approaches. They show how other countries organised their
audiovisual sectors and responded to new challenges. For
example, older comparative studies such as Pige (1962),
Dizard (1966), Emery (1969), Unesco's studies, and recent
ones by Head (1985), Negrine (1985), Kuhn (1985, 1986),
Dyson and Humphreys (1987, 1988), Mattelart and his
colleagues (1984, 1986), Balle and Rogers (1985), McQuail
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and Siune (1986), Mac Cavitt (1981), etc.; provide suitable
examples for comparative broadcasting studies.
The first justification for comparative policy is that the
principal problems - here, broadcasting deregulation and
new media's development - faced by one western government
are often similar, if not identical, to those facing its
neighbours. Think of collective concern arising from
satellite broadcasting. These issues particularly affect
the EC countries, as we shall see in Part 2. Dutton and his
colleagues (1987; 5-9) note that past ways of
distinguishing different nations' approaches to the new
media appear overly simplistic and general. All too often,
international differences are reduced to such dimensions as
public versus private ownership of the media, or monopoly
versus competition, without duly considering other
distinctions that might be drawn between nations.
Comparative studies of political communications systems,
for example, indicate that the differences between nations
are more complicated, varying in ways that are not commonly
highlighted in discussions of American - versus - European
approaches in communications.
The extent to which common problems result in a similar
response is practically and theoretically important (Rose;
1973). Administrators may justify a comparative approach
with the prospect of their government borrowing policies
or learning lessons from another country. This is
particularly true in the case of new communications
technologies where one country examines the effects of a
policy adopted in another and tries to trace its own policy
path. Moreover, every study of public policy, however
narrowly defined, involves either implicit or explicit
comparison (Rose: 1973; 69, La yer; 1986; 7). Cross-national
comparison undertaken consciously simply adds a new
dimension to our comparative perspective, raising the
possibility of much richer insights concerning the
influence of cultural milieu, political competition and
government structures on characteristics of public policy
(Cyr and Leon; 1975). It helps avoid generalisations or
provides additional limitations and constraints on policy-
making.
Comparative analysis requires us to test our findings on
more than one nation. This generalisation could also be its
weakness (see below) because it requires deft handling of
very complex, diverse information, but it can lead to more
stimulating and incisive conclusions on specific and
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general policy levels. Comparisons across space, according
to Rose(1973; 69-70), may refute any proposition of
international inevitability; comparisons across time
eiriphasise the mutability of policies. But comparison is
also valuable because any such study provides raw data for
analysing a 'non-decision' - that is, why one of the
countries did not decide to do what the other did. The
literature on the empirical study of power has given
considerable attention to the theoretical and
methodological problems involved in studying what
governments do not do.
An important difficulty in analysing television policy in
western Europe results from a lack of systematic and
reliable data. This also occurs in the general fields of
policy. Richardson and Jordan (1983; 247-55) inform us that
policy-making and implementation in Europe have become much
more difficult over the past decade because of the
complexity of modern societies. Grosier (1982), describing
complexity, uses the clever analogy of the light switch:
turning on a light is a simple act, but it is only made
possible by the development of a large and complex
structure that produces and distributes electricity.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that there are
identifiable trends in the European policy process that
could have important consequences for the managerial
capacity of government.
It is argued that comparative research is particularly
difficult to conceptualise, organise and implement. The
greater the number of countries, policies, or time periods
considered, the less a single individual can know in detail
(Cyr and Leon: 1975; 375-6). Furthermore, the broader the
concept's frame of reference, the greater is likely to be
the difficulty in applying its generalisations to anything
in particular. A description of universals tells us little
about a world that varies. Approaching comparative analysis
in terms of straightforward examination of policies'
differences and their outcomes does not begin to address
the sorts of problems which may appear. Cyr and Leon (1975;
376) point out that it is often quite impossible to define
whether different policy outcomes are due to variations in
the specificities of policies themselves, in the general
cultural milieux in which they operate, or some combination
of these. They continue by pointing out that similar
problems arise when structures of policies, rather than
their outcomes, are studied. Richardson and Jordan's (1983;
247-8) 'policy-cycle' concept drives towards central
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questions related to the effectiveness, approach and
tactics of a government attempting to solve societal
problems. Moreover, as Lowi (1964; 678) notes, any policy
sector may itself exhibit more than one policy style.
Whether focusing on policies or outcomes, comparative
analysis faces an intellectual thicket.
We must therefore not be over-optimistic about the validity
of our results; we must be open to new resources. As
Laswell (1968; 5) points out, the comparative method's
vitality will depend on whether the expansion of the stock
of 'facts' accepted as relevant is accompanied by
methodological changes that render facts indispensable to
understanding and managing the policy process. Therefore,
theoretical constructs must be matched with carefully
collected data and evidence, both quantitative and
qualitative. Finally, if comparative communications policy
studies are to be extremely valuable in formulating our
communications systems, future decision-makers need to
recognise the limitations and generalisations of any
analysis.
1.2.0 SOME THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF STATE ACTION AND THE
MEDIA: IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK
The media and politics have a symbiotic relationship. In
seeking to comprehend the complexities of the media and
policy process, scholars from both fields have constructed
a number of models to analyse the growing impact of
electronic media on sociopolitical and economic life and,
on the other hand, the role of the state and state action
in modern society in general, and in the media in
particular. This section describes a range of approaches or
models of state action and the media.
The analogy and synergy previously described become useful
for understanding politics and policy action because
knowledge of the policy process can be applied to
communications policy. As Havic (1983; 16-7) points out,
communications issues tend to share common characteristics,
such as low visibility or receiving little public
attention. On the other hand, analysing communications
issues in terms of the state directs our attention to a
single, general problem: the interrelation between the
governing institutions of a country and other aspects of
that society. Following the widespread adoption of
Keynesian economic management policies, the modern state
28
has become more closely involved in operating not only the
economy, but other aspects of society as well. State
intervention in the communications area ranges froni
facilitating industrial development through subsidies and
tax concessions, to direct public ownership of certain
industries or enterprises (see Part 4). The state has
recently been the subject of considerable discussion,
making theoretical analyses look more sophisticated
although 'sometimes no less confusing' (Scace: 1980; 3-4).
Political sociologists have become more interested in state
and economy than socialisation and culture; they employ
generally more critical and diverse approaches (King:
1986). A similar tendency has occurred in media studies
with a trend towards examining the political economy of the
media (see Garnham: 1979, Golding and Murdoch: 1977).
Nevertheless, trying to explain state action has led to
further fragmentation of the policy field. Various
approaches, as in the case of communications theory, have
been developed to analyse state action. This section is a
modest attempt to develop a distinctly political
perspective on communications policy and state action.
First, I outline some models for understanding state action
in our modern democratic capitalist societies, showing
different interpretations of the recent trends in
communications, particularly broadcasting policy. Second, I
attempt to transfer these interpretations of state action
to the broader domain of communications. Third, rather
than offering definitive conclusions on the best way of
explaining the relationship between state and
communications policy, I suggest a wider model that is open
to various suggestions and alternatives.
Because I aim to suggest, I limit my critical assessment to
a modest critique within each model. These models may not
be wrong, but this does not necessarily mean that they are
right. Baudrillard (1983) argues that the models now
determine, rather than represent, reality and that stable
positions of power or discourse can no longer be
determined. The models chosen in this section do not
necessarily represent all tendencies in policy theory,
media sociology or, even less, in international relations.
Although theoretical and empirical work on these approaches
has so far been inclusive, recent research (Kitschet: 1986,
Gurrevitch: 1978) notes the compatibility of different
explanations rather than a simple-zero sum competition
between them. I will attempt to explain the reasons for
adopting a model for politics and polity that commences
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with domestic society and extends outward to incorporate
information about the external environment. I also consider
the state as a primary unit of analysis and the basic unit
for action. Thus, I think that the state also enjoys a
'relative autonomy' from both its internal and external-
international environments. I therefore regard state action
in terms of the state's performance with respect to these
environments.
1.2.1 FUNCTIONALIST APPROACHES
Functionalist approaches usually start from the hypothesis
that political life should be seen and understood as an
organic whole. Similarly, they see the media as one of
society's essential subsystems, contributing to society's
internal integration by consistently responding to its
demands and needs (McQuail: 1987b, Brown;1970). Schudson
(1986; 44-5) notes that functionalism holds that audience
experience of the media provides people with a sense of
connection to the collective whole that few other
institutions can rival today. This approach essentially
depicts media as self-directing and self-generating within
certain politically negotiated institutional rules.
At policy level, every part of the political arena is
believed to be interrelated. Euston (1967; 53) notes that
the operation of one part cannot be fully understood
without referring to the way the whole policy process
operates. The task is to determine the structures on both
levels that contribute to maintaining the system. In terms
of sociological functionalism, this is associated with two
themes: that societies are increasingly complex and
differentiated, so that social roles and institutions are
progressively more specialised; and that the
differentiation of society takes the form of modernising,
the developing industrialised countries with liberal
states. The conservative version of functionalist analysis
regards the political system as a distinct area. In another
version, state action requires a particular economic system
(Gough: 1978; 4) or it is regarded as a 'pawn' of interests
(Dahi: 1963; 50-1).
According to Hall(1986; 5-6), these theories need to
account for the systematic variation of the policies of
different nations: they explain too much. A state action,
then, is a cluster of actors, institutions, decision-making
processes and outcomes, as well as the causal relationship
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and interplay between them. Thus the power becomes
situational, operating in specific circumstances over
specific issues (Mosco:1988; 113); state action impartially
reflects the preferences of competing interests. According
to this approach, one could imagine the state overseeing a
marketplace of competing interests, with no single interest
capable of controlling decision-making.
Functionalist analysis responds to some of its main critics
by transferring the concept of dysfunctionalism into policy
analysis to explain contradictory policies in the complex
environment of contemporary political analysis.
Functionalism creates an extended state whose price is
increased policy complexity and interdependence (La Potre:
1975; 4-5), but the functions performed by a system are
vague. Some speak about 'accumulation' and 'legitimisation'
functions, others note 'creative' and 'control' functions,
and others argue that the state performs 'recruitment' or
'integration' functions (Kerret et al: 1962, Ham and Hill:
1984, Dunleavy and O'Leary: 1987, Hall: 1985, King: 1986).
The main weakness of functionalist analyses is that by
having to build up such a broad range of structures to
confront or accommodate almost everything, they 'explain
nothing' (Hall: 1985,5). This could be seen in the
developmentalist theories of the 1960s (see Lerner: 1958,
Schrainm: 1964, Pool: 1971, Rogers: 1963), which linked
urbanisation, media growth and industrialisation with
social progress. Moreover, the emphasis given by
functionalism to the compatibility of subsystems is
problematic when analysing dysfunctional or contradictory
policies and structures. As Hall (1986; 7) argues, 'it is
virtually impossible to derive structure from function in a
systematic and non-arbitrary way. It may well be that the
policy and economy are a system in some sense of the term,
but if so, it is by virtue of the institutions that present
individuals with a matrix of incentives which render them
interdependent, and link their behavior to the nature of
the system'. Structural functionalism only works by giving
constant priority to structure rather than to function.
1.2.2 CULTURAL APPROACHES
Television policy differs between societies and nations
because there are different cultural attitudes to what is,
and what is not, proper matter for public concern.
'Culture', as a collective product of a particular society,
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can also determine and explain state action. The behavior
of politicians, policy-makers and administrators is
strongly affected by the political culture in which they
have been socialised and operated. Therefore, policy is a
social activity whose form will be influenced by the time
and place in which it is conducted. The cultural approach
takes this truism as a starting point.
Gurrevitch and Bluinler (1977; 262) note that apart from the
procedures and mechanisms evolved by political and media
institutions to govern the relationships between them, all
political systems generate principles derived from the
tenets of the political cultures which regulate the
political role of the mass media. Taking the structure and
regulations of broadcasting media in the US, UK and France,
for example, these structures could be analysed in terms of
competitiveness, public service ethos and statism,
respectively. According to this açproach, the political
culture of a society formulates a system of empirical
beliefs, symbols and values that, in the final analysis,
define the conditions under which a political action takes
place.
This political culture could also vary across classes,
ethnic groups and generations within a nation, as well as
across nations. The main point of this approach is to
describe a policy-style corresponding to national cultural
terms. The problem is that it underestimates the importance
of economic rationale. It sounds wonderful to say that the
BBC or ORTF were products of the public service ethos in
the UK and the statist Rousseaunian aspirations in France,
but in doing so one forgets the economic incentives behind
this development. Similarly, the need to modernise their
mature industries should be explained in terms of creating
political culture demanding more choice and more freedom.
One has to accept that deregulation and privatisation have
resulted from a shift in values and attitudes that favours
greater reliance on private markets. Clearly, if
functionalist analyses explain too much, cultural
approaches explain too little.
Furthermore, by assuming that decision-making is only
associated with political culture as a whole, one must also
assume that policy should be affected by a whole range of
'subcultures' because every institution and administration
provides its own behaviour and culture. It is true that
examples like the 'old boys' network are heavily related to
this, but it would be abstract, and perhaps arbitrary, to
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accept this and argue that, for example, British
broadcasting was shaped by the broadcasters. If it is so,
then 'broadcasting is too important to be left to
broadcasters' would be void.
The cultural approach, however, provides a useful example
concerning diversity within a state, on one hand, and the
influence of a culture on policy on the other; culture is,
after all, a direct product of its society. Nevertheless,
when we attempt to analyse policy in terms of cultural
norms, the context within which these cultural norms have
been developed is forgotten.
1.2.3 POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH
Contrary to the cultural approach, the political economy
approach adopts the view that the increasingly complex
structure of advanced capitalist society makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to separate policy production
processes from the economic process (see Garnham:1979a,
Hall: 1982, Golding and Murdoch: 1977, Williams: 1972).
According to Mattelart and Stourdze (1985; 4-6), this
relationship becomes more complex and stronger as the
communications industry becomes dominant.
The political economy approach, related somewhat to
orthodox Marxist tradition, is mainly represented in media
theory by Garnham (1979a,b) and Golding and Murdoch (1977).
It regards media as economic, rather than ideological,
entities with two roles: directly as creators of surplus
value through commodity production and exchange, and
indirectly through advertising in creation of surplus value
in other sectors of commodity-production. It assumes that
analysing communications problems should start with
studying ownership, management and economic structure, as
well as the market forces in which media operate. It also
takes the view that the dynamics of cultural production
industries can mainly be understood in terms of economic
determination. In doing so, this approach attempts to bring
light to the real nature of communications policy problems
in advanced capitalist societies (Edgar and Rahin: 1983; 4-
6). Therefore, in terms of policy formation, structures of
power and the economic system, as well as economic and
circulation issues, determine state action.
The strength of this approach lies, in general, with its
capacity for proposing empirically testable market
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determinations, although evidence is circumstantial,
numerous and complex (McQuail: 1987b;64-5). In terms of
policy action and formation, it relies on an overly
simplistic image of social structure that takes economic
class into account but treats sectorial, territorial and
cultural differences as politically insignificant (19).
Incidentally, Hughes (1981; 20-2) notes that this approach
challenges the Poulantzarian 'relative autonomy' concept
(see later). This approach leaves no possibility for the
media to be anything except the servants of monopoly
capitalism, leaving no room for programme production to
reflect even the contradictions of capitalism(20). In terms
of policy analysis, this approach often resorts to ad hoc
categories, such as class factions or non-class actors, and
comes out with results that all phenomena are ad infinitum
in the sole direction of benefiting the dominant capitalist
class. However, the fact that it draws our attention to
power as a systemic (Mosco;l988; 117)- and consequently the
media as expressions of power - calls the analyst to
comprehend more than power's manifestation and policy's
formation in situation and structure. On the other hand, it
is necessary to expand the focus of analysis beyond the
usual 'class-power relations', if we want to examine policy
formulation and execution.
1.2.4 PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH
This approach of polity is also known as rational choice
theory, social choice theory or mathematical choice theory.
Its principal unit of analysis is not whole systems, but
individuals, usually understood as rational actors. Polity
is a conception among individuals whose aims are access to
power or scarce resources, where the means have been
rationally calculated to achieve the ends (Dunleavy and
O'Leary:l987; 55, Hall:l986; 8).
Some pluralists (Barry:1978, Hardin:1982), and even
Marxists (Roemer: 1985), have used public choice methods to
develop their arguments. However, a majority of public
choice scholars espouse political values and policies
normally associated with conservatism or market liberalism.
Sometimes there is also a correlation between public choice
and new right approaches(21). The early search for simple
theories that can be tested against empirical data has
driven many public choice theorists since the early works
of Downs(l957) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Against the
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clutter of political science or sociological analysis,
sparse but rigorous frameworks offer far greater potential
for explaining potential phenomena and for suggesting
improvements. This approach's main position is to see the
government as a piece of machinery, like the market where
individuals (or resource-maximising agencies) can achieve
their goals. Thus, policies are best explained in terms of
the outcome of the game-like contest in which individuals,
or institutions acting as individuals, compete for
resources and the support of electors who are seeking to
maximise their personal revenues (Hall: 1986; 8-9, Seldon:
1976; 45, Gray and Jenkins: 1985; 36-45). Politicians and
administrators as self-interested, rational, maximising
actors become as important in policy as economic variables.
The appearance of dominant images or ideal types, such as
politicians, results from this. Accordingly, one could say
that Mrs Thatcher or President Mitterrand dominated and
determined the broadcasting structure, rather than the
economic situation, in their respective countries.
This approach can sparsely and simply explain behaviour.
Hall (1986; 12) argues that 'a more accurate assessment of
the merits of state intervention must begin not only from
an institutional understanding of the dimensions of state
intervention, but from a more explicitly institutionalist
analysis of market behaviour itself. Even though this is
done, the often rigid distinction between market-based and
state-based styles of action can be called into question'.
Wade(l979; 359-74) also states that any link between
public-choice analysis and its prescription is apolitical.
She also claims that even if public-choice analysis were
valid, its very validity would make the reforms it suggests
unlikely and impossible by forgetting history and ignoring
political science literature. Recently, public choice has
moved towards organisation theory, devoted to the discovery
of laws applicable to the operation of all administrations.
Significantly, by doing so, it adopts a perspective closer
to bureaucratic politics than to the public-choice sphere.
1.2.5 GROUP AND INTEREST THEORIES
This approach's essential unit of analysis is neither the
political system as a whole, nor the individuals within it,
but social groups or classes who conflict within the
polity. Policy, therefore, is best explained as a direct
product of group - particularly higher - level groups -
conflict and/or bargaining. Such groups have many roles and
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their influence varies at different stages of the policy
process with which they are involved. Power is the outcome
of competing and struggling interests organised into
groups. Macridis(1977; 322) notes that ideology, values,
the state, the formal organisation of political decision-
making and the content of decisions are determined by a
parallelogram of group theories. This 'presumption of
inertia' suggests that people lobby or protest to influence
policy issues very close to their own interests and about
which they already know a good deal. Therefore, the
conscious choices by actors and groups that have common and
identifiable goals and purposes is significant because some
policies emerge from the formation of a winning
coalition(22) among mobilised groups(23). Specifically,
close examination of interest groups would be useful for
policy.
Group theories became the model for pluralist analyses
during the l950s and l960s, when they were used to attack
state monism and justify the idea that group interaction
can produce a social equilibrium. Moreover, vigorous group
conflict/bargaining must be expected in any complex
society; pluralists are equally confident that competing
groups' influence over policy-making is closely related to
the democratic polity. Such a polity entertains the demands
of all potential groups offered access to political power,
while the prevalence of overlapping memberships among
groups reduces the likelihood of sectarian conflict (Hall:
1986; 12-3, Gray and Jenkins: 1985; 38-40, Polsby: 1980;
56-67). This perspective views state-media relations (24)
as a product of political bargaining among interest groups
representing all segments of society (Mosco and Herman:
1980)
In this perspective, government policy takes more notice of
intensely influential groups than those with weak
preferences. Broadcasting structure is therefore influenced
by lobbying and pressure of interest groups, rather than by
the state; the bargaining process among interest groups
leads to the formation of general state policies, including
policies on mass communications (Krasnow and Longley:
1973). Thus, the state is a 'coding machine' - a passive
vehicle through which input is processed. The state
generally mirrors or responds to the balance of pressure
groups in civil society (MacPherson: 1973). Policy is law-
making, and law-making is the legislation of victories in
pressure-group contests. A variation of this analysis could
also be seen from a left-wing perspective by replacing
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interest groups with social classes or class fractions and
replacing their interests in the production mode.
This approach's strength is that it provides a framework
for policy analysis which shows coalitions between or
within groups in any polity. It allows us to investigate
three factors as determinants of policy: the interests of
these groups, their actual capacities, and the skills they
can bring to coalitions. From a wide range of policy
alternatives, the policy will be constrained by relative
balance in class power. A problem arises when actors or
groups appear to act against their interests. What is, for
example, the consumer's say in the policy decision-making
regarding the deregulation of broadcasting or in the famous
'more choice' policy signal? In cases like this, it could
be argued that the consumer's real interests are not more
often expressed by narrow consumer associations and/or
broadcasters or other political unions behaviour.
Therefore, the concept of consensus is misleading, taking a
subjective, rather than objective, view. It is rather a
matter of conflicting interests and pressures among elites
and between groups and/or classes. The latter leads us to
wonder whether something is missing from the whole
analysis. Such an analysis needs a more extensive and
sometimes exhaustive range of data on the basis of interest
and power as well as class interest and class power.
Dahl(1961; 164) recognises that leaders do not merely
respond to the preferences of constituencies but also shape
these preferences. Thus, one could ask whether the
consumers want more choice, or if it is their leaders who
do, since information largely depends on people other than
the consumers themselves. Such an analysis 'would involve
a more complete investigation of the organisations,
agencies and institutional structures that envelop social
structures and the state'(Hall: 1986; 13).
In a modern complex society, institutions and organisations
often mediate between power and its distribution (Allison:
1971; 4-23). Deregulation in action could be seen as a form
of intervention that advances managerial efficiency by
overcoming the fragmentation caused by dominant interests'
capture of state agencies (Mosco: 1988; 117). One must
therefore look at the organisational level to understand a
policy. Accordingly, researchers need to be extremely
cautious in going beyond actors' expressed preferences in
analysing power relations (Poisby: 1980; 8). Hall( 1986;
13-4) points out that even a group's self-understanding and
37
interests can be shaped by its patterns of organisation and
the organisation of its contenders.
Similarly, Lukes(1974; 23-4) argues that people's interests
are shaped by socialisation, education and the mass media
and that real interests can only be established by
examining what they choose when relatively free of these
constraints. Furthermore, according to this approach,
policy-making must be a continuous, incremental process. As
noted above, policy outcome could be found in coalitions of
interests. However, this perspective does reveal whether
these coalitions are between groups or their leaders.
Snider (1987; 317) notes that without any theoretical
specificity concerning the differential ability of states
to transform resources into political strength, seemingly
counterintuitive results are easily misinterpreted.
Nevertheless, the class interests picture provided by this
approach assists our understanding of various developments
in the communications sector in general, and broadcasting
in particular. This perspective particularly explains how
policy-making and state action are affected by interests
and coalitions of interests.
1.2.6 STATE-CENTRIC THEORIES
The 'state-centric' approach has recently become important
in determining policy. Although it has two variations, left
and right, both argue that public policy is not primarily a
reaction to pressure from interested social groups. On the
contrary, state preferences are at least as important as
those of civil society in accounting for what the
democratic state does and does not do. The state is not
only frequently less subject to societal pressure than
previously imagined, insofar as it regularly acts upon its
preference, but it also becomes relatively autonomous when
its preferences diverge from the demands of the most
powerful groups in civil society and it imposes those
preferences against societal resistance (Nordlinger: 1981,
Hall: 1986, Saunders: 1981, Hill and Ham: 1984) . The
state's strength consists of its capacities to be
autonomous and to act (Hoffmann: 1983; 23-8). The latter
depends on the state's organisation and the balance between
its scope and resources.
From a pluralist perspective, the state is regarded as a
broker (Dunleavy and O'Leary: 1987; 86). Public policy is a
part of the state apparatus. State administrations,
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agencies, politicians, parties and governments have their
own preferences. The state as a broker, as an intermediary,
might be constrained by clients and other interests, but it
is more autonomous than a cipher, a machine or mirror. It
is rather more than a mirror, since it is self-seeking,
neither mirroring society, nor neutrally following public
interest. The state as a broker is therefore not a distinct
organisation easily demarched from the rest of society. It
is an autonomous actor, formulating independent preferences
and objectives that cannot be reduced to an aggregate of
private preferences or the interests of the dominant class.
This approach highlights variables such as the territorial
and functional centralisation of the executive branch, the
domination of the executive over the legislature, and the
control of material and informational resources by the
ability of policy instruments to change civil society.
Krasner(l988; 43-56, 1984; 224-230), for example, notes
that a conception of the 'national interest' led American
policy-makers to develop a foreign economic policy
independent of domestic pressure. He also points out that
the central characteristic determining the state's ability
to overcome domestic resistance is its strength in relation
to its own society (Krasner: 1978; 55). The state is not
neutral or passive, consisting of many formal and informal
pressure group activities. This approach, indirectly
related to the 'realism school' in international politics,
provides a tool for understanding the policy process and
corrects other approaches that underestimate the state's
role.
This approach's main problem is that it disallows societal
influences. Deutch (1963) and Heclo (1974) note that
policy-making should be seen less as a struggle for power
and more as a process of social learning. This view is
related to the previously mentioned policy succession. It
also explains that policy formation is a process of solving
the puzzles generated by the often unintended consequences
of past policy. The problem is that we are entrapped by
'conservatism of policy' because every policy is not only
new, but merely reconstructed incorporating previous
policies. As a result, we are bound to history. History
doe not necessarily provide the same lessons to all. For
example, the early privatisation of British electric
telegraph and the privatisation and ensuing chaos of the
early 'radio days' in the US, UK and France make one person
avoid a similar policy, but to someone else, the
multiplicity of outlets and freedom of choice provide
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another lesson.
Similarly, theories about state capacities and existing
capacities of the state to carry out a range of policies do
not assure us of the state's effectiveness because success
or failure of a policy depends largely upon appreciating
that policy within its society. This approach cannot
explain why new policy issues that are not legally codified
produce certain patterns of policy formation; it does not
explain why some policies are successful, others fail; it
also cannot explain systematic changes of legal
codifications of a policy issue over time.
I want to stress that a pure state-centric approach,
although providing a promising line of enquiry, needs to be
put within a societal framework or environment before it
can explain the state's action and behaviour. The state
affects, but is also affected by, its societal and
international environment. Modern states do not appear to
be as independent of societal influence as state-centric
theories suggest.
1.2.7 STATE AUTONOMY-SOCIETY APPROACHES
A policy within the wider framework of state society-
relations does not necessitate returning to pressure
groups' influence models to explain state action. There are
likely to be structural consistencies behind the
persistence of distinctive national patterns of policy. In
'strong' states, particularly, intermediation between state
and society may not be confined to pluralist and
corporatist options. Rather, states may selectively
recognise only some mobilised interests concerned with a
policy issue. Segmented policy patterns result, co-opting a
limited range of compatible interests into the policy
process.
Marxist theory in general, and neo-Marxist theory in
particular, have paid attention to the role of the state
and its action in the reproduction of the capitalist
system, as well as to the state's autonomy. Marx and Engels
in both the 'Communist Manifesto' and 'The German Ideoloqy'
see the state with a measure of independent power, not
necessarily linked to the interests of the dominant class,
at least in the short term. They also see the state's role
in building socialism. Lenin, in 'State and Revolution,'
sees the state as a tool for imposing industrial and social
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order and discipline. To a large extent, of course, these
ideas about the state are also related to Rousseau's
thoughts on the state as an educative tool in its new
society.
Gramsci's (1971) decisive contribution to the Marxist view
of the state was his emphasis on hegeinonic forms of state
power and 'popular political blocks', rather than seeing
state institutions as a direct reflection of simple class
or infrastucture interests. Similarly, neo-Marxists have
also been interested in explaining why states could be said
to pursue policies unrelated to capital gains. Miliband
(1969) distinguishes between 'government' and 'state',
emphasising that the government is not necessarily the most
influential, although the most visible part, of the state.
Despite the lack of compulsory connection between economic
and state power in capitalist societies, there are several
basic procedures to ensure that the state operates in the
long-term collective interest of capital (Dearlove and
Saunders: 1984; 45). Nevertheless, the state responds
relatively independently to capitalist demands, allowing
short-term concessions to the labour class. Poulantzas
(1978) argues that the state is 'relatively autonomous',
although interlocked to capital needs. The state's function
is to unify capitalist interests and, if able to operate at
a distance from them, to impose political solutions on
often-conflicting business sectors.
Habermas (1976) explains the continued failure of state
strategies in terms of 'legitimisation crisis'. Offe (1984)
notes that the interventionist state develops its own
institutional self-interest of one class. Jessop (1982)
argues that the state is located within actual societies,
not simply pure modes of production. Lefort (1986) and
Castoriadis (1987) emphasise 'state autonomy' because
examining the intrinsic dynamics, development and active
interventionist role of the state in capitalist societies
as well as its role in those societies claiming to have
eliminated class relations is difficult. In other words,
the recent neo-Marxist accounts provide a theoretical
framework that sees state managers as 'relatively
autonomous'(25) from the capitalist class by sometimes
taking into account a broader perspective of the relation
of state and society. Similarly, the concept of relative
autonomy has been transferred to the media(26) as a part of
an ongoing process, itself linked to class struggles,
audience and the state (Downing: 1980; 150-60).
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Nordlinger (1981; 11, 9, 27-38) notes three types of state
and society: (i) autonomy exists when the state acts on its
own preferences and these differ from society's; (ii)
autonomy is obtained when state and societal preferences
diverge and public officials act to bring about a change in
societal preference; (iii) state autonomy describes a non-
divergent situation of state and societal preferences. In
the latter case, it is plausible to argue that state
preferences influence societal preferences to produce
convergence, and vice versa. Nordlinger's valuable analysis
makes the case for the state's administrators/managers to
be given a more prominent place in explaining state action
by putting them within a societal framework. Cynics,
however, point out that neo-Marxist approaches simply
permit a Marxist to conduct a 'pluralist' analysis using
Marxian terms. On the other hand, these analyses provide a
framework of enquiry that can be extended to organisational
variations among capitalist states. Most importantly, they
provide us with a framework that integrally connects
economy and policy. Forms of government policy-making
depend primarily upon the nature of the economic system
(King: 1986; 34). Communications technologies are seen as
more of an economic possibility in their early development
than as important because of the message's context.
Working within this framework, it is possible to explain
historical continuities and cross-national variations in
policy. At this point, Hall(1986; 13-4) provides another
variation: the so-called 'institutional approach to state-
society relations'. He argues that his model better
explains policy by emphasising the institutional
relationships -both formal and conventional - that bind the
state's components together and structure its relations
with society (27). This approach uses the concept of
institution to refer to the formal rules, compliance
procedures and standard operating practices that structure
the relationships between individuals in various units of
policy. As such, they have a more formal status than
cultural norms, but this is not necessarily derived from
legal (as opposed to conventional) standing. This model
emphasises the relational character of institutions, using
'organisations' virtually as a synonym for 'institution'.
Hall's approach is interesting bebause it asserts that - by
adopting Weberian ways - organisation affects the degree
of power that any one set of actors has over policy
outcomes. This is extremely useful when trying to explain,
for example, the problems of co-ordinating various units in
new media policies, Secondly, Hall points out that
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organisational position also influences an actor's
definition of his own interests by establishing his
institutional responsibilities and relationship to other
actors (28). Such an analysis could be applied both inside
and outside the state. The latter situates policy within
society and is seen as more than a sum of countervailing
pressure from groups. Moreover, it enables individuals to
contribute to policy output. It also frees us from
explaining and re-explaining and being involved in the
general debate about incremental and rational policy by
concentrating on output, rather than analysing policy-
making in detail.
This approach is largely adopted in this study because it
helps us to understand policy process and output. I also
take into account, on one hand, the importance of the
state action's 'relative autonomy' and, on the other, the
fact that, regardless of state autonomy, all state policies
will seek to contribute to capital accumulation in the end.
The approaches described above forget to put the state-
society relationship within the broader framework of the
international environment. Individual states and societies
have become increasingly interdependent economically,
industrially and militarily. Broadcasting is no longer a
purely national affair. Satellite broadcasting technologies
and telecommunications are part of a global communications
system, necessitating policy guidelines to enable the
national system to work well within an international
system, with fair and equitable distribution of the world's
wealth of information knowledge and culture.
Political systems and policy processes are influenced more
and more from abroad, meaning that old orthodoxies about
boundaries of the state as a country need re-examining.
Converging computing, telecommunications and television
have brought international actors into the communications
field and created a trend towards the globalisation of
production and distribution. Satellite technology breaches
aspects of national sovereignty with overlapping
footprints, and because national telecommunications
networks must now - more than ever - be internationally
compatible, national policy decisions can have an immediate
national impact.
Nowadays, governments compare their performance in fields
like communications in terms of results achieved and
methods used. Comparison, emulation and the use of foreign
models or approaches have started recording history,
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especially in communications policy. The 'complex
interdependence,' named by Keohane and Nye (1977), between
state-nations and societies generates distinctive political
processes while underlining a set of behavioural norms,
rules and policies covering many issues. Broadcasting
regulation and deregulation movements have been set up
and/or influenced by international agreements(see Part 2).
The communications technology revolution continues the
trend, bringing more and more activities within the
international agreements framework.
Skocpol (1979) argues that the state is lanus-faced,
anchored in both a class-divided socioeconomic structure
and an international system of states. The international
arena, for Skocpol, is increasingly characterised by
competition and co-operation among states, reflecting
internal conflicts over national - versus - global
solutions to problems. Apart from internal determinants,
there are also external determinants of the state-society
relations in which the state plays a part and is affected,
and which also involve phenomena outside that state's
boundaries. This obviously includes other states, but also
encompasses global economic systems or international
economic and political agencies/bodies. Such a distinction
is not absolute. Very few - if any - phenomena can be
identified as solely internal or solely external. However,
this distinction gives a perspective of the state in an
international context and its interaction with other
sovereign states. The state does not act merely as a
mediator between internal demands and external constraints
and pressures, but as a shaper, capable of moulding its own
preference between domestic and international policy
determinants.
As well as being the primary unit of analysis, the state is
generally also the foremost unit of action. Hoffmann (1960;
4) said long ago: 'One of the crucial features and
paradoxes of politics today is that whereas internal
politics are conditioned and affected by world problems
more than ever before..., the policies of nations remain
largely dictated by the domestic experience and by the
nation's image of itself'. Broadcasting, as we shall see
later in this study, is a suitable example of this.
However, the environment - whether domestic, international
or both - greatly constrains state action. The
internationalisation of capital imposes structural
imperatives on states limiting their action. This does
not, however, contravene the 'relative autonomy' of the
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state from both society and world economy. According to
Hyder (1984; 4), the tentacles of international co-
operation are deep and widespread, but its impact depends
on the extent to which negotiated agreements are actually
carried out. The lack of any established legal and
political arrangements causes problems for implementing
policies. The EC is an example because its specific
business is to complement, supplement and even replace,
individual policies of its member-states without being a
political union.
In explaining state action of modern and complex states,
this study, has adopted the 'relative autonomy' of the
state-society approach that functions within an
international environment. This is mainly why I chose to
examine the EC's television policy. In this study, state
policy is defined in terms of the performance of the state
with respect to its own society and the international
context.
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PART TWO: DEREGULATING 'TERRESTRIAL' TELEVISION
This part seeks to analyse, describe and interpret the
restructuring of terrestrial television systems in Europe
by considering and then comparing the broadcasting policies
of the UK, France and Luxembourg as well as the EC.
Analysis focusing on these systems' major changes (such as
the growth in the number of TV outlets), the policy
processes and the substance of legislation is emphasised.
Of course, policy process and substance overlap because
content cannot adequately be considered without referring
to process, and vice versa. However, before analysing these
developments, one needs to be aware of what West European
governments have done in broadcasting media policy.
2.1.0 REGULATING BROADCASTING: AN AFFAIR OP THE STATE
The development of broadcasting across the world has been
marked by a common theme: whether examining such
developments in North America, Europe or Africa, one finds
general concern over its power and, consequently, concerted
efforts to 'oversee' its general developments and
operations. Not surprisingly, this 'oversight' varies
according to individual political and cultural traditions,
but the underlying intention -- namely to protect the
public interest -- is the common thread linking
broadcasting history.
Regulatory activity has usually originated from various
laws, established to control the development of wireless
telegraphy in late 19th century. These laws were used as
the basis on which the state could legally and legitimately
extend its powers over radio initially, and television
broadcasting later on. Broadcasting systems have,
therefore, always existed within a framework established by
the state, with varying degrees of participation from
private, profit-making organisations. The broadcasting
models that consequently developed in each state reflected
individual political, economic and cultural considerations.
Within Europe, broadcasting was considered a public service
(ps) and was either run by public bodies or, at least, was
subject to government licensing, programming and
organisational requirements. As with radio, television
broadcasting organisations have usually been encouraged to
pursue some notion of 'the public interest'. But how is
that interest is defined? And how can it be pursued in the
day-to-day operations of the broadcasting systems? It is
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the use of concepts associated with the ps such as 'public
interest', 'information, education and entertainment'
within specific organisational structures that cause
significant differences of emphasis. However, some of the
traditional justifications for the establishment of psb
have been:
(a) The monopoly concept: borrowed from economics theory
that states: 'a pure monopoly exists when there is one
producer in the market. There are no direct competitors
either in the popular or technical sense. However,the
policies of a monopolist may be constrained by the indirect
competition of all commodities for the consumers' dollar
and of reasonably adequate substitute goods, and by the
threat of competition if market entry is possible'
(Ferguson: 1969; 253)
In traditional market theory, monopolies are the
undesirable results of competition between suppliers of
goods or services. According to McQuail and his
colleagues, the European broadcasting monopolies are the
planned results of political decisions. When a sector of
the economy has been monopolised by market forces, it is no
longer subject to consumers' control. When monopolised by
political decisions, it may be indirectly maintained or
abolished by consumers acting as voters (McQuail and Siune:
1986; 115-6). In Western Europe, the broadcasting systems
have been adapted to quite different socio-economic and
political conditions. They have had to serve a number of
political purposes by not always similar means.
Nevertheless, the monopoly concept seems to have some
common features. McQuail and Siune (1986; 117-21) point
out some of them: (i) monopoly rights have been restricted
to transmission only and do not cover the production or
reception of the signal; (ii) a broadcasting monopoly
means that only one institution is allowed to broadcast
from a given territory; (iii) its basic financial form is
the licence fee, that implying initially at least, a
'generic cohesion' between a monopoly of what was to be
sent and of what was received was involved; and (iv) any
broadcasting monopoly must have a geographical definition.
Most European states established nation-wide monopolies,
with one institution serving the whole nation. Some of
them have subsequently started regional broadcasting. This
is the original BEC model, followed by other countries such
as France, Italy and Scandinavia. Of course, there have
been exceptions to this situation, especially in countries
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with linguistic and cultural differences, that made
centralisation difficult. Thus, in Belgium and Switzerland,
for example, each linguistic community enjoys its own
broadcasting service. The monopoly concept also differs.
The Laender-monopolies, which in turn have been 'added-up'
to form a national television network, are responsible for
broadcasting. To a certain extent, this differentiation
depends on different evaluations and interpretations of
what actually constitutes a broadcasting monopoly. As
noted above, broadcasting monopoly for some could mean a
free marketplace for opinions that form a pluralistic
society; for others it is the only safeguard for
universally received, balanced, quality programming. The
establishment of broadcasting monopolies	 throughout
Western Europe is more than a 'historical arrangement'.
(b) The frequency rationale: has been used to justify not
only the government's regulation over broadcasting, but
also to exclude private broadcasters from the sector. The
argument is that broadcasting is based on techniques using
electromagnetic airwaves. The waves were first used for
wireless telegraphy. Wired telegraph and telephone systems
were usually organised in national monopolies because this
kind of electromagnetic communication could not work
without traffic regulations. Therefore, broadcasting
satisfied the requirements for 'natural monopolies'.
Incidentally, radio was to replace the telephone and
telegraph but with a fundamental difference: its lack of
secrecy. In 1918, the US Secretary for the Navy said that
radio was the profound conviction of every person in the US
and abroad -- that it was a natural monopoly. This view
correlated with the Navy's desire to keep that control of
radio, established during the war, 'for all time' on the
grounds that much would be lost if radio operation were
left to rival companies. The US experience of radio in
1920s that also made control over radio desirable. The US,
early radio days exhibited that without traffic
regulations, the whole communication process would
collapse. The Europeans, too, learned their lessons from
the US experience. The UK was the first, with the BBC
established in 1922; shortly after, its model was adopted
by European countries such as Italy (1924), Sweden (1925),
Ireland, Denmark, and Finland (1926).
(c) The international context: According to McQuail and his
colleagues (1986; 121-2), every country's choice of
broadcasting model was partly determined by the results of
international conferences concerning the allocation and
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reallocation of frequencies, whereby the number of chahnels
available for each country was decided. With a limited
number of channels available, an impressive majority of
European countries reserved the channel(s) for a public
institution/organisation. The only exception to this, as
we shall see later, was Luxembourg. The necessity for
national and international coordination in the broadcasting
domain draws our attention to the previously noted
theoretical framework of the state as a broker that can act
relatively autonomously allocating, in broadcasting's case,
limited resources.
(d) The variety of opinions rationale: The model of the
public broadcaster enjoying monopolistic status has been
justified by another non-technical and normative
rationale. The time period played an important role
because when public control over broadcasting was first
argued broadcasting was feared to lead to the dissemination
of subversive ideas (Hood: 1986; 68). For a variety of
reasons, excluding private and commercial broadcasters was
regarded as a means of safeguarding the recipient (Scherer:
1986). This was also considered a prerequisite for
protecting freedom of information. For example, the First
Amendment of the US Constitution guarantees this normative
goal, also expressed in another way in the Beveridge
Committee's report on independence of the BBC's output.
2.1.1 TOWARDS BROADCASTING DEREGULATION
The concept of broadcasting, with its dubious yoking of
trusteeship and control, has been under attack from the two
opposite directions of the Radical Right and Radical Left
(Hood: 1986; 59) They represent a formidable, and possibly
unstoppable, coalition (Curran: 1986; 90) by calling for a
wider range of opinions to be allowed media access, for
presently repressed, mediated or merely ignored views to be
recognised, and for democratic control of broadcasting
institutions. As Hood (1986; 60) notes, the development
of the new technologies and the possibility of a
proliferation of channels appears -- for some-- to
present an unproblematic opportunity to end the paternalism
of the public service institutions.
According to the Radical Right, free-market mechanism must
be adopted in broadcasting. In economic terms, this
mechanism is required to fulfil two potentially conflicting
functions: to be as economically 'efficient' as possible in
49
terms of resource cost, arid to produce what the consumers
want. Accordingly, because the freedom to publish is not
restricted by the state, we have free press. This freedom
ensures diverse choice, making the consumer dominant over
the press. Because publishers have to satisfy public demand
to stay in business, they need to respond to what the
people (the consumers) want. This free-market approach
supposedly renders the press accountable. If policy-makers
want to change the press structure, they have to change
people's way of thinking. By imposing changes through its
agencies, the state openly invites political censorship.
The Radical Right has largely applied the same argument to
broadcasting (Curran: 1986;91). Broadcasting is over-
regulated at the hands of the state. It is therefore
necessary to have more channels and fewer controls,
creating greater variety and greater consumer control
through rigorous competition. It thus assumes that the
market will provide appropriate means of public
communication to support a democratic polity, or that the
market can ensure the necessary freedom from state control
and coercion (Garnham: 1986; 29), and finally, use the new
technologies as a weapon against regulatory state bodies.
On the other hand, the Radical Left looks at technology as
a tool with societal dimensions. It criticises the
hegeinonic nature of state power and argues that the state
cannot provide what society needs. Its answer is community-
based radio and television that will serve their local
community socially, culturally and politically. Community
radio and television provide a change from vertical to
horizontal communication, rejecting communication's one-way
culture. They largely base themselves upon Bertold
Brecht's proclamations about radio in the 1930s, when he
saw it as a potentially interactive medium. Garnham (1986;
29) notes that the Left has tended to fall back either on
idealist foundations or free communications without
organisational substance or material support.
To the Radical Right, broadcasting plays less of social
role and more of an uninhibited part in market forces
within a economy (Hood: 1986; 67-8). Moreover, the
'natural monopoly' argument linked to the deregulatory
trend in telecommunications is increasingly less dominant
than before. The new version has not yet clearly shown
whether the concept of psb will also lose its strength.
The state, on the other hand, is losing its control over
the broadcasting media.
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Nevertheless, optimism about the • free-market mechanism is
not justifiable, especially in broadcasting. Economists
like Lankaster (1978) and Spence (1976) note that a free
market with no entry restrictions often fails to satisfy
the criteria of 'efficiency' and 'optimum diversity'
simultaneously. This means that the market may fail to
produce goods that contribute more to social welfare than
the marginal social cost of their production because it may
not be profitable to do so. These functions tend to
conflict when there are significant economies of scale in
producing some goods, or when their production is
characterised by intangible, scarce resources with high-
opportunity costs.
Similarly, Ehrenberg and Barwise (1983) argue that the
difference between television and the press is that the
former cannot cope financially with programmes that are
watched by only tens or hundreds of thousands. For
Ehrenberg and Barwise, there are four factors against
narrowcasting TV -- whatever the delivery system: (1) in
contrast with the printed press, television programmes are
very costly to make; (ii) television is cheap to view, but
only when its audience is measured in millions (by
contrast, a book or magazine can be viable with sales of a
few thousand); (iii) a television channel requires large
and regular sources of programme supply (50 to 100 hours
per channel per week) and elaborate delivery systems; and
(iv) television is a very slow and inflexible medium for
passing on information. Informative programmes must be
basic and watchable to appeal to a large audience and pay
their high production costs. The expert will probably read
specialist books or magazines instead.
Looking backwards, the deregulatory movement goes beyond
the 1970s (Tunstall: 1986a; 8-9). In the UK, US and France,
deregulatory elements emerged in the early 1920s; after a
long debate plus market failure, free-market approaches
were replaced by the public companies system. However, the
recent deregulatory trends began in the US during the
Carter Administration, but are elaborated and publicised by
the Republicans, becoming dominant during the two Reagan
Administrations. The Reagan Administration's faith in
regulation by the marketplace determined new conditions for
the functioning of American television. For example, radio
and TV stations have been freed from government-imposed
limits on commercial time, from having to provide minimum
amounts of news and public affairs programmes, and from
having to provide educational programmes; also, programming
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logs need not be kept for public inspection and annual
financial reports are no longer required.
In western Europe, on the other hand, PS broadcasters are
now having financial problems because television has
reached saturation level and people do not easily accept
increases in licence fees. Moreover, costs are too high
because of expansion, i.e. by having two or more
television channels. The changing nature of western society
is ps broadcasters' final crisis factor. Increased leisure
time and leisure interests and differing tastes and
expectations have contributed to the fragmentation of the
old-style mass audience (Kuhn 1985; 4-5). Moreover, the
traditional ps broadcasters are restricted by their
statutes and have often found it difficult to respond to
this cultural and moral pluralism (Kuhn: 1986, Richeri:
1986)
On the other hand, the new channels -- whether terrestrial
or satellite-to-cable -- are mostly supported by
advertising. The advertising dynamics have generally been
proven to: (i) negatively influence the content of
programmes, making them 'non-controversial', 'medium-brow'
and 'non-political' to create a 'buying mood'; (ii) create
homogeneous, rather than diverse, opinions; (iii) exclude
minority positions; and (iv) lead ultimately to an
oligopolistic market situation that generates further
homogeneity (Comley: 1976; 128-205). This is a vision of an
'intensively market and individualistic society' where ps
institutions- including television- have little or no
place. Italy, where the programming and quality of PAl's
output have tended to move towards the lowest common
denominator of public taste, is an example of this
(Richeri: 1985; 31).
We are at the crossroads of television's future. Current
trends show us moving towards a 'consumer-driven' market in
broadcasting with a proliferation of both terrestrial and
satellite-to-cable channels. This view is shared by the
Delphi Inquiry (on behalf of the EC) which states that
privatisation will increase the number of TV stations --
about five times by early 2000 (de Bens and Knoche: 1987).
This situation faces governments with problems like whether
or not new media channels should compete with the
conventional ones, and how to control programming content.
I see the proliferation of new channels taking place on two
levels. The first will be an increase of limited
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terrestrial frequencies; these new channels will serve
most, but not all, of a country's territory. They will be
additional to existing public service (ps) networks, which
will dominate audience share. On the second level, there
will be international or pan-European channels where cable
and satellite collaborate with, rather than compete for, an
initially small audience. Although there will be DBS
channels, it seems that they will be received via cable in
the big cities only, as a cable network will also be used
for telecommunications. In other areas, such as the
countryside, direct reception seems to be the principal
means for the new channels - even if not the only one.
2.1.2 PUBLIC TELEVISION MONOPOLIES: A 'DEREGULATING'
TYPOLOGY
As institutional models of regulation differ, so do
deregulatory movements. Thus, when a regulatory model is
predominantly organisation-oriented, deregulation follows
suit. At least, this seems to be the case in Europe.
Scherer (1986) gives us, in general terms, four types of
policy in deregulating public monopolies: (i)
denationalisation, which designates the transfer of public
property from the government-owner to the private-owner,
such as the privatisation of TF1 in France under the Chirac
Government(1986-8); (ii) privatisation of tasks, which
implies that one or more (but not all) of the tasks
previously protected by a de lure monopoly is taken away
from the public entity and transferred to private
enterprise, such as the commissioning of programmes from
independent producers by both BBC and ITV in the. UK; (LLL
demonopolisation, which characterises a policy that
abolishes the de iure monopoly of the public institution
with respect to some or all of its tasks by permitting
competition, such as recently introducing commercial radio
and television in France, or the BBC-IBA system in the UK
(Murdoch (1986) also calls it liberalisation, i.e.
introducing commercial competition into these sectors of
activity, previously defined as public services or natural
monopolies); and (iv) organisational privatisation that
occurs when some or all of the regulatory constraints under
which public - as opposed to private - enterprises have to
operate are abolished. This can be achieved by
transforming the public entity into a private company, but
with the government as the sole or majority shareholder. As
we shall see later, examples are the Sociétés Mixte or
Sociétés Locales ci' Exploitation Commerciale in the
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development of cable in France.
The deregulation of broadcasting, however, has led to new
formalised procedures, i.e. to the foundation of new
regulatory bodies and new regulatory procedures to licence
new broadcasters (mainly commercial) and oversee their
behaviour. This sometimes leads to stricter rules which
impose a reregulation, rather than a deregulation, of the
broadcasting structure. A subsequent trend is
'commercialisation of the public sector, (Murdoch: 1986),
which implies the transformation of the nature of the
public enterprise by making commercial practices and market
requirements the yardsticks against which their performance
is measured. This procedure can take several forms but it
is certain that deregulation has so far only rearranged
the broadcasting sector.
Dyson and Humphreys (1988b) point out that deregulation
clearly involves a complex set of components. First, it
has been associated with the neoliberal strategy for
modernisation of the economy by privatisation and promotion
of an 'enterprise' culture. Second, deregulation reduces
bureaucratic inefficiency and financial profligacy. Third,
it responds to the imperatives of the increasing
internationalisation of markets because it aims to open the
national economy to the global market to benefit from
inward investment and to shake up lethargic domestic
actors. And fourth, as in France deregulation, has been
motivated by partisan ends. These components have surely
heavily influenced the deregulation debate, at least in
Western Europe. These components have also been
interlinked with the imperatives of restructuring the home
economies and the convergence of technologies (see Part 4).
But at this stage, deregulation has been mostly associated
with politicisation and political ideology, rather than
with market principles as it claims.
Deregulation does not eliminate -or even lessen - the
political nature of decision-making; rather it shifts the
political debate from control of regulation to control of
markets (Tunstall; l986b; 9-12). on the other hand,
regulation or deregulation is political because it is 'a
question of governing' (Elkin: 1985; 104-5). Bargaining and
negotiation have been increasingly apparent in broadcasting
deregulation because of the variety of actors, both
domestic and international, in an area where only few used
to play.	 Yet deregulation has also prompted multimedia
diversification by permitting
	 greater freedom of
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commercial operations in broadcasting (Dyson and Humphreys:
1988a; 8-9) -- a situation that leads to further
politicisation.
It has been increasingly difficult for governments in the
1980s to formulate broadcasting policy responses. One
obvious reason is that governments seemed reluctant to
loosen their control over broadcasting. Ironically,
deregulation expresses a political contradiction for
governing television. West European governments have also
been under pressure to adapt their policies to the new
marketplace (Dyson and Humphreys: 1988a; 8-9).
Nevertheless, terrestrial broadcasting will continue to be
state regulated because of the need to allocate airwave
frequencies; cable and satellite television seem to be
regulated by 'international compromised regulations',
mainly directed by the EC, as we shall see later in this
study. Applying rules to a broadcasting marketplace
implies a strong state to oversee then. This will finally
lead to further politicisation of the field, despite claims
to the contrary.
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2.2.0 SOME ESSENTIAL FEATURES: UiC, FRANCE AND LUXEMBOURG
This section presents some essential features of the
studied countries' broadcasting systems. Each system may
share similarities, such as the centralisation of the
programming output, but each has its own distinct
character. British broadcasting has been identified by the
BBC's dominance - both domestically and internationally -
as well as by the co-existence of two distinct monopolies:
the BBC and commercial television. French broadcasting has
been identified with tight government control over
programming and news output, rather than with the
distinctiveness of its particular components, such as the
big television companies constantly manipulated by the
state. Luxembourg broadcasting has been identified by a
commercial company (not Luxembourg-owned) granted a
monopoly status and its search for an international, rather
than domestic, audience. Luxembourg television is an
international broadcaster, mainly owned by French and
Belgian interests, seeking a foreign audience for
advertising revenue. Each part of this section will
introduce the governments of these countries giving an idea
of their general philosophy.
During the recent television age, the French looked at the
British system to improve their own heavily politicised
system. The British, if one credits the background
discussions of the Annan Committee, were looking at the
French system for lessons. Therefore, even though both
systems have their own distinct characteristics, they seem
to look to each other for new developments and lessons.
2.2.1 BRITISH BROADCASTING: DUOPOLY, THE BBC AND CHRONIC
FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
1986 was British television's golden lubilee year, while in
1981, the BBC received its sixth Charter, extending it
until December 31, 1996. Similarly, the Broadcasting Act
of 1980 extended the Independent Broadcasting Authority's
(IBA) term, and made it responsible the new Channel Four
(C4)
British broadcasters have been fortunate in being allowed
to work out their own purpose and method. They did not
have the problems faced by their French and East European
counterparts, or even the blatant commercialisation of US
TV stations. The British system is characterised by its
56
duopoly, heavy regulation, the psb concept and the 'middle
ground' representation, but also by a centralised general
output, chronic financial problems and constant arguments
concerning objectivity and independence of the broadcasting
media. However, this broadcasting picture has been
associated with minimal legislation, preferring indirect,
somewhat 'undercurrent' action. The latter involved
pronounced secrecy, privacy, informality and exclusiveness,
having a few privileged participants, and was little
concerned with public accountability (Dyson and Humphreys:
1988a; 255-6). This minimal legislation has no single
authority to deal with the broadcasting media, meaning
fragmentation of British media policy-making and a high
degree of self-regulation.
Although the Home Office (HO) generally regulates
broadcasting, under the provisions of the Wireless and
Telegraphy Acts of 1949 and 1967, it is the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) that allocates the frequencies and
deals with the hardware aspect of broadcasting. The HO is
mainly responsible for content and programming. Although
this split is recent, the fragmentation of British
broadcasting is not new at all, having started with the
above -noted Acts. Although the Home Secretary was (and is)
answerable to Parliament on broadcasting policy
questions(l). The Broadcasting Authority acts as a buffer
between the government, various interest groups and the
broadcasters (HNSO: 1981; 34). It ensures both that
broadcasters are independent and that programmes serve the
public interest (2). These authorities have been the BBC
and the IBA, which are assumed to pursue the ideal of psb,
rather than simply responding to market desires (Negrine:
1985; 15). Although the regulators exercised self-
restraint, 'in practice the reality of regulation was
shaped by the broadcasting professionals' (Dyson and
Huinphreys: 1988a; 256). Burns (1977), in his excellent
study on the BBC, shows how the professionals are self-
regulating in their decisions about programmes. This of
course relates to the famous concept of independence of
British broadcasters, especially the BBC.
The concepts of independence and impartiality have been
associated not only with the psb ethos, but also with
'centrist' political and 'neutral civil service' concepts
that formulated pre-1979 British tradition. The concept of
independence has also focused upon freedom from government
interference(3). This approach is quite opposite to
French, and most European, broadcasting where independence
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was a dream for broadcasters under constantly rigid
government control. Nevertheless, this independence has
been a practice rather than a specific, expressed law
letter. This leads to another characteristic of the
British broadcasting: that 'law has provided a framework,
rather than a blueprint' (Dyson and Humphreys: l988a; 257).
For example, apart from the independence practice, the
quality of programmes and general output has been left to
broadcasters.
The IBA oversees ITV and the Independent Local Radio (ILR)
(both made by commercial companies) and C4 (a wholly owned
subsidiary of the IBA). The Authority's powers are to issue
franchises to broadcast, run the transmitter framework,
regulate advertising and oversee programme output(4). It
is overseen by Members appointed by the Government. The
commercial television system (or IBA/ITV system) is
structured on 17 subordinate companies, now including TV-
am, and C4, each with its own Board of Directors and
separate senior officers. The IBA/ITV system is perhaps
better described as private, plural, regional, and federal
(Howell: 1986; 63). A common criticism is that this
structure is top-heavy. However, it has emerged as an
unusual hybrid of public and private regulation, which has
basically emulated the BBC's self-regulation system.
The BBC's ultimate legal existence is based upon a Royal
Charter, currently running from 1981 to 1996; it also has
a 'Licence and Agreement' that provides somewhat more legal
detail (5). Both these documents are remarkably brief (6);
this brevity reflects British law tradition. The BBC is run
by 12 Governors, but apart from the chairman, the members
are part-time (7). The BBC, and British broadcasting in
general, has been largely influenced by its first Director-
General (DG), John Reith, a man with an engineering
background, Calvinist ethic and bureaucratic instincts.
The BBC's reputation, status and prestige, both
domestically and internationally, have not been equalled.
A description of the BBC could also be public, central,
and national (Howell: 1986; 6). On the international
level, the Corporation has established a philosophy of
broadcasting with professional standards and world-wide
influence. To a certain extent, the BBC was fortunate in
remaining free of fascism, communism and commercial
advertising for more than 60 years -- unlike other, larger
nations (Tunstall: 1986a; 112). Domestically, the BEC is
regarded as the national channel, or the 'Voice of
Britain'. The IBA/ITV system has come to look more like a
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second BBC. The Corporation is a considerable publishing
house for books, videos and records, employs about 30,000
people, and has been an important factor in the British
education with its quality educational programmes. Its
external services are broadcast in 36 languages; some are
quite popular abroad. Nevertheless, the BBC's destiny, and
its finances, depend upon the political will and power of
the government of the day.
Finance has been a chronic problem for British broadcasting
policy-makers. The IBA/ITV system has, like the BBC,
depended on a sole source of income. Although both systems
have been criticised, sometimes strongly, there has been a
kind of symbiosis and retrospective adaptation between
them. Nowadays, as in the 1920s, financial control has
been one of the major issues. The BBC's monopoly trial
broke up in early l950s because of simultaneous pressure
from the advertising lobby and the Tory backbenchers. The
duopoly that replaced the system has, ironically, been
under fire, mainly from the same actors who proposed it.
The BBC, however, has continued to expand and adapt itself
to new environments. In 1964, it launched its second
channel, and in 1967 opened its local radio stations (8).
In the l980s, the BBC operates four nation-wide networks of
which the fourth, Radio One, was added to win the young
audience that used to tune in to the pirate stations in the
1960s.
On the other hand, ITV runs a single network organised on a
regional basis.	 C4 arose from pressures on Thatcher's
Government for a second commercial channel. During the
1950s, BEC TV ratings plummeted to 30 per cent of the
total audience, compared to the newcomers' 70 per cent.
Afterwards, with the second channel, it took about half of
the audience, thus justifying the licence fee. Competition
between the BBC and the IBA/ITV system has pushed up the
costs but also created more jobs and accelerated the
removal of finicky restrictions on political discussion.
It has also stimulated the BBC to improve standards of
performance in programme variety but resulted in five major
companies dominating the network's production (9).
The BBC depends financially on licence fees, and ITV on
Net Advertising Revenue After Levy (NARAL). Both sources
depend on changes in national economy and there is
relatively little scope for reducing costs in the short
term. Tunstall (1983; 37-8) notes that the government
influences revenue in both cases, controlling BBC licence
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increases, IBA/ITV's future and ITV's advertising. In
times of inflation, these points are increasingly salient.
The BBC TV licence fee was increased only twice in the
1950s and three times in the 1960s, but no less than five
times in the 1970s. There were licence fee increases in
1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, more than doubling the colour
licence fee in just four years (10). This inevitably made
British television economics even more politically charged.
The pattern goes like this: BBC programme costs increase,
the Corporation pressures for an increased licence fee,
incorporating inflation. Then the ITV's follows a similar
pattern (in terms of increase in IBA rental, Treasury levy
and in turn increase of charges for commercials). 'One year
the headlines proclaim ITV affluence, and BBC poverty but
next year the headlines say the reverse' (Tunstall: 1983;
38)
Both systems are big, bureaucratic organisations. The BBC
especially constitutes a central administration and a
single system of formal grades and promotion procedures or,
according to Burns(l977), a 'cultural bureaucracy' with
acute hierarchical complexity. However, it is not only the
bulk of its administration that is based in London, but
also its production output. According to the BBC TV
booklet (1985), the main centres of production are in
London (3534 hours out of 5026), Birmingham (470 hours per
year), Manchester (562) and Bristol (193) (11). The IBA
roughly duplicates the engineering side of the BBC but
lacks the BBC's major programme production activity. ITV
is a federal system of 15 regional companies, among which
the networking companies make most of the prime-time
programming. Five companies have dominated since 1968.
There are the 10 lesser companies (12) but ITN, TV-am and
C4 are also important. With Independent Television
publications (TV Times), 20 entities comprise the
Independent Television System (Briggs and Spicer: 1986).
The system is largely centralised in the so-called 'London-
Birmingham' axis, demonstrating that three of the five
networking companies are based in London and Birmingham;
about two-thirds of the network's production comes from
them, and over half of the networked programmes (including
news) were produced in London.
Within this regulatory environment, British broadcasting
policy has had some constant characteristics. Apart from
minimalist legislation, there has been hostility towards a
media ministry or a single set of strategic national media
goals (Tunstall: l983;238). According to Seymour-Ure(1987;
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269-70), Britain has made policies that are uncoordinated,
partial, indirect and, in terms of a public political
agenda, largely invisible. Throughout the history of
British broadcasting, governments have made policy about
all aspects of media, not holistic or in part (C4), such as
finance, the development and applications of the new
technologies, contents and audience. But what is more
striking is the governments' careful attempt to achieve
their goals through regulating structure and organisation,
finance and technology. As Seymour-Ure(1987; 271) puts it,
the governments 'tend to regulate the framework for media
content and, at worst, to defineits boundaries or a few
exclusions'.
The setting-up of periodic commissions or committees on
press and broadcasting is another British characteristic.
The Committees on broadcasting used to have a mean life of
about two or three years; since World War II, all have
dealt with the future of British broadcasting. The members
of these committees were mainly part-time amateurs,
However, their main recommendations were usually adopted,
although initially the government of the day was expected
follow a different policy to that recommended by the
committee. The Peacock Committee was the next major
enquiry, after the Annan Committee, to look at the future
of British broadcasting. The lack of a single department
indicates the fragmentation of British media policy in
general, and broadcasting policy in particular. The latter
is also reflected in the number of different departments
dealing with broadcasting. Apart from the HO and DTI --
which often conflicted there are many other public and
statutory bodies (Tunstall: 1983; 244).
Finally, British broadcasting policy has generally been
regarded as an 'active' policy area (Seymour-Ure: 1987;278,
Kuhn: 1985; 8-9). However, one could say that broadcasting
policy was more 'reactive' to developments and pressures
from various lobbies, especially advertisers. Surprisingly,
the Conservatives have been rather active while the Labour
party seemed to organise or 'correct' mistakes associated
with Tory 'innovations'. Mrs Thatcher was committed not
only to restructuring British broadcasting, but also
British economy and society. Thus, before we look at the
Conservatives' broadcasting policies, it would be useful to
know their general philosophy.
Their position combined a political critique of growing
state intervention, based on the theories of 'political
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overload', with an economic critique of Keynesianism,
founded on monetarist conceptions of the economy
(Hall:1986, Krieger:l986, Moran:1985). It inherited a
difficult situation: a declining industry controlled by
state trade unions and weak product competition. Within
this environment, the Conservatives argued that the British
state had grown too large and demanded a reduction in state
activity by rationalising the public sector and emphasising
the more effective private sector.
To fund a welfare state that the country could not afford,
past governments had raised taxes. The Conservatives asked
for a reduction of public expenditure that would allow tax
reductions. Moreover, they felt some of the traditional
state activities should be returned to the private sector,
starting a denationalisation of nationalised industries and
encouraging private activity and ownership. This logic was
inspired by the monetarist economic theory, on one hand,
and government willingness to reduce the political and
industrial power of the trade unions on the other. The
Conservatives' whole attitude was based upon: (1)
rationalising the industry, (ii) stabilising state
finances, and (iii) re-ordering market mechanisms by
shifting the balance of power away from trade unions in
particular. According to Budge and McKay(1988; 14-5),
Conservative policy can be distinguished by two periods:
from 1979 to 1983, characterised by intensified monetarisni
during which public expenditure had to be carefully
controlled; and from 1983 to 1987, characterised by
privatisation and dere gulation, when monetary targets were
rarely met.
2.2.2.	 FRENCH TELEVISION: CENTRALISATION, STATE CONTROL
AND LACK OF MARKET STRENGTH
The French media have been regarded as one of the most
disciplined in Europe (Raboy: 1983, Montaldo: 1974). The
state, apart from making and enforcing laws and regulating
the autonomy of the press, involves itself in the
production and distribution of information through the
state-controlled Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Havas, the
important advertising agency in the country. Some of
French broadcasting's essential features have been tight
government control, centralisation, Parisian dominance and
a lack of market rules on broadcasting.
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Radio and television were, until very recently, arms of the
state because it controlled and managed the essentials of
audiovisual activity. Since the Liberation, French
broadcasting associated with politics. President de Gaulle
was considered one of the
	 instigators of tight state
control over news output. As will be described later,
French television had a 'double personality' because it had
to be the 'voice of France' -- a public service objectively
presenting events -- but in effect, it was seen as a means
of propaganda serving government interests. This led to
the weakening of television's credibility - especially
during the events of Nay 1968 - as an information medium.
French governments in particular, have always been involved
in developing public utilities and industries directly
affecting national life. It was inevitable that the
broadcast media would be brought under state control.
Radio, in its early days, was not established under
provisions of the 1881 Press Bill but under the laws on
transmissions monopoly (1837). Thus, radio was under PTT's
responsibility (1926). Some private radio stations were
tolerated, and they were very popular. From the Liberation
until 1982, the monopoly was strictly enforced, but some
commercial stations transmitted from outside French borders
(Monaco, Saar, Luxembourg) . They were at least partly
controlled by the French state, which was the controlling
shareholder in the equity of each of these companies
(Tarle: 1979; 44-5).
The public monopoly character comes from two traditions:
the common technical grounds of limited radio frequencies
and the French concept of the state as a federation of
complex interests of classes, rather than as a referee
between them (Flichy: 1984; 231). This partly explains why
broadcasting was so rapidly transformed into a subordinate
system of partisan ends. This situation has created an
ethos of broadcasting affairs closely associated with the
politics of the day. Thus, the only conflict centred on
the impartiality of news output. This situation was, to a
certain extent, related to the Jacobin centralist and
statist traditions of French society. Consequently, every
government has wanted either to impose or influence the
structure of French broadcasting.
French broadcasting history has changed with
and, of course, politics. A cabinet decree in
Radiodiffusion - Television Française (RTF)
Ministry of Information's direct control (13).
Fourth Republic (1944-58), about 16 attempts
governments
1945 placed
under the
During the
re made to
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introduce legislation on broadcasting but the chaotic
political situation of the time meant that broadcasting
remained under executive control (Raboy: 1983). The RTF
held a monopoly on broadcasting transmission, distribution
and programming (Bombardier: 1975; 31). It was quite
natural, in such a period of rebuilding a stagnant economy,
for broadcasting to be under state control to defend the
regime from the threat posed by its opponents, especially
the Communists and Gaullists (14). But broadcasting
continued to rely on political power throughout the Fifth
Republic (1958)
During the Fifth Republic, a powerful de Gaulle easily
realised broadcasting's potential as a political weapon
that could be used for partisan purposes (15) (Boudon:
1986; 45). The Fifth Republic, moreover, coincided with
the establishment of television as a mass medium in the
country (16) . Needless to say, state control over
broadcasting media was maintained, despite attempts by the
commercial lobby to introduce some form of commercial
television (17). Additionally, de Gaulle used to appoint
political sympathisers to key managerial and editorial
posts at RTF, which became practice for his successors. In
1964, a new broadcasting statute set up the Office
Radiodiffusion Télévision Française (ORTF), modelled on the
BBC Charter, but it was honoured more in 'breach than in
observance'. The events of May 1968 again raised the issue
of control over news programmes and information(18) ,
causing massive strikes and protests by journalists. These
events simply showed that television had lost all of its
credibility in matters of information (Flichy: 1984,
Miquel: 1984).
	 De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou
undertook to liberalise ORTF in 1969. He abolished the
Ministry of Information and affirmed political autonomy
over the news output, creating two 'autonomous' units
within ORTF, each handled by one sympathiser to the
government news director. The Bill of 1972 confirmed the
basic principles of ORTF's unity but gave full power to a
'Président Directeur-Général' appointed by the government.
The Ministry of Information was re-established, but its
power was more theoretical than practical.
Giscard d' Estaing came to power in 1974, bringing a new
law to change the country's broadcasting structure. This
reform aimed to 'éclater' (break-up) ORTF's monopoly,
introduce competition between the television channels,
promote a kind of liberalisation in news programmes, and
open up broadcasting to market forces. But both sorts of
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liberalisation were, once again, mere rhetoric. The
government intervened directly in the nomination of each
channel's news director, who were surrounded by political
sympathisers.	 However, the result was a relative
multiplicity and liberalisation of information(19). The
'&clatément de 1' Office', as it has widely been called,
could be responsible for providing a 'base line' for 1982's
developments, as we shall see later. ORTF was split up
into seven 'sociétés' and 'établissements': Television
Française(TF1), Antenne 2 (A2), France Régions(FR3)(20),
Radio France(RF), Societe Francaise de Production (SFP),
Institut National de 1' Audiovisuel (INA) and Telediffusion
Française (TDF).
President d' Estaing justified the changes rather
rhetorically by invoking the need to adapt to evolving
public expectations and technological changes rather than
by making profound and real changes. The liberalisation
option was largely expressed by measures such as
introducing TV advertising or tightening control over news
(Martin: 1981). This reorganisation was, however, mainly
for administrative reasons, because ORTF was facing severe
financial problems, trade union challenges and a critical
parliamentary report drafted by a close associate of the
President. Despite ORTF's 'éclatement', the monopoly was
maintained. Indeed, when state broadcasting was threatened
by the 'radios libres' (21), additional legislation was
introduced to support the monopoly. On the other hand, the
'éclatement' multiplied the decision-making centres but
increased the levels of bureaucracy in an already top-heavy
system, further strengthening its centralising tendencies.
Moreover, the administrative fusion severely undermined the
unions by separating the 'intellectual' workers of
programming companies from the 'technical' workers of the
production companies.
During an era when state monopoly was not questioned, the
political debate focused on how the state services should
be managed. As in the UK, financing was a dominant issue.
The controversy centred on whether, and later to what
extent, television should carry commercial advertisements.
In 1968, after an acrimonious parliamentary debate,
advertising was introduced to supplement income from the
licence fee(22). Advertising not only boosted ORTF's
finances but accentuated the argument for introducing a
commercial channel. While an overall ceiling on 25 per cent
of total revenue was more-or-less preserved following
1974's reorganisation, the two main networks (TF1 and A2)
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relied on advertising for more than half of their
respective revenues(Kuhn 1985; 49-50). In 1983, advertising
which was previously banned due to the powerful of the
regional press lobby, was finally allowed on FR3.
Demands for decentralisation of decision-making in all
spheres of activity, following the ésprit de l'autogèstion
of May 1968, spilled over into the broadcasting debate.
Regional diversity in television production and programming
was demanded. Most political scientists have viewed France
as the most centralised of all western democracies. French
broadcasting, therefore, followed the 'hypercentralised
attitude' of the state, whereas before World War II, radio
was organised in two types on a regional basis: private
radio stations (organised 'a 1' Americaine') and PTT radio
stations (Flichy: 1984; 234). During these years, the idea
of large services like transport, electricity or gas were
very popular, especially because of the service's concept
of equality and universality. Moreover, the desire to
suppress regional inequalities led to the introduction of
the network concept (23). Consequently, the system was
further centralised and the news output associated with
administrative problems inevitably politicised.
Since the Liberation, governments, political leaders and
parties have wished to change this situation, trying to
satisfy society's demands within the broadcasting field.
For the first time in the Fifth Republic, the left wing
gained a complete political advantage. Both the executive
and legislative branches were in Socialist hands. People
did not talk about a 'new government' but of a 'new
regime', describing 1981 as a 'Year of Chan ge'. In effect,
the Socialist Government had, in some way, a frenetic
desire to make changes. The Socialists embarked on their
programme determinedly and euphorically, but the early
expansionist prime pumping and rearranging phase was
finally followed by the virage (U-turn) in policy (Machin
and Wright: 1986; 5-6). In effect, their policies are
described in two periods: from 1981 to March 1983, when the
government followed 'standard socialist policies' (Cohen:
1988; 198), infused by a nationalisation programme to
rationalise the economy. This policy quickly led to sharp
deterioration of the current account and a weakening of the
franc. By June 1982, it was clear that the programme could
no longer continue. In March 1983, after the franc's third
devaluation, Prime Minister Mauroy launched a new policy
that began the second period, identified by a turnaround to
conservative policies and the replacement of Mauroy by
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Fabius. The 'rupture' with capitalism was now perceived as
unattainable.	 The major policy shift consisted of the
deindexation of real wages from productivity. Policies
also changed as the Socialists discovered market discipline
and attempted to restore firms' confidence in profit-tax
reductions and other advantages, while unemployment
compensation and social security were put in order (Cohen:
1988, Hall: 1986). In the end, the language of the Left,
and particularly of the Socialists, also changed: the state
was no longer regarded so uncritically. In the next
chapters we shall see how much broadcasting policy was
influenced by this new attitude.
2.2.3 LUXEMBOURG AND THE COMMERCIAL MONOPOLY OF THE CLT
Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion (CLT) -better
known as Radio Telé-Luxembourg or RTL (from now on CLT) -
has metaphorically been Europe's main 'offshore' TV
broadcaster, beaming commercial television and radio
services into neighbouring countries and making its
advertising revenue on the basis of foreign audiences. As
Europe moves towards more commercial television outlets,
CLT has attempted to capitalise on the opportunity by
expanding to a major programming role. On the other hand,
the smallness of the country and the need of CLT's tax
revenues have made Luxembourg governments follow a
minimalist policy on broadcasting so as not to upset CLT
and its foreign shareholders.
The Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, having a number of
broadcasting frequencies recognised by international
conventions at its disposal, preferred to concede its
public service to a private company: the Compagnie
Luxembourgoise de Radiodiffusion, set up on May 31, 1931.
In 1954, the company, now CLT, first operated as a high-
powered radio station, adding television in 1955, and thus
becoming a very profitable company. With powerful long- and
medium-wave,	 as well as FM, transmitters, CLT's radio
programmes in French, Dutch, German and English were
clearly designed for foreign audiences. The television
service (Tele-Luxembourg) was inaugurated in 1955; since
then it has been broadcasting a TV programme in French
covering Luxembourg, France and the 'Belgian Province of
Luxembourg'. The service was renamed to RTL-television in
1962 (Pige 1962)
Radio Luxembourg was founded under a law passed on December
67
19, 1929, which conferred on the Ministry of PTT the right
to licence and supervise broadcasting stations. Thus, CLT
became a uniquely positioned company in European
broadcasting, i.e. a 'private' station became a respectable
national spokesman but with strong links outside
Luxembourg. Indeed, in its early days, CLT was heavily
criticised for illegally using usurped frequencies for
commercial operations. In 1962, however, it was accepted
by the EBU members and Luxembourg was among the signatory
countries of the European Agreement for the Prevention of
Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside National
Territories to outlaw such unauthorised commercial
stations.
The 1929 law required a majority of Luxembourgers for the
administrative council and station staff and that the
equipment be purchased, as far as possible, within the
country, as advised by technical and programme council's
meetings. Therefore, the state Commissioner's main task
was to ascertain that the operating conditions (cahiers des
charges) were respected. Following the general legal
framework, the government granted a licence to CLT in
September 1930. Over the years, these licences, together
with the corresponding operating conditions, were extended
and whenever the company wanted either to make use of new
frequencies or to introduce new services like television,
new agreements were drafted and new operating conditions
established. In 1986, nine of these conditions were
applied to CLT's operations, but all were copied from the
1930 agreements (Hirsh: l986a; 192-3). The present licence
expires in 1995. In effect, the CLT's monopoly is only
mentioned on the licence and not on any legislative text,
making it a de facto, rather than de lure, status.
Moreover, this situation of granting the country's
broadcasting monopoly to a company dominated by foreign
capital, whose main target has been an international,
rather than domestic, audience has made some influential
people question this monopoly. It is true that CLT also
caters for Luxembourg viewers, specified clearly in the
licences. However, in a country with just 500,000
inhabitants, it does not make sense for a company to occupy
itself with the domestic audience.
Regardless of its minimalistic policy towards CLT, the
government retains some important rights, particularly over
75 per cent of the company shares that can only change
hands with government approval. The government can veto a
change of ownership that could threaten the political
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neutrality of the station's political output, or in • the
case of a competitor trying to acquire a stake. These
modifications were introduced in the 1973 licence after an
attempt from the French state-run company, SOFIRAD, to take
over the CSF shares in CLT. French financial and
industrial interests (Havas, Paribas, CSF) that founded the
CLT primarily intended to escape the nationalisation of
broadcasting that emerged at about the same time in France
by using Luxembourg as a neutral base for international
broadcasting. Today, CLT is controlled by Belgian (mainly
the Group Bruxelles-Lanthert of Albert Frére) and French
interests. Luxembourg's ownership of less than one per
cent is neglible; this will be a major issue in the
politics surrounding Luxembourg broadcasting in the l980s.
The company is dominated by a holding company, Audiofina,
which owns 54.5 per cent of the equity. Among Audiofina's
shareholders are Group Bruxelles-Lambert (38 per cent),
Electrafina (a joint venture between Bruxelles-Lambert and
Societe Generale de Belgique (15 per cent), and the French
Agence Havas (30 per cent). Other French shareholders are
the Compagnie de Compters (or Schlumberger) (12.6 per
cent), the 1982 nationalised bank, Paribas (10.3 per cent);
the publishing group, Hachette (8.2 per cent) (but sold it
to Moet in 1986), and the financial company, Edmond de
Rothschild (7.7 per cent - but its affiliates hold about 15
per cent). Broadcasting in this country has been totally
advertising-supported - a pioneer of that kind in Europe.
To do this, the government followed a minimalist approach
and put no quantitative or qualitative limitations on
advertising, apart from some widely banned sectors such as
tobacco, pharmaceuticals, or general regulations to protect
children. CLT's 1984 advertising revenue was FF1444
million and its net profit FF160 million (C16 million).
CLT had to pay a considerable licence fee to the state.
CLT has been one of the largest tax-payers in this country
contributing about 5-7 per cent of Luxembourg's annual
revenue. Thus, it is understandable that the government is
unwilling to upset the company by imposing stricter
legislation.
With the advent of satellite television and the
deregulatory mood over terrestrial frequencies in Europe,
CLT started seriously reconsidering its future and fortune
in the new European audiovisual landscape. These anxieties
were shared by the government, since the future of
Luxembourg as a place for international broadcasting
started looking dubious it is necessary for the country to
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restructure its economy and find new markets and
investments. The Werner and Santer governments have held
office during the period under examination. They were
mainly coalitions with other parties, the first having a
conservative approach, the second a social-democrat, right
of centre perspective. Both governments' broadcasting
policies, however, fell largely within Luxembourg's
minimalist tradition, but Santer's was more committed to
new satellite broadcasting projects.
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2.3.0 BRITISH TELEVISION IN THE i.980s
When the Conservative Government came into power, its main
aim was to 'roll back' the boundaries of the state and
restore market competition. Regarding the communications
field, it underlined a movement towards a 'privatised'
communications system -- a radical broadcasting policy in
which broadcasting would be controlled by market forces
rather than the state. Thus, the consumer would dominate,
and broadcasting would be rationalised within a competitive
environment where market forces would determine its
structure. Although this radicalism was not applied in real
terms, it was contained in the terms of references set out
for committees and consultants. It seemed that in the
longer run, British television's future structure would
probably be more affected by government dictates than by
the power of technologies -especially cable and satellite.
During 1981-86, the questions concerning British broadcast-
ing focused once again upon its future, this time looking
at the l990s and the BBC's financial problems. The central
theme was whether or not the BBC should take advertising
and, if so, to what extent introducing the market principle
to a previously well protected field would reshape the
whole structure of British broadcasting.
British broadcasters enjoy a strong vertical duopoly,
assisted by an 'alliance' of public and commercial
interests. This duopoly came under attack from the Peacock
Committee, which recommended that the government take
measures	 to deregulate the so-called 'comfortable
duopoly '. This committee was set up to find ways of
solving the financial problems of the BBC. Its approach
appeared to be narrowly economic by contrast with its
equivalent in France, which was heavily political. This
latest broadcasting inquiry was significant in that it
sketched out the new British audiovisual landscape and has
been used as a point of reference in subsequent reports.
The Peacock Committee tried to find ways of combining the
concept of public service with the forces of a competitive
market, the latter being under consumer control. It
understood broadcasting, and especially television, in
terms of publishing books. Nevertheless, it did not
recommend abolishing the BBC's licence fee, nor taking
advertising, but put the licence fee on the index price -
which can hardly solve the Corporation's chronic financial
problems.
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During the 1981-86 period, Channel Four, long-discussed and
anticipated but also quite original, progressive and
pioneer-like in its way of working for both British and
European television, began. C4 is devoted to minority and
cultural programming and has been quite successful in
relative terms, signifying, perhaps, a reinterpretation of
psb. The Conservatives decided to place it under the
auspices of the IBA (and not the Open Broadcasting
Authority, as recommended by the Annan Committee). In
doing so, they followed their market philosophy but took
some precautions. However, C4's success has posed its own
problems. Both the Peacock Committee and the White Paper
were forced to consider whether C4 should sell its own
advertising time, be removed from the IBA's umbrella and be
'privatised', largely indicating how contentious the 1980s
policy -- that C4 complements ITV -- is. Another major
issue has been the incremental transformation of British
television into a 24-hour, gpnd-the-clock, service. Both
the BBC and ITV adopted new ways of managing finances and
management procedures in the late 1980s. The traditional
broadcasters have 'readjusted their sets' by restructuring
themselves, which must be considered a success of the
Conservative Government since it has made these
broadcasters think about future competition.
Moreover, since mid-1986, particularly during the post-
Peacock era, the Conservatives seem to have dedicated
themselves to breaking up the vertical duopoly by
attacking it from inside and out. This has been done from
outside by forming a new channel, auctioning the ITV
franchises, 'privatising' C4 and making BBC adopt pay-Tv
practices and asking it to be more 'attractive'. 	 From
inside, a quota for independent productions has been
imposed, weakening the unions' powers. Although
independent production can offer creativity and new
practices within the BBC and ITV, Mrs Thatcher considers it
a way of weakening the 'last bastion of restrictive trade
union practices'. The Conservative Government's whole
policy on terrestrial television seems to be somewhat
incremental, incoherent and step-by-step, with the ultimate
goal of deregulating or introducing competition among
television channels.
At the political administrative level, there has not been a
single coordinator for the whole sector, such as a
department or ministry of communications and the media,
indicating	 a compromise between several powerful
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departments. As as result, management of the television
sector has been confused allowing Mrs Thatcher to be,
directly involved in the media. Finally, during 1981-86,
the IBA has as faced a period with few ups and many downs.
Until 1982, it regulated only one channel, then it had a
second (Channel 4). In 1985, it supervised DBS, but since
then, the IBA has been faced with the prospect of its own
abolition. The 1988 White Paper proposes IBA's merger with
the Cable Authority and the setting up of an Independent
Television Commission with less power and responsibility.
Both commercial and public television have effectively
fallen in line with a de facto deregulatory process. This
has made them look for ways of being more effective, as
well as attractive, in a potentially competitive television
landscape.
2.3.1 INCREASING THE OUTLETS: FROM CHANNEL FOUR TO ROUND-
THE-CLOCK TELEVISION
During 1981-86, British television went through a 'quiet'
revolution in contrast to its French counterpart, whose
changes were heavily political. Two major changes took
place: the launch of C4, and the incremental transforma-
tion of British television, particularly commercial TV, to
a 24-hour service (since the end of 1986).
(i)The Channel Four Television Company was formally
established on December 10, 1980, as a subsidiary of the
IBA. It was incorporated as a private company limited by
shares and came into operation on January 1, 1981, with
Jeremy Isaacs as Chief Executive. He played an important
role, with others, in establishing C4's character
(Blanchad: 1982; 9).
C4's primary mission was to contain a suitable proportion
of programmes to appeal to tastes and interests not
generally catered for by ITV, and to promote suitable
educational, innovative and experimental programmes
(Wakshlog: 1982). C4 was to complement to ITV without being
controlled by ITV companies. However, many of these ideas
depended on ITV companies, which were to be the main source
of programmes and collectors of C4's advertising revenue.
The IBA's main role is to approve C4's schedule and
ensure a variety of primarily minority-interest programmes
that complement ITV's output. With the publication of the
1988 White Paper, C4 is facing the most critical problem of
its fascinating history: whether to 'go independent' and
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start selling its own advertising or remain as it is. What
will C4 be offering its viewers in the future?
Discussion for a fourth channel goes back two decades to
the 1962 Pilkington Committee. Since then, concern has
centred around who should run the channel, were it given
the go-ahead (24). Before defeat in 1979, the Labour
Government published a White Paper (July 1978) (25) stating
that the Open Broadcasting Authority (OBA) should be
independently financed through advertising and that more
programmes should be commissioned from independent
production. When the Conservative Government came into
power, it stopped any OBA developments; the Queen's Speech
announced that C4 would be under the IBA and the
Broadcasting Bill of 1980 finally confirmed this. William
Whitelaw, the new Home Secretary, played an important role
in C4's fate. He wanted its revenue to come from spot
advertising but would also allow block advertising and
sponsorship (26). However, some regulations regarding C4's
output were obscure. Because the Government wanted this
channel to be successful in financial terms, without
relying on public funds, it reduced the percentage of levy
on ITV companies' profits (Guardian: 15 October 1980).
C4's funding was structured to help it survive in the
broadcasting market as a minority channel (27). It has
been funded by the existing ITV companies through a system
of subscriptions (28). In return, all C4 airtime is sold by
the ITV companies on their own regions (29). It has, at
times, come under pressure from its subscribers, i.e. the
ITV companies (Negrine: ibid). Critics claim that this
arrangement gives the ITV companies total control of
television advertising because if C4 were allowed to sell
its own advertising, according to one of the 1988 White
Paper's new options, 'the network would almost certainly
increase its revenue while providing competition from the
ITV monopoly' (Goldstein-Jackson: 1988).
Unlike the ITV system, C4 acts as a commissioning agent,
not a production company. It airs the work of independent
producers (35 per cent); the major ITV companies (up to 40
per cent), regional ITV companies (up to 20 per cent), ITN
(15 per cent) and from overseas. Wales has its version of
C4, a Welsh-speaking service (SC4). For some, C4 is a
'closed shop' because it requires the independents to
follow union agreements, and sometimes imposes (or
dictates) the terms of the contract (30). Nevertheless, C4
has boosted the independent production sector and its
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experience has been adopted by the government as a policy
for the major networks.
C4 faces the complex problem of broadcasting for 'tastes
and interests not generally catered for' and relying on a
commercial system that targets a mass audience but only
provides 8 per cent of its own audience. This is stable,
but not large. C4 has tried daily not only to reach a 10
per cent target, but also to keep its 8 per cent (31).
C4's profile suggests that because its programmes will
never have the mass appeal of ITV, specific audiences
should be targeted. C4 should go more for popular
programming, such as Cheers, Family Ties and the Cosby
Show. These programmes achieve very high ratings in the US
and elsewhere, and have performed well on C4. C4 planned a
more conventional pattern, aiming to draw audiences right
through the early evening, but going against its aim to
complement ITV. Perhaps the provisions of the White Paper
will allow C4 to go ahead with these projects. C4 is not
really a minority channel (32). Viewers are becoming
accustomed to some of the specialist programming that would
be destroyed if C4 had to compete for revenue. Present C4
programme policy, and the ratings resulting from it,
constitute a balancing act more delicate than that of any
other channel. ITV provides one-third of C4's schedule, but
acquired programming is increasing and now stands at 45
per cent. C4 is also cost-effective, especially regarding
shooting costs that were much cheaper than the BBC's (33).
In its seventh year, C4 saw the 1988 White Paper (pp 24-26)
set out three constitutional models for a new C4 : (i) as a
profit-making, private-sector company licensed by the new
Independent Television Association (ITC) in the same way as
services on ITV; (ii) as a non-profit, ITC subsidiary,
free to raise funds as it used to and with minimum income
guaranteed by the ITC to avoid erosion of the channel's
remit; and (iii) as a partner to a more commercial Channel
5, able to plan	 complementary schedules to strengthen
their competitive position vis-a-vis the other channels.
It is arguable whether a commercial company would take the
risk for a non-commercial venture. Besides, television
differs from the newspaper market. A privatised C4 does not
seem the best solution for improving the station and
securing its long-term future as an innovator. C4 appears
to be an innovator because it has a flexibility provided by
the IBA/ITV relationship. Any change in C4 may considerably
alter its own programming philosophy. This is unfortunate
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because C4 perhaps represents the 'last reinterpretation of
the public service role of broadcasting' (Curran and
Seaton: 1985; 238-9). In this version, the freedom of
creative individuals to risk making the programmes they
want to make is seen as a guarantor of public good.
The channel's first years gave it a strong domestic and
international image. In the post-Peacock, 1988 White
Paper era, there has been a belief that C4 would never be
the same again. At this point, Docherty et al. (1988; 176)
conclude: the worst thing about a channel dedicated to
challenging and transforming conventional television is if
it succumbs to complacency. The public, and the
broadcasting industry, consider that Channel Four has an
important contribution to make to British culture and
society. It would be disastrous then if the channel
settled into the rhythms of the past five years. Staying
one step ahead or, more precisely, one step slightly ahead
and to the side, is a major task, and only the channel's
tenth anniversary will tell us if it succeeded.
(ii) Increased broadcasting hours has been another issue,
starting from Breakfast-TV in 1982, Daytime, then Late
Night and, finally, 24-hour television service in late 1986
and the beginning of 1987. The round-the-clock television
issue is, on the surface, simply continuing competition
between the BBC and ITV. The real issue, however, must be
seen as preparing conventional broadcasters for potential
competition with a proliferation of new channels beaming
from the UK or Europe. This is also a means of testing the
potential market's reactions, while searching for ways to
absorb independent production into programme output. The
BBC started first with the Breakfast-Time programme in
1982; ITV followed in February 1983, after awarding the
morning franchise to the TV-am company, which saw
managerial turmoil and superstar dismissals in its first
years. They usually transmit every weekday, between 6.25
and 10:00 am, but TV-am also broadcasts at weekends. Their
programmes are live, offering a magazine programme: a fast-
moving blend of news, current affairs, interviews, and a
wide range of topics including sports, cooking, consumer
issues, etc., all rather informally presented.
Daytime television followed. The BBC introduced a
lunchtime service in 1972 with At One. There were regular
afternoon programmes in 1974, but these were abandoned in
1979 for financial reasons. 	 When the IBA awarded the
breakfast TV franchise to TV-am, the BBC'S DG, Alastair
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Mime, allocated £3 million to hastily set up breakfast TV
first. When ITV started talking publicly about a fully
networked venture into daytime TV, Mime launched BBC's
daytime service first. In February 1986, it was decided
that there should be a major midday news programme, on-the-
hour bulletins and a forum for viewers' reaction to
television. In its first year, daytime television centred
around soap operas such as Neighbours, Sons and Daughters
and some documentaries (Laughton: 1987).
On the other hand, ITV companies claimed that their
advertisers were seeking marketing opportunities in the
daytime audience and began regular daytime transmissions.
When regular broadcasts were imposed, daytime TV claimed
that in winter 1986, 7 to 8 million watched TV in the
middle of the day. In late afternoon, ITV's Australian
soap operas were attracting about 5 million viewers
(Guardian: 5 January 1987). In the beginning, Yorkshire
Television announced firm plans to broadcast in the early
hours. Then Thames TV and LWT began broadcasting regular
programmes during the night (Through the Ni ght on Thames-TV
and Night Network on LWT). The smaller ITV companies were
somewhat reluctant because of programme costs and
potentially low regional late-night advertising. Thus,
night time programmes were concentrated in London and the
South-East. The IBA, however, seemed determined to push
the companies into this 24-hour pattern, suggesting that
those without the resources might consider taking other
companies' programmes or collaborating on a partial network
service (34).
These three new aspects of so-called round-the-clock
television, previously limited to the US and Italy, have
been regarded as something that could withstand the
challenges of satellite-to-cable channels without
duplicating what the new television retailers will offer.
Their target has been a potential audience of 25 million
viewers (Guardian: 5 January 1987). Following the Peacock
recommendation, the 1988 White Paper proposes a
subscription and encrypted service on the BBC at night
only, to be finally assigned to ITC for commercial use.
2.3.2 THE TRADITIONAL BROADCASTERS ADJUST THEIR SETS
British television, and the BBC in particular, celebrated
its golden jubilee in 1986. Many pointed out that both the
BBC and ITV systems had arrived at a crossroads. After 60
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years of mutual and regulated expansion, broadcasters had
been exposed to external political pressures and
technological forces that they could little influence. On
one hand, the BBC was in severe financial straits (35), on
the other, so were the IBA and ITV companies. The IBA faced
a difficult role as a regulator trying to cope with the
government's policy, especially regarding C4's advertising,
and concurrently taking into account the ITV franchises,
their 'internal agreements' and their vulnerability in an
economic crisis.
The BBC's real income had dropped once again as the licence
fee fell further and further behind the rate of inflation.
Then the competition for breakfast and daytime television
had increased production costs since there was now more
competition for new programme ideas and feature films.
Moreover, the BBC had to face a fresh and confident
Conservative Government demanding a restructuring of
broadcasting.	 The Corporation also had to adapt to
potential competition from the new media. Although its
first attempt to gain a satellite channel failed (see
later), in 1987 it started leasing a transponder on
Intelsat (25.7 degrees West) to beam its programming to
Scandinavia (36). The BBC also planned to provide Europe
with a satellite-delivered news service, but the Foreign
Office rejected any subsidy (37). The BBC had to argue in
commercial terms because it had to maintain a reasonable
total viewing (and listening, though this was less
critical) audience to keep its licence fee and justify
other ventures. Thus, the 'Beeb' became an audience-
ratings hunter by adopting a rather commercial attitude to
help it survive in a potentially competitive environment.
BBC Enterprises, the commercial arm of the Corporation, had
worked on a larger number of programmes from its archives
that retailers were now selling. The new relationship
between psb and the retail group is just one example of the
BBC responding to political and financial pressures.
In 1985, the Corporation had to cope with the consequences
of two linked Government decisions: the £58 colour licence
fee (instead of the £65 requested) leaving a nominal short-
fall of £350 million over the three-year licence fee
period; and the Peacock Inquiry, which looked at
alternative ways of funding the BBC, such as advertising,
sponsorship or subscription. Under the shadow of the
Peacock Committee, the BBC decided to reorganise itself
before the completion of the report (38). The Peacock
Committee finally recommended that advertising on the BBC
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was not a solution currently and that the licence fee would
remain the principal source of revenue. The Government,
through its Home Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, announced that
the increased licence fee would reflect the annual
percentage rate in the Retail Price Index (RPI). Given the
tendency of BBC's costs to rise faster than inflation, this
indexing will be strong incentive for efficiency and care
in undertaking fresh commitments. Competition for audiences
will intensify, translating into rising costs for the
labour-intensive broadcasting industry. If this is related
to the fact that inflation in television industry runs
ahead of RPI, the latter means a 'double squeeze' on BBC
finances (39)
Fundamentally, the BBC's annual subsidy is now linked to
the annual index. No conditions, no chairman's objectives,
no corporate plans to be approved. Each year the public
money 'will roll on the target'(Jenkings: 1987). What does
it mean? For some, it could mean that the Corporation will
continue searching for quality programming, for others,
that the political relationship might be further obscured,
and for some others, that it should have to adopt a more
entrepreneurial strategy, similar to modern business
management (40). The 1988 White Paper acknowledges (and
praises) the Corporation's new managerial attitude and
commercialisation, while arguing that there is scope for
further progress.
In policy terms -- relating this picture to the 1988 White
Paper as well as to the recommendations of the Peacock
Committee and other subsequent reports -especially the
provision that the BBC should be turned into a 'pay-as-you-
watch' service -- one may argue that the Government has,
since mid-1986, started 'squeezing' the BBC's monopoly
status by 'informally informing' it that in the near future
it will have to compete not only with the ITV system, but
also with other potential rivals for the same revenue.
Therefore, under its new management, the Corporation has
make structural changes to redefine its role and to make it
competitive in a deregulatory market (41).
In the IBA/ITV system, the lEA's statutory duty - as the
regulatory body - is to provide psb. Despite difficulties
dealing with the ITV companies, it has managed the whole
system well. The lEA's case could be unique because no
other country in Europe has, as the Economist puts it (19
April 1986; 29) a body like it. Moreover, as commercial
television spreads,	 other countries are looking at the
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IBA's experience.	 The irony is that while others are
thinking of copying	 Britain's system, the Government
wishes to reform it - how radically remains to be seen.
The companies constituting the ITV network do so on the
basis of a fixed-term contract. Until the 1988 White
Paper, they were liable to lose their franchises at the end
of the contract if the IBA decided that another company
would do a better job. However, this was not efficient,
causing IBA Chairman, Lord Thomson, to say publicly that
'there must be a better way' of regulating the commercial
television system. One example is the 'Network Agreement'
which came to light in 1987, whereby the ITV companies'
profits were guaranteed by a market-sharing agreement,
making their case a classic cartel (42). This has probably
made the ITV companies the most profitable sector of the
British economy (43). This agreement, perhaps illegal
under British law, and certainly under EC law, was not
stopped by the IBA, whose duty under the 1981 Broadcasting
Act to ensure adequate competition between the companies.
During 1986-87, the lEA was keen to stop these network
arrangements. In 1986, it twice prevented takeovers. In
October of the same year, it forbade Thorn-EMI and BET to
sell their stake (about 90 per cent) in Thames TV to
Carlton Communications (44) . It also prevented Rank
Organisation's takeover bid for the Granada Group (45).
The IBA's objection was the same in both cases. The
Authority picks franchise holders for a cycle of eight
years. The contracts for all except TV-am run out at the
end of 1989. It was believed that franchises could change
hands during their lease. This problem will certainly
emerge again in the future as television becomes a more
volatile industry. One answer could be a simple way of
awarding franchises, but because the IBA will soon be
replaced by the Independent Television Commission, these
points have become somewhat academic. Moreover, as Channel
3, ITV will remain regionally based. The franchises will be
auctioned and awarded in two steps: First, applicants have
to pass a 'quality threshold' to meet programming rules;
second, the winner will be the highest bidder (46).
Having realised that they would now be the main target of
the Government's policy on broadcasting, the ITV companies
are seeking ways of readjusting their positions. The
Government, willing to show its intentions, asked the
Office of Fair Trading to examine the monopoly status --
not a common practice (47) . 	 Moreover, in the 1987
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election campaign, Mrs Thatcher blamed the ITV companies
for charging 'whopping great prices', preventing small
businesses from getting on screen (48). How have the ITV
companies responded to these challenges? Since 1986, they
have been scrambling to diversify to protect themselves
against an uncertain future in which they will all lose
their monopolies, and some their franchises. ITV
executives believe that the conflicts of interest within
the network federation have grown so intense that the
federation is disintegrating (Sunday Times: 3 July 1988;
C7). There have been investments in other projects, such
as Thames TV in Astra, Granada in BSB, Television South's
acquisition of MTM Entertainment, etc. (49). Since the
White Paper, a spate of takeovers and mergers has been
predicted by City analysts; as one of them has said, 'some
of the companies will get together, others will look for
links with outside firms. Even some of the larger will be
vulnerable and will want to chose their partners rather
than fall prey to an unwanted bidder'(cf. Guardian: 8
November 1988; 8). The future will demonstrate to what
extent criticism of the IBA/ITV system was right and
whether current proposals will solve the problems.
2.3.3 BROADCASTING POLITICS AND THE BBC
Changes in British society and its political system made
the broadcasters' task more difficult than before (Negrine:
1985a). Moreover, the decline of the two-party, system
posed unfamiliar problems for broadcasting coverage
(Tunstall: 1986a). Under the two-party system the
broadcasters could comfortably balance opposites, keep
distances and feel able to survive in the 'middle ground'
(Kumar: 1977; 231-3). The attitude of British broadcasting
- especially the BBC - has tended to 'grativate towards the
centre and towards consensus in terms of politics and
values; in fact it took a perverse pride in being accused
by both the Labour and Conservative parties by pleasing
neither on occasions, it achieved a high degree of
impartiality' (Negrine: l985a; 22). In this context, it
should also be noted that British society, both ethnically
and culturally, has become more pluralist than in the past
(Kuhn: 1986a). The established ps broadcasters have often
found it difficult to respond to this growing societal
pluralism, even if they have taken initiatives with cases
like C4. Despite these initiatives, it remains difficult
for primarily mass-audience-oriented channels to reflect
the needs and concerns of a diverse society.
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Furthermore, 1981 saw the emergence of the Liberal-SDP
Alliance, which is itself the middle of the two parties.
This provoked problems for the BBC over the new party's
coverage. During the 1983 electoral campaign, broadcasters
were criticised for their willingness to include the SDP
in their election programmes and the broadcasting time
granted the new party (50). Even though the SDP enjoyed no
sympathy among the journalists (Seymour-Ure: 1982), it
received attention partly 'due to its personality but non
policy-based-party' (Seaton: 1986; 13), and partly because
it reflected broadcasters's middle-ground attitudes.
During 1981-86, the BBC had tremendous difficulties with
Conservative Government (51). Starting with the Falklands
war in 1982 (52), peaking with the Peacock Committee, and
seeming to 'calm down' with the dismissal of the
Corporations's DC, Mr Alastair Milne, in 1987. Some
examples of the BBC's clashes with the Government:
(1) In 1982, during the Falkiands war, broadcasters were
heavily criticised by the Government over their reports on
the conflict and of accused of a lack of patriotism.
(2) In January 1984, a Panorama programme alleging links
between Conservative MP5 and Far-Right politics led to
libel actions, resulting in a humiliating High Court
apology and compensation plus legal fees.
(3) In July 1985, the Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, a
'Thatcherite', asked the BBC not to screen a Real Lives
programme about Ulster. The Board of Governors ordered the
withdrawal of the programme, causing BBC journalists to
stage a one-day strike for the first time in the BBC's
history.
(4) In August 1985, the revelation that senior
appointments at the Corporation were vetted by the security
service, M15, fuelled speculation of Government
interference.
(5) In October 1986, the Conservative Party's Chairman,
Mr Norman Tebbitt, published a 21-page dossier on the BBC's
news coverage of the US raid on Libya, claiming evidence of
anti-government and anti-American bias, both rebutted by
the BBC.
(6) The dismissal of the BBC's DC days before a political
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row regarding government interference over a programme
concerning the Secret Society Series.
(7) A report by a journalist about a highly classified
Zircon satellite was withdrawn by BBC management.
These examples indicate a close, if tense, relationship
between broadcasters and those in power. Conflict becomes
unavoidable when broadcasters cannot positively favour
their 'rulers'. Of course, such a situation was
unthinkable for their French counterparts some years ago
when government intervention over new output used to be the
practice. To an outsider with some experience of direct
government control over broadcasting output, British
broadcasters seemed fortunate to be able produce programmes
according to their wishes, although they have indirectly
been government servants by having to either praise it or
obey its general directives. Thus, the terms of
impartiality and government intervention are increasingly
vague.
This relationship is neither new nor unique (see, for
example, the Suez Crisis) and will not change dramatically
in the future. It is important to remember that the
Conservatives placed broadcasters in an uncomfortable
situation. The BBC's image is not the same as it was in
the 1960s and 1970s. Its independence was brutally shaken,
and the commentators seemed to be sceptical about the old
'Beeb's' survival. The recent developments concerning
British broadcasting indicate that this will be quite
difficult because a more commercial attitude,even in news
output, is necessary. Whether commercialised news
programmes can offer the same quality and direct criticism
of government decisions and policies remains to be seen.
This government policy of attacking the BBC, however, has
damaged effect on the Corporation's domestic and
international image. The BBC of the late 1980s seems less
independent, even to its journalists and programme-makers.
The systematic and effective attack on the BBC has also
been associated with Tory propaganda that it was leaning to
the left and becoming unpatriotic. Of course, these
arguments are not quite true but the consequence is
apparent: it is harder today for the BBC to claim its
prestigious impartiality.
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2.3.4 THE PEACOCK COMMITTEE AND THE FUTURE OF BROADCASTING
The Peacock Committee wanted to sweep away the 'comfortable
duopoly' of the BBC and ITV by the turn of the century,
giving subscribers a choice between any number of
television programmes beamed directly into homes; giving
the consumer sovereignty. The 219-page report lists its 18
recommendations (Table page 298) for the first three stages
of deregulating the industry - starting by January 1988 -
and creating a free-market system dictated by the consumer.
The whole credo is that TV is a medium undergoing a form of
revolution, thanks to the development of cable and
satellite technologies. The report focuses on criticising
the inefficiencies of the 'comfortable duopoly' and the
practices and arrogance of the BBC and/or the IBA/ITV
system.
The evolutionary strategy's goal is defined as 'a system
which recognises that viewers are the best ultimate judges
of their own interest, which they can best satisfy if they
have the option of purchasing the broadcasting services
they require from as many alternative sources of supply as
possible'. The Committee concluded that for the time
being, advertising is not solution to the BBC's problems,
and that the licence fee should be indexed to RPI (53).
However, it was split on the question of privatising BBC
Radio One and Two, agreeing only that the Corporation
should be given this option. Only four of its seven
members supported a proposal to auction the ITV franchises
when the contracts expire in 1991.
The Committee also envisaged a three-stage transition from
the present television system. The first step towards a
free-market system would be to adapt TV sets for direct
subscription (54), which would replace the licence fee
during stage two in the late 1990s. The final stage, in
the twenty-first century, would introduce an era of
electronic publishing, during which customers would buy
packages of programmes much as they buy newspapers. This
multiplicity of choice would permit the creation of a full
broadband market, financed by subscription. A key
provision was that the free-market system should be
supplemented by a new Broadcasting Council to provide
programmes of minority or specialised interest with the
accent on 'knowledge, culture, criticism and experiment'.
This Council would have the right to stipulate programmes
that should be broadcast in a non-encrypted form. It would
be financed either by Government or by the broadcasters
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themselves.	 In this way, the Report hoped to alleviate
fears that its recommendations were the downhill path to
'wall-to-wall Dallas'. Another issue is that all
censorship should be eliminated because 'pre-publication
censorship has no place in a free society'. To further
deregulate, all restrictions on 'pay-per-view' should be
abolished; BT should be allowed to set up a national cable
network; the BBC and ITV should take at least 40 per cent
of their programmes from independent producers; the
'silent' early morning hours should be auctioned; and
satellite franchises should go on the market.
The members of the Committee, chaired by Professor Alan
Peacock, received evidence from 843 organisations and
individuals. The Report was drafted just as the traditional
structure of psb had been shaken by technological change.
The Committee could, conceivably, have ducked these issues
by focusing strictly on alternatives to the present licence
fee. Instead, it chose to broaden its remit and embrace
future broadcasting policy on the grounds that the new
technologies were making the duopoly untenable by opening
up huge potential for wider consumer choice. The result
was a report that contained a 'remarkable mix of
traditionalism and radicalism' (Financial Times 4 June
1986; 20), and also gave unquestioned support to the new
methods of communication, forgetting the conventional ones.
On the other hand, it accepted many Reithian concepts on
maintaining quality and range of programming, while
advocating a greater role for free-market forces.
In other words, this exemplifies the approach of trying to
'marry' opposites. Its analysis refreshingly clarified the
often-confused debate over broadcasting deregulation. In
particular, it rebutted the contention that more
competition must lead to lower programme standards by
forcing broadcasters to chase mass audiences. It
convincingly argued that this situation would be likely
only if broadcasters were forced to rely on advertising as
their principal form of financing. 	 In that case, they
would have to deliver big audiences to advertisers, instead
of bringing a wider range of choice to viewers. The
Committee answered that broadcasting policy should evolve
towards enabling viewers to register their choice by paying
for the programmes they watch, initially on a subscription
basis, and ultimately by being charged for individual
programmes. In principle, this is an admirable aim but
broadcasters and their products, the Committee argued, are
not physically different from books and magazines. BBC
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executives pointed out that the £2-billion British
publishing industry produces more than 50,000 books a year.
The costs, as noted in the beginning of this part, are
vastly different. The £2 billion may be enough to run just
four TV channels, but too little to run 30 or more channels
(Snoddy: 1986; 21).
To some extent, the Committee seemed to have overestimated
the impact of the new media when it argued that they will
threaten the duopoly. If the public wished to pay for a
broad range of extra TV services, how much deregulation
would be necessary or justified? To some, the Committee's
conclusions of indexing the BBC's licence fee and charging
a flat fee for car radios appeared reasonable for the time
being. It was over-eager to deregulate the existing
system, arguing that it was inherently unstable.
Broadcasters argued that there was little evidence in the
Report to support this claim.
Some other suggestions appeared to be more questionable.
While there was a strong case for reforming the IBA's
system of awarding ITV's franchises, not auctioning them
could encourage holders to maximise profits at the expense
of programme quality. It also seemed unreasonable to
insist that the BBC offer all its programmes on a
subscription basis while making the ITV companies continue
conventional broadcasting. The need to buy special
decoders to unscramble the BBC signals must risk reducing
its appeal to viewers. As Alastair Hetherington, one of the
Committee's members, notes, 'the Committee deliberately put
as its first unanimous recommendation a technical
requirement' (Hetherington: 1988; 15) that called for
subscription by requiring 'all new TV sets sold or rented
to the UK market.. . to have a peritelevision socket and
associated equipment'.
These problems highlight a much larger uncertainty
underlying the Committee's approach to longer-term policy.
The Committee offers a cogent analysis, as well as some
useful practical suggestions, but it needed to be clearer
in other respects. On one hand, it may be at least a
decade before it is known whether the Committee will become
a historical curiosity - flawed by too much abstract
thought, undiluted by common sense - or whether its report
will be seen as a visionary document that led to a real new
age of broadcasting choice and
	 independence from
government interference.	 In policy terms its
recommendations could be seen as points for a 'step-by-
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step' policy because the broadcasting stages the Committee
envisages have quite clear boundaries - rather than being a
kind of evolutionary transformation.
2.3.5 INTO THE POST-PEACOCK AND THE 1988 WHITE PAPER ERA
The Peacock Committee undoubtedly originated as a result of
the supposed unpopularity of increases in the BBC's licence
fee and a vocal lobby that suggested that advertising
would provide an alternative (Brittan: l987a; 4).
Criticism from the Conservative backbenchers that
'something should be done about the BBC and its claim for
a £65 licence fee', combined with a strong arguments that
the BBC was costly, inefficient and ridden with restrictive
practices backed by proponets of deregulation (O'Malley:
1988; 22-6). Additional momentum came from a clever
campaign by the advertising industry, which argued that the
market was big enough for another commercial channel
(Economist: 13 April 1985; 17).
The Peacock Committee was seen as the Government's 'hired
gun', hired to introduce BBC advertising (55). But as
noted, the Committee went much further than it was asked
to, taking a wider view of broadcasting. In 1989, Peacock
admitted that he stressed the terms of reference and funda-
mentally examined the broadcasting system, including ITV's
role (Sunday Times: 13 November 1988; C6). It seemed that
the Government was neither seeking nor expecting proposals
of such a radical nature and that these were unlikely to
find a place in the Government's repertoire. As Miller and
Sutherland (1988; C6) said, the Report was seen as a 'dead
duck'.
According to one of the Committee's members, Mr Samuel
Brittan, 'the main reason for Government's embarrassment
was that in putting forward the idea of a free broadcasting
market without censorship, Peacock ecposed many of the
contradictions in the Thatcherite espousal of market
forces' (Brittan: 1988; 3-4). Moreover, the opposition,
through its shadow Home Secretary, Gerald Kaufman, told
Parliament 'this report does not deserve even to go into
bin, it should go straight into the wastepaper bin' (Sunday
Times: 13 November 1988; C6). In principle, the Government
favoured deregulation, competition and consumer choice, but
there were also traditional Tories, like Douglas Hurd, who
were upset that the report opposed their plans to regulate
programming content.
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When the 1988 White Paper was published, the 'dead duck'
quacked (Miller and Sutherland: 1988; C6). The Paper
seemed tantamount to a ringing endorsement of Peacock's
vision and its recommendations have become the centrepoint
of government broadcasting policy. The Government finally
endorsed auctioning ITV franchises, expanding subscription
TV and adopting an entirely new broadcasting philosophy:
viewers, not broadcasters, should rule the airwaves. There
were signs that the Report was being seriously considered
before then. By setting up a Cabinet Committee, chaired by
the Prime Minister, which considered key recommendations,
for example. This Committee was a cross-departmental
working party (the DTI, HO, Arts and Libraries) to prepare
the White Paper.
Finally, by publishing the White Paper, the Conservative
Government has shown its desire to liberalise British
television for the l990s in the way advocated by the
Peacock Committee. The creation of a fifth, and possibly a
sixth, channel is under way, but the whole system will rely
upon the viewer's choice. The Government insists on
'quality, range and popularity',but critics say that this
new structure will threaten standards, increase censorship
and put commercial values before broadcasting. However,
the Government intends to ensure that ownership of
broadcasting will not be concentrated in fewer hands; the
White Paper contains ideas for limiting media ownership to
British, EC or overseas entrepreneurs (Guardian: 8 November
1988; 1).
2.3.6	 INDEPENDENT PROGRAMME PRODUCTION AND TRADITIONAL
BROADCASTERS
Since C4 was set up, the independent production sector has
grown steadily, as have its status and influence within
broadcasting. The independent producers had 'the flames of
their wildest dreams fanned by an extraordinary
recommendation in the Peacock report' (Housham: 1987; 8) --
that 40 per cent of BBC and ITV programmes should be
supplied by independent producers because C4 commissions,
were more cheaply and efficiently produced on the more
competitive independent markets. This was accepted in
principle by the HO, which modified the quota to 25 per
cent to be reached in four years. Therefore, the IBA and
BBC would require about 500 hours a year of 'independent
programming' within 1987-88 (56).
88
Some said that this would affect the quality, economy,
location and creativity of British television (57) in a
world of rapidly changing television trading patterns
(Paterson: 1987; 9). The argument went on to point out
that the small, independent TV stations could damage their
own carefully nurtured production facilities, and that the
Conservative Government was using independent producers to
weaken the trade unions' strength. The ITV companies, for
example, maintain a 25 per cent quota. On the other hand,
the Independent Programme Producers Association (IPPA)
argued that the gradual access for its members could be
accommodated without causing harmful industrial relations
because there was plenty of room for expansion. The ITV
networks' increased output to feed 24-hour transmissions
was given as an example of	 the need for new and
independent production programmers.
Another criticism was related to ITV's regional identity.
The IBA has been regarded as a 'guardian' of regional
programming which, to some extent, reflected regional
culture while providing regional employment. The difference
between an independent, like Diverse Productions, and an
ITV franchise contractor, like Scottish TV, was that
responsibility for the former lay with the shareholders,
whereas for the latter it lay with the shareholder, region
and the IBA. The argument was that the independent would
undermine the regional role by inevitably going where it is
cheaper and there are available facilities. London was
seen as the prime location. It was stressed that the metro-
politan centre of attraction would exacerbate the North-
South divide (58), leaching the north of jobs and culture,
similar to the US situation where Los Angeles is the centre
of productions (Paterson:1987;9). After a survey
undertaken in association with the IPPA, the independent
producers argued that regional production would encourage
independent access because more than 1050 production
companies and facilities houses were in the regions, with a
total annual turnover of £411 million.
However, it is debatable whether independent quotas can
improve the quality of the ITV/BBC programmes because these
factors necessarily hinge more decisively on the nerve and
imagination of the programme commissioners (Housham: 1987;
9). Many independents claim their commitment to psb would
protect British TV from the downmarket trends of
deregulation. The cynics expect the industry's 'old boys'
practices to persist, giving commissions to already-
established independent producers who have only just
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abandoned their BBC/ITV jobs. On the other hand, both the
BBC and ITV systems create the space for high-cost,
investigative programming, which might not be justified in
terms of audience size alone, but which is cushioned by the
high ratings won by popular dramas and light entertainment.
What size of 'dependent independent' (like the relationship
between them and C4) could achieve these 'creative
economies' of scale? The BBC and ITV programmes were
highly exploitable in the international marketplace, but
where were the independent producers' major achievements?
Nevertheless, a policy for independents could be made to
fit within the EC's television policy, which as we shall
see later, asks for an increase in independent productions
of the total programming output. Independent productions
could also decrease the well-protected programme-production
fields through the 'vertical duopoly' of the BBC and ITV,
concurrently weakening their bargaining power. However,
bearing in mind the demand for more programmes and
television outlets, an increase of independent productions'
identity seems necessary.
2.3.7	 UNDERMINING THE 'DUAL MONOPOLY'
The character of British broadcasting has been largely
determined by the social context of its development,
including the impact of the World War II and the public
service concept. The personality of the BBC's first DG,
John Reith, who effectively influenced the BBC's attitude,
was also crucial. From the start, broadcasting was seen as
a public service, a paramount concern for both individual
and society. Incidentally, commercial television developed
under this public service ethos, which can be seen in the
provisions and the duties of the Independent Television
Authority (later the IBA). The concept that broadcasting
must be the public's servant still underpins all UK
broadcast services, although interpreting this formula has
varied over the years. But the whole question of the
character of the duopoly remained ambiguous (Heller:
1978;9)
On this premise, a rather vague view of psb was formulated
in the UK. The Peacock Report reproduces some principles
(59) - borrowed from the Broadcasting Research Unit (BRU) -
that partly coincide with those found around the world: (1)
geographic universality, (2) provision for all interests
and tastes, (3) special provision for minorities,
especially the disadvantaged, (4) reflection of national
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identity, (5) independence of vested interest, including
the government of the day, (6) different sectors of
broadcasting not being competitively funded, (7)
competition in quality of programming, rather than for
audience size and funding, (8) liberalising, rather than
restrictive, guidelines for broadcasters.
However, Blumler et al. (1986) note that psb is like the
British Constitution: it is uncodified and adaptable. What
the Home Secretary called 'popularity', and what
broadcasters term 'high audience ratings' have already
become a guiding principle of the system, together with
range and quality. Nevertheless, taking a broad historical
perspective will show that it is the BBC, rather than the
commercial system, that has often been threatened. During
1981-86, the BBC was once again questioned, not over its
output but over what it represented: state monopoly.
The political climate was against any monopolistic output.
There were, and still are, many who want to reshape the
media, but most importantly, the dual monopoly was
challenged by an accidental consensus of both the Radical
Right and Left. In the UK, the BBC and IDA were criticised
over their accountability and lack of openness to the
societies they represent (Hood: 1986; 61). The Radical
Left called for a broader range of opinions, greater access
to the media and democratic control over broadcasting
institutions (Hood: 1986, Curran: l986a). The Radical
Right argued that business interests should exploit the new
technology (for reasons which had little to do with the
social role of broadcasting and much to do with the
uninhibited play of market forces in a monetarist economy)
(Hood:1986; 60). In the UK, the doctrine of deregulation
was mainly articulated by the Times newspaper, Adam Smith
Institute and the advertisers. They pointed out that the
only criterion for judging programme quality was how many
people liked it. As the Times (15 January 1985; 8) put it:
'we need a more open and less monolithic system of
broadcasting in which customers can choose what qualities
they want from their television sets'.
In October 1984, the big advertising agency, Saatchi and
Saatchi - which handled the Tory party's election campaigns
in 1979 and 1983 - published Funding the BBC: the case for
allowing advertising , in which they argued that the licence
fee was inequitable, hitting the poor hardest, and that
collecting it was expensive. Advertising would fill this
gap, without lowering programme standards. This coincided
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with the Conservative Government's feeling that the power
of the 'market forces' should determine the shape of
economic structures, even in broadcasting. The Adam Smith
Institute, in a series of pamphlets, like The Omega Report
on Communications, made some influential points for right-
wing thinking on broadcasting by emulating the free-market
principles of the 19th century in broadcasting, as well as
in other spheres of public life such as the health service,
energy, etc.
As O'Malley (1988; 15-7) has shown, industry suffered
escalating costs and a growing concentration of ownership.
These factors have prevented very powerful companies
entering the industry and have limited the range of
political and social opinions available in mass circulation
papers. He concludes: 'the idea that the newspaper press
since the l960s is a model of the unrestrained market
operating for the good of the consumer is simply
inaccurate. One form of regulation, the state, was replaced
by another, the market'.
The new technology that promised a plethora of new channels
lent support to deregulation but, amazingly, the Government
did not tale the necessary step. Instead, it questioned the
vertical duopoly of the traditional broadcasters. Moreover,
the high penetration of VCR5 (over 8 million, i.e. third
position after the US and Japan) backed the argument that
the British favoured more choice. During 1981-86, the BBC
was once again questioned about its status but was again
left more or less intact. This was not because the BBC was
strong. That it won the 'advertising war' must be seen in
the context of it losing every single battle (less money,
more commercial management, etc.), confirming its weakness
despite its lobbying. But if the BBC was to lose the war,
it had to be dissociated from its 'frere ennerni', the ITV
system, because together they constituted a duopoly leaving
little room for deregulation.
Nevertheless, this duopoly contains a strong psb element.
This has made the Government, the Peacock Committee, and
even the 1988 White Paper, appear confused or contradictory
because in all three there is a willingness to fight
duopoly and, at the same time, to preserve it. The
Conservative Government created panic and uncertainty in
1980s by using the technological change argument, whereas
in the post-Peacock, White-Paper era, it is clear that
technology is not enough.	 On the contrary, a whole
political rationale has developed to lead broadcasting into
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the competitive environment but agit, under the
supervision of the state and its 'watchdo gs', like the ITC
and the Broadcasting Standards Council.
2.3.8 A 'POLICY OF REFLECTION' FOR TERRESTRXAL TELEVISION
The process of 'privatisation' adopted by the Conservatives
has been well under way within the communications sector
(Murdock: 1984; 265). The Government's objective has been
to regulate 'lightly', giving priority to the commercial
development of a competitive industry providing consumer
choice. Despite the aim to produce step-by-step
deregulation/privatisation, attempts to fulfil this were
half-hearted. For example, apart from asking for
competition in broadcasting, the Government has not really
instituted this in the broadcasting scene. Nevertheless,
this step-by-step policy-making has continued in fairly
traditional consensual ways. Policies have been modified
pragmatically. For example, when the Government realised
that the technology arguments were inadequate, it changed
tack to consumer choice. In the post-Peacock era, the
Government has shifted the target (from BBC to ITV) but
kept the same aim: competition in broadcasting, which has
put the BBC and ITV under pressure. In the 1980s, the
Government seemed to realise that the BBC had a powerful
ally in the ITV system, which was also hostile to new
entrants. To a certain extent, the latter was obvious in
the evidence given to the Peacock Committee by the IBA-ITV.
It could be an oversimplification, but looking at the whole
period from the outside, it is possible to see a
'piecemeal' approach. That the policy was neither concrete
nor coherent does not weaken the argument for it being
fragmented. Besides, the history of British broadcasting
policy backs this point. This country has been notorious by
its absence of a national communications policy (Tunstall:
1983; 238, Briggs and Spicer: 1986; 13-4, Seymour-Ure:
1987; 271-6). There is no place, no institution, no
research society, no intellectual network for formulating
policy options for the television sector. Current
terrestrial broadcasting, future satellite broadcasting,
cable, video, and cinema are dealt with through ad hoc
measures. Seymour-Ure (1987; 278-81) notes that
broadcasting policy in general may surely be regarded as an
active policy area, but that it has been associated with
the 'no media policy' tradition in British political
culture.	 However, as Seymour-Ure also argues, the
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Conservatives managed to have a kind of policy on cable
TV, constituting an innovation. This innovation has been
transferred to the terrestrial TV sector because the TV
screen remains the same whether receiving cable or direct-
from-satellite programmes.
Seymour-Ure (1987; 283) also asks to what extent there
could be a coherent media policy without a coherent notion
of 'media'. The lack of a Ministry of Communications has
been noted by various scholars in the field (Curran and
Seaton: 1987, Tunstall: 1986a, Seymour-Ure: 1987, Briggs
and Spicer: 1986). Of course, this demand is linked more
to the need for a long-term and coherent media policy than
to establishing of a new department. A coherent media
policy and a single department would also require
significant changes in government attitudes in order 'to
remove - or at least reconcile - the paradoxes observable
in the present jumble of policies' (Seymour-Ure: 1987;
285)
Setting up the Peacock Committee is related to another
characteristic of the system: the periodic government
enquiries that try to coordinate a policy on either
broadcasting or press (if a Commission has been set up for
an inquiry on press). These enquiries bubble to the
surface about every 10 years, addressing remarkably similar
questions and often having no immediate effect. The
Peacock Committee was to look at the funding of the BBC
while the first of the committees on broadcasting, the
Sykes Committee (1923), also rejected advertising on the
BBC because it would lead to lower standards. Other
reports, such as the Beveridge Enquiry (1949), produced
change in unexpected ways. Within three years, its
majority recommendation that the BBC's monopoly should be
preserved led to commercial television. Many of the Annan
Committee's recommendations were rejected but Lord Annan
said his Committee's ideas 'had been influential on the
broadcasting structure' (Financial Times: 4 July 1986; 19).
The idea for a fourth channel run by the OBA, although
rejected, led to the establishment of C4. Comparing these
committees, especially Annan and Peacock, makes the Annan
committee appear somewhat more cultural, intellectual and
less business-oriented, whereas the Peacock Committee was
widely regarded as an economically, rather than culturally,
oriented report.
This, however, gives us an exact picture of our times: the
economic vs. the cultural aspect of broadcasting.
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peacock's is the first committee in post-war Britain to
place the economics of broadcasting at the centre of
policy-making; therefore, it becomes increasingly important
by either adding to or modifying our conventional
thinking on the subject. Indeed, the latest Committee on
broadcasting, after publishing the 1988 White Paper, seems
to have influenced the whole government policy initiative.
Since late 1986, British broadcasting has been 'undergoing
an historically unprecedented period of turbulence' (Dyson
and Humphreys: 1988a; 251) since new ideas, acts and
legislation have emerged. For policy development, the 1980s
have proved rather a transitional period for conventional
broadcasters to reflect and adopt to new strategies. Also,
in terms of government policy, this period has been
complex and without a clear policy, but a time of rhetoric
favouring deregulation and thinking how to implement it.
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2.4.0 FRENCH TELEVISION UNDER THE SOCIALISTS
Until 1981, no French government was prepared to abolish
the state monopoly over broadcasting. The election of
François Mitterrand as President unleashed a chain of
events in state broadcasting media and the public. The new
Government, in its early days, embarked upon its programme
with determination, calling for immediate reforms.
Nevertheless, the real challenge to the monopoly came also
from public-service journalists and unions, as well as from
ecology and anti-nuclear movements who began to adopt
pirate radio broadcasts as a part of their strategy. Since
1981, the Socialists boasted a regional element of state
broadcasting as part of their general commitment to the
decentralisation of power away from Paris. A new condition,
accompanied by a change in attitudes, was needed more than
ever if French broadcasting was to remedy traditional
problems and, perhaps, prepare for the advent of the much-
wanted audiovisual revolution (Kuhn: 1986, July: 1982,
Ramonet: 1982).
The 29 July 1982 Audiovisual Coininunications Act (Loi 82),
which marked a clean break with this traditional system,
was to open the media sector to new actors and allow new
opportunities for traditional actors. This process was
facilitated by the provisions of Loi 82, which were couched
in terms that would allow subsequent decrees (décréts d'
application) to fill in specific points. However, the
liberalisation process proved more extensive than
originally conceived by the proponents of the new Act.
Loi 82 was drafted by the Ministry of Communications on the
basis of a report commissioned by the Moinot Commission in
September 1982, and if it did not literally repeat Moinot's
proposals, it maintainec its essentia2 concepts.. The
setting up of a special Ministry of Communications meant
that the state was in command of the whole administrative
prerogative and specific policies of the sector. In taking
such a step, the Socialist Government clearly pronounced
that communications were part of its reform programme.
This reform came through Loi 82, which set up the Haute
Autorite (HA) to act as a buffer between the Government and
the broadcasters. Although the HA signified the 'rupture
avec le passé', it did not have the power to authorise the
nation-wide terrestrial channels, which were mainly
controlled by the central state. During its short life
(1982-86), the HA struggled to prove its independence from
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the government, which sought to restrict its influence,
unwilling to provide the HA with its own status. Loi 82, on
the other hand, created a complex and confusing legal
framework but allowed space for future developments because
it was a 'loi cadre', which means adaptable to changes.
Through Loi 82, the Government allowed new entrants to the
broadcasting sector. Nevertheless, this framework was not
functionally better for existing companies in the
audiovisual sector, making it more complex by creating a
range of bodies without proposing accountable solutions for
the dominant financial problems. On the political level,
the aspects represented by Loi 82 were between a liberal
Thatcherite logic and a voluntarist, statist, dirigiste
logic because the Act was neither a representative of
deregulation, nor exactly a state-driven attitude. The
case of radio was, in some way, a de facto situation which
fell under legal and regulatory framework.
Liberalising the state monopoly on television was
contradictory and speculative because the broadcasting
policy was to be different from the one pursued by the
Socialists during their first years in power. The launch
of Canal Plus (C+) could be considered successful within
the context of a coherent planning policy, following an
option of controlled deregulation under the auspices of the
state. On the contrary, the cases of La Cinq and TV6 (now
M6) aroused a furore of reactions, finally making the
whole issue a 'political hot potato' just few months
before the 1986 parliamentary elections. It created a range
of reactions on the domestic level between Government,
opposition, press and film industry and other interested
parties. On the intergovernment level, the reactions came
from leading government figures and, internationally, from
Luxembourg. This movement has largely been associated with
the French polity. The Socialist Government abandoned its
plans for a coherent policy or 'limited deregulation' on
the audiovisual sector, favouring political sympathisers,
and especially European entrepreneurs and interests, rather
than merely French ones. This deregulation was motivated
by partisan ends, a situation already so prevalent in
French broadcasting and press policies. Thus, in the 1980s,
the debate concerning broadcasting deregulation was
eventually led by party politics, rather than financial
considerations. Moreover, this broadcasting policy was
characterised by rapid changes closely related to the U-
turns in the Socialist Government's general policy.
However, the decline of the state monopoly over
broadcasting must be seen within a general framework of the
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needs and expectations of the French society associated
with the financial problems of the monopoly, as well as the
general political conjuncture relating to the new
broadcasting media.
The Socialist Government's policy could be seen in two
stages. The first, the 'euphoria period', started roughly
with the Moinot Commission (1981) and lasted until
President Mitterrand's announcement (January 1985) about
creating private terrestrial channels. It was a period
closely associated with the development and fortunes of
cable television in France. The second stage commences with
the commissioning of the Bredin Report (1985) from Prime
Minister Laurent Fabius and terminates with the 1986
general elections. This stage could be called an 'anxiety
period' because the Government pressures for new channels
coincided with the beginning of the so-called 'Italian
media anarchy', and most wanted to avoid such a situation
for the 'Paysage Audiovisuel Francais'[(PAF)-the French
Audiovisual Landscape].
To understand those changes, one has to bear the Socialist
Government's mixed track record in mind. While some
important Socialist policy objectives appear to have been
met, many policy aims were adjusted or remained
unfulfilled, while others were quietly abandoned (Mazey:
1986; 412-3). It seems that 'controlled liberalisation'
of broadcasting was similarly abandoned for partisan
purposes, indicating the explosion of another myth
concerning the French state. It was generally believed
that the dominant policy-making style, since 1958, was
rationalist. But policy performance in the 1980s cannot be
fully understood in these terms.
Furthermore, the Socialist Government's policy record
confirms that state policy-making is too varied and coinplex
to be encouraged within a single schema. In the cable TV
case, despite often being potrayed as a monolithic
Leviathan model, the state was, in fact, extremely
fragmented. Therefore, public and, in this case,
audiovisual, policy has to be seen under the wider
sociopolitical reality of the politico-administrative
system, meaning that the French government is not a
cohesive body with a single set of policy preferences.
This lack of cohesiveness is very useful in understanding
the Socialists' fluctuations and 'long-jumps' concerning
French broadcasting.
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2.4.1 THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 29 JULY 1982
Loi 82 was a long and complex statute, not limited to psb,
that included 110 articles and concerned the whole
audiovisual sector. Loi 82's provisions corresponded to
the Government's effort to provide a coherent policy, but
it also provided a complex framework of various
organisations. On the other hand, it offered the
opportunity of competition and some decentralisation, but
again under the state's control. In particular, Loi 82
simply expressed two characteristics of the Socialist
Government: French politicians's frenetic desire to
introduce their own legislation on the broadcasting system,
and the fact that the 'fragmented Leviathan' was also
subject to international and external pressures.
Therefore, in a deregulatory era, the Socialists had to
react and respond to those developments and pressures
before losing control of the entire situation.
The prelude to Loi 82 was a 12-member commission announced
by Premier Mauroy in July 1981 and headed by senior civil
servant, Pierre Moinot, to study and make recommendations
on the future broadcasting structure. In effect, Mauroy
said that the reform should: guarantee the political
autonomy of the state media; decentralise the media and
promote pluralism; and establish creativity in programming
within the overall mission of culture, education,
entertainment and information (Presse Actualité: September-
October 1981). In October 1981, just as the law on radio
passed a second reading, the Moinot Commission tabled its
Report (CROPPM (Moinot Commission): 1981).
Written mostly in rather technocratic language, addressing
itself mainly to the administration, the Report settled
perfectly into a historic discourse on French media (Raboy:
1983; 311). It referred to the the legacy of 1789 and to
historic struggles for freedom of opinion, expression and
the press. It quickly linked those historic rights, and the
contemporary administrative needs to organise them, by
stressing that government was the guardian of civil
liberties. Moreover, it regarded the concept of 'public
service' as the conclusion to the right to communicate,
stating the incompatibility of psb with control from either
political or economic power. The Report's main
recommendation was to set up an independent authority,
named by the President and the chief magistrates of the
state. The authority would guarantee psb guidelines stated
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by	 the	 government,	 such	 as	 'autonomy'	 and
'decentralisation' (60).
Loi 82 expressed four main principles: (i) modifications in
the conditions of existence and representation of the
broadcasting system, (ii) a centralised information
apparatus still with a tendency for decentralisation, (iii)
a tendency of exchanging information and cultural
programmes, and (iv) introduction of new technologies and
new functions combining data processing, telecoms and
audiovisual systems. Loi 82 focused on abandoning the state
monopoly over programming.
In principle, psb was to continue, but the state had to
give up its exclusive rights of controlling all sources of
broadcasting output, although it retained control of
frequency allocation. The monopoly aspects of Loi 82 could
be summarised as follows: (i) no television station could
transmit without state permission, (ii) the Government
could determine the operating conditions of the state
television companies and nominate, directly or indirectly,
the principal managers, (iii) the Government played an
essential role in SOFIRAD and Havas agencies and used its
power through the licence fee, and (iv) centralisation
of the system remained because the President of the
Republic himself would authorise the entrance of commercial
private channels. All important decisions concerning the
French audiovisual sector since 1982 had notably been made
on the level of Secretariat d' Etat a la Communications,
not by the Cabinet but by the President and the Prime
Minister. Loi 82, however, apart from psb, allowed the
private sector to evolve and develop as shown by the
introduction of 'radios libres'. Another major innovation
was the creation of the Haute Autorite to act as a buffer
between the state and the broadcasters. Loi 82
distinguished between the legal provisions governing the
'hardware' media and those of 'programme content'. It also
acknowledged that it would be much more difficult to retain
the present distinction between telecommunications and
broadcasting because the same network would be used for TV
and telephone. Thus, the Government considered that all
media infrastructures had to have a common set of
regulations, a similar approach to the DGT's strategy for
the new media. In addition, Loi 82 distinguished between
the forms of communication and the availability of the
media, envisaging three cases: the 'abundant media'
(videotext, teletext); media needing permission to transmit
(cable and local radio) ; and the private elements on
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terrestrial television.
Decentralisation was a major concern of Mitterrand's early
presidency. The Socialists attempted to introduce
legislation to spread power from the centre to the regions
creating departments for functions previously carried out
by state appointees. Regional councils were to be directly
elected and their power increased. This decentralist
tendency was to apply to the broadcasting sector as well.
Apart from the 'Committees Regionaux de la Communication
Audiovisuelle', Loi 82 provided guidelines for establishing
regional companies ('Sociétés Régionales de la
Radiodiffusion Sonore') to coordinate the activities of
local stations (Article 50), which had existed since the
late 1970s under the auspices of Radio France. Another
provision (Article 51) concerned the better organisation of
regional television. Minority local-language programmes
something discouraged under previous administrations were
to have more time and finally, advertising was to help
finance regional TV productions. Loi 82 was duly passed in
the National Assembly with the Socialists voting in favour,
the Conservatives against, and the Communists abstaining.
Conservative opposition was expected, but they wanted to
further the reform by opening-up the broadcasting to
private concerns(61). The Communist abstention was also
expected they feared the new bill went too far by
weakening public control (62), preparing the way for the
invasion of private interests (Le Monde: 18 May 1982).
As a general framework, Loi 82 allowed space for various
developments (63) because it became clear that some things
could not be reformed immediately. Thus, some measures
would under pressure be reappealed (as on local radio
advertising which eventually introduced in 1984). Although
the act provided a formal account of the psb structure, it
failed to find solutions in important areas such as
financing (regarding local and regional radio and TV
stations). Its basic concern was the transitional period
during which the authorities had to respond to day-to-day
lobby pressures. Moreover, commercial television
stations, although banned by the Government, could not be
legally sued because Loi 82 did not provide any relevant
sanctions (Kuhn: 1985, Sorbets and Palmer: 1986).
Television under these provisions found itself between the
Haute Autorite (HA), the Government and the National
Assembly (Missika and Wolton: 1986). Parliamentary power
was also reinforced, especially because of financial
rearrangements allowing it to vote the amount of public
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money given to public broadcasters. Broadcasters also had
to keep a balance between the Haute Autorité's supervision
and the state's policies. The Government's main concern,
however, was to avoid the 'anarchy of the Italian media' by
taking small steps towards deregulation. To a certain
extent, Loi 82 demonstrates the abandonment of the state's
de lure monopoly. On the other hand, maintaining the state
monopoly over the nation-wide broadcasting industry did not
prevent other companies from entering the new media
programming market at the local level (Flichy: 1984,
Boudon: 1986). At another level, this situation could help
the Government to avoid the pressure towards broadcasting
privatisation. Moreover, Loi 82 was a complex amalgam of
national and regional broadcasting companies and
'établisséments publiques' such as TF1, A2, FR3 TDF, etc.
(64) . All of these companies, and others of secondary
importance, were part of the broadcasting system with the
state as single, or at least principal, shareholder (65).
These companies, according to Loi 82, were to be financed
by a mixture of advertising revenue and licence fee (66).
2.4.2 THE HAUTE AUTORITE DE LA COMMUNICATION AUDIOVISUELLE
The HA was seen as a move toward a kind of pluralism in
state media but it was difficult to avoid government
interference, despite attempts to present an independent
profile. The HA was the second greatest innovation after
the 'radios libres' (Article 10) because it signified the
change in broadcasting affairs associated with political
interference. This situation resulted from a political
system that never achieved a significant degree of
political consensus. The HA's powers, however, were limited
(such as on nominating TV company directors, broad
supervision concerning the psb character, permission for
transmission to 'radios libres' and local, off-the-air
channels) -
The HA's competence shows the Government's dilemma of
liberalising the system while maintaining control over its
performance and output. It seems that the HA's relative
autonomy was not a break with tradition, but rather an
extension of it. As an innovation of Loi 82, the HA had to
work with the state within a limited	 deregulation
framework,	 primarily	 through	 the	 Ministry	 of
Communications.
The HA's duty was to ensure the broadcasters' autonomy, and
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that they would respect the ps guidelines contained in the
'cahiers des charges'. The HA was responsible for granting
licences to local radio stations and cable operators, as
well as for harinonising the channel's programme schedules,
representing French broadcasting to relevant international
bodies and appointing the heads of the public TV companies
-- it was a vital part of the new broadcasting structure.
Nevertheless, it did not have the powers to authorise the
nationwide terrestrial channels, which were directly
controlled by the Ministry of Communications; its real
power was limited to channel operation as it could not
intervene in the management --particularly because the
licence fee was fixed by Parliament. Therefore, it lacked
both political independence and economic power.
Forming the HA was a matter of fierce political
controversy. The Moinot Commission recommended that it have
nine members, only three of whom could be political
appointees chosen by the President. Mitterrand, however,
decided that all the HA's members should be political
appointees (Le Monde: 7 March 1982). The appointment method
of the so-called 'neuf sages' (nine wise men) (67) was
similar to that of the Conseil Constitutionel (68) (Kuhn:
1983; 75-6). Since the Assembly Presidency is also a
partisan post, unlike the Office of Speaker in the British
House of Commons, it is not surprising that the HA had a
'left-of-centre' flavour (69).
Loi 82 also created the Conseil National de la
Communication Audiovisuelle (CNCA), which was a
consultative body of 56 members representing the various
groups involved in the field (70). Its role was to advise
the HA and Government on issues related to broadcasting, as
well as to appoint a minority of the Governors to the
boards of the TV companies. The CNCA was a different
version of the Social and Economic Council, which was in
the French tradition of corporate representation. Because
of its size, composition and limited power, the CNCA did
not played a decisive role in the audiovisual sector.
The dual supervision of broadcasters caused tension between
the HA and the Government was the former tried to assess
its powers and the latter sought to maintain its capacity
of influencing developments in the field. Responsibilities
were shared as	 follows:	 the HA controlled local
communication and the psb, 	 whereas nation-wide
communication, including cable and satellite, was given to
the Government.	 Thus, the HA could hardly play the
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referee's role in both private and public sectors. In
addition, it remained powerless in the face of important
decisions concerning La Cinq and TV6. It could uphold
complaints from Opposition MPs of 'biased' treatments.
Broadly speaking, it was the focus of complaints from
political parties, interest groups and individuals who, in
turn, pressured management and staff of the separate
companies (71). The French widely believe that the
Government's attitude made it impossible for the HA to
clarify its position on many broadcasting matters, partly
because the Government managed to create a body to
supervise the broadcasting outlet without being
simultaneously identified with the executive power. Of
course, this ambition for independent broadcasting could
hardly agree with a dirigiste state attitude. It could also
be said that HA was created during the l980s to calm down
the heavily politicised French broadcasting system.
Nevertheless, given the development of the new media in
France and the changing nature of the system as a whole,
the HA was founded too late to influence the future of
French broadcasting (Missika and Wolton: 1983; 23, Kuhn:
1986; 18). Under the 'Loi Leotard' of 1986, the
Conservative Government replaced the HA with the Commission
National pour la Communication et des Libértés (CNCL).
However, after the 1988 elections, the Socialist Rocard
Government replaced the CNCL in 1989 with a body similar to
the old HA, the Conseil Superieur de 1' Audiovisuel(CSA)
(72)
2.4.3 THE 'RADIOS LIBRES': THE FIRST BREAK IN STATE
MONOPOLY
Loi 82 aimed to ensure expression and to give access to
cultural, social, professional and philosophical groups, as
well spreading French culture, improving knowledge and
developing the concept of citizenry (Eskenazi: 1981,
Cazeneuve: 1980). Radio fell under this framework.
However, abandoning radio monopoly recognised a de facto
situation since even the Socialists themselves, when in
opposition, were involved in the 'radios libres' (73)
Therefore, after 1981 the 'gates' were opened to a larger
number of astonishingly varied, small, privately run, local
radio stations (74). Many different groups now enjoyed
access to local frequencies (75). Not surprisingly, radio
proved quite popular and the new stations challenged the
previous dominance of the state-run networks and the
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peripheral stations. Decentralisation seemed more marked
with the introduction of public stations at the department
level. The law of private local stations now totalled 1000.
As municipal radios were not allowed, town councils also
joined in, though they had to be careful not to contribute
more than 25 per cent of the relevant station's revenue
(Kuhn: 1985; 59).
Nevertheless, the Government sought to organise the new
private radio stations. Although they did not have to
follow the psb requirements regarding programming, their
maximum transmission capacity had to be no more than 30Km.
According to Kuhn (1985; 59-60), two particular aspects of
the government's policy were criticised: financing and
frequency allocation. The first, and perhaps most
controversial, was the initial decision banning radio
advertising. The Government adopted this approach to keep a
balance between the advertising budgets of state
broadcasting media and the new radio stations (Le Monde: 25
September 1982). The Socialists' ideological hostility
towards the commercial ethos was another reason. The
Government also considered the potential losses of
advertising funds from regional press. Because that
decision was controversial enough (76), and impossible to
control (77), the Government abandoned the advertising ban
through the Loi of August 1, 1984.
This situation indicates that the Government, even without
considerable pressure, was confused and ignored
advertisers' pressures, eventually having to accept what
it wanted to avoid: the dominance of advertising on the new
radio stations. This attitude could be seen as a prelude
to their television policy and their anxiety to avoid a
'dereglementation sauvage' (wild deregulation). The radio
advertising case also illustrates the unsuccessful
Socialist hope of finding a balance between market
pressures and political confusion. The second problem with
radio was the demand for licences, which far outstripped
available radio frequencies. Paris, in particular, was the
most demanding. The HA tried to satisfy all applicants for
a radio station licence but there were some difficult
cases, such as Radio Solidarité (Kuhn: 1985; 62).
Radio's advantage over television was that, with its lower
overheads and production costs, it could multiply its
outlets while still offering a wide choice. This explains
the willingness of the French audience, deprived of choice
for long time, to welcome these new 'radios libres'. Radio
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deregulation, however, shows clearly that the radio as
'libre' only in name because economic, rather than
politico-ideological, interests were regarded first, as
opposed to the 1970s situation of wanting an alternative
voice to the state media.
2.4.4 LIBERALISATION, DEREGULATION AND THE POLITICS OF
TELEVISION
Developments on terrestrial television moved so fast that
French people, used to a calm landscape of three public TV
channels, now had to adjust rapidly against a background of
complex political and financial manoeuvres (Tarle: 1986).
Under the Socialist Government, the country acquired three
new channels (Canal Plus, La Cinq, TV6), in less than 18
months (October 1984 to February 1986), which relied on
available hertzien frequencies. Setting up the last two
aroused a fierce political debate, confirming once again
the close relationship between politics and broadcasting.
The Socialists, having experienced over 20 years of right-
wing political control, hoped to introduce a measure of
liberalisation. Thus, the licensing of 'radios libres' and
the pay TV channel, Canal Plus, fitted within this
framework. But the Government found it hard to liberalise
and maintain ps ideals, like restricting the amount of
imported programming. Political wisdom suggested should it
revise some of its policies.
Late in 1984, when cable and satellite projects hold up
(see Part 3) , the Elysee announced that commercial
terrestrial television channels would be authorised.
Article 79 of Loi 82 provided for such stations to be
operated on the basis of Government concessions, but it had
repeated that this would not be carried out until much
later. However, Mitterrand's office put forward the view
that only commercial stations could capture an audience
big enough to attract advertisers. It must be noted that
there was pressure for new channels. In spring 1984,
clandestine stations intermittently spluttered into life,
only to be extinguished by police raids (78). These
private stations were named 'libres', reminiscent of
'radios libres', but the Government was reluctant to
deregulate television; the Socialists rejected the idea of
allowing private television stations to transmit on
terrestrial frequencies. The Government also seemed to
plan the country's future PAF on four channels in addition
to those broadcast from TDF1 (Parrot: 1985, Grantam: 1984).
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In January 1985, Mitterrand said in a television interview
that there was room for 80-85 local TV channels and that PS
television should remain best guarantee of quality. Premier
Fabius commissioned the well-known lawyer, Jean-Denis
Bredin, to produce a report within three months concerning
the feasibility of introducing new channels into the PAF.
The major recommendations of the Bredin Mission's report in
May 1985 were the baseline for the President's proposals
for Loi 85, passed by the National Assembly in September
1985.
The Bredin Report embodied a generally cautious approach to
developing commercial television in France, stressing the
financial and technical limitations of private television.
It also proposed setting up two national channels, formed
in association with a large number of local ones.
Mitterrand, relying on these suggestions, envisaged
creating about 80 channels operating within 62 centres
(79). Additionally, many large French publishing groups
shared an interest in launching either local or nation-wide
channels, such as Hersant and Hachette. The Report also
recommended that the two channels be capable of
broadcasting to a third of the population (about 17
million). According to the Report, this number would rise
to about 22 million as additional transmitters were
gradually installed.
It was also suggested that advertising would be enough to
support the new channels. According to the Report's
calulations, France's advertising revenue was roughly FF
23.7 billion in 1985, increasing to no more than FF3
billion by 1990. Given that each national channel costs
FF16.5 billion a year to run, two new channels would soak
up all the additional revenue (Marketing: 4 July 1985, j
Medias: June 1985). This aroused many reactions such as
whether the Report considered that the three state-run
channels had already started adopting a more 'advertising-
hunting' attitude. Commentators said that advertising
revenue would not even be enough to support one channel.
The Report felt that C+ should jettison its recent policy
of selling advertising and revert to its original funding,
based on subscription and sponsorship. The Ministers of
Culture and the PTT also questioned the advisability of
introducing private terrestrial channels. President
Mitterrand and Prime Minister Fabius, however, favoured
Bredin's recommendations, which were eventually passed by
Parliament; after the January 1985 announcement for private
television, about 400 potential private operators came
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forward (80).
It is obvious that the Government was anxious about the go-
ahead for new channels, which had become a political 'hot
potato' over the years.
	
The Conservatives, vulnerable
faced with Socialist-controlled television, argued for
complete privatisation (Kuhn: 1986, Riols: 1985, Betts:
1985). This must also be linked with the deregulatory mood
of the early 1980s. Thus, French Conservatives, and
Gaullists in particular, could not escape this climate and
demand a reduction of the state sector.
On the other hand, the Socialists had to face the failure
of their 1982 economic experiment, rising unemployment,
their setback in the 1983 municipal elections and the 1984
elections for the European Parliament. But the Socialists
were no longer uncritical of the state. Within this
environment, the Conservatives increased their pressure. In
May 1984, Jacques Chirac, as the Gaullist leader, announced
his policy for privatising one state channel (Le Monde: 14
May 1984) (81). In 1985 the Conservative's slogan,
'liberté, practicabilité, viabilité', implied that the
state must stop involving itself, either directly or
indirectly, in any communication organisation (Riols:
l985b, O'Connor: 1985, Querat: 1985). Therefore, the
Socialists' announcement introducing new commercial
channels was a counter-attack on Conservative rhetoric. In
addition, the Socialists tried to give the impression that
they were the first to dare to deregulate broadcasting. It
is not certain, however, how much further a Conservative
Chirac government would privatise the PAF.
The Government's decision to grant the country's first
commercial television - La Cinq - to Jereme Seydoux, head
of the Chargeurs SA industrial holding company, and one of
France's richest men, and to Silvio Berlusconi, illustrates
the political character of French broadcasting. In effect,
it sent shock-waves through French politics while leaving
national contenders, in whose business the state had a
stake (e.g. SOFIRAD, Havas), or semi-national contenders
such as CLT, out in the cold. The decision over La Cinq's
ownership ignited a furore of opposition, not only from the
Left and Right, but within the Socialists themselves. It
also caused a crescendo of protest from the film industry,
broadcasters, publishers and other powerful lobbies, even
the HA (in the TV6 case), putting the Government in a very
embarrassing position. The Conservatives promised to
reallocate the channels but Mitterrand, ironically, as an
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opposition leader who had frequently attacked former
President d'Estaing for his close links with the country's
press barons, once claiming that he was managing a
'Kriegspiel' against the freedom of information, was now
closely linked to the Seydoux family himself.	 The
Communists again opposed the inroad of commercial
interests into the broadcasting sector, considering
commercial TV incompatible with the maintenance of psb
principles. Opposition from the Socialists was mainly led
by Minister of Culture Jack Lang, who considered that
France's cultural sovereignty was threatened by Berlusconi,
whose reputation was built on the popular concept of
'tabloid television', composed of US productions, TV Globo
telenovelas, B-movies and quiz variety shows. Lang and
others saw the decision as a beginning of some thing to
avoid, i.e. a 'Coca-Cola culture'. Berlusconi's programming
was characterised as 'demagogue', privileging the
'debilité' (weakness) of culture.
Mitterrand had no choice but to move, and swiftly, on the
commercial TV decision because both the domestic political
and European audiovisual landscapes were becoming hostile
to Socialists. On the other hand, Berlusconi represented
what Mitterrand had always wanted to avoid: the Italian
media anarchy. Thus, the decision over La Cinq appeared to
many as a renuciation of the principles proclaimed in 1982,
which eschewed uncontrolled deregulation, as well as
subsequent threats to cultural industries (Sorberts and
Palmer: 1986). Mitterrand wanted these channels to be
provided by pro-Socialist entrepreneurs in case he lost the
coming elections, leaving the Socialists without access to
the electronic media.
2.4.5 CANAL PLUS: 'LA TELEVISION PAYABLE'
C+ started broadcasting in November 1984 as France's first
privately owned channel and Europe's first terrestrial pay
TV channel. It is not a state company, being run by the
multimedia conglomerate Havas, which has a stake in CLT and
is also active in advertising and travel. In 1985 C+ lost
FF 500 million, but in 1987-8 it became the only money-
making TV service in France, the biggest pay TV station in
Europe, and one of the most successful anywhere in the
world. It had about 2 million subscribers or 11 per cent of
TV households, for a FF 150 subscription rate per month,
and an average 80,000 new subscribers per month, with
profits of FF 115 million in 1986 and FF 400 million in
109
1987 (Cable and Satellite: August 1987, Television Business
International: launch issue 1988) . Nevertheless, like
other channels, C+ did not avoid the political debate
surrounding French media. Its launch was a dramatic
occasion. Havas, which owned just over half of C+, was a
state company. Havas' chairman, André Rousselet, was a
close associate of Mitterrand (82) and a key figure in
defending socialist attitudes on broadcasting. C+ was set
up under his personal supervision and, of course, he was
its dominant figure afterwards (Kuhn: 1985; 63).
C+'s launch signified a complete departure from the policy
followed in the state's terrestrial channels. First, C+
was not wholly owned by the state, despite Havas being the
major (but not the single) shareholder (83). Second, C+ was
not based on a licence fee and/or advertising but on
subscriptions. Some income also came from sponsorship.
Third, in contrast to the three state channels, C+ was not
subject to strict psb guidelines (84). The result was a
freer schedule dominated by films, sports, serials, chat
shows and a diet of sex and hard-core pornography (85).
The irony is that when the Government was considering an
alternative to public channels in 1981-82, it planned a
'cultural entertainment channel' (86). However, it caused
disputes with the French cinema lobby, the Bureau de
Liaison des Industries Cinématographiques, over the
release of new films on C+ (87). In late 1988, C+ was
struggling to increase its film stock without being tied to
the French industry; some of its operating conditions,
because it now had to work within a more competitive
environment, were redrafted.
Initial Havas estimates of potential subscribers did not
correspond to reality and there were heavy losses of some
FF50 million per month (88). Moreover, the Societe des
Acteurs et Compositeurs (SACD) threatened legal action
against C+ because it was not paying copyright loyalties
(Michalowska: 1984). Early technical problems were caused
by using ORTF's old channel One frequencies - now owned by
TDF and based on a 12-year contract. This gave C+ access to
90 per cent of France without heavy capital expenses.
After the crisis, C+ survived by offering a hybrid system,
with more than three-quarters of its output scrambled, but
clear from 12:00 to 2:00 pm and from 5:45 to 8:30 pm. The
subscriber never owns the decoder, which is loaned by C+;
when payments fall behind, the decoder is quickly disabled
by c+ not providing the subscriber with the access code. C+
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was also associated with a policy to reduce VCR
penetration. This came from the 1982 decision to impose a
de facto tariff import control on Japanese VCRs by delaying
them through a small customs point at Poitiers (Levacic:
1984)
Overall, there was nothing Socialist or progressive about
C+ which could equally have been established by a
Thatcherite government. C+ was neither egalitarian in terms
of access and psb principles, nor innovative in
programming. It was neither a cultural nor educational
channel. In terms of programming, it was less radical than
C4 and in no way catered for a specialised minority
audience. However, C+ was used to test the PAF and to
examine the media industries' capability to adapt to the
field. In 1989, C+ capitalising on its home success, is co-
venturing spin-off channels in Spain, West Germany and
Belgium and onto TDF1. In 1987, C-I- entered the Paris-Bourse
and has become more private, competitive, commercial and
aggressive.
2.4.6 LA CINQ: 'BEAUJOLAIS OU COCA-COLA?'
La Cinq (La 5) reconfirmed French broadcasting's close link
with partisan ends. It was launched on February 20, 1986,
as promised, but was under Socialist rule for only two
months. It took its form under the Conservative Chirac
government. Berlusconi replied to his critics that he would
set up 'neither a Coca-Cola nor a spaghetti channel', but
that he would offer a 'beaujolais' channel, preserving the
French culture (Financial Times: 27 November 1985). During
his reign in 1986, however, the service was being put
together in Milan (Italy), where Berlusconi's studios were
located, not in France. The French firms he had persuaded
to work for him were commuting between Paris and Milan two
days a week to construct the channel.
The content during the Seydoux-Berlusconi period was a
selection of variety and quiz shows inspired by
Berlusconi's three Italia channels (Canale 5, Italia 1,
Rette-Quatro). For example, the celebrity Amanda Leer
hosted cherchez la femme, a replica of Viva la Donna on
Rette-Quatro (Cable and Satellite: June 1986;25). La 5's
first programme, a variety show, was rumoured to cost
£500,000. According to statistics, 8 per cent of French
viewers in 14 towns tuned into La 5 for at least one minute
that evening. In 1987, La 5 reached 64 per cent of the
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population but 45 per cent had to readjust their sets
(Libration: 6/7 June 1987). It was not an innovative
channel, its programming was old and lowbrow, and in 1989,
it still loses money.
Seydoux was prepared to open up the shareholding to outside
press and film industry interests to defuse criticism from
the film lobby that La 5 would lower standards and drive
the public out of cinemas. Although he declared his
intention to create quality television based on
entertainment, with French-made programmes making up to 50
per cent of La 5's output within the first 5 years, this
seemed to be speculation rather than a real plan. He was
thought to have made this announcement because of the risk
of the Conservatives thwarting route allocations for his
long-distance airline, UTA. His 'calm' reaction when the
Conservatives sought to withdraw his operating licence
tends to confirm this. Incidentally, Seydoux was anxious
to declare the financial risks he undertook to operate, as
he said, his 'television adventure' (88). The Government
helped La 5 by providing special advertising terms. For
the first time, La 5 could advertise beer on French TV, as
well as carrying commercials for the large stores, travel
and tourist trade and press. The newspaper reaction was
that these new regulations would directly hit the troubled
press's revenues.
During 1986, La 5 did not seem to have any problems
getting advertising revenue. Its financial status was FF
440 million (approximate advertising income of February-
December 1986 with unknown deficit), but in 1987, it
reportedly suffered enormous losses. Chirac's government
reallocated the licences to press baron and close
associate, Mr Hersant, in conjunction with Berlusconi,
thereby upholding La 5's close relationship with politics
(90)
2.4.7 TV6: 'C'EST Id, C'EST BIEN LA SIX'
La 5 was closely followed by TV6, the music channel
launched the very same day, on February 22, 1986, when its
licence was signed by the Communications Minister, Mr
Georges Fillioud. TV6 was a consortium between
advertising agency Publicis (25 per cent), radio station
NRJ (16 per cent), film distributor Gaumont (25 per cent)
(89), and advertising agency Gilbert Gros (12 per cent).
The HA doubted the need of TV6 and its financial viability.
It was not happy with NRJ, wanting the video clips to be
112
produced by the French, arid wanting an advertising quota
of 12 per cent of the total time (Le Monde: 27 February
1986). For the first weeks the channel showed four hours of
music clips a day with some advertising (offered free) and
endless jingles. A week later, the so-called 'proper
programmes' with a DJ began. By the end of 1986, TV6 was
reaching about 35 per cent of French households, mainly in
Paris, Bordeaux, Grenoble, Lens, Lyons, Marseilles, Nantes,
Niines and Toulouse.
From February until December 1986, TV6's advertising
revenue was FF 10 million, with an estimated FF100 million
deficit. Following the cancellation of its franchise by the
Chirac Government, the CNCL reallocated it to a consortium
led by the CLT, also changing its name to Metropole 6
(widely known as M6). However, until 1988 its appeal was
low (1.6 per cent) as it had become a 'talking heads'
channel.
2.4.8 THE DECLINE OF BROADCASTING'S STATE MONOPOLY IN
FRANCE
The established post-war concept of a public service
monopoly was no longer a creed of faith for French
political leaders. The abandonment of a state monopoly by
Loi 82 had resulted in new actors, mainly from the private
sector. Could it be argued that the Government's wish to
decentralise and liberalise the system in relation to the
advent of new technologies caused the state monopoly to
decline?
Returning to French television history, there was a major,
and widely accepted, distinction between the 'télévision
de société' and the 'télévision d' stat'. The former was
dominated by a system of private initiative where the state
defined the rules and judged without intervening, directly
or indirectly, in the management of public broadcasters.
In the 'television d' Etat', the state directly controlled
and directed the essential activities of the audiovisual
system (Missika and Wolton: 1983; 113). In France,
television was more associated with the state than with
its society. The Constitutions of 1946 and 1958 declared
that each company which has the character of a public
service must be under a national property. During either
the Fourth or Fifth Republic, the concepts of 'colléctivité
nationale' and government property were confused (Goguel
and Crosser: 1975; 53); during the post-war period, the
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two were synonymous. The development of television as a
mass medium signified the decrease of parliament's role as
the representative of public opinion and, in a way, as a
'relais' between the government and the citizens (Goguel
and Crosser: 1975; 149). Nevertheless, as described above,
television's image as a credible medium decreased rapidly;
instead of the 'voice of France', it became the 'voice of
the government'. The events of May 1968 simply illustrated
a situation where television's accountability and its
public service character were declining.
Additionally, continuously tight government control over
news output, the scandals of clandestine advertising,
frequent strikes, bureaucracy and financial problems
demystified the status of state monopoly (Francois: 1976).
The 'éclatement' of ORTF resulted in lowbrow programme
production, especially fiction and dramas (Korlin: 1983,
Souchon: 1980). As ORTF broke up, the new 'sociétés' were
confronted with financial problems and increased production
and administrative costs. Incidentally, extending
programme output through the FR3 and the difficulty of
increasing the licence fees accentuated the decline of ps,
showing its 'malaise' even before the new media
technologies. On the other hand, French society was also
suffering its own illness. The events of May 1968
demonstrated that not only students, but also numerous
categories of professional people, were protesting against
the hierarchical system. This structure could be explained
by the centralisation of French society, administratively
and, to a lesser extent, politically, in which the citizen
felt excluded by the government (Hanley et al.: 1984; 131).
Key words at that time were: 'participation', 'autonomie',
'autogèstion' and 'contéstation'. These words reveal a
thirst for responsibility, 	 personal	 involvement,
communication and discussion with state institutions (91).
Television - a display, in some way, of public institutions
- had lost its credibility. The real free radio stations
came as a societal reaction groups for free expression
without state control. Within this climate, it must be
added that the Socialists carried, although superficially,
some of these messages. Loi 82 expresses their frenetic
desire for change, in an attempt to remedy the defects of
PS television. However, they also had to face problems
with financial and administrative costs, programme-
production difficulties, increase in programme hours, etc.,
intensifying the already-existing financial problems of
state TV companies, which seemed unable unwilling to adapt
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to changing demands. Additionally, relating this situation
to the general technological logic adopted by the
government to promote economy and industry, one could say
that the economic rationale undermined the public monopoly
rationale by being inefficient and costly. And, according
to economists, when a monopoly situation only increases its
costs without increasing its revenue, it be sold to the
private sector (Birnbaum: 1977, Stigler: 1981). If one
looks back again, one will see a slow, step-by-step,
liberalisation from the state monopoly, starting with the
'éclatement' of the ORTF and continuing with Loi 82, Loi 85
and, finally, the Conservative Loi Leotard in 1986.
The decline of the state monopoly could have resulted from
market and technology considerations, societal and
political pressures, and financial constraints. However,
for Ledos et al. (1986: 20-7), deregulation marks an
abandonment of ps ideas in the face of political
expendiency and commercial pressure. The loser in this
battle is always the public interest. On the contrary,
Nissika and Wolton (1983) suggest that political control
has gone hand in hand with a set of cultural assumptions
among broadcasters and politicians alike, designating
popular tastes and aspirations in French psb.
From the above discussion, one might conclude that changing
conditions were not the only reason for the decline of the
state monopoly; it was also caused by socio-economic needs
relating to future developments within the international
arena, intensifying the need to reorganise the French
broadcasting system.
2.4.9 THE 'POLITIQUE DU VIRAGE'
Looking back, one will see that the Socialist
Government's policy had two directions: one, with Loi 82
and the setting up of C+, formed a rather coherent policy
on the audiovisual sector; the other, in their last year in
power, when a sudden decision to deregulate terrestrial
broadcasting led to abandoning its previous aim of
controlled liberalisation. The former's controlled
liberalisation framework could be seen in : (i) modifying
the rules of the game, (ii) increasing the number of
actors, (iii) placing a television policy under the general
field of communications, and (iv) introducing an
incremental liberalisation of the system. Loi 82 was just
the start of the final 'changement'. 	 With it, the
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Government's policy was not only to create a coherent
strategy for future developments in television, but also
to, deal with the financial problems - even those created
by the unions since ORTF.
Moreover, the phrase 'communication is free' came to blur
the traditional distinction, even contradiction, between
the freedom of the press and control over broadcasting.
Creating the HA as a buffer between TV companies and the
state guaranteed this change. It must be admitted that
since 1981, state intervention in the audiovisual system
was progressively reduced. The accusation that the
Socialists influenced the HA's decisions is rather
political because CNCL - which replaced the HA -- although
more complex and professional was also criticised for
political affiliation to Chirac's government.
This first period also indicates the Government's anxiety
to respond quickly to the evolution of new media
technologies. C+'s launch was important because it was the
first effort to create something not totally based on state
money. The only mistake was relying on Havas' research
measurements and charging the subscribers too much, but
eventually C+ survived. Most important, C+ fitted this
limited liberalisation framework since it was used as a
backer for cinema - a commitment it now wants to abandon.
If laws can declare policy, one could say that Loi 82 was
a 'loi cadre', in comparison to Loi 85, which was a 'loi de
televisions privées'. This policy was also envisaged in
Lol 82, in accordance with the Socialists' view of the
audiovisual industry being part state, part privately
controlled, the state giving the responsibility of
upholding a balance between the public and private venture.
On the contrary, total control by the private sector would
lead to complete disorder and a cultural recession.
In Loi 85, which was largely a copy of the Bredin Report,
the Socialist policy made a U-turn ('virage') towards
private initiative and a deregulation policy. Mitterrand
and his advisers were more involved than the cabinet and
the party. Realising the potential effect of losing the
coming elections led the Socialists to impose their own
sympathisers on the new channels. The Socialists decided,
haphazardly (92), to introduce new private channels. It
was a policy of panic, a policy of impressing before the
final act. Chirac did something similar with the French
hostages in Lebanon before the second round of 1988
Presidential elections. The Socialists had to do something
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spectacular to attract voters because cable and satellite
had been in a 'pause de réfléction' since 1983. Besides,
the radio situation showed that new jobs could also be
provided. Additionally, the public favoured the
Conservatives' claims for more, and private, television.
Incidentally, since 1985 the general Socialist policy
favoured the private initiative much more than before.
Policy-making is always political but when politics become
the principal factor in deciding who gets what, it is bound
to produce less-than-ideal results. The Socialists seemed
to make the right decision when they awarded the fourth
frequency to C+, but the two new chann1s were allocated in
a state of panic,. indicating the voluntarist character of
the French broadcasting system. Privatisation would have
been inevitable with the Conservatives, but it is uncertain
whether they would have privatised TF1. This is because
they also had to 'maintain' the tradition of French
broadcasting, i.e. from one government to another, and from
one (audiovisual) law to another. This path was followed
by the Socialist Government. Moreover, the Government's
changes showed the belief that the state could no longer
pay for the restructuring of the broadcasting system. This
restructuring was also related to the failure of the
Government to impose a stricter policy on the press with
the 1984 legislation, especially the failure to control
Hersant's ambitions in both press and broadcasting. The
final decisions illustrate that the Government had
abandoned its optimism about the development of cable and
satellite television.
Both Socialists and Conservatives have left French
broadcasting with three paradoxes: (i) France has been
perhaps the only country to create a number of 'generalist'
channels, which compete heavily for advertising revenue
proven insufficient to support all channels, (ii) France
has been the only country to open up its audiovisual sector
without any strong French media company. If C+ was used as
a tool for strengthening the communication companies, with
La 5 and M6, France has become the only European country
that preferred European multimedia groups to a French
'national champion'. It could, however, be argued that
this option could enhance the economic viability of the new
ventures, and (iii) US imports have never been as high as
now. La 5, especially, provides lowbrow, mainly US,
material. Loi 82 was supposed to give a better, French,
version of the broadcasting system. But the Government,
especially in the last year, was not following a well-
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organised plan. Overall, it was a policy of intention; in
other words general rhetoric at the expense of any
complicated analysis of broadcasting.
It is difficult to say what this policy's effects have been
because the Conservatives wanted to put their own signature
on the PAF, changing he rules of the game once again. Some
of the effects of this 'policy of politics' might be: (1)
increased competition among the stations with a subsequent
increase in costs and a decrease in revenue, (ii) increased
commercials, but too few to support all channels (for
example in 1986 the allowed advertising time was 18 minutes
a day; in 1988, it was 12 minutes an hour !!) and, (iii)
programme-quality has decreased.
Today PAF gives the impression of being a complicated and
confusing kaleidoscope: wrestling, competitions, TV stars
are overpaid, TV games with expensive gifts, frequent
interruptions of programming with commercials. Then a
plethora of sex and violence films late night hard-core
films on C+, soft porn on M6 and strip-tease programmes on
TF1 - completes the picture. Although it is too early to
tell, France may be the prime example of 'quantity not
meaning calality '. However, whether the Socialists or the
Conservatives are responsible for this picture is difficult
to say because both now look at television primarily as an
economic activity.
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2.5.0 LUXEMBOURG AND THE 'CLT SYNDROME'
Luxembourg politicians see broadcasting and other
communications activities as a major source of money to
restructure the country's economy. However, its national
broadcaster, a pioneer in international broadcasting
dominated by French and Belgian interests, has also
adopted a strategy of diversifying its activities within
the broadcasting sector, not only in Luxembourg but also in
central Europe. CLT was the first European broadcaster to
realise the importance of satellite broadcasting for
'regenerating' its audience and revenue. In the 1980s,
however, the company had to recognise that continuing
liberalisation in Europe was not necessarily advantageous
for international broadcasting. Introducing private
channels on terrestrial frequencies made the private sector
work within the national rules of their respective
countries. Therefore, in the late 1980s, CLT concluded
that it would not be realistic to continue operating from
Luxembourg only. Because the logic of terrestrial
television remains largely national, the company was forced
to become Belgian in Belgium, German in West Germany and
French in France in 1985.
France also realised that its privileged influence over the
company's affairs could not easily continue because one of
CLT's major shareholders, the Group-Bruxelles Lambert, took
a more active role within the company. Consequently, CLT
entered the scene of international and domestic politics.
The final outcome: exclusion of the company from French
private channels.
Both the Werner and Santer governments in 1981-86 played
their traditional role, i.e. largely as another actor in
the whole gamble within the CLT. They had little to do
because the company, from its very beginning, has been
fairly uncontrolled. This perhaps made the politicians
realise not only their impotence but, more importantly, the
consequences of allowing their broadcaster to be controlled
by practically unregulated foreigners. On the other hand,
the company was too important a taxpayer to be challenged.
To a certain extent, CLT could be a suitable example for
studying external pressures and influences within a public
institution. CLT, however, has been undergoing a
centrifugal process. Its operating companies have been
moving out of Luxembourg and the company has gained
considerable autonomy. Again, the government remains a
spectator.	 During 1981-86, the Government observed the
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politics surrounding CLT and influenced decisions about its
strategy, showing the difficulty for a small country today
to come to terms with the big companies. For the Grand
Duchy, in particular, it is the realisation of losing its
traditional competitive advantage: the uniqueness of being
Europe's hub of transfrontier broadcasting.
2.5.1 THE EXPANSION OF CLT
CLT's prime objective is commercial broadcasting (92).
In opposition to other groups seeking to take advantage of
new opportunities in Europe's audiovisual scene, CLT
already had access to this sector. Its strategy has had
two main directions; towards control over programming
production and entrance into new broadcasting ventures,
such as cable and satellite - or even foreign terrestrial
channels.
The first, which I call 'programming strategy', started in
1980 as CLT's expansion in film and programme-production.
In the film sector, apart from acquiring the technical
facilities located in Billancourt Studios in Paris (93),
CLT's initiatives were international because of its equity
in various production companies such as Video
International, Stand Art, Hamster Productions or La
Compagnie de Distribution Européenne (94). Since 1977 it
has become important in television production with the
acquisition of Video Télé-France'(95). Moreover, CLT has
been able to produce video clips and sports; one of its
aims is to exploit these markets, as well as creating new
programming, again in conjunction with affiliated companies
(96) -
The second strategy concerns the services in new media and
terrestrial broadcasting. According to CLT's estimates,
its French audience in the 7 departments it covers is about
64 per cent of TV households (97); in Belgium it is
estimated at 1,680,000, mainly in Wallonia. With cable, it
has attempted to find a slot for its programmes in France
and Belgium, and it had an ambitious plan for West Germany,
collaborating with Bertelsmann on its new channel, RTL Plus
(see later). In France, CLT has also tried to enforce its
competence in new media developments (98) . Satellite
television considered important in its expansionist
strategy, being also suited to its purposes for
broadcasting to a multinational audience. Thus, in 1979,
CLT has been involved in the LuxSat project, and after its
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collapse, its search for a channel on TDF1 (99). Because
the LuxSat project faced major financial problems, the
shareholders thought it better to abandon it.
This was largely related to French influence, also West
Germany's opposition concerned German publishers backing
the project. Chancellor Schmidt regarded the venture as an
inroad into German broadcasting affairs. The French, on the
other hand, considered LuxSat antagonistic but were less
obstructive after the publication of the Théry Report (see
Part 3). In practice, the LuxSat project had international
implications. The French had to convince the rest of the
shareholders that, because of the the risk involving the
company's finances, it would be better to join TDF1. Thus,
in early 1983, CLT publicly announced that the venture was
risky. In October 1983, both French and Luxembourg
governments signed an agreement for CLT to lease two of
TDF1's channels to offer French- and German-language
advertising-supported entertainment programmes (100). The
understanding was that CLT would be the only French-
speaking channel on TDF1, giving the company a good deal.
Strategically, the collaboration with TDF1 was a response
to the threat CLT and TOF felt from the Leorc
government's support on the Coronet project (see Part 3'.
Nevertheless, introducing new French terrestrial channels
undermined, at least in spirit, the privileged position
that CLT had negotiated. When the Television par
Satellites, the self-claimed operator of TDF1 (see later),
promoted the idea for pan-European, multilingual
entertainment channels, CLT seemed to lose in favour of
other European media groups. The answer to this turn of
French policy, which finally excluded CLT from TDF1, was
largely related to the independent attitude adopted by the
CLT in the 1980s, as we shall see.
At the time, this exclusion appeared to threaten CLT's
international character directly. The problems satellites
faced made CLT lose faith in satellite broadcasting. Today
CLT believe the new media will complement terrestrial
broadcasting and allow for faster penetration of the
various national markets. In 1987, CLT was awarded a
transponder on Astra for RTL Plus and a licence to run M6
in collaboration with others. Politics was a decisive
factor in CLT's satellite and broadcasting business.
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2.5.2 THE 'BYZANTINE' POLITICS WITHIN THE CLT
The heavy involvement of French state interests within the
CLT enabled the French government to dominate all
decision-making. The 1980s, however, have proved that the
French cannot control the company as easily they did
before.
The French Socialist government was unhappy with the CLT
for four reasons. First, Pomonti was not made company MD
(101).	 Secondly, instead of him, Gaston Thorn became MD
and vice-chairman (102). This election was 'hot'
politically because Thorn was supported by the Group
Lambert-Bruxelles (GLB), and Werner (103) by France through
Havas (104). Thorn was also opposed by Luxembourg's Santer
Government, which feared that the former could use CLT's
chairmanship to help his Democratic Party return to power
in the coming elections (Seridan: 1986). This clash
resulted in a compromise making Werner the chairman, and
Thorn vice-chairman, with the implication that he would be
Werner's successor. The French, who realised that they
could no longer run the coiipany according to their wishes,
were angry. At another level, the CLT's chairmanship was
not too important because the real management power lay
with its shareholders Audiofina having a big say.
The third reason for French discontent was RTL
journalists' criticism of the French Socialist government.
In an intergovernment meeting with their Luxembourg
counterparts, the French government made its objections
clear (105). The fourth reason concerned the new attitude
adopted by the single largest shareholder within Audiofina,
the GLB (106). However, with its new chairman, Albert
Frere, the GLB took an active role within the CLT. First,
it defended Jacques Rigaud, then Gaston Thorn, upsetting
both French and Luxembourg governments. The GLB's highly
independent profile was also used by the French as an
excuse for depriving the CLT of TDF1's channels. The GLB's
connection with media tycoon Rupert Nurdoch in European
media made the French suggest that CLT was preparing to
feed France a diet of 'tabloid television' (106).
The Frere-Hurdoch connection was used as an argument by the
French government to exclude CLT from La 5 (107). As is
known, CLT did not even get the sixth channel - or any of
TDF1's transponders - from the French Socialists (108). In
November 1985, Prime Minister Santer visited Bonn and
talked with Chancellor Helmut Kohl about the possibility of
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CLT getting a transponder on the German satellite TV-SAT in
case CLT could not get any on TDF1 (109). When Chirac came
into office in France, he allocated the sixth channel to a
consortium led by CLT, but M6 is too small for CLT's
ambitions. Finally, CLT plans to use one of Astra's
transponders.
CLT had (and still has) to work within a delicate balance
of Europe's changing television environment and the
politics surrounding it - not only in its parent country,
but also in the countries of its major shareholders.
Incidentally, following the liberalisation of European
terrestrial frequencies, CLT's only comparative advantage
is its considerable expertise on international
broadcasting. It also has to adjust to a new environment,
operating from the Grand Duchy while also diversifying in
business and TV services in other countries. In late 1986,
it won a licence for a new commercial channel in
francophone Belgium via a Belgian company, TVi (télévision
independénte), of which CLT owns 66 per cent (110). These
new directions, as well as its new channel, RTL Plus,
described below, are part of its new strategy to team up
with national partners.
2.5.3 RTL Plus: 'PROGRME TV ALLEMAND'
RTL Plus (RTL+) not only indicates the expansionist
strategy of CLT but also that its operating companies have
moved out of the Grand Duchy, gaining considerable
autonomy. Additionally, the companies have become subject
to legislation and/or regulation in their host countries,
making CLT adjust to local expectations. RTL+ is a German-
speaking, general entertainment channel transmitting from
Luxembourg to Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate, the southern
parts of north Rhine-Westphalia, southern Belgium, and
eastern France. It began broadcasting on January 2, 1984,
with satellite transmission in August 1985 to over 400,000
cabled households from Eutelsat Fl (111).
RTL+ argues that it is a 'refreshingly different' channel,
adopting the young image of RTL radio services and
capturing viewers in the 14-30 age group. Critics have
said its success is partly because the local Saarland
channel does not compete for third place, after the two
public networks, ARD and ZDF. RTL+ also became SAT1's first
rival for both viewers and advertising. Although SAT1 was
the first to broadcast via satellite, RTL+ was the first
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private service available to German viewers, a situation
indicating CLT's experience in international broadcasting.
However, SAT1 won out in 1987 because of its German
identity (112), and CLT had to give some of its shares to
Germans. Although it still owns 46.1 per cent of RTL+'s
equity, the majority (51.9 per cent) of the shareholdings
are now under German ownership, strongly influenced by the
mega-publisher, Bertelsmann (113) . To become more German,
RTL+ also had to move its programming and production staff
from Cologne to new offices in Munich. This move was seen
as a way for RTL+ to compete with SAT1 for terrestrial
frequencies (Cromelin: 1987). It was also done to gain
advertising and viewers form the north Rhine Westphalia.
However, this strategy to gain more and more German viewers
has made RTL+ more German than international.
In its pursuit to gain advertising, it shows a maximum of
12 minutes (20 per cent) of advertisements an hour during
its 8 hours of transmission (114). To overcome advertising
problems, RTL+ split up local and satellite advertising
since 1986, but competing with German channels in both
cases. Thus, RTL+, like all of Europe's new private
channels, has a long way to go before it becomes totally
advertising-supported, needing constant backing from its
shareholders in the meantime.
2.5.4 A POLICY FOR AN 'UNCONTROLLED BROADCASTER'
Both the Werner and Santer governments had to cope with a
monopoly broadcaster they simply could not control.
Therefore, television state policy was not only difficult,
but also decreased in status. This has been related to
traditional Luxembourg policy, starting with the minimalist
legislation surrounding the whole broadcasting sector.
Therefore, Luxembourg governments never tried to intervene
in generating gains for CLT. Consequently, the state became
an observer, rather than a regulator, perhaps explaining
why CLT's policy has been dictated from Paris, rather than
from the City of the Grand Duchy. This situation simply
signifies something we shall see later with satellite TV:
that Luxembourg broadcasting policy was a result of
external, rather than domestic, pressures. Thus, a concrete
policy is increasingly difficult.
The state had either to break up CLT's monopoly or continue
as an observer. Both the Werner and Santer governments
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chose the latter because of the CLT's •tax contribution.
Nevertheless, the Santer Government resisted some French
intrigues within the CLT. In theory again, the government
can stop granting the CLT's 'cosy monopoly'. In practice,
this option seems impractical because CLT has enjoyed a
comfortable, de facto situation. For some commentators, the
state has been seen as the CLT's ambassador abroad.
Although this is an exaggeration, the Luxembourg
governments, including the last one, have tried to ensure
CLT's future in Europe's new media scene by proposing
satellite projects or directly negotiating with other
countries, such as West Germany or France, to find a place
for the CLT's satellite ambitions. This is the price a
small country must pay for opening its doors to foreign
capital in the spirit of entrepreneurialism.
Today, Luxembourg seems to have lost what has made it
unique in European television of the last 50 years: that it
was the only place to get a franchise and frequencies for
commercial broadcasting. Commercial broadcasting on
terrestrial frequencies is now commonplace in most European
countries, making the detour via Luxembourg unnecessary and
making CLT 'emigrate', causing Luxembourg to lose
additional income. The new conditions have also led CLT to
ask for, and obtain, a reappraisal of its contractual
relationship with Luxembourg, and a downward recalculation
of the franchise fee. Consequently, the Grand Duchy's
total fiscal benefit from CLT's activities has decreased
from an all-time record of LuxFr 18 billion in 1982 to
LuxFr 1.7 billion in 1987. Nevertheless, even in the late
1980s, 75 per cent of the company's profits are generated
from its radio activities, despite the considerable
expansion of its television services. The 20 years of
television experience gave CLT a considerable advantage, as
with RTL+, which managed to compete against SAT1 with a
budget that represented only one-tenth of its rival's, and
M6, where CLT imposed a realistic budget on its partners.
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2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is a cliché that the communications business in Europe
radically needs to adapt to a new and competitive
environment. Traditional broadcasters have lost what has
long been perceived as natural monopolies. In the UK, a
Conservative Government succeeded a Socialist one, and in
France, a Socialist Government succeeded a Conservative
one. Both British Conservatives and French Socialists
wanted to respond to the demands and pressures for a new
television landscape. At first glance, there would seem
to be more fundamental changes in France's TV environment
than in Britain's. This is true, but under closer
examination, one sees important changes in British
television.
Both governments presented distinct philosophies, but their
approaches toward broadcasting seemed similar. At another
level, one could also argue that their political
philosopies were the opposite of their television policies.
This could be explained by wider general conservative
innovation in the UK, in contrast to radical innovation in
France. It is also true that both governments wanted to
leave their signature on their respective audiovisual
systems. While the French Socialists exhibited a frenetic
desire for change, the British Conservatives, the leaders
of deregulatory practices in western Europe, appeared to
resist fundamental, rapid changes.
The 1981 Broadcasting Act only reimposed the duopoly of the
BBC-IBA scheme, whereas Loi 82 led to a de facto
liberalisation of the state monopoly, deregulated the radio
frequencies and, finally, set up the first private or
commercially oriented channel, Canal Plus. In Britain,
setting up Channel Four was, despite some modifications, a
child of the previous Labour government. The Conservatives
put it under the IBA umbrella as a complement to the ITV
system. Surprisingly, compared to C+, C4 is oriented to
minorities, cultural programmes and has largely been a
successful reinterprentation of psb, whereas C+ has been
an unimaginative pay TV channel, based largely on hard-core
programmes, at least in the beginning, that is not obliged
to carry psb elements. Surprisingly, C+ was formed by a
'progressive' government, looking after not only France's,
but also Europe's, cultural heritage, whereas C4 was
launched by a Conservative Government looking at the
economic aspect of television.	 Both channels aimed to
stimulate the film industry and independent production, but
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again C4 followed a more successful formula than C+, which
fights to suppress this. C4, by working as a publishing
house and commissioning films from both ITV companies and
independent producers, whereas C+, by targeting families
and yuppies, took one and a half years to stabilise.
Recently, both channels have changed considerably because
of new policies adopted in their respective countries.
Other British television issues are the incremental
transformation to a 'round-the-clock' service (but not
everywhere) and, the readjustment of both BBC and ITV
strategies whereas in France, the new, commercial, over-
the-air channels rapidly formed a radical innovation
without leaving the system much time to adapt to new
developments.	 To an extent, this rapid innovation came
with the politicisation of French television's landscape
and the desire of every government to introduce its own
broadcasting law. Thus, the new PAF has been interlocked
with the 'policy of politics', rather than with a strategy
for the future of television. Nevertheless, British
television was also coloured by politics (e.g. the
Falkiands War, the Peacock Committee, the post-Peacock,
White Paper era). Those politics, however, have been rather
within the diluted usual British system of committees,
panels, advisers, etc., leaving little space for direct
confrontation and argument like the French case. British TV
politics appeared 'cooler' than its 'Latin-franco'
counterpart.
Borrowing the words of the French Minister of Culture, Mr
Jack Lang, his Government's idea was for 'a Latin
Audiovisual Space', as opposed to one culturally dominated
by Anglo-Saxons. It is fair to say that under the
Socialists, French broadcasting was becoming more British -
-a kind of senii-duopoly. Creating the HA is largely
reminiscent of the IBA. The IBA, however, has not had any
state influence. The HA tried hard to, and to a certain
extent succeeded in, obtaining autonomy from the state.
Incidentally, the TV stations, perhaps for the first time,
were very independent - a success for the Socialists. Of
course, this does not mean that its independence was
absolute, but even the BBC cannot claim absolute autonomy,
although it is swathed in that myth. The Chirac
government, however, led PAF to a more US-style of
broadcasting policy. It was ironic for the Socialists that
despite their efforts for a coherent broadcasting policy,
through imaginative and controlled change, their final
deregulation seemed to lead them down paths they
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desperately wanted to avoid. Their 'politique du virage'
was largely characterised as a policy of panic with short-
sighted ends, whereas British Conservatives appeared calm
incrementalists. To be fair, one has to wonder how the
British Conservatives would have reacted had they had been
defeated in the 1987 elections. British reluctance,
however, to introduce major rapid changes was also linked
to Mrs Thatcher's attitude of asking for liberalisation of
services while, at the same time, insisting on regulating
programme content. Mitterrand awarded new channels while
Thatcher oversaw the whole broadcasting sector. With the
1988 White Paper, the British Conservative Government seems
to follow a similar, but less rapid path as the French.
In both countries, commissions were set up before any
major decision's in broadcasting were made. In the UK
there was the Peacock Committee, dealing mainly with
terrestrial television's future, whereas the French set up
the Moinot Commission and the Bredin Mission before Loi 82
and the new channels, respectively. All reports'
recommendations were largely followed by the respective
governments. It seems, however, that the French commissions
were set up to examine technical feasibility (except the
Moinot), rather than to formulate a policy, whereas the
Peacock Committee appeared to provide a policy scenario for
the Government. Moinot and Bredin did not stray from the
questions they were asked, whereas Peacock went on to find
ways for the general structure of British broadcasting -
although it was set up to examine BBC finances. Moreover,
the Peacock Report took one year, whereas the Bredin Report
was complete in only three months. Peacock's
recommendations seemed more elaborate than Bredin's report.
The latter's main recommendation, that advertising revenue
would support the new channels including the old ones,
appears less realistic in 989 since both La 5 and M6 are
having difficulties finding advertising revenue.
Thus, the British government followed a step-by-step
policy, which appeared to be more careful compared to the
French government's policy on two-tables. It may be a
simplification, but the traditional British 'conservative
innovation' seems rather more successful than France's
'radical innovation'. But introducing the new channels and
further reshaping the audiovisual sector under Chirac's
government seemed to put the French in the lead toward
liberalising terrestrial television in western Europe.
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Deregulating airwaves has undermined Luxembourg's unique
position as a location for international broadcasting,
providing a window for private broadcasting to other
audiovisual landscapes, highly controlled by their
governments and public broadcasters. This new situation
has led CLT to 'emigrate' to other countries and operate
under lighter regulation at home. While both the French
and British had problems approaching broadcasting, both
Luxembourg governments in the same period simply could not
regulate their sole broadcaster, the CLT. On one hand, the
CLT was far too important a tax-payer for governments to
upset. Paradoxically, the real direction of policy was
coming from Paris, but the 1980s saw this control decline
with the active involvement of the GLB within the company.
Besides, for CLT, both Belgium and Germany appeared to be
more profitable, in terms of audience and advertising
markets, than its traditional French market, now saturated
with six terrestrial channels. Furthermore, the tradition
in Luxembourg has been minimalist regulation under the
spirit of entrepreneurialism. Finally, the new situation in
European broadcasting has influenced Luxembourg's revenue
because CLT, having diversified to other operations and
countries, now pays less tax.
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2.7.0 TOWARDS EUROPEAN TELEVISION
Until the late 19705, it was assumed that each nation-state
could operate and, to some extent, control its broadcasting
system as it wished through widely varying cultural and
political forms. The advent of cable and satellite
television intensified the pressure for certain kinds of
regulation and/or coordination of the flow of programme
content throughout Europe (McQuail and Siune: 1986;24). One
of the consequences of the internationalisation of
television was new actors entering the media arena. Apart
from various bodies - public and private - seeking to
exploit the new television situation, there have also been
some transnational public actors involved in the content
and legal and economic affairs of transnational television.
Within Europe, these actors have been: the European
Community (EC), Council of Europe (C0E), Unesco, the World
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the European
Broadcasting Union (EBU). Some other transnational actors
have been concerned with regulating existing technology,
such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
with its European branches (CEPT, EUTELSAT) and ESA.
Internationalising broadcasting has made these
organisations consider themselves competent on the issues
raised by the new situation in television, and thus to
increase their status among other transnational and
national actors. Europe has been a hotbed for problems of
copyright, spillover and video programming distribution
across frontiers. The geographical proximity and, to a
certain extent, cultural familiarity, increase the need for
uniform regulation in cable and satellite issues. Three of
the most competent bodies involved in these issues: the
C0E, representing the wider Europe and more active in media
affairs; the EBU, a cooperative body, mainly west European
broadcasters; and the EC, through its Commission.
2.7.1 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS A TRANSNATIONAL ACTOR
A unified Europe remains an elusive dream but the founders
of the European idea at least succeeded in creating a
unique set of institutions. No other international
organisation has the range of power or legal instruments of
the EC. While the Common Market has not yet (and may
never) constitute the West European Federation to which its
most passionate enthusiasts have aspired, it is,
nevertheless, more state-like than any other arena for
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Ninternational policy cooperation (Wallace: 1984). In
practice, the ability of individual member-states to block
decisions they dislike has remained formidable, often
making the Community look sluggish on foreign and economic
policy. To be fair, there have been many achievements. The
greatest have been removing tariff barriers, transferring
resources from richer to poorer members through regional
programmes, enabling greater job mobility and ease of
travel and, most significant, the 1985 White Paper for a
unification of the EC market by 1992
The EC member states are, naturally, similar and crucially
diverse. Compared with other international organisations,
they represent similar economic and political systems, but
on the other hand, there are differences of language,
culture, economic preferences, administrative methods,
political priorities, and so on. All of these tend to be
magnified by the intense, and often conflicting, bargaining
process in Brussels, which is a dominant feature of policy-
making in the EC, i.e. finding a balance between the
opinions of the interested parties. Policy-making within
the EC can rest on tolerably certain expectations of
compliance and operates both at the rhetorical level and in
the concrete expression of policy. On the contrary, its
legal system is particularly well developed, and arguably
more integrated than its political system (Weiler:1981).
Broadly speaking, implementing the EC's policies is often
untidy, uneven and slow, but this is standard in all
federal systems (Sharansky: 1981). In practice, much EC
legislation goes on away from the glare of publicity and
political controversy. The collorary is that implementation
must be assessed primarily as a function of the performance
of individual governments, though with the important
qualification that the Commission can, and sometimes does,
intervene as a supervisor and monitor of Community
legislation to a greater extent and in more detail than
other international agencies (Wallace: 1984). However, the
absence of a clear political framework means that
performance is intrinsically an interactive and sometimes
irregular process based on 'give-and-take', and 'trial-and-
error'
A team of spokesmen appears in the press room to provide
information on the Commission's activities, publications
and reactions to events. It is a smaller replica of the
kind of government briefings given by the US State
Department, but the Commission is not a government. It is a
civil service. The 17 Commissioners are only appointed by
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national governments, they are not elected (115).
The Commission proposes and the Council of Ministers
accepts or rejects. A Commission's proposal, such as a
Directive, becomes law throughout the Community only when
the Council has approved it, which is often a lengthy
process. Below the 17 Commissioners is a huge bureaucracy
for elaborating proposals. In theory, the Commission is
only the EC's administrative arm; in practice, it is the
Community's watchdog, but also the initiator of most
policies. Because the Commissioners have portfolios, such
as transport, agriculture or external relations, the
Commission tends to be regarded as the EC's government.
Actually, it has powers overlapping those of the Council of
Ministers, particularly in enforcing the Treaty of Rome -
the basic EC law. The Commission can often act decisively
when it takes the Council too long to arrive at a common
line. Moreover, 'European opinion' seems to expect the
Commission to hold views and take action on every
conceivable subject, even those over which it has little or
no power. It is interesting that the EC, in a way, has
started to move its policy agenda to new areas, such as the
new communications technologies and the media. It is
arguable, however, whether it will be more successful in
these fields, which have become increasingly important for
Europe's near future.
2.7.2 THE EC AND THE MEDIA
Over the years, the EC has not always enjoyed a happy
relationship with the media. Policies close to the hearts
of European bureaucrats have been heavily criticised by
many journalists. The recent Eurocraze seems to influence
broadcasting in the future (Tempest:1986). The EC
Commission has studied the future of the media for some
years and assumes that since satellite broadcasting raises
a number of questions with a pan-European dimension, it is
automatically the appropriate body to find the solutions.
The Commission's broadcasting policy was initiated on March
12, 1982, with a request from the European Parliament in a
'Resolution on radio and television in the Community' to
deliver a report on legal problems in broadcasting. The
Commission completed its report, Realities and Tendencies
in European Television, in May 1983. Its main
recommendation was support for the European Broadcasting
Union (EBU) 's plans for a European programme series. On May
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23, 1984, the Commission adopted a Green Paper, known as
Television Without Frontiers (TWF). TWF particularly
emphasised the need for a free supply of broadcasting
services within the Common Market and for free access to
television programmes across borders. It also invited
discussion throughout the member-states on how broadcasting
and copyright laws may be harmonised. The following year,
the Parliament adopted a resolution (October 5, 1985)
calling for a regulatory framework for an EC media policy.
On April 29, 1986, the Commission published its final
proposals in a Directive transmitted to the Council of the
Ministers on March 16, 1986. Its principal objective was to
'sweep away the national regulatory obstacles and to
establish the free flow of radio and television
broadcasting within the EC'. It aimed to set up minimum
acceptable standards for all the member states so that
television viewers would be able to receive programmes
from any other Community country and to provide a liberal
system encouraging broadcasting freedom. All of this
coincided with the spread of cable and satellite
television. The Directive, like TWF, seems to emphasise
private sector broadcasting and the promotion of pan-
European advertising, rather than public service
broadcasting (116).
Finally, on May 12, 1986 the Commission transmitted its
Action Programme in favour of the EC Audiovisual Programme
to the Ministers, which later became known (January 1987)
as the MEDIA Programme (Measures to Encourage the
Development of the Audiovisual Industry). This aimed to
strengthen audiovisual industries based on three
principles: 'pragmatism, professionalism as well as the
creation of synergetic effects' and, to some extent,
provides the rationale for action. In 1988, the Community
and the Council of Europe finally launched the European
Cinema and Television Year, a 12-month programme backed by
24 countries.
In its audiovisual policy, the Commission suggested:
(1) that broadcasting is primarily an economic activity;
(2) that the Community must ensure that the relevant,
directly applicable provisions of the Treaty (particularly
Articles 59, 60, 62) should be respected to suppress all
discrimination and other restrictions on broadcasting from
member states;
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(3) that present rules on advertising and copyright
obstruct the free flow of television broadcasts between
member states, and;
(4) that a limited number of measures should be adopted as
a first step in establishing a legal framework for a single
Community.
After the Rhodes summit in December 1988, the Council of
Ministers decided that the EC countries should agree on the
issue and that the Directive should be in line with the
proposed C0E's Convention on Broadcasting. In mid-1989,
there have fears, however, that the Directive may fall
because of the lack of being approved by the member states.
The French Presidency (June-December 1989) undertook to
continue efforts to secure an agreement, and a one month
extension was sought from the European Parliament, so that
the Directive would remain on the table until the end of
autumn 1989.
2.7.3 THE COMPETENCE OF THE EC TO REGULATE TELEVISION
One of the EC's key features is the scope and substance of
its policy repertoire (Wallace: 1984). That results from
the EC Treaties covering increasingly broad range of
external and internal policies, from trade to safety
standards, from agriculture to employment and, more
recently, from media to some considerations about European
defence. This flexibility has a longer trajectory: it is
closely related to Article 253 of the Treaty of Rome, which
allows this extension of scope. What is different now, in
relation to the 1950s, is that the EC occupies itself more
with common concerns than with common goals. Broadcasting
is a common concern, as is agriculture.
The 'restricted policy competence' bestowed on the EC by
the Treaties has not prevented it from engaging in policy
problems which compete and overlap with traditionally
regarded, national political affairs. Broadcasting
regulation, a purely domestic matter, has become one of the
EC's preoccupations in the 1980s. Because transfrontier
television does not respect frontiers and involves
financial concerns, the Commission asserts its right to act
for two main reasons; first, it has a political and moral
responsibility because broadcasting is relevant to European
integration. It relates this to Article 10 of the European
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Convention on Human Rights, which states that 'everyone
has the right of freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive impartial
information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers'. According to the
Commission, broadcasting will allow a closer European
union, safeguard and strengthen peace and freedom, create
closer relationships between member states and serve as a
symbol of the fundamental liberties expressed in this
Convention. Second, the Community considers itself the
proper forum for action on media policy, rather than other
national or international authorities.
Commentators, interested parties and especially some
broadcasters argued that the existing mechanisms for
regulating broadcasting are satisfactory. Others suggested
that alternative international bodies could be more
suitable, or that self-regulation would be preferable to EC
legislation. For example, the European Broadcasting Union
(EBU) or the Council of Europe (C0E) have a more diverse
membership. The C0E, in particular, represents interests of
23 states, has been active in media policy for longer than
the EC (117) and has paid more attention to cultural,
social and legal affairs. Moreover, both the EBU and the
C0E have demonstrated a flexibility and a readiness to
consider the cultural diversity of national broadcasting
organisations.
Another criticism is that satellite television cannot
respect the EC's frontiers more than it does for each of
its 12 member states, thus it is at a disadvantage in
comparison to either the EBU or C0E, which are wider in
membership. Incidentally, the rapid developments in
satellite technology may make certain rules obsolete even
before they are adopted or have had any time to take
effect. On the other hand, the EBU's role as a regulator is
limited when one sees that the larger broadcasting
organisations in Europe seek short-term, self-interest,
rather than long-term cooperation. Some have also suggested
that the 'big league', consisting of the larger
broadcasters within the EBU, also pushes for two levels
within European broadcasters themselves; this has been
exhibited in their reluctance to participate in the Europa
TV venture. The C0E's ability regulate to media policy may
prove insufficient, particularly given that its overall
real power is rather limited. Indeed, some would like to
see a weaker organisation to regulate the whole issue
instead of the EC. A weak organisation, or an organisation
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without the power, instruments and supervisory capacity of
the EC, would not create problems for such short- and long-
term interests.
Lastly it is questionable whether the EC can even play the
minimal role of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
in the US because the Community is considered an economic
union, rather than a political body. The Euro pean Court of
Justice may play an active role in examining cases about
satellite broadcasting and national protectionism. The case
between the Dutch Advertising Society, the Bond van
Adverteerders (BvA), versus the Netherlands over how much
advertising satellite channels can carry is a prime
example. The outcomes of cases like this are likely to
affect media legislation in all EC countries, giving the
Court an active role in the media scene. However, the
absence of a European supervisory body, along the lines of
the IBA or the HA, is clearly not likely to worry those
member states with a desire to maintain national state
power.
2.7.4 BROADCASTING AND EUROPEAN INTERDEPENDENCE AND
INTEGRATION
The Commission considers broadcasting an important part of
European integration, believing it will unite the European
people, or as Rousselet (1987) wrote, 'the Europe of the
viewers'. This enthusiasm is somewhat reminiscent of the
integration school's optimism. Economic integration will
gradually lead towards the transfer of political loyalties
(Taylor:1983), which will eventually be followed by a shift
in the focus of economic policy-making towards a new centre
in Brussels (Pelkmans: 1980). However, as history has
shown, the political assumptions of the sectorial approach
to European integration were not wholly correct (Webb:
1983). Whether television can be considered a tool for
forging European integration is questionable.
It is unlikely that television could emulate the role of
nation-builder played by the entry of the US film industry
- mostly because of linguistic differences. Transfrontier
television can perhaps bring European cultures together,
but the dominance of US programming on these channels could
make this difficult. Moreover, within the Community, the
potential of smaller countries to sell programming to other
EC nations is not as great as some would claim. For
example, Belgian potential in the francophone film market
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is reduced by the dominance of French films in the Belgian
market (Mattelart et al.: 1984) (see also Part 4).
These assumptions about television as a tool for further
integration are also reminiscent of the Functionalist
tradition, which stated that dynamic integration was the
learning process of citizens who would gradually be drawn
into a cooperative ethos, bringing greater benefits, and
eventually leading to the European Union. Although such
concepts are idealistic, satellite television contributes
to cooperation; governments have to negotiate more with
other governments to retain some control over their own
broadcasting affairs. How much this will help
interconnections between the member states has more to do
with the issues related to the 1992 target rather than to
broadcasting. While cooperation does not, of course, imply
integration or expansion of supranational competence pr se
(Lodge: 1986), television is extended to the political
realm, which in turn signals decision-makers' awareness of
the desirability of yet more consultation and cooperation
between governments and interested groups.
Nevertheless, transfrontier television confirms the
paradoxical situation that exists within the unique regime
of the EC.	 Although similar to what Keohane and Nye
(1977) have called	 complex interdependence, the nation
state remains, to a certain extent, the basic unit within
the EC and in world affairs. Although the traditional
model of sovereignty is clearly impossible, today's state
still survives - despite pooling some of its powers with
others. Transfrontier broadcasting is an example of many
apparently sovereign decisions being seriously constrained
or neutralised by others' decisions, economic trends and
interests. This is evident, for example, in the Spanish
Government's negative reactions towards a private Spanish-
speaking channel transmitted via satellite. Or the case of
the UK delegation at the World Administrative Radio
Conference in 1977 regarding cultural sovereignty. Or even
in French accusations (as we shall see later) that
Luxembourg's satellite was a 'Coca-Cola' satellite invading
French culture. Satellite broadcasting demonstrates that
the state has to adapt its policies to the framework of
interdependence.
Satellite television appears to be a suitable example of
interdependence among the EC member states. Purely
national action is no longer satisfactory, but a system of
regulation could be achieved by setting up a collective
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regime. In broadcasting, both European and non-European
multimedia conglomerates are playing an increasingly
important role in the audiovisual sector. These programme-
distributors want free-flow of programming, information and
advertising throughout Europe. On the other hand,
individual state action does not seem to ensure a better
outcome than coordinating domestic laws in a collective
regime. This coordination is nothing more than a typical
example of interdependence - a set of behavioural norms and
rules covering a broad range of broadcasting issues under
the principle of long-term reciprocation. Such a collective
system, seen in the Directive, provides both restraints
and opportunities for the state and limits its freedom of
unilateral action on broadcasting affairs.
However, the nation-state, even in this case, is not
obsolete. Each nation-state has individual calculations of
self-interest (Krasner: 1982) and, according to this, tries
to see whether the overall balance of restraints and
opportunities remains acceptable. This becomes more
difficult when considering the different national attitudes
towards any policy. Bulmer(1983) notes that domestic
politics have a vital impact on the policy output of the
Community. Of course, this balance is different for each
state, depending on the structure of the domestic political
system, leading to the concept of intergovermentalism where
Community institutions, especially the Commission, cannot
accrue power independent of the member states. The unit of
analysis is the member-state and the bargaining between
itself and the other member-states is the focus. In the
case of television, member-states have served either to
impede the EC's wide progress or to create competition by
using the C0E. The UK, Dutch and Danish governments made it
clear that they would prefer the C0E to propose the
harmonisation of regulations concerning broadcasting. The
quota programming principle of the Directive is supported
by very few countries and opposed particularly the
British, Danes, Germans, Irish and the Luxembourgers.
Again, in the case of time allowed for advertising, the
majority agree but is opposed by the British, Irish and
Luxembourgers, showing that the member-states, despite
losing absolute control over broadcasting affairs, can
still press for control on issues related to domestic
interests. Again, the example of programme quotas is
aligned more with French television quotas, rather than
with British ones. On the other hand, the British expect
that internationalising the English language- making it
the EC lingua franca - will give British broadcasting huge
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potential.	 Any rules, especially those imposed by the
Community, threaten this potential.
The 'reinforcement' of the state in broadcasting affairs
has been backed by broadcasting liberalisation in Europe,
leading to a renationalisation of broadcasting policies.
This is because, in contrast to what was imagined in the
early 1980s, broadcasting has been liberalised more through
the terrestrial frequencies and less via satellite
transmission, enabling states to maintain control of
developments and dictate their terms according to national
policies. Nevertheless, the arrival of transborder video
forces the states to take common action because it is a
Community concern. Transfrontier television might be an
element of European integration in the process of mutual
understanding of European cultures, but overly optimistic
declarations could be misleading.
2.7.5 BROADCASTING AND THE COMMUNITY'S AUDIOVISUAL POLICY
Audiovisual policy-making has conformed to all of the EC's
characteristics: most notably, a huge amount of political
and administrative labour that produces meagre results.
Helen Wallace (1983) notes that policy consists of
consultations among the governments of member-states on
issues of common concern with the main objective of
bringing together contrasting views and gradually aligning
national policies, rather than adopting a legislative
programme at the EC level. These elements are also seen in
television policy. On one hand, TWF and the Directive
obviously tend to include various views about broadcasting,
attempting to reach a compromise. On the other, the
reluctance of EC members to adopt the Directive indicates
that television policy has followed the usual policy-making
path. Even the latest principles of the MEDIA programme
follow the normal EC language guidelines, principally
designed not to upset the heads of state.
To understand the Community's policy-making, it is useful
to remember the distinction made by Mayntz and Scharpf
(1975) between two kinds of policy-making which, to a
certain extent, are elaborations of the incremental versus
rational policy literature. The first method is called
reactive policy-making, defined as an incremental process
along an issue in which the solution depends on the gradual
adjustment of existing policies. The objective is to
marginally alter the scope of policy instruments as
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problems change. Active policy-making, on the other hand,
represents a rather ambitious attempt to establish a new
set-up of different policies via comprehensive appraisal
and solutions.
The Community's policy has been reactive rather than
active. Wallace (1984) notes that this is due to the
absence of precedent and a 'body' of existing policies.
The Commission, in particular, sees itself as a policy
initiator (Taylor: 1983, Philip: 1986) and promoter of new
policies that are constantly readjusted. However, policy-
making in the Community should not be seen simply in terms
of preparing and agreeing legislative proposals.
Implementing policies provides a rich field for influence,
especially where management committees and advisory bodies
have been set up to oversee developments and provide advice
for future policy (Philip: 1986). Faced with the basic
principle of services moving freely within the Common
Market, the Commission has two choices: to produce
legislation harmonising every aspect of broadcasting to
ensure that there is no chance of the laws in any EC
country conflicting with those of another; or to propose a
framework of basic rules. The first would require a whole
new appraisal; a range of specific solutions to
	
small
problems and, finally, an active policy. It has chosen
the second option. Over the years, the Commission has gone
through the normal advisory stages. It held a discussion
agenda for relevant European interest groups, took opinions
from advisory committees and set up working parties of
government experts. The process within the Community's
decision-making is as follows: the Commission proposes, the
Parliament (or Assembly) and the Economic and Social
Committee advise, the Council disposes (yet to happen in
audiovisual policy), and the Commission comes back in again
to implement any decision-made.
The Commission's proposals have met with disagreement from
various groups, especially the public service broadcasters
and some countries with high-quality programme output. One
could say that the Commission's thinking has been more
influenced by well-organised interests than by the
viewers. This decision-making pattern makes the outcome
of the adopted policy predictable: a policy that tends to
include various aspects and draw a line to find a
compromise solution. All these characteristics are also
present in the Commission's television policy -- a somewhat
middle-range approach. Because of the Commission's anxiety
over its competence, it approaches television as an
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economic activity, rather than a cultural product.
The scope of its policy could be categorised into three
dimensions: industrial - hardware, the programming-software
productions and advertising-legal. The first two are
examined in Part Four of this project. Here, we look at the
advertising and legal dimensions of the Commission's policy
initiative.
2.7.6 THE PROPOSALS REGARDING ADVERTISING
The Commission believes advertising is an important part of
promoting of goods and services; it is expected to be the
main revenue source for the new channels. Because the EC
member-states have different content rules regarding
advertising, some broadcasters may find it impossible to
broadcast programmes simultaneously. TWF points out that
the member-states must start looking for ways of removing
legal barriers to the movement of broadcasting services,
which will be also necessary to prevent distorting
competition. Otherwise, broadcasts within and throughout
member-states will be subject to restrictions of varying
severity. Therefore, demand for advertising time will tend
to be concentrated on certain countries. The Commission has
also related this to Articles 57(2) and 66 of the Treaty,
seeking to establish certain minimum standards which will
permit programmes to be transmitted throughout the
Community. The Directive, in Article 5, argued that all
countries should be obliged to have at least one channel
carrying advertising, but that leaves considerable
latitude on the amount permitted and the formula used (per
day, per hour, etc.). It gave two general principles: (I)
advertising time should be limited enough not to interfere
improperly with the function of broadcasting as a means of
education, information and entertainment, and (ii) the time
allowed should be sufficient for the demand for
broadcasting advertising in a given member state to be met,
taking into account the interests of the other media. The
Commission has proposed: (i) more airtime for TV
advertising, (ii) a ban on advertising tobacco and tobacco
products, (iii) special rules for alcohol advertisements
and, (iv) rules to ensure that TV-sponsored programmes are
legally received in all member-states.
The Commission has seemed to take a more consumerist
approach regarding the future of television since it has
backed the arguments for commercial broadcasting rather
than traditional public service television. This is one of
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Commission's problems because its analysis has
superficially taken into account the problems facing psb
during the last decade. Although it acknowledges that
introducing advertising is not without disadvantages and
thinks that psb should continue, it considers that psb,
advertising and commercialism could be compatible (U).
The main battle within the Commission was over the amount
of time to allocate to advertising. The usual compromising
took place: 15 per cent was a straight compromise between
the 20 per cent suggested by the UK and the proposed 10
per cent of the Italian Commissioner. Thus, Article 13 of
the Directive reduces advertising time to 15 per cent,
while TWF proposes 20 per cent. Cases like banning tobacco
products pass without considerable alterations (Article 9)
because they are agreed by all member states. In other
cases, like protecting youth, the proposal becomes too
general, effectively leaving the member-state to act at a
national level. This means that the Commission has
followed its usual form in attempting to find a solution
without upsetting either broadcasters, governments or,
mainly, the other media. The method is well tried and
there is no reason to object to such a 'middle-range'
approach.
The same approach is seen in the case of sponsorship.
Article 12 of the Directive suggests that responsibility
for programmes rest with the broadcaster and that his
editorial judgement remain free from the sponsor's
influence. Once again, the Commission leaves the member
states to define the terms in the light of current
developments. However, this may create more problems due
to each country's definitions. Moreover, situations such
as 'backdoor' sponsorship, which is very well known in the
USA are increasingly difficult to define and control when
the general framework is so vague and abstract.
The Commission argues for harmony and simultaneously
encourages the member states to enforce more restrictive
rules than those imposed in the Directive. Looking at the
Commission's general policy-style, this approach is very
common. In practice, the states follow the general
guidelines with few alterations, but some cannot be
equally applied among all member states. Because there is
no supranational body in the EC to oversee the area (like
the FCC in the US), the whole matter is enormously
bureaucratic.
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Finally, the Commission inadequately explores the
relationship between advertising and psb because its
enthusiasm for advertising overshadows any other
consideration. Once again, the Commission has used its
minimalist approach by adopting a little bit of everything
in its policy concept. Eventually, the Assembly amended the
15 per cent quota from per hour to per day and deleted the
paragraph expressing that less than 15 per cent could ban
certain broadcasters in some member-states. It also
determined the terms of sponsorship and internal
broadcasts, but rather vaguely.
2.7.7 PUBLIC ORDER, PERSONAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO REPLY
The Commission's approach on this issue was more
controversial, especially the 'Right to Reply' topic, which
despite being discussed in TWF in some detail, disappeared
in the first version of the Directive. This was interpreted
as another compromise by the Commission, caused by the
difficulty of tackling such a matter. Eventually, the
Assembly reintroduced the right to reply and has asked for
an arbitrary body to be set up to deal with this.
On other related issues, some provisions have been
targeted towards protecting youth from broadcasts that may
damage their moral welfare, particularly those of violent
and pornographic nature. In TWF, the Commission suggested
its usual lowest common denominator solution (TWF: 1984;
288,292). Again, the member states would have to be self
disciplined, so programmes will not pose new problems. In
the Directive (Articles 15 and 16), the member-states are
also responsible for enacting effective measures to ensure
compliance with the above requirements and to implement
even stricter rules.
The Commission has called for minimal standardisation and
direct action because there have not been real problems
among the member-states' legislation. For example, hard-
core pornography is not broadcast in any EC country. It is
common for broadcasters to keep the delicate balance
between freedom of information and protection of youth.
Furthermore, national legislation, which covers youth
protection, falls within the category of 'general interest'
in connection with paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
143
2.7.8 THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT COPYRIGHT
The Commission has been increasingly interested in
copyright. Both the TWF (section C Of Part 6) and the
Directive (Chapter V, Articles 17,18,19,and 20) are
concerned about copyright. The suggested legislation has
been designed, according to the Commission, to remove
restrictions on cross-frontier broadcasting, including the
territorial limits on copyright and related rights accepted
by the European Court in the Coditel case (Coditel versus
Cine Vog Film; case 62/79). These appear to particularly
affect the retransmission of foreign programmes by cable.
The basis of copyright law is that the creators of
intellectual property have a right to control how their
material is used. Thus, a copyright holder can grant or
withhold licences, using his material in different
territories. Because the Commission was unhappy with the
Cine Vog verdict, it intended to establish a compulsory
licence for cable distribution of all transmissions
throughout the EC countries. By doing this, it wanted to
leave the freedom to provide services unaltered, while
protecting the legislative interests of the copyright owner
and his	 licensee concerning the exploitation of their
rights. In TWF, the Commission rejected other
alternatives, such as bilateral arrangements or collective
licensing, considering them impractical because cable
operators could be faced with many copyright holders and a
variety of contracts (TWF: 1984; 316-18).
The Commission also argued that copyright owners would have
an automatic right to 'equitable remuneration', to be
determined according to various principles or, if
necessary, by arbitration. Therefore, a copyright holder
would no longer have the right to chose, either
individually or through a collecting society, whether or
not his programme is broadcast because, according to TWF,
this constitutes a restriction on the free flow of
information (TWF:1984;328-34). As with the other cases,
the copyright proposals were strongly criticised by
government and culture industry bodies. Copyright was also
subject to numerous international agreements, meaning that
any new Community system had to be compatible with them.
Some others pointed out that the intended downgrading of
the rights currently granted to copyright holders and
related rights within the EC states would itself contravene
Article 222 of the Rome Treaty, which preserved the system
of property ownership in the Community, including
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intellectual property (Davies: 1985). Others said that the
whole issue should be left to the market forces to
determine because the Commission followed a liberal
approach towards television. Then a compulsory licence
would be acceptable in special circumstances. By following
this path, the Commission would have taken into account the
already-established and legitimate practices notable in the
film and video industries and the variety of factors
surrounding them.
The Commission realised the unpopularity of its proposals
and in its Directive, the solution was based on voluntary
agreement. In the first place, it now argues , it will be
for a contractual agreement and if this is not possible, a
compulsory agreement will be adopted. Following this
solution, the Commission, as usual, tried to balance
opposite positions to find a common, accepted denominator.
Nevertheless, there have been some assumptions that the
latter proposals will again be changed dramatically.
Surprisingly, the Assembly suggested that the formation of
an arbitrary body - where holders of rights would be
adequately represented - would be a better solution.
2.7.9 CONCLUSIONS
Through its Commission , the EC has finally proposed a
television policy framework for its member-states after
four years of draft reports and consultative documents. It
is not complete at the time of writing, the MEDIA programme
being in its initial stages and the Final Directive as yet
not approved by the Council of Ministers. This
demonstrates that the television policy has simply followed
the path of every other EC policy. Even the content of
this policy, i.e. the attempt to coordinate national
regulations governing broadcasting activities and to remove
the obstacles impeding broadcasting's freedom across the
member-states, is couched in the usual, somewhat trivial,
Community language.
The Commission has regarded broadcasting as a principal
economic activity since it had to justify its competence in
this field. In doing so, it has emphasised the economic
aspect of broadcasting and overlooked the cultural and
societal effects of television. Moreover, in attempting to
find an average formula for legal and advertising issues.,
it has forgotten the particularities of the public service
tradition in Europe and its proposals have been influenced
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by the concept of consumerism.
Incidentally, the Commission has somewhat overlooked the
difference between small and large countries in terms of
programming and potential. Its main concern of overcoming
the US challenge has made it propose quotas that will be
very difficult to respect; experience in other domains
confirms this.
Overall, it must be acknowledged that the Commission has at
least succeeded in putting these issues on the agenda; the
debates may continue into the foreseeable future. The
Community's proposals may well become de facto guidelines
for broadcasters and states before they are adopted across
the Common Market. The change from its traditional policy
areas to new ones is important -- a fact that demonstrates
the adaptability, dynamics and flexibility of this
organisation.
In a more pragmatic approach, the Directive is only one of
300 planned - by 1988 only 70 were approved - to be adopted
by the Council of Ministers by 1992. If it is approved, it
will be similar to other EC legislative programmes that
offer a broad framework and leave many 'grey' areas. Even
with the Assembly's amendments, some proposals are open to
interpretation, meaning that arguments will continue. The
television policy debate may last for some years, whatever
the final outcome.
The Community's broadcasting policy has clearly shown that
television has become, apart from its traditional role as a
cultural medium, the most important tool for politics and
economics.
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PART THREE: THE NEW MEDIA
This part describes and interprets the new media's
development in the UK, France and Luxembourg. It
emphasises how the implementation process affects the speed
and substance of any new development and analyses how the
lack of clear policy accentuates these difficulties. It
concludes that new media development cannot be simply
technology-driven, but is influenced by correct policy
choices, translated into coherent policy-making and
investment strategies.
3.1.0 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW MEDIA
Since the late 1970s, media pundits and programmers have
been predicting the advent of a new golden age of
television with the explosion of more glamour satellite or
satellite-to--cable channels to provide more viewing choice,
dramatically stimulating the demand for multichannel
television. So far this golden age has obstinately refused
to dawn.
Cable and/or satellite television are often classified as
the new mass media but cable and satellite broadcasters
have not obviously created anything so different from the
old terrestrial media (Lund: 1988; 346). In effect, both
cable and satellite TV belong to the first generation of
new media, which is mainly associated with the old mass
media, but distributed in a new way. On the other hand, the
second generation of new media is classified under the
common denominator of telematics, or telecommunications
computerised data. While cable and satellite TV belong
largely to the mass communication domain, the second
generation is primarily point-to-point communication. The
latter is really new; the former are, in fact, no more than
new transmitting channels (Burgelman: 1988; 182). Cable TV
is not a new technology because it was not born in a
laboratory but began humbly as a community antenna
television. Similarly, satellite TV was conceived in 1946
by Arthur C. Clarke who, in a widely ignored article in
Wireless World, pointed out that an orbiting satellite
would revolve around the earth at the same speed as the
earth rotates on its axis, above a fixed point, and could
be used as a transmitting station (1). Since the 195 Os,
major developments have made in satellite technology (2).
Over the years, since DBS became feasible, the term Direct
Broadcasting by Satellite has become increasingly vague. It
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now seems that almost any satellite system delivering a TV
signal to any antenna less than about five metres in
diameter is described as DBS (Williamson:1988;25-6).
'Direct' means that it was intended to be direct-to--home
but not direct-to-cable, head-end. Here, it is assumed that
DBS is for individual reception as the satellite power per
transponder is sufficient for a dish 80cm in diameter,
according to WARC'77 specifications. When I say DBS, I
mean direct broadcasting via a high-powered satellite.
Cable TV is a closed communication system in which homes
are collectively wired by coaxial cable (via feeder and
trunk lines) to a central originating head-end (Sherman:
1987;8). Cable and, to a lesser extent, satellites, have
been seen historically as parts of the wired city and
information society. Nevertheless, according to Dutton et
al. (1978;l-6), this notion is problematic because in the
early l970s, cable began as an existing vision of the
future of communications only to be discounted as a utopian
scheme before the end of the decade. Yet, the wired city
remains problematic as it leaves a number of unsettled
questions about what developing modern cable systems can
really achieve. If the future of broadcasting is partly
determined by the bleak realities of the present
(Ostry:1987;36), cable illustrates the changing boundaries
that exist between traditional entertainment media and
other information activities and their unification within
IT (Metcalfe:l986;126)
Cable technology has advanced rapidly in the last 15 years
and might continue to do so. Cable's growth can be seen in
four stages (Hollins:1984, Muler:1987, Tydeman and
Kelin:l986). The first stage is when it has evolved to meet
three basic needs: allowing the reception of broadband
signals in areas not covered by existing transmitters,
improving reception in remote areas and reducing the number
of unsightly roof-top aerials, particularly in new towns
and housing estates. Britain, the US and Canada have
reached this stage.
In the second phase, these households will also be
interested in receiving additional programmes, perhaps
imported from neighbouring countries. This increases the
demand for connection to a cable system. If no royalty
charges have to be paid, the demand will mainly be
influenced by programme availability and construction and
maintenance costs. The availability of such inexpensive
imported programmes affects local programme production - a
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problem which has long been recognised by regulatory
agencies in the US and Canada. They have tried to protect
local broadcasters by prohibiting or restricting such
imports.
The third stage is the result of cable's ability, given
spare channel capacity on the wire, to provide programmes
not available at all on broadcast television. A large
number of cabled households are in this category, making
them attractive for additional programming and
distribution. These programmes range from local community
channels to narrowcasting-type services, specifically
produced for cable TV audiences; they can be financed in a
number of ways: monthly subscription, advertising-
supported, pay-per-view, or a combination.
Finally, in the fourth stage, distributing television
signals becomes just one of a wide range of functions
undertaken by cable systems, ranging from home security and
fire alarms to home banking and shopping, data transfer,
electronic mail, energy monitoring and, eventually, person-
to-person voice and telephone facilities.
Cable TV evolved simultaneously to conventional television
during the 1950s in the US and Europe. Almost every
European country introduced some system of cable TV, under
the jurisdiction of the PTT5. The reason: better reception.
In the US in the early 1970s, some community antenna
operators began to realise the commercial potential of
cable TV. Cable began to spread to upper-income suburbs and
municipalities, offering more cable channels with access
channels for local news and entertainment. During 1981,
1982 and 1983, connections increased at annual rates of
16.9 per cent, 20.9 per cent and 26.5 per cent,
respectively. In 1980, the FCC further deregulated cable
services, allowing syndicated services to be set up in
competition with local independent channels. Cable
networking did not spread until September 1975, when Home
Box Office, Time Inc.'s pay movie channel, offered its
service to cable operators using the Westar satellite, thus
starting a cable programming explosion over 9 years that
resulted in about 50 new channels (not all of which have
survived)
Most European countries have left the cable system monopoly
to the PTT5 - with the exception of Austria, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Switzerland. The PTTs construct, install and
are responsible for their maintenance; their monopoly is
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protected by a 1960 Council of Europe agreement - the
European Agreement on the Protection of Television
Broadcasts - giving states the right to authorise or
prohibit cable TV distribution within their borders.
However, it was the launching of the European
Communications Satellite, Eutelsat Fl, which made a new
European cable industry possible. Nevertheless, the story
of new cable networks this decade, as we will see in this
study, has been more of a disappointment: targets not
reached, money in short supply, compromises over technology
and finally, the threat of being 'leap-frogged' by SMATV
reception. Although cable is essentially a national affair
despite carrying some foreign channels, schemes for an
interactive European network are occasionally mooted.
There are two levels of cable development within the EC:
The first is formed by the small countries with high
penetration. Belgium (81 per cent), the Netherlands (85
per cent) and Luxembourg (60 per cent), have already gone
through phases 1 and 2 and are entering phase 3. Ireland
and Denmark have greater cable penetration of about 30 per
cent. According to an EC report, saturation of cable
penetration has been reached so that, except for small
growth, the cable networks will no longer expand (Bens and
Knockle:1987). Their early cabling success, especially in
Belgium and the Netherlands, resulted from the abundance of
high-quality programmes, free of charge, from the
neighbouring countries, as well as their multilingualism.
The other level consists of larger countries: the UK,
France and West Germany. In West Germany, coaxial cable
has started being installed and 40 per cent density is
expected by 1995. Apart from their role as carriers, the
cable companies will certainly be allowed to provide their
own TV packages. Another level is the Mediterranean
countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal), in which
cable TV is non existent.
According to Muller (1987; 268), the three large countries
have difficulty of reaching.high cable penetration because:
(i) they cannot use inexpensive, imported foreign
programmes. Where they are available, they are of little
interest due to the lack of multilingual audiences or
competition with high-quality domestic programmes; (ii)
current terrestrial broadcasters use high-quality
programmes partly because of the large financial base
related to licensing and advertising; (iii) high
penetration of VCRs partly pre-empt demand for pay-TV
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services, reducing the incentive to connect to cable
networks.
Cable in the 1980s has been a mixture of triumphant
breakthroughs, dramatic reversals, upheavals, crises and
cash shortages. It appears that cable networks - and the
abandonment of optic fibres for coaxial cable - will grow
at a considerably slower rate because the networks in the
smaller countries have already developed. Similarly, the
high hopes for DBS have been brought down to earth by
launch disasters (Shuttle, Ariane) and a potential
competition with optical fibres. New conventional channels,
especially for television, made governments and businessmen
reconsider their initial optimism of the halcyon days in
1979. By 1989, DBS had not begun to 'blanket' the world
with television. Only the Japanese system was in orbit,
compete with technical problems that made it unoperational.
The same happened with the most recent launch of the German
TV-SAT. The French TDF1 managed to be in orbit in late
1988. But these examples show that the satellites are only
being built when governments are prepared to sponsor DBS -
something not accepted by the British Government, as we
shall see later. In the US, DES development has been
equally confused, with consumers leading the way by
purchasing their own back-yard dishes. Satellite channels
are still based on satellite communications. Nations are
also struggling over policies determining who benefits from
satellites. At the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), developing countries have been moving to sharply
limit the number of satellites the rich countries can
launch.
Despite the satellite industry's woes, there are sill
nearly two dozen satellites distributing programmes to
cable systems, television stations and hotels in the US and
Europe. The field has grown in recent years with the
opening of underused channels in the Ku-Band frequencies,
which can be broadcast and received by using smaller dishes
than the old C-band frequencies. According to Tydeman
(1987), the number of transponders available for delivery
of TV signals will be about 140 by 1990.
If everything goes well, there will be about 33 DBS
channels available in Europe - quite an optimistic
scenario. Nevertheless, as with cable, DBS satellite TV in
the early 1980s knew an overly optimistic period that was
replaced in the xnid-l980s by pessimism, especially about
DES's future. In 1988, optimism again emerged, but more for
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the medium than for high-powered satellites. The
development, for example, of TVSAT was contracted at a
fixed price of DM 1.5 billion, of which 76 per cent was
financed by Deutsch Bundespost and FRG's Ministry for
Research and Technology 24 per cent. The space segment
itself listed between ECU 150-250 million to build, but end
prices vary according to launch, insurance and positioning
costs. Total investments of around ECU 900 million are
needed to launch a system (Luyken:1987).
The late l980s have indicated that the demand for new media
in relation to other information media may follow, not over
the 10-year diffusion time-scale for domestic TV, but in
the longer-term diffusion profile of the telephone, which
took at least 50 years.
As Burgelivan points out (1988;188), a new medium arrives
after a short period of pessimistic prospects, then it
occupies its own place as a competitor to (or in
coexistence with) the rest of the media. The case of home
video is a suitable example. Looking at VCR's history, it
is unclear which developments may really have been
predictable (3) . Klopfenstein (1986;167) notes that 29
market-research, academic, investment, government and other
reports on the future of home video, forecasting to 1988,
assumed that the high-priced VCRs were destined to remain a
luxury item to whet the video appetites of millions who
would be satisfied with less expensive videodisc players, a
largely failed medium. Few studies were pessimistic about
VDP. A report written for investors painted a very rosy
picture of the home video market.
The public policy adopted also plays a significant role in
developing new media. During the 1980s, governments were
under pressure to adopt new commercial strategies for the
marketplace. Light regulation was viewed as necessary to
attract investment from potential backers in the industry.
Nevertheless, the frameworks built to design the
appropriate regulatory tools provoked new problems as they
tried to match market principles with a complexity of
administrative actors and a changing technology. Thus,
development problems led to financial problems and problems
of administrative coordination with no political consensus.
The l980s outcome was confused and incomplete.
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3.1.1 IMPACT ON THE 'OLD' MEDIA
Looking at the l980s, general predictions about the new
media and their implications are likely to be of limited
value. Certain themes, however, do tend to repeat
themselves in certain contexts (Negrine:1988;9). One
concerned the future of broadcasting as a public service
being under attack for a variety of reasons (Kuhn:1986;6),
including new media. The argument was that they would
undermine one of psb's foundations; their monopoly due to
the scarcity of airwave spectra. The proliferation of
channels would bring about a new age of broadcasting - the
so-called 'third age'- where the viewer would be able to
choose his own programming menu (Curran and Seaton: 1987;
211-3, Kuhn: 1986; 7, Dyson and Humpheys: 1988a; 2-3).
This situation would also lead to boundary erosion between
broadcasting and sectors such as publishing, electronics
and advertising, so that broadcasting policy and politics
would lose their traditional autonomy. However, the
increased number of outlets does not necessarily mean
greater programme choice. Audience fragmentation may result
in breaking certain economies of scale, with the result
that some types of programme are less frequently produced
because no single channel is guaranteed a large enough
audience to cover production costs. Competition between
channels may lead to a policy of playing safe rather than
taking risks, with channels competing within a very narrow
spectrum of output (Kuhn:l986;1-8). However, all this has
been largely theoretical, since the impact of new media has
not been straightforward.
The introduction of cable and satellite channels has
created a new competitive situation. According to Lund
(1988; 348-50), the competition directly threatens the
broad, mass-audience programmes from the national ps
broadcaster, meaning that traditional psb channels will
have to increase their mass-appeal entertainment
programming and reduce their minority-appeal programmes to
compete with foreign channels on entertainment. Moreover,
another challenge might come indirectly from the thematic
channels which, with their narrow-casting diet, impose a
direct and specific threat to a specific range of national
psb programmes. Lund also points out that ps broadcasters
are facing all these types of competition simultaneously.
However, cable's 'must carry' rule ensures that all
national channels continue to be available to all.
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The potential of such a situation has made public service
broadcasters reconsider their future role and readjust
their strategies concerning both direct and indirect
competition. Their financial situation has been weak so
they have had to adopt a more competitive strategy, which
seems to consist of a light, mass-appeal commercial
approach for the future. This means that they do not search
for the 'best', but pursue higher ratings. It appears that
a 'ratings war' will ensure, rather than competition for
better programmes. Competition's impact has been indirect.
The ps broadcasters have adopted a kind of self-
commercialisation to respond, or to counter, the
competitive challenge from the new commercial broadcasters.
Humpheys (1988; 38) also notes there is a very real danger
of an unprecedented cleavage developing within the psb
systems between those elements that see a future for
themselves in the new media and those that remain more
dependent upon the traditional terrestrial media.
The traditional public broadcasters' new strategy is also
linked to deregulation on terrestrial frequencies. This has
increased the difficulties for potential profits for new
media channels. During the 1980s, cable and satellite
channels have been losing money. By 1988, no satellite
channel had made a profit and some were registering huge
losses. Consequently, it has been hard to measure their
direct impact. Both new channels and new actors involved in
the field have acted, directly or indirectly, as powerful
agents for the deregulation of broadcasting (Huiupheys:
1988; 39). Lobbying governments is a direct method
involving an alliance of publishers, advertisers, satellite
and cable operators and manufacturers. Indirect methods
include the first new channels entering the broadcasting
systems.
It seems likely that the advent of cable to satellite
channels will cause further deregulation. In 1987-1988,
there were about 27 of these channels; they were offered
to about 13 million West European cabled households in
1987, but their impact was speculated rather than real. It
is very possible that more cable and satellite channels
will emerge and eventually deregulate the whole structure.
Nevertheless, these channels are not on a par with the
introduction of radio and television.
As Burgieman (1988;186) noted, in l950s, there was plenty
of time available to consume the new output. Nowadays,
however, radio and TV consumption occupies almost all
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leisure hours, so the same phenomenon could not be
repeated. Instead, the new media - which need a large
audience to be profitable - will target the present
broadcasting audience. It follows that every successful new
medium will detract from time spent watching traditional
broadcasting. After all, there are only 24 hours in a day.
According to Dutton et al (1987; 140), despite
technological experimentation, hype and razzmatazz, the
market for existing media services - TV, radio and
newspapers - has not yet been overly distributed. However,
many media companies are 'hedging their bets' by becoming
involved in the new developments. It seems likely,
therefore, that the new media's impact will be direct and
real, but in the early 1990s, not the early 1980s, as was
assumed. Nevertheless, the exact impact is uncertain. The
home video could also be used as an example. Alvarado
(1988;324) notes that a number of studies show video not so
much replacing cinema as operating as an adjunct to it.
Many countries who are keen cinema-goers also use video for
film-screening purposes. Cable and satellite channels may
have a similar impact on TV.
3.1.2 CABLE TV IN THE UK AND FRANCE BEFORE 1981
Cable TV has a long history in the UK, compared with
France, and Europe in general. Television transmission by
wire is not a recent phenomenon in the UK but has been
rarely discussed within the context of the historical
development of British broadcasting. (Roman: 1983, Murdock:
1984, Negrine: 1985a) because of the impracticality of
installing transmitters to serve every part of the UK, TV
households in areas beyond the reach of a BBC transmitter
used cable for TV reception (4). British cable expanded
widely with the establishment of television after the World
War II. Cable also provided a solution to reception
problems and offered a double income to the cable operators
because the major concerns (like Rediffusion and Radio
Rentals) were also among the main companies renting
receiving sets (Murdock:1984;273). From the construction of
the first television relay system in 1951, there was a
gradual shift to television relay within the industry as a
whole. By the end of 1971, there were about 1.8 million
subscribers (or about 11 per cent of total broadcast
licences) (5)
However, the Annan Committee (l977;220) rejected any idea
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that cable services be expanded to compete with national
broadcasts (6). Even in a future cabled UK, it saw no role
for private operators. Then, it advocated the BBC and IBA
views that any future network should be owned and operated
by the Post Office. The only development was to license 12
small cable projects to run until the end of 1983 (7). This
view supported the Committee's opinion that cable systems
ought to remain local distribution systems and that
European countries could not give high priority to cable
and satellite developments without entirely excluding any
possibility for further development.
By the time the Thatcher Government came into office, the
major cable companies were under pressure (Murdock: 1984).
The growth in TV set rentals brought about by the
introduction of colour TV had level led off after 1975-
1980, when the proportion of TV homes with colour TV sets
increased from 39 to 70 per cent. Owning two TV sets, as
well as the use of VCR's, helped a 'second boom'. However,
it was widely felt that pay TV would provide a useful extra
stimulus (Murdock: 1984; Negrine: 1985b, 1984).
In France, the development of cable was practically non-
existent except in some border areas. The 1972 Act on
Broadcasting provided some exceptions to state monopoly,
such as closed-circuit transmission, but implicitly
outlawed cable. However, near the borders of francophone
Belgium and West Germany, viewers could receive foreign
programmes (8). Looking at the expansion of cable in the US
and Canada, as well as neighbouring Belgium, Société
Française de Télédistribution (SFT), was set up in 1972 by
the PTT and ORTF to build and supervise a few experimental
projects. Although the same features of cable TV
(financing, programming) of the 1980s were considered,
cable TV was regarded as an expansion, to a certain extent,
of the old media (Dessaucy: 1973; 53). In 1973, several
experiments were authorised to test community television
(9); they were to take place in seven new towns, as well as
in a number of new urban areas equipped with coaxial cable
(10)
In 1975, President d'Estaing commissioned a report on the
economic and social impact of IT, leading to series of
state-sponsored and -aided investment plans, such as
modernising the telecommunications network through digital
technology (11). The famous NORA MINC REPORT (1978) was
used as the theoretical basis for an industrial policy to
tackle France's backwardness in the new technologies. This
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was related to a programme for developing telematics (12)
and creating a fourth channel and DES. In 1976, it was
decided that cable authorisation would be granted by the
Prime Minister. In 1977, a statute prohibited cable
distribution except by the three state-run channels and in
areas where, due to spillover, foreign programmes could be
received over the air. TDF was the only body that could run
and build cable systems (13). President d'Estaing's
opposition to developing cable as a local medium was partly
because of competition with the regional press and state-
run channels (14), and partly because of space policy. Thus
he gave priority, rather than cable TV. (Kuhn:l985,
Flichy:1983).
In the early 1980s, France's Socialist Government and
Britain's Conservative Government regarded cable TV as, in
some way, analogous to the discovery of steam machines. For
the British, 1982 was the IT year, whereas for the French
it was the year for the Government's ambitious Cable Plan
to be announced. The French Socialists decided cable
networks would be built under the Government's direction
through an enormous proposed investment of public money,
whereas the British Conservatives left the whole thing to
market forces under their 'entertainment-' and 'enterprise-
led' policy.
3.2.0 CABLE AND SATELLITE TV POR THE UK
The Conservative Government believed that, wherever
possible, private capital should take advantage of the
profit potential in IT, and that this would hasten the
general advance of new technology (Robins and
Webster:1986). Thus, in both cable and DBS, it adopted a
'market-led' policy. The UK was the only large European
country to expect the entire capital cost of laying-down
cable systems and building-up the satellite system to be
paid by the sellers and producers of the recycled
programmes and the satellite operators, respectively. The
Thatcher Government expected the private sector to turn
cable or DBS dreams into reality - an approach quite
opposite to its French counterpart. In both cases, the
private sector was reluctant to invest unless something
certain could be demonstrated. In cable, success could not
happen without extensive investment; adequate rates of
return would be generated only when cable systems fulfilled
the function for which they were originally intended a
communications network. In DBS, as with cable TV, financial
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and political problems led to the inevitable collapse of
the first DBS effort, the so-called Unisat.
The development of cable systems in the UK was meant to
herald the IT revolution but development was much slower
than anticipated because of the Government's unrealistic
and unhelpful attitude. In the late l980s, expectations
are quite timid compared to those of the early 1980s, the
'years of euphoria' (1982-1984) being replaced by the
'years of limited expectation' (1984-198 6) . The
Conservative Government allowed maximum flexibility for
cable services under its famous entertainment-led policy,
including: (i) constructing cable systems; (ii) the type of
services provided; (iii) range and quality of these
services. The whole plan, therefore, was based on the
belief that entertainment services alone would support the
other non-entertainment services, quite unrealistically
leaving cable a marginal role on the television scene.
On the other hand, the Government's plans DBS was two-fold:
(i) it should offer the opportunities for British space and
consumer electronics industries, and (ii) it would provide
a strong base for British TV programme-makers in an
increasingly competitive domain. Thus, the Conservatives's
free-market policy realised the international character of
IT in general, and television in particular. This is
obvious in the Government's anxiety not to be left behind
by the increased pace of other European projects.
Therefore, it gave priority to British technology, forming
the Unisat consortium to carry the task. Another group,
the so-called Club 21, formed by broadcasters and
manufacturers, would operate the satellite.
In this first Unisat round (1982-1985), the Government's
attitude was haphazard, confusing the parties involved with
its ambiguous policy: a mixture of technology- and market-
led, desire and reality, and finally, free-market choice
and dirigisme. Due to the high risks and the enormous
investment required, the parties involved decided to pull
out from the project. The second round, which started late
in 1985, indicated that the Government had learnt its
lessons from the Unisat case. Now it gave a 15-year
programme-choice period and free choice concerning the
origin of the satellite system. This new venture, by the
British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) Consortium, was
reminiscent of the beginning of the ITV system.
Existing cable operators faced two problems. In the short
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term, they had to sell cable TV to a reluctant British
public. In the long term, the entertainment image of cable
seems to have been modified by adding a multipurpose
communications function. BT obviously saw its involvement
in cable TV as just another way of locking up the whole
future of domestic voice and interactive information
services. In those 'dark years' of cable, BT became one of
the major players.
No programming obligations were foreseen or required for
cable and satellite TV services; they would be regulated
with a 'light touch' through the Cable Authority and IBA.
The Government believed that an open, laisser-faire policy
would create the cable network's infrastructure and build
up the DBS system, eventually covering leaks created by its
incoherent plans. Through a policy of ad hoc committees on
cable, the Government attempted to encourage competition in
the supply and provision of the networks. A similar
approach followed on DBS, where free-market, private
enterprise principles and the flexibility of the
marketplace would build up the satellite systems. However,
this policy suffered in both cases from a lack of
consistency and coherence. The Peacock Committee largely
recognised the failure of that policy, but the choice of
either BT or Mercury building up the cable network on a
natural basis seems unlikely.
3.2.1 THE EVOLUTION OF A CABLE AND DBS POLICY
The Conservative victory in 1979 marked the turning point
for IT in general, and cable and DBS in particular. Cable
policy was defined in greater detail and with great
enthusiasm. The whole tone and direction of this policy
could be summarised as speedy action, private funds and
light control, similar to the US approach (15), and
dissimilar to French and West German cases during the same
period. DBS policy followed a similar path.
In March 1980, the Home Secretary initiated a study of the
implications of establishing a UK DBS service by about
1985. In November of the same year, he also announced that
the Government was prepared to consider applications for
pay TV franchises from existing holders of cable licences.
In March 1981, pilot schemes were authorised in 11
locations, with 2 more licences added soon afterwards. In
May, the Home Office study appeared, emphasising that the
Government would not wish to finance such a project and
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that programme services would be either provided or
supervised by existing broadcasting concerns, recommending
two DBS channels by 1986.
The whole attitude towards cable and DBS was related to the
general policy and enthusiasm on the IT sector in the early
1980s. It was also in 1970s that the Labour Government
formed the Advisory Council for Applied Research and
Development (ACARD) (16), which published its report
focusing attention on the economic, industrial and
employment opportunities posed by IT (Dutton: 1987,
Hollins: 1984). This approach towards cable was shaken by
the growing political and industrial popularity of IT
(Negrine: 1985b;1lO). Then, the international environment
put on pressure as well: the ACARD report, by mentioning
the French experiment in Biarritz with optic fibres, argued
that modern telecommunications was at the heart of any
large-scale IT development. Moreover, satellite
developments in France and the FRG, or the commercial
LuxSat project, made many British commentators start
worrying about the impact of the European developments on
British media industries (17). In the beginning,the HO's
policy-making cycle paralleled new ideas about IT, but
finally, after the consideration that pilot schemes were
obsolete, the DTI tried to gain more influence over cable
affairs and hence, broadcasting-related issues
(Negrine:1985b, Collins:l986a, Metcalfe:l985). There were
three reports defining a new climate for cable systems
while the first 11 franchises were allocated in January
1984: the report of the Information Technology Advisory
Panel (ITAP) in 1982, followed by Lord Hunt's Inquiry in
1982 and then the White Paper (WP) in 1983 on the
Development of Cable Systems and Services, which became the
Cable Act of 1984.
The ITAP was composed of top executives from British
computing and electronic firms, but not from broadcasting,
cable	 or	 telecommunications	 (18)	 (Hollins:l984,
Dutton:1987). ITAP's broad philosophy was subsequently
incorporated into the Hunt Report and throughout the WP. In
its 54, pages it encourages the speedy development of cable
systems (Evans et al. :1983) and states that the whole
development must be left to the market forces, adopting an
entertainment-led attitude. The report endorsed: (i)
private financing on cable systems; (ii) a relaxation of
restrictions on programming regulations, (iii) a new body
to oversee cable development; and (iv) preference for
technologically advanced cable broadband systems.
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The Government approved the report and set up a committee,
chaired by Lord Hunt, to examine these implications and the
impact of cable on the existing media, necessary
regulations and restrictions over programming, and the
regulatory framework. The Hunt Report (19) recommended
speedy action and minimal restrictions. During 1982, cable
TV aroused enormous public interest in the press, on
television (20) and in Parliament (21). Existing cable
operations and some financial interests in the City began
considering investment possibilities. Potential operators
argued that only a minimum of regulations should be placed
on cable TV, such as being allowed to offer both services
and programmes, and not being subject to the national
channels' 'must carry' rules. The Hunt Report recommended
liberalisation on the grounds of no restrictions and on the
separation of operator and programme-provider. The Hunt
Committee showed an awareness of the dangers associated
with local cable monopolies, recommending that competition
for franchises would provide the fairest and most efficient
way for cabling Britain without a large influx of public
money (22).
In an environment where cable's commercial viability was
uncertain, City financial interests were reluctant to
invest large amounts of funds. The WP, largely based on
Hunt's recommendations, contained few surprises.
Incidentally, it meant, in some way, further satisfying
those favouring deregulation, partly because of the poor
commercial prospects perceived for cable. The WP had to
devise a set of measures to protect the existing public
broadcasting and telecoms services, while not
simultaneously discouraging private investment in cable
(Evans et al.: 1983).
Entrepreneurs could install any viable technology, subject
to its meeting specific minimum performance standards and
providing the capacity for interactive services. On the
franchising and licensing process, this would be regulated
by a statutory Cable Authority (CA), which would organise
and oversee the franchise-bidding process and allocate
licences to cable operators. On programme services,
franchise holders 'must carry' all existing national
networks, but otherwise have a free hand apart from
questions of public taste and decency. By and large, the WP
adopted a market, entertainment-led expansion policy
favouring advanced technology (Negrine;1985b, Dutton:1987,
Evans et al.: 1983) (23). During the summer of 1983, when
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the Cable Bill was passed through Parliament, proposals for
the 12 interim franchises were being received. In the
Guidance Note from the HO and DTI, there was a provision
that licences would be for areas up to 100,000 households.
This would precede the setting-up of the CA. Thus, cable
operators would not have to follow psb guidelines.
Additionally, the DTI was involved in broadcasting matters
- a field traditionally left to the HO (Negrine:1985b,
1987, Metclafle: 1986).
The overall strategy was designed to encourage fast
development of cable by using market forces and private
capital, establishing a plan involving pilot projects and
providing a DBS system also funded by private sources. The
concept of psb was to be assured with the new CA, along
lines similar to the IBA, although the editorial and
advertising content of cable programmes has wider latitude
than those applying to existing PS broadcasters (Gray and
Grand:1983), where in DBS the IBA would be the responsible
for the whole venture. Finally, one hardly sees the
participation of municipal (local) authorities as in French
cable (see later). They were excluded from the whole plan.
3.2.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH CABLE (1981-1986)
Following the speedy development policy, before the
setting-up of the CA, the HO and DTI granted 12 franchises
for new broadband systems. The interim nature of the
licences meant that the terms and conditions might be
modified according to changes made by Parliament to both
Cable and Telecommunications Acts of 1984. At that time,
the UK had about 2.6 million cable subscribers, or about
14 per cent penetration. The franchises were to be granted
to areas of about 100,000 people (24) . There were 11
successful new applicants out of the 37 that applied.
Successful applicants were awarded both a
telecommunications and broadcasting licence - the former
for 20 years, the latter for 12 - to allow them to recoup
their heavy investment costs. Once the franchises were
granted by the HO, it was necessary for BT to grant a
licence guaranteeing the operation. This was considerably
delayed (25). The expectation of the Telecommunications
Bill, which came into force in 1984, played a role in this
delay. Other delays also slowed down cable development:
practical difficulty with local authority planning,
technical problems with cable installation and other
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regulatory issues (Tydeinan and Kelm:1986;131). But the
biggest blow to the hopes of the cable revolutionaries was
the announcement, in the April 1984 Budget, of the end of
100 per cent capital allowances on buying machinery and
buildings and laying new cables. According to Forester
(l987;l06), this meant that the average break-even point on
a consortium's investment was extended from seven to nine
years (26). Therefore, while 1984 was generally seen as a
depressing year for the cable industry, the signs were that
1985 would be worse.
When the CA came into existence, only Swindon was
operational (July 1985); cable was not only experiencing a
slow take-up rate, but also a deep depression. None of the
other 11 projects had begun construction and were
struggling to raise the finances (27). The CA thought it
best to stimulate activity in the industry(i.e. give out
more franchises) rather than applying the same programming
rules to the new schemes. Thus, it advertised five more
franchises in 1985, only receiving five applications (28).
By the end of 1987, the CA authorised one more franchise
(29) and in mid-1988, advertised five more. Forester
(1987;107) lists a cumulative series of blows to the hopes
of those wanting a fast expansion of cable: 'first the US
firm, Jerold, pulled out of a joint venture with GEC, then
Thorn-EMI and BT announced a review of their plans, next, a
company formed by Plessey and Scientific Atlanta to supply
cable equipment folded, Clyde Cable Vision (Glasgow) and
Merseyside Cable Vision (Liverpool) had trouble raising
money to get started. By October 1984, old, established
operator, Visionhire, announced that it was pulling out of
cable altogether and - to everyone's surprise - even
Rediffusion decided to call it quits'. In 1988, of 1.4
million households passed, only 18.3 per cent (266,000)
were subscribing. Of those cabled households, only 53,000
were subscribing to wideband systems. Compared to 1986 and
1987, penetration had increased from 17 per cent to 18.3
per cent.
Like the 'greening' of America, the 'cabling' of Britain
has yet to succeed. Cable is off to an unpromising start in
the UK; many analysts say that there is no early prospect
of a significant take-up. There has been limited optimism
in 1989 because of the City again admitting cable
potential, not for entertainment services, but rather data
communications on cable services. These systems could
compete with BT on price and be interconnected to form a
national network. Perhaps it has been forgotten that most
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of these systems in 1984 were to provide switched star.
However, a quick penetration in the near future seems
unlikely because any growth will be offset by the loss of
the old systems.
3.2.3 THE PEACOCK COMMITTEE AND CABLE TV
As noted above, the Peacock Committee took a wider view of
broadcasting. To hasten the development of cable TV in the
UK, it recommended that BT (or another telecoms company,
such as Mercury) should be allowed to be a common cable
carrier. The report envisaged a national grid of infinite
channel capacity based on optic fibres. If BT were allowed
to carry additional services (i.e. cable TV, not only
telephony and data), then it could be economical to replace
local circuits with fiber optic cables (Peacock:1986;l44).
This change could reduce the cost of local telephony
services more than any option available, including
competition from local networks. The quality of service
would be greatly enhanced. However, BT had been restrained
by the Government. According to the Committee, preventing
BT from being a common carrier for cable TV had led to
stagnation. Thus, Recommendation 15 of the report argues
that national telecommunications systems (e.g. BT, Mercury
and other subsequent entrants) should be permitted to act
as common carriers, with the view to providing a full range
of services, including delivery of TV programmes. It also
recommended (Rec.16) (like the Cable and Broadcasting Act
of 1984), that cable franchises should be restricted to EC-
owner operators. Much of the expertise and experience lies
with US concerns, who may well be more prepared than
Europeans to take risks establishing cable in the UK. The
restriction in any case is unwarranted (Peacock Committee:
1986; 146). Although Peacock envisaged Mercury being
allowed, along with BT, to build a cable favour grid, such
a plan would tend to BT because its former monopoly would
allow it to upgrade its existing system while Mercury would
have to build a totally new one. BT also did not favour the
plan as it would have to give up its cable operations,
which are expected to be profitable in future because the
main profits are considered to come from information and
data services.
Recommendation 13, moreover, argues that DBS franchises
should be put to competitive tender, rejected again by the
CA as the similar Recommendation 10 for ITV's terrestrial
franchises. It replied that if such recommendations were
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accepted, they would also be applicable to cable. As
regards night-time TV (Recommendation 9), the CA agreed
that it would undermine part of cable's attraction and
could slow down its development. This would especially be
true if new terrestrial services were allowed the same
commercial freedom granted to cable without psb
obligations.
On one hand, the Peacock Conunittee clearly points out the
failure of the Government's cable policy; on the other, it
involves itself in recommendations that denounce the
entertainment-led policy. Its recommendations for new
terrestrial channels and the Government's 24-hour TV
pressure at least did not help cable TV development .in the
UK. The Government, of course, could not adopt a
recommendation that would officially recognise its failure
on cable policy. The 1988 White Paper (para 6.43) notes
that the Peacock recommendation would be impractical
inhibiting the growth of telecommunications networks. It
also foresees a new, flexible regime, set up to deliver
multichannel and microwave transmission. It sees cable
continuing to play a significant part under the new
arrangements, and recommends avoiding local monopoly by
awarding the local networks competitive tender. The two
remaining DBS frequencies will be advertised by the IBA in
1989, while entire supervision of both cable and satellite
will be given to the ITC.
3.2.4 DBS: FROM TJNISAT TO BSB
Some in the media industry thought that apart from the
potential impact of other DBS projects on British industry,
there could be some positive developments: a rapidly
expanding market for hardware and software at home, on the
Continent, and especially in the Third World, where
satellites could provide an economical solution to the
problem of launching a national TV service. Consequently,
they started lobbying for an early British satellite. A DBS
system would stimulate the domestic market and provide a
display of potential investors (Murdock:l984;275).
In the 1981 DBS study, the Home Secretary, Mr William
Whitelaw, stated that the Government was serious about
starting British DBS in 1985, with one or two television
channels and possibly other information services. He
suggested that this approach would need to be 'consistent
with, and indeed built into, existing British broadcasting
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arrangements and institutions' (HMSO: 1981; 2). HO experts
questioned how DBS and cable systems might coexist in the
UK's social environment. They suggested that cable systems
should start so that DBS services could be distributed by
cable (BRU: 1983).
bIn March 1982, the Government announced its decision to
support DBS and the domestic satellite manufacturers. After
considering a number of bids, the Government announced the
privately owned consortium made up of the BAe, GEC and BT,
the national champions, to design and manufacture the
hardware. United Satellites (Unisat) was to build the
satellite, and the four available radio and two TV channels
would be run by the BBC, starting transmission in 1986. The
BBC also announced to the House of Commons that it was to
go ahead with the DBS venture and signed a preliminary
agreement with Unisat a year later (30).
The Conservative Government's re-election tended to
reinforce the developments set in motion during their
previous term. The BEC, however, decided that the project
was not feasible. For the Corporation, facing an uncertain
financial future itself, the project was unrealistic,
directly conflicting with the BBC's public service ethos of
universal service. Additionally, the BBC was limited in its
raising fund ability on the open market, was precluded from
advertising, and forbidden to pass all of the costs onto
the UK taxpayers by increasing the television licence fees.
In December 1983, the Corporation decided that it could not
go ahead. Subsequently, the HO proposed a tripartite,
three-channel consortium for UK DBS and offered to withhold
the allocation of the other two WARC channels for three
years to allow the system to become established in a
competitive market. Then, the IBA would be empowered to
award 12-year DBS franchises in the same way as ITV
franchises. The Government also endorsed C-MAC as the
transmission standard suggested in the Prat Report.
This tripartite DBS venture comprised the BBC with 50 per
cent equity, the 15 TV companies with 30 per cent equity,
and third-party companies selected by the Home Secretary on
advice from the IBA with 20 per cent equity. The venture
was to operate under a Board, with the main source of
revenue from subscription; whether advertising become
another source would be the consortium's decision. The
Government's aim was clearly that the whole project would
not be funded by public money. The third-party companies
were chosen in 1984 on the basis of complementary skills to
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the BBC and IBA/ITV. They were: Thorn-EMI, Granada TV
Rentals, the Pearson Group, Consolidated Satellite
Broadcasting; also having to be restricted to the UK/EC
origin, recommended by the IBA. These companies plus the
ITV and BBC constituted the so-called Club of 21.
After 18 months of discussions, the Club decided
unanimously in June 13, 1985, not to proceed with the
project because the costs and risks were too high. The
'demise' of Unisat came as no surprise. During these 18
months, the bidders had to consider a range of problems. On
one hand, the Government insisted on a British-made DES
system and technology without providing any financial
support, despite spending two years encouraging a DES
system. On the other, the three Unisat satellites cost a
formidable £560 million or £80 million a year for a
projected 7-year plan. Detailed quotas on alternative high-
powered systems for RCA, Hughes, and even Britsat, were
submitted, all of them roughly half that of Unisat, but the
Government (through the DTI) formed an integrated UK
satellite industry. Despite the consortium's interest in
dealing with BAe - with whom it may have secured a better
deal.
The huge negative cash outflow, the uncertainties of market
acceptance of the service, and the technological changes
that made DES high-powered satellites obsolete before they
started (as in France) caused considerable concern. The
setting-up of the Peacock Inquiry made the ITV companies
worry about advertising and renewal of franchising. Cases
of SMATV liberalisation, the levy charges and the
privatisation of BAe also cast doubts on UK DES prospects.
The last move was to close down the Satellite Broadcasting
Authority or, rather, a preliminary working party for a
Satellite Authority without any power or role. The collapse
of Unisat could not mean the end of UK DBS. The rumour that
the English-speaking channels would use TDF1 transponders
strengthened the argument for a British satellite system.
The ITCA allowed the individual ITV companies complete
discretion in deciding whether to participate in the DES
ventures. The Home Secretary tried to give an incentive by
lifting the statutory requirement of the IBA to readvertise
ITV franchises in 1989, and extending the existing
franchises up to 1997. The statement was not contingent on
participation in DES, but it was understood that winning
the franchise was contingent on the joint DBS project going
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ahead. The Monte Secretary also requested that the IBA
review the prospects for a viable DBS service. The IBA's
enquiries indicated that 'there was sufficient interest and
optimism to justify a new approach, on the basis of a 15-
year programme contract period, and a free choice by the
contractor of the satellite to be used' (Green:1986;86).
The development of a DBS franchise would be regulated by
the IBA and wider provisions of the 1984 Cable and
Broadcasting Act. The new venture reminded some of ITV's
start. on April 2, 1986, the IDA advertised in the national
press for providers both from applicants for DBS programme
contracts and others. The advertisements aroused
considerable interest. The IBA's contract specifications
for awarding the three UK DBS channels laid down only
'light regulation' (31).
Five consortia, with impressively 'heavyweight' backers,
submitted their proposals on the last day of the deadline;
the IBA did not announce the winning consortium until the
end of 1986. Despite the impressive list of backers, there
were some notable absentees, including Robert Maxwell, BT,
WIT Smith and Thorn-EMI (32). Instead, there was a 'Kangaroo
Invasion'- Rupert Murdoch, Robert Holmes a Court and Alan
Bond emerged as major backers.
On December 11, 1986, the IBA awarded the British Satellite
Broadcasting consortium (BSB) the DBS franchises. BSB
consisted of the Granada Group, Virgin plc., Amstrad,
Pearson plc., and Anglia Television. The IBA's announcement
came one day after the Irish Government confirmed it was
awarding a licence for an Irish DBS project to Atlantic
Satellite, a company 80 per cent owned by the US satellite
company, Hughes Communications. Atlantic was also looking
for customers in the UK to lease its satellite hardware
(Financial Times: December 2, 1986). BSB's plans were to
commence broadcasting through three new channels in 1989.
It also has plans to spend £18 million on marketing in the
prelaunch period with a further £11 million in each
succeeding year (33). In 1988, BSB went to the stockmarket
searching for potential investors (34).
In mid-1987, BSB made an agreement with Hughes Aircraft for
the satellite contract, despite BAe's appeals to the UK
Government. Hughes won out with an irresistible combination
of price, financing, delivery and launch (see later). By
the end of 1988, TDF1 and Astra were operational, whereas
BSB is backlogged for Autumn 1989 and Murdoch's Sky
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channels are competing very hard (35). BSB, with C+ as an
example, expects to do well, intending to charge only £10 a
month for the film channel. It anticipates that 85 per cent
or more of its viewers will want to see it, giving it
350,000 subscribers in the first year. With an uncertain
advertising market in the early days, it will depend
heavily on subscriptions for cash flow. BSB expects four
million viewers by the end of year 4 and 10 million by the
fifteenth year. Meanwhile, BSB moves on but its success is
far from assured. A new UK terrestrial channel, competition
from Sky, TDF1 and TVSAT 2 satellites may create huge
problems before it is even launched. Clearly, BSB has been
locked into the l980s h ype strategy, while in the 1990s, it
looks at its future sceptically.
3.3.0 CABLE AND SATELLITE TV IN 'SOCIALIST' FRANCE
In 1982, France had practically no cable TV but perhaps one
of the most ambitious cabling programmes in the world
planning that half of French households would be cabled by
the year 2000. The Socialists' target was not merely to
open new channels, but to build an integrated network on
switched-star fiber optic cable interactive systems
carrying sound, pictures, text and data. The Government's
plans were announced in November 1982 in the-so-called Plan
Cable. It was too ambitious, attracting enthusiasm and
fierce criticism. Although cable TV development was backed
by the 'Concorde Syndrome', it was motivated as in the UK,
by a kind of boosterisin. The Plan Cable represented a
characteristically French approach to similar situations:
the enormous proposed infusion of public money together
with the framework for control of cable installations and
operations, both under the Government's scrutiny and
direction. For the Conservatives the whole venture should
be left in the market forces, abandoning the PTT's monopoly
as in the UK. This market-led approach would be opened to
pluralism and social communication. Within the Socialist
party, the base was not too sure about the whole project
while the Communists directly opposed cable projects.
As will be argued later, the Plan Cable was largely
influenced by the DGT, which, in accordance with CNET, the
engineering body of PTT, could influence the whole cable
policy. Within 10 years (1975-1985), the DGT had fulfilled
the political goal of raising the country's standards of
telephone equipment and services to those of other
developed countries. In doing so, it gained important
169
technical and financial legitimacy (36). Some criticised
the Plan Cable as political voluntarism, others for the
traditional French fault: adopting glorious projects that
would be debated for years, making utopian decisions and
finally realising nothing because of shortage of funds.
Some pragmatists argued that the whole venture with a high-
scale of fiber optic networks could not be achieved by the
market or by the industry. Then, the Plan Cable was unclear
about distributing responsibilities between various
government bodies, such as the Ministry of Communications,
the Haute Authorité, the Ministry of PTT and, of course,
the DGT.
DBS's fate was not clear at all. In the beginning, it
appeared that the Socialist Government had not decided
whether to go ahead with the DBS venture of d'Estaing's
Administration. One supported the Plan Cable, one Canal
Plus. DBS was seen as a technology that could destabilise
national sovereignties in broadcasting and cultural
affairs.
Although the DBS projects appeared to be abandoned,
especially after the 1984 Thery Report which characterised
high-powered satellites as obsolete technology, the
Government, in the year before the legislative elections,
revised its approach for satellite broadcasting. The
decision to induce terrestrial channels demonstrated not
only the Government's confusion, but its indecision over
developing either cable or satellite television.
Additionally, in 1985, the Government preferred a
commercial and European dimension on TDF1 ventures to make
it more profitable and attractive for programmers and
advertisers. In both cable and DBS projects, one sees the
Government's contradictory strategies, involving various
state institutions sometimes with opposite intentions and
ends (e.g. TDF and DGT). This situation created a range of
control problems. Financial and technology problems arose
between 1981-1986.
At the political/administrative level, the Government
sought to compromise between the desires, wishes and
imperatives of different concerned ministers, involving
itself in the 'game' of bureaucratic politics. ilowever, its
decision to ban CLT on TDF1, granting TDF1's transponders
to European original entrepreneurs instead, further
politicised the whole issue. These political problems came
to be closely associated with financial ones. In cable, the
holistic approach of the PTT and, in particular, its
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relations to the Sociétés Locales d'Exploitation
Coinmerciale SLEC) - the local operators, formed on a mixed
economy of private and public capital - made them
reconsider cable's profitability.
The problem, however, was creating a market free enough to
attract investment and developing an audience big enough to
motivate programme production, to generating public demand
for both cable and DBS channels. Contrary to the UK, France
was not cabling for immediate profit. Industrial factors in
both cable and DBS were given priority over economic and
commercial considerations (see Part 4). The main objective
was a 21st-century integrated, interactive audiovisual
network, but the cable project constructed on optical
fibres was too costly; the industry could not cope.
Besides, the Théry Report considered high-powered
satellites (i.e. TDF1) obsolete.
Finally, the French route to cable particularly indicated
the state's attempt to lead economy and industry and,
perhaps, society to an IT level. The problems faced by this
policy in both cases demonstrated once again that a
rational, cohesive policy was relatively difficult to
achieve, especially when it had to direct high technology,
which was continuously changing, and invite competitive
technocrats to influence decision-making. Both cable and
DBS development in 1981-1986 experienced two stages: the
first between 1982-1984, was a period of optimism for
cable, identified with an enthusiasm for quick development;
the second, 1984-1986, was a period of reflection related
to a depression due to lack of progress. Similarly, TDF1
experienced two phases: the first, between 1979-1984, was a
period of 'limited optimism', stopping with the Thery
Report in 1984, which regarded DBS as obsolete and
unnecessary; the second phase, which in effect lasted until
TDF1's launch in 1988, was a continuous postponement of any
decision about TDF1.
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3.3.]. THE EVOLUTION OF CABLE TV IN FRANCE
Under the Socialist Government, cable TV became an
essential component of the so-called filière eléctronigue
(see Part 4). In effect, television was the short-term
dimension of cable. The longer-term dimension, i.e. the
interactivity of cable services, was considered most
important in this country, which wanted to participate in
the IT race. The Nora-Minc Report created the cultural
environment which influenced the political elite, but the
Plan Cable was envisaged by the DGT, and the CNET in
particular.
Loi 82 provided a legal framework for cable. It fixed a
certain number of principles applicable to developing cable
networks but it had some ambiguities (Freches:1985). On
November 3, 1983, the Minister of the PTT, Luis Mexandeau,
announced the Plan de developpement des réseaux cables de
vidéocommunication or, shortly Plan Cable. This
announcement indicated the decision to begin a large-scale,
systematic cabling of the whole of France to satisfy the
multiple needs for modern communication. Plan Cable aimed
to assist the birth of a French model of télédistribution,
and vidéocommunication. The object was to connect, by 1992,
at least 6 million households, at a rate of at least one
million homes per month from the beginning of 1987. The
technical choice was fiber optics. A Mission
Interministérielle (Mission Cable) for the development of
the services and the objectives of the Plan Cable was set
up to exploit cable networks and stimulate programme
supply. The project was to be under the auspices of the PTT
and, especially, the DGT, to avoid an anarchic development
of cables and antennae (Le Monde: 5 November 1982). The
initiative of cabling and the management of broadcasting
services would return to local authorities
(municipalities), but control of the whole network
development, including the technical exploitation,
ownership and management of telecommunications services,
would return to the state. The total investment for 1983-
1985 was estimated at about FF11.9 million, FF6.5 million
of this being for local networks, FF2.4 million for
programmes.
In April 1983, Mission Cable was set up to carry out
feasibility studies and help the flow of programmes to the
new systems. But it was not before May 1984 that the
Government announced the plan (Freches:l985, Busson:l987,
Betrand:1985, Green:1984, Pineau:1984). In the Council of
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Ministers of May 3, 1984, the rules of the game were laid
down: (1) The infrastructure of networks, as well as their
financing, would come from the PTT. A network would be
defined as not exceeding 60km in two 'departments'; (ii)
commercial exploitation would be given to Soclétés Locales
d'Exploitation Commerciale (SLECs), which would be
economically mixed; (iii) it authorised the HA to regulate
the total of programmes distributed by the exploiter.
Thus, Loi 84 on exploiting cable networks further defined
the nature of SLECs. It distinguished three types of
exploitation. The first concerned the construction of
transmitters and the cable networks, as well as the
relation between the state and the third parties. The
second was related to the use of radio frequencies. The
third required that the cable operators should have a
licence before starting operate. The local cable services
would be under the HA'S supervision (Article 17). However,
it would be up to the Government to deliver authorisations
other than those given to the HA (Article 78 para 2). Loi
84 also required that none could have more than one
licence. The potential operator had to have a double
concession to exploit its company (the double mechanism
between the HA and Government). Whereas programmes were
under the approval of the HA, if they were transmitted
nation-wide, according to Article 85 of Loi 82, they should
have the Government's permission as well.
The whole issue was highly complex. For example, the
distinction between local and national programming was
wrong because the Plan Cable needed high political and
administrative coherence. Then, the DGT was not interested,
as we shall see later, in broadcasting affairs, whereas the
SLECs had neither money, nor possibilities of finding
money. However, to a certain extent, the Plan Cable
decision threw a long shadow over proposals for DBS,
despite the Government declaring the complementarity
between DBS and cable. All previous cable developments were
regarded, as in the UK, as an extension of the psb activity
and, since 1977, TDF has been the controlling agency for
installing and exploiting those frameworks; with the Plan
Cable, cable TV was clearly beyond TDF's capacity. However,
TDF remained in charge of the head-end of all networks,
meaning that it controlled programme reception from
terrestrial or satellite transmissions. This cable policy
was largely influenced by the industrial lobbying activity
of the Groupement des Industries Eléctroniques (GIEL),
composed of 10 large French electronics associations which
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established the Commission de Diffusion de la Télévision
par Réseaux Cables (CODITEC), as the corporate voice of the
industrial lobby to take decisive action upon the public
authorities. CODITEC stressed the necessity for France to
be competitive in the developing new hardware and software
markets for audiovisual media, and to cable the country
with optic fibres to secure the industry's competition in
the international market (Dyson and Humphreys: 1987; 103).
Nevertheless, the DGT was the most influential party of the
cable lobby, surpassing even the industrialists (Dyson and
Humphreys:1987, Dyson:1986, Brenac et al. :1985). Brenac et
al. (1985;308-1O) suggested that in the Plan Cable, the DGT
had not only the paternity of the project, but also made
the Government have a cable policy with a specific
decision. Then, the DGT allied with CNET and, together,
they influenced the Government's cable policy. To support
this argument, one has to accept that in June 1981 the
Socialists did not have any real cable policy. This
thought was elaborated either by the Ministries of PTT or
Culture. As Dyson and Humphreys (1987;104) note, the DGT's
influence reflected the increased social and political
status and prestige of its technocrats. Moreover, with the
Plan Cable the DGT involved itself not only with the PTT
Ministry, but also with the Ministries of Interior,
Culture, Communication and Industry (see also later). It is
not clear how much the Nora-Minc Report influenced the
evolution of the state cable policy. The Report was a basic
document for telematics that created a cultural environment
for the new technologies, but the Plan Cable was under the
auspices of DGT and, to a certain extent, inspired by the
CNET.
Under the 1984 legislation, the initiative for building up
the cable network fell to the local authorities, which had
to be licenced by the HA on a service-by-service basis. The
proposed procedure for creating a network started with PTT
evaluating the local (municipal) authority's request. If
the project was promising, the local authority, the TDF and
PTT (i.e. DGT) and other public or private interested
parties would liaise with the SLEC, which would do a socio-
economic feasibility study of consumer demand and
programming offers. The network's technical requirements
were to be drawn up by a team consisting of TDF, DGT and
local authority. Once the network's size and capacity were
agreed, schedules of cost and implementation would be
determined. The SLEC would be responsible for all customer
relations - including collecting subscription fees set by
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the local operator (37).
In conclusion, the Plan Cable seemed to be a neat mixture
of state monopoly, high technology and local provision.
From the start, these elements seemed incompatible. The
Plan was largely associated with an 'economy of supply',
somewhat ignoring the 'economy of demand' by serving a
voluntarist logic in responding mainly to an industrial
imperative (Bousson:1986).
3.3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH CABLE (1982-1986)
In summer 1983, a financial and economic constraints led to
the revision of Plan Cable's basic approach such not only
optic fibers, but a mixture with coaxial cable, could also
be installed (Le Monde: 16 October 1983). The existing
networks were given time to enter the framework of the new
system, but for the most part failed to attempt to do so.
Even in 1985, it was evident that the Socialists would lose
the elections, leaving the Conservatives to make radical
changes (Freches:1985, Busson:1987, Bousson: 1986,
Dupuis:].984, Lacan:1983). Between 1983 and 1986, very
little development took place. Only two networks from the
regional projects, Biarritz and Gengy Pointoise, were
entirely optic fibers. On the other hand, the Region
Parisienne had not actually made any impression by the
1986 elections. Paris was supremely psychologically
significant in France's cabling project.
The Socialists' desire to launch a major policy initiative
was confined by the task of reconciling the Government's
centralising instincts with its commitment to local
autonomy in the ésprit d'autogèstion, which created
considerable confusion over the question of control
(Green:1984). Moreover, many were to show an interest as
some other major investment programmes such as electricity
and telephone, were already complete (Betrand:l985;145-6)•.
A cable system could not be longer than 60km in any of its
dimensions, nor cover more than 2 of the 95 departments
(38). Cable was considered economically unprofitable in
cities of fewer than 100,000, or with fewer than about
20,000 subscribers. Broadly speaking, it was intended that
the interested parties, such as city, group or urban
districts, would first apply to the DGT and Mission Cable.
After the socio-economic local feasibility study about the
commercial visibility of the project, the project would be
added to a waiting list by the DGT. Actually, 52
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municipalities signed contracts with the DGT, which
represented about 12 million inhabitants and about 6
million switches (39). Another option was for a town to
build its cable system independently using coaxial cable
for a tree and branch system - in practice this was non-
existent.
The SLEC5 had to be a 'société mixte' - rather a joint
public/private association, similar to local councils and,
to a certain extent, acting as government agents. The main
difference from local councils was that the SLECs chairman
had to be an elected official, but the local government was
not required to be the majority stockholder, although it
had to retain a blocking right over policy decisions. A
statute a l'éxploitation des services de radio-télévision
mis a la disposition du public sur un réseau cable passed
on August 1, 1984 it was related to Loi 82 and included 6
articles (Journal de la Mission:1984). According to Mission
Cable, SLEC was a private law company to exploit an
industrial and commercial service or an activity of general
business (Journal de la Mission:1984). There would also be
a government commissioner on each body to ensure that the
network respected the operating conditions imposed by the
state. In mid-1984, no entity apart from the state was,
entitled to hold stock in more than one SLEC. This was
related to Article 80 of Loi 82 and was designed to
discourage the formation of American-style private
commercial national networks and, implicitly, to frustrate
the multimedia ambitions of the publisher, Hersant (Dyson
and Humphreys: 1987; 105). A local authority could opt for
one of the following: either run the whole company on its
own, let a private concern run it, or devise a plan for
balancing private/public cooperation.
The SLECs had wide-ranging functions and were to be in
charge of all decisions on programming, contracts with
suppliers, marketing, collecting subscriptions, fees to the
DGT for using its network and TDF for the head-end (Journal
de la Mission:l984). Introducing the SLEC5 was a change
from the original plan in which the municipalities were to
run the systems by themselves (40). originally, their
participation was to be 30 per cent of the cost for half of
the households passed; this was considered the normal take-
up rate, with 40 per cent being the normal penetration rate
(Betrand:1985;l47). The municipality's investment would be
reimbursed back to it by the DGT. The rationale behind this
arrangement was that the municipalities would pay the
installation costs of a coaxial system while the state paid
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the extra cost of installing a optic fiber system. In June
1984, understanding between the PTT and the SLECs was that
the more the municipality paid, the faster it would be
cabled up (Betrand:l985). The HA's 1985 proposals for local
over-the-air TV stations indicated the Government's wishes
for cable. These stations would be operated by the SLECs,
which would also operate cable systems. The . fear was that
the channels might build far larger local audiences through
broadcast than they would be able to achieve for a long
while when switched to cable (41) (Riols: 1985a). These
proposals, apart from creating confusion, indicated a
situation far removed from the original project. The desire
to create an IT infrastructure was eclipsed by launching
new terrestrial channels; the fibre-optic plan was no
longer a part of the Government's longer-term economic
policy.
The commercial aspect could be attained by cabling 15-
20,000 households; systems could start operating with about
3000 subscribers. A cabling SLEC was expected to break even
within about five years, dividing its expenditures equally
between programming and operating costs on rental fees
(Journal de la Mission:1984). On the other hand, the
revenue would come from installation fees, subscriptions to
basic programme services, as well as pay TV channels,
instalments from programmers out of advertising or
sponsoring revenue (42). However, whatever policy was
adopted, the subscriber would carry the burden (43). The
cable networks could carry advertising or sponsored
services, as well as premiums. As a start, the Mission
Cable would provide a computerised catalogue but the SLECs
had to carry a minimum quota of 15 local programmes (see
Part 4).
In 1986, the Plan Cable was still in its pause de
reflection. The optimism for the 12 pilot projects could
not be justified. The ambitious plans did little to impress
in terms of households connected. In 1987, there were
343,000 homes passed and of them, 86,120 were connected
(Cable and Satellite: August 1987; 40). Moreover, apart
from the hymn to modernity, the dimensions of reality show
low state investment. For the state, the Plan Cable by the
end of 1986 represents an investment of FF6 billion, FF15
billion for 1995 and FF35 billion for the end of the
century. The the Conservatives' new Loi 86 tried to
introduce the ésprit du libéralisme on cable by changing it
from a supply economy to one of demand. It stated that
anyone could construct and operate a network. Out went the
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compulsory participation of the municipalities, as well as
the DGT as compulsory constructor - at least in theory(44).
Political voluntarism, misjudgement of commercial plans,
complex legal environment and control problems demonstrated
that cabling France would not be different to the UK.
However, what the Socialist Government set up could be seen
as a basis for the future. In that light; the methods
adopted by Chirac's Government could not be considered more
successful than the Socialists.
3.3.3 THE 12 CABLE PROJECTS
The 12 pilot projects are reminiscent of those experiments
with the British Labour Government, as well as Mrs
Thatcher's, with the 12 interim franchises but in France,
the state, rather than the private sector, would lead the
developments. Paris and its suburbs are always important in
such a centralised country.
In May 1984, Louis Mexandeau announced that 133 urban areas
had officially applied for cable (45). He also confirmed
that equipment for 320,000 homes was ordered from LLT-
Thomson and Velect-CGGT for 1984. One third would be
coaxial cable and the rest optid fibres. These 12 projects
were to be set up with plans to cable one million
households by 1985, maintaining the same rate in subsequent
years. The total costs were estimated at FF 45,000-60,000
million. The fibre-optic networks were justified on the
grounds that they were needed for the interactive services'
demand in the future; they also upgraded and extended old
cable systems. These modernised towns were: Biarritz,
Lille, Montpellier, Metz, Grande Synthe, Rennes,
Grenoble/Echirollers, Nancy-Ludres, L'Isle d'Abeau as well
the Region Parisienne, including Gengy-Pointoise and the
City of Paris (46). By the end of 1986, it seemed that
these pilot projects, as well as the whole project, were
stagnating and fading away regardless of the state's
attempt and Mission Cable. Only Biarritz and Grande Synthe,
with 91 per cent and 100 per cent penetration,
respectively, were successful but their networks were small
enough - only 1500 (Biarritz) and 8500 (Grande Synthe).
Metz also had 45 per cent penetration, but it had had old
systems before this. In the rest of them, the take-up rate
was between 2 per cent (Montpellier, Rennes) and 20 per
cent (Dunkirk). In Paris, it was about 14 per cent by the
end of 1987 (Cable and Satellite: August 1987), with a
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realistic rate of FF140 for subscription fees in most
areas.
3.3.4 TOWARDS A 'TELEVISION DIRECTE PAR SATELLITE'
France and West Germany decided jointly to commission the
construction of two DBS systems and parts of a potential
back-up on the ground in 1979 (47). This cooperation
derived from the Symphonie programme, whose objective was
to start the first venture for direct operational satellite
for television purposes (48). Finally, the concerned
ministries signed an agreement in 1980 defining the
objectives, general framework and conditions of the
programmes. It also included the development, construction
and launching of two satellites, identical to a large
extent; both had to conform to specifications of the WARC
'77 plans and each would be in orbit at 19 degrees West
(Flash:1986, BRU:1983). This programme aimed to (i) start
up natural operational systems, and (ii) create technical
and industrial conditions for exploiting a new product of
considerable potential in a world market.
This cooperation was both industrial and political:
political because both France and FRG reacted to
Luxembourg's satellite plans (see later) and FRG was
becoming an important space power; industrial because they
saw a big export potential, especially to Third World
countries (49). Backing was equal, but due to the higher
participation of France in the Ariane programme (see later)
and the geographical distribution of the satellite
footprint, the base of industrial return would be 54 per
cent for FRG and 46 for France. Moreover, the satellites
were formally ordered from the Eurosatellite consortium,
consisting of the French and West German 'national
champions': the electronic firms AEG/Telefunken (FRG) and
Thomson-CSF (France) , and the aerospace companies
Messerschmidt Boelkow Blohm (MBB) and SNIAS (Aerospatiale).
At the administrative level, responsibility for the
programme was given to a company consisting of TDF and
Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES) for France,
Deutche Bundespost (DBP) and Deutche Forschungs-und
Versuchsaustalt fur Luft-und-Raumfahrt (DFVLR) for the FRG.
The two groups were based in Munich. The Eurosatellite
consortium would provide broadcast service over the German
TVSAT and the French TDF1 satellites, capable of using the
five channels allocated by WARC'77. TVSAT was to be put
into orbit in 1984, but was eventually unsuccessfully
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launched mid-1988. TDF1 was scheduled for 1985, but was
finally put into orbit late 1988.
The decision to proceed with a joint satellite project was
mainly made with the respective aerospace industries in
mind (see Part 4) . However, considerations regarding
national and international telecoms policy also played an
important part (False:1981, BRU:1983), primarily because
governments wanted to be fair to their broadcasters, as
well as to support their aerospace industries. Indeed, the
projects had industrial aims; broadcasters were allowed to
reserve their positions on the possible use of operational
satellites, and how such ventures might be financed and
run. The national programmes of the respective psb's would
fit in with the satellite characteristics for national
coverage. This Franco-German venture was also an attempt to
catch up with the US and Japan, as well as Canada and the
USSR, without upsetting the delicate public service
television landscape. The necessity for France to cover
Corsica made it go for a wider footprint covering a major
area of Western Europe and Northern Africa. In this initial
stage, the psb concept on DBS was strong enough. In that
stage, TDF1 was to carry the public service channels (50).
When the Socialists came into office, they did not have any
projects or commitments on TDF1 programmes and gave cable
priority. Additionally, in 1983, the French commitment to
DES seemed to be revised, with the Ministry of PTT
apparently favouring the cable/communications satellite
options at the expense of DES (Connections: October 1983).
Furthermore, the Théry Report on DBS in 1984 noted that DBS
should be abandoned because of its high building costs and
launching of TDF1 while its need was unproven. According to
Thery Report the Government's commitment to France's
cabling was antagonistic with a DBS development. The only
reason for going ahead with TDF1 was to put RTL on it,
making, said the Report CLT abandon its LuxSat venture
(Connections: February 1984). By early 1984, TDF1 was not
seen as a very attractive project for the Socialist
Government, especially under the PTT's influence in
conjunction to DGT; the whole venture appeared to have been
abandoned. The second round began in March 1984 when
Michéle Cotta, the HA's president, expressed optimism at
the Télécable 1984 exhibition about cable and satellite.
This optimism was justified on April 26, 1984, when cable
regulations were agreed at a Cabinet meeting (51).
Satellite TV was no longer considered incompatible with
cable. The original idea that TDF1 would carry the public
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service broadcasts was no longer supported because it
attracted little support from broadcasters, manufacturers
and advertisers. (Brailland:1984). In May 1984, the
Government agreed in principle that CLT would lease two
TDF1 channels, for French- as well as German-language
services supported by advertising. The state-run channels
cooperated with the Télévision Suisse Romande and Belgium's
RTFB to create TV5 transmitted from satellite to cable.
In a climate of inodernisation, generated by Prime Minister
Fabius, the Government appeared to back DBS firmly in 1985.
The two-satellite configuration was reaffirmed: TDF1 would
be launched in 1986, TDF2 in 1988. Furthermore, a marketing
organisation, headed by Jacques Pomonti, President of INA,
appeared to have the task of arranging DBS programming.
This was the so-called Télévision par Satellite (TPS)
company, which was actually never formed by the Government.
Nevertheless, in his interviews in February 1985, Pomonti
said that TPS would not merely lease the transponder, but
would also manage the project, participate in programme
development and, perhaps, help finance the receiving
equipment's distribution (52).
Poinonti tried to form a new scheme where CLT would still be
present on the two channels with a 'privileged place',
meaning that CLT would have to be in some partnership,
since no operator could run any channel on its own.
Moreover, during that summer, the TPS structure was
announced but, again, was not confirmed by the Government.
Robert Maxwell and Silvio Berlusconi appeared as the 2
principal shareholders of the company with 20 and 8 per
cent, respectively. However, the state would retain a 34
per cent blocking minority in the company. Furthermore, it
announced the operators of the two transponders - a psb
channel of culture and entertainment funded by advertisers.
It was speculated that this channel would also be
distributed on private, national, over-the-air networks and
might be run by CLT (New Media Markets: 20 August 1985),
creating more confusion in the TDF1 'gamble' (53). The
confusion and speculations about the project were heavily
interlinked with the Government's plans or suggestions for
potential operators. But the Government did not announce
anything until the end of 1985, when it decided to grant
one transponder to La 5. It also allocated one more to
Robert Maxwell, giving him the option to have a pan-
European beam for his TV ambitions. A third channel would
be operated by the above-mentioned psb channels, under the
name Canal Un. This decision effectively excluded CLT. The
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latter reacted but it kept a low profile, waiting and
expecting to be the operator of the fourth TDF1
transponder. Unfortunately for CLT, just five days before
the 1986 national elections, the fourth transponder was
allocated to a new ad hoc consortium, the ESTB (European
Satellite Television Broadcasting), whose owners were the
existing transponder holders, Berlusconi and Maxwell. The
decision allocating TDF1 transponders in relation to the
announcements of La 5 and TV6 produced one of the worst
political storms of the Socialist Administration; apart
from CLT, French multimedia communications groups, such as
Hachette Europe, were excluded.
In this round, the Government appeared to be adamant one
minute about proceeding with TDF1, and the next to have
abandoned original plans for psb on TDF1, giving a more
commercial approach to the whole venture. It did not decide
on the operators until a few months before the elections.
Its attitude created confusion as well as speculation.
President Mitterrand's personal intervention changed the
DBS gamble. As will be analysed later, Mitterrand's policy
was to ensure that the country would retain a 'friendly to
Socialists' broadcasting presence after the elections.
Thus, as Dyson and Huinphreys argue (1987; ill),
Mitterrand's intervention was dictated by raison d'etat: it
seemed better to accommodate Maxwell and Berlusconi rather
than leaving the way open to Murdoch and Hersant. Finally,
at the end of 1988, TDF1 was eventually put in orbit. When
the Conservative government came into power, it initially
decided to abandon the project as uneconomic, but due to
manufacturers, pressure and its commitment with West
Germany, it decided to go ahead on a more commercial and
private sector basis. At present, télévision dirécte par
satellite in France has just started.
3.4.0 CABLE A!D DBS: TOO MANY ACTORS INVOLVED
Both the cable and DBS ventures in the UK and France
involved a considerable number of actors asking cooperation
from both the private and public sectors. The attitudes and
the interest, however, of some of the actors involved were
sometimes antagonistic. Since both cable and DBS were seen
as basic tools of responding to the high-tech challenge,
both governments had to operate within a complex field of
actors and their lobbies. Since the new media were seen as
an economic opportunity, one would expect to observe new
entrants and industry lobbies. Moreover, traditional
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actors, such as the telecommunications companies, also
wanted to reixnpose their status and gain momentum in the
new markets, whereas the 'culture industries' sought both
guarantees and protection from their government. The whole
framework became more complex when the Government had to
operate, direct and regulate within such a crowded, and
sometimes conflicting, environment. This section simply
describes the major actors at three levels: (i) government;
(ii) operators and (iii) programme providers.
The government or administrative level is most interesting
due to the involvement of new bodies to coordinate cable
and DES developments and to regulate the new services. It
illustrates the conflicts between some administrations
involved in both projects. In the UK, there had to be
cooperation (54) between the , generally regarded to
favour paternalism, control and public service, and the
pfl, favouring market, deregulation and competition, which
led to some contradiction and collision. In France, the
Plan Cable involved administrations such as the Ministries
of Industry , PTT, Education, Culture, Communication and
Interior, often competitive and antagonistic.
In both countries, other government (or public) bodies were
assigned major duties within the cable and DES ventures in
their countries. In the UK, we see the and Oftel. One
could say that the CA followed the HO'S direction, Oftel
(Office of Telecommunications) that of the DTI. The CA had
to consult Oftel to grant a licence to a cable operator.
The CA was a fully fledged regulatory authority, empowered
to administer, albeit with a 'light touch', wide-ranging
powers under the Cable and Broadcasting Act of 1984. It was
set up by Parliament and followed the privatisation style
of the Conservative Government where previously state-
controlled industries, like telecoms and airways, were
privatised, the Government launched a regulatory body like
Oftel to take over the bulk of regulation and monitor these
industries. The CA's powers were to: (i) grant franchises
for large cable systems covering a whole town; (ii) license
the provision of cable programmes; (iii) draw up codes on
programme standards, advertising and sponsorship to control
the content of cable programmes; (iv) oversee the services
provided, ensuring that the rules were kept; and (v)
promote all cable services.
The CA's chairman and members were appointed by the Home
Secretary. Its staff is small (55) and based in London. It
works in partnership with Oftel and sometimes with the DTI.
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The last two handled technical requirements of cable
systems and suggested their installation. The CA has to
support itself by the licence fees from the cable operators
(56). The CA's aims, in general terms, were: (1) to promote
cable development while protecting the strengths of psb;
(ii) to encourage, by license allocation, a situation
whereby British industry accrued the greatest benefit
possible from cable (57), although ownership must be 70 per
cent EC companies; and (iii) to ensure that religious and
political groups were allowed to make programmes but not to
own or run cable channels or operating companies - a
difficult task for the CA because these groups could be
involved in cable operator consortia. Whereas DBS
responsibility was given to the IBA, Oftel granted licences
for the laying of cable (for fully switched systems an
operator received a 20-year licence) . Problems of
overlapping between the IBA, Oftel and the CA have already
arisen, e.g. if an operator lost his operating licence, he
must have sold off leased his network to a new one. This
was highly unsatisfactory for any potential investor; such
uncertainty did not help development o an industry where
considerable doubts already existed over profitability.
In France, according to the Acts of 1982 and 1984, the HA's
role was to grant licences to SLECs on a case by case
basis. In 1984, the HA expressed its wish to delay the
regulation of cable systems until they became profitable.
The Mission TV Cable (58) was to coordinate the development
of French cable. It included representatives from all the
ministries concerned and was set up in December 1982 to
carry out two tasks: to 'revive' cable development in the
12 towns and coordinate their efforts, acting as an agent
for the relevant local authority in its negotiation with
the PTT and providing research funds (59) and expert
advice; and to monitor existing programme production
available to SLECs and expand production and small
producers. The target of 2000 programming hours was to be
produced and stockpiled - for future networks - within 6
months. Copyright holders were to receive small up-front
payments of FF3000-6000. Cable systems would then be given
a reduction of about 20 per cent of the normal exhibition
costs for their schedules. The problem was serious:
programme quality would be the crucial factor for high
take-up rate, which translated to success of the
Government's industrial strategy of cabling France (60).
But most of programmes purchased for 1985 were not French
at all. There were also plans for coproductions (61), but
these were not too advanced. (Bertand:1985, Journal de la
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Mission: 1984, Green: 1985, Riols: 1985b, Busson: 1986).
Mission Cable was to expire in 1986 but it took three more
years, until 1989, demonstrating cable's poor performance
in France.
The DGT was the most dominant and active in French cable
and telematics developments (62). In alliance with CNET, it
formulated a new strategy and imposed veritable strategies
on the Government when neither the Ministry of PTT nor the
Ministry of Culture had any specific strategy (Brenac et
al.: 1985; 108). Having FF3 billion satellite programme at
the same time (63), the DGT's objective was to construct a
fibre-optic network for telecommunications purposes,
irrespective of whether cable would be used for
entertainment purposes. Responsibility for the Plan Cable
would ensure its continuing prestige, legitimise its huge
investment requirements, secure employment and assure its
monopoly in future communications services (Dyson and
Humphreys: 1987). The DGT would also ensure the network's
compatibility, thus allowing for interconnections
(Betrand:l985, Green:1984, Kuhn:1986). The Plan Cable
appeared to be a terrible paradox for the DGT since, on one
hand, cable would provide a high-tech interactive network,
but on the other, it would weaken the DGT's monopoly status
by providing justification for local telecommunications
companies (Charon: 1988; 82-83).
TDF (Télédistribution Francaise) was an important actor,
not so much for the provision of the head-ends, but for its
battle with the DGT over cable. TDF's (64) interest,
therefore, was in the conception, erection, hardware
maintenance and personal training side. Finally, the Caise
Depot et Consignations (CDC), a state financial institution
(65), invited cable business providing FF1.5 billion in
1983 to urban areas wishing to build cable networks
(Télédistribution Magazine: March 1984; 36-37).
On the operators level in the UI(, British Telecom (BT)
which, unlike the DGT, would not be too influential over
cable policy or the common carrier, was dominant. BT was an
actor under Government pressure. However, the Peacock
recommendation that BT should be the common carrier
recognised the Government's failure as well BT's dominance.
BT had so far played a careful game involving itself in
British cable to build up expertise and take plum
franchises. It was involved in the Westminster and Aberdeen
franchises and took over Swindon (from Thorn-EMI) and
Coventry. The Government's decision to make cable a free
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market meant that BT would not win all the pilot
franchises, precluding any idea of a national system. Two
years before the company's privatisation in 1984, BT
offered to cable the country in a similar way to the DGT or
Bundepost (FRG), in return for a monopoly on the business.
But its network telecommunications monopoly was broken up
when Mercury was licenced as a telecommunications carrier
in 1982. In the faltering performance of British cable, BT
had a central role (66), having also bought up some
existing UK cable networks. Faced with its limited scope in
British cable, BT was keen to see the British-based media
programmers succeed by directly investing in programme
channels. However, it has been cautious, investing only £10
million in programming (67) and a total of £150 in cable.
BT has also shown a strong interest in building up its
service role in uplinking satellite channels. It made an
investment in leasing Intelsat capacity long term and
selling it out short term, running the risk of not finding
customers. It also had two Eutelsat leases and leased 11 of
Astra's 16 channels (see Part 4), indicating its interest
in satellites, rather than in cable. The reason was
obvious: the UK's role in Europe's satellite-to-cable TV
business lay in programming channels. An additional reason
was the UK's natural fulcrum in world-wide satellite
telecoms (68). In the long run, the business of satellite
communications might prove bigger business than TV
transmission, which was an immediate consideration for BT,
since its duopoly with Mercury on telecommunications
services within the UK only lasts until 1990. Beyond that
no-one knows what could happen in telecoms policy. BT,
facing competition from Mercury over lucrative markets,
made decisions to open new satellite markets. BT
involvement might have important implications at the turn
of the decade, not only in the UK but also in Europe. For
example, BT's backing of Astra gave Astra prestige and also
made Eutelsat change its policy towards Astra (see later).
In France, in TDF1, one •sees a company being somewhat
responsible, somewhat the operator of the system. This
company was the Télévision par Satellite (TPS), slightly
similar to Mission TV Cable, but its status was never
confirmed by the Government. However, TPS and its DG,
Jacques Pomonti, emerged as major actors, appearing to
express the Government's policy and intentions on TDF1. TPS
was not merely to rent out the transponders, but also to
manage the project, participate in programme development
and perhaps help finance distribution equipment. The basic
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objectives were (i) to run TDF1 on a purely commercial
basis (New Media Markets: 14 Nay 1985); (ii) to make TDF1 a
European satellite, rather than a national one like tfnisat,
for example; (ii) to involve investors from various
countries by using the Coronet model, so if TDF1 failed, it
would be a European commercial failure rather than a French
one; and (iv) to adopt thematic programming, following many
US cable channels. However, the Government abandoned these
ideas and the La 5 announcement stopped any movements.
After the 1986 elections, TPS disappeared and was suddenly
replaced by Téléspace, another private company. It is yet
unclear whether the Socialist Government had decided to
give any responsibility for TDF1 to TI'S, a company that
rather confused the whole satellite gamble, as we shall see
later.
For the other companies in the British cable gamble, it is
important to consider US involvement and investment because
UK companies were desperately sort of cash. The US
companies had equity in cable operators and satellite-to-
cable-delivered channels. For example, Cable Vision (US) is
the biggest single investor in Croydon Cable Television,
with a 30 per cent stake in the operating consortium; Time
Inc. had a 20 per cent stake in Westminster Cable, 18.6 per
cent in Aberdeen Cable, 30 per cent in Costwold Cable, 20
per cent in Cable 1, 50 per cent in Cablevision and 1.9 per
cent in Greenwich Cablevision (New Media Markets: Special
Report November 1985). The 'enterprise-style' of UK cable
consequently opened the doors to US companies and large
multinational corporations.
SLECs were to be 'native' in France. However, large
corporations were involved in French cable. Three of them,
very famous from their long experience of dealing with
municipalites, were also interested in being involved in
cable. These were the Coinpagnie Générale des Eaux (GCE)
(69), Coinp agnie Lyonnaise des Eaux (CLE and C3D
Communication CGE and CLE were public water companies. In
1985, the rivalry between them, especially between the CGE
and CLE, shifted from Paris (70) to its suburbs, where they
were now competing with operators of several cable projects
(Betrand:1985, Riols:1985b)
While cable was seen as a source of potential profit,
industrial firms and programme producers were expected to
invest about FF 1.5 billion each by the mid-1980s. In the
early 1980s, the Groupement de Industries Electroniques
(GIEL) (71) set up the Commission de Diffussion de la
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Télévision par Reseaux Cables (CODITEC) as the corporate
voice of the industrial lobby (72) to urge decisive action
from the public authorities and to mediate between the
firms and the Government (Dyson and Humphreys:l987,
Bettrand:l985). CODITEC, on one hand, was stressing the
necessity for a cabled France in terms of hardware and
software markets, while estimating over-optimistic
scenarios regarding the size of cable market and the number
of new jobs; its arguments teased the Government rather
than being pragmatic. Contrary to the British case, the
French stressed hardware, rather than programming services.
On the UK side, there was a partnership between US-UK
hardware companies which eventually split up: GEC-Jerrold;
Plessey-Scientific Atlanta and Racal-Oak. In France, the
Gonflans Sainte-Honorine would construct the optic fibres
and LTT, SAT, Velec-ET the electronic components (see also
Part 4).
In the Unisat consortium, we also see a joint venture of
two denationalised industries, BT and British Aerospace,
whereas in France, the whole TDF1 project was given to the
Eurosatellite consortium, which included the 'national
champion' Thomson. Another major, but 'outside', actor in
the Unisat round was RCA with its extremely competitive and
attractive prices for a cheaper RCA system at half Unisat's
demanded costs.
On the programme-providers side, there was much US
penetration in the UK, especially on Screen Sport and
Premiere, as well as Robert Maxwell with Mirrovision
channel. In France again, there was a more solid national
approach. One main source was the INA, which stored all
state-channel programming after their commercial
exploitation for five years in a computerised catalogue -
IMAGO - and helped the Mission Cable to gather 2000
programming hours. A2 and TF1 set up a multipurpose
subsidiary to cooperate with cable, whereas FR3 was
supporting 3 of the 12 pilot projects. The film industry,
with its Archives du Film with a 700,000-film (not only
French) potential and Gaumont, film distributor, suggested
a film channel for cable. In contrast to the UK, Loi 82
noted that there would not be US-style commercial cable
programming but the HA and Mission Cable engaged the
multimedia groups Havas, Gaumont, Parafrance, and Hachette
to produce light commercial programmes. The press was also
interested but sceptical about participating. European
suppliers, such as Sky, were interested in supplying cable
systems but, in contrast to UK cable rules, French cable
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depended on stricter government rules, creating problems
for providers.
Nevertheless, in the BSB round, five known consortia
submitted applications (73). The new media magnates,
Murdoch, Holmes a Court and Bond, were all there. Carlton
Communications, Saatchi and Saatchi, Granada TV, LWT,
Anglia, BT arid Virgin were also present. The electronics
outfits, whose expertise and capital investment would force
the crucial link between the hardware and the home, were
Ferranti, Cambridge Electronics, Amstrad and City
institutions. Most of the second-round bidders preferred to
leave the satellite-provider question open. Generally, the
bidders were rental retailers, City institutions,
electronics firms, programmers and the newspaper and
advertising industries.
A major actor in both DBS and cable TV, but notable
absentee from both UK DBS rounds, was Robert Maxwell. That
he always had a channel on TDF1 made the other actors see
him as a strong potential competitor. Having been
politically aligned with the Labour Party made him
unpopular with British Conservatives, but not to French
Socialists. Maxwell, with another Socialist 'sympathiser'
media tycoon, Berlusconi, was allocated TDF1 transponders
and played a important role in TDF1. Although Maxwell and
Berlusconi were seen as competitors, it seemed that they
joined forces to 'conquer' European media. They always
seemed ready to enter the field, which was the most
important reason for the French Government to leave out
French media groups, such as Hachette, Hersant and CLT, who
were the big losers. In both countries, newspapers and
communications groups were anxious to catch up with the DBS
train to diversify their empires, but both political and
financial problems associated with cable and satellite TV
impeded any major developments
3.4.1 IMPLEMENTING CABLE AND DBS
A multiplicity of actors with competing interests usually
create 'noise', a common phenomenon in the world of policy,
and this noise makes effective action much rarer (Jenkins:
1987; 226). But implementing a policy is often influenced
by the organisational context in which it takes place, as
well as the interactions (or transactions) between the
major players. The issue in France and the UK was the
introduction and regulation of the new media. Simple enough
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one might think: a policy/programme clearly in the public
interest; after all, who does not want what cable and DBS
promise? The problems are related to the financing of these
ventures and, in effect, who would eventually pay.
Admittedly, in both countries, cable networks were for the
national benefit but it was individually, nationally,
privately or publicly too costly. Moreover, as financial
trouble is often related to the technology requirements, it
seems certain that additional problems will also emerge,
especially when the organisational context involves
principal actors with contradictory aims.
In both countries, there was a lack of co-ordination on who
implemented, what was implemented and, finally, why there
were conflicts with other main actors in the process.
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973;xi) note that the
implementation process is often a series of interrelated
decisions involving many, none of whom has any marked
degree of control over the situation. That was the case
with cable and DBS development where both countries had
control and political problems because of the complex
organisational framework on one hand, and the fact that
implementation was divorced from policy, on the other.
Since implementation is related to an interaction of
actors, it has been largely political. Dyson and Humphreys
(1988a;112) note that implementing public policy was
characterised by unforeseen disagreements, delays and
disappointments. Heroic feats of coordination and control
were less evident later. These problems were technical,
financial and politico-administrative. Technical problems
are examined in Part 4; here I look at the politico-
administrative and financial problems, but these two are
often interrelated.
3.4.1.1 FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND COMMERCIAL UNCERTAINTY
In both countries, the actual costs for the new media, and
cable network's construction, in particular, were greater
than the expected. In the UK, spiralling capital costs and
a phasing-out of capital tax allowances for new investment
(announced by the Government in the March 1984 Budget),
meant that cable's development would be cautious and
primarily responsive to an uncertain demand for more
entertainment programming. In fact, cable was not the only
industry to be adversely affected by the Budget decision,
although the damage caused was probably not as great as
was made out at the time (Hill:l985). However, the decision
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became embedded in the minds of most in the financial
community as a factor making investment in cable much less
attractive than it might had been (Cable Authority, Annual
Report 1986). British stockbrokers and potential investors
were sceptical about the profitability of wideband systems.
If there was profit to be made, it was felt that it would
only be in the longer term. In retrospect, the boom on the
stock market offered many more attractive prospects, such
as the privatisation of BT, British Gas, etc. Kitkat and
Aitken, a stock exchange firm, surveyed about 50 investment
institutions in 1982; some were mildly enthusiastic about
cable expansion but most tended to be lukewarm, severely
reducing hopes for a private sector-funded expansion on
cable systems Hughes:1983).
Much of the City's caution was due to the huge capital
investment required (74). The City thought that financing
cable systems would involve a substantial proportion of
cash flow in the form of investment payments, while the
Government's tax policy was diminishing any profitability.
Moreover, there were few indications of the demand for
these services, or the willingness to pay a modest
subscription of £8 a month (Hill:l985). Incidentally,
prices were much higher than had been predicted. Although
inflation was one reason, it was difficult to explain the
difference between the £15 planned, and £30 demanded by
Clyde cable, for example. This discrepancy was related to
the technological problems of providing such advanced cable
equipment. The fact that the range of programmes was
limited in 1984, since only Sky was operational, made cable
less attractive. With one or two exceptions, cable
operators were receiving and distributing all the same
channels -- fewer than anticipated.
In France, the Plan Cable was, as noted above, to reflect
the 'economié de rnixte', i.e. the partnership between the
state, SLECs and industry. In effect, the state would
provide the bulk of funds needed for the construction of
fibre-optic networks (75). The municipalities were to
provide 30 per cent of the costs of the network (76) and be
responsible for financing local production in relation to a
special effort from the film industry. Private, or even
public, actors were expected to find a further FF1.8
billion. To what extent these calculations, mainly made by
DGT, were realistic, was a moot point. None could
accurately estimate the overall cost (77). As in the UK,
the fundamental questions concerned profitability and take-
up rate, But the Government's requirements further worsened
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the whole effort. First, it pushed for a fast cable
development, not restricted to powerful financial groups.
Second, cable should be developed according to the Plan's
longer-term objectives. Not surprisingly, as in the UK, the
response from interested parties was lukewarm.
Manufacturers, programme-suppliers and municipalities were
reluctant (78). The only source of optimism caine from CDC,
but local cinemas and leisure interests viewed cable as a
threat.
Moreover, the arrangement between the DGT and the
municipalities created problems. At the beginning, the
municipality's contribution was FF 1500 per connection to
cover installation costs, and a monthly rental of FF140 per
subscriber, making the municipalities wonder whether such a
heavy investment could be profitable (Green:1984). This
started a debate involving the Ministries of Interior and
Finance; a comprise was reached where by the DGT would
initially assist with financing building up the networks.
The DGT would also encourage the municipalities to enter
financial partnerships, negotiating the terms of agreement
on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the municipalities
remained sceptical, arguing that the risk was enormous
(InterMedia: May l984;2). The DGT estimated that the mean
cost of a system was FF7000 per connection in 1985, quite
different to the previous FF1500 (79). This situation
created an environment of ambiguity concerning cable's
financial feasibility. In France, the reluctance came from
the municipalities; in the UK it was from City investors.
Comparing the two countries, France and the UK, despite
following a different path, eventually put 'all their eggs
in one basket', i.e. the state in France and private funds
in the UK. While France based its policy on an economy of
supply, the UK adopted one of demand. Both approaches,
however, appeared unprepared, less flexible in dealing with
financial problems and largely associated with political
concerns and technical difficulties.
Furthermore, both British and French DBS projects faced
similar financial problems. Although a DBS system is not as
expensive as cabling a country, the investment is enormous
and the risks cannot be ignored. On the other hand, proper
commercialisation of reception equipment and attractive
programming are also essential for its success. A basic
problem concerned the launcher. Since the l9BOs, DBS
economics changed dramatically because of the adventures of
Ariane and the Shuttle, removing a clear distinction in
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terms of cost-benefit, between light- and high-powered
satellites. Both launchers charged the satellites roughly
according to their weight. The disaster of the Shuttle, and
the failure of Arianne in 1985, however, postponed the
launching and jeopardised space programmes. Consequently,
this increased the insurance policies for satellites. By
and large, the main risks for investors were: (i)
failure of the launcher -- insurance was to cover the cost
of new launching, but with a delay of two to three years
before completion and launch of a spare satellite; (ii)
difficulty in operatinc of the satellite -- TVSAT has been
the most recent example; and (iii) the tremendous increase
in insurance costs caused by the launchers' accidents.
Incidentally, the failures also created a backlog of
satellites waiting for a spare slot. This situation has
become an important problem for ventures such as BSB which
has to compete with other 'birds', such as Astra, which are
already operational.
Both Unisat and TDF1 faced financial capital problems also.
Unisat's case was, however, more obvious since the 'Club of
21' could not buy a cheaper RCA(US)-made satellite, due to
the Government's insistence on a British system. Thus, the
'Club' found that it could not risk a huge amount
(approximately £50-60 million) on such an insecure and
risky venture. TDF1's capital investment was also huge
(unit cost for satellite and launch in 1986 of £50
million). Here the state appeared unwilling to commit
itself. For both ventures, the target was to sell dishes
but due to the problems with the standard (see Part 4), the
mass production of dishes, which would decrease their unit
price, never happened. Thus, the City did not envisage a
substantial investment in initial years, even for BSB.
Incidentally, the Thery Report posed further questions
regarding both the necessity of high-powered satellites and
the emerging problems with the travelling wave tubes on
TDF1 (see Part 4).
This uncertainty raised questions from French programmers
about the profitability of leasing one of TDF1's
transponders. The price of a transponder was also uncertain
(80). Nevertheless, programmers like Maxwell and Berlusconi
appeared to be committed to TDF1 rather than the 'Club of
21', mainly because the French Government backed the TDF1
venture, making it look more 'certain' than Unisat. To
conclude, in both countries, cable and DBS faced similar
financial problems, largely associated with the commercial
risk of those ventures. This uncertainty, to some extent,
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caused problems exacerbated by politico-administrative
difficulties, always present in the implementation process
of public policies.
3 • 4.1.2 POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
When the organisational framework involves interactions
between principal actors with competing aims and interests,
effective government performance is rare. Cable and DBS
development in both countries is no exception, since the
policy performance has confirmed that public policy-making
is too varied and complex. In addition, the financial and
technical problems came to accentuate the politico-
administrative difficulties, which were themselves
significant. Moreover, the organisational framework
involves an institutional perspective of performance and
change, which insists that past choices constrain present
actions, that the preferences and capabilities of
individual actors are conditioned by institutional
trajectories which are dependent on their own logic.
Institutional structures persist even if circumstances
change. Thus, according to Krasner (l988;71-2), prior
institutional choices limit available future options since
the possible options at any given time are constrained by
institutional capabilities, and these capabilities are
themselves a product of choices made earlier. Finally, this
perspective implies that something persists over time, and
that change is not fluid or continuous or instantaneous and
costless (Carroll: 1984; 73-4).
In the UK, while the DTI was looking for technical and
economic opportunities, the HO was struggling to maintain a
delicate balance in Britain's audiovisual landscape. Thus,
rhetoric and practice were combined in a tussle for power
between the two institutions with respect to broadcasting
control. A similar relationship was emerged between the CA
and Oftel (81). Moreover, in the Unisat project, both the
BBC and IBA/ITV tried to use the venture as a 'political
football' in their search to end financial difficulties.
Even the number of companies involved in the 'Club of 21'
was unmanageable, since each was seeking individual profit.
Moreover, their dealings with the Unisat consortium
accentuated their differences, mostly using what was
laughingly known among them and the DTI as the 'fruit bowl'
argument (Cable and Satellite:April 1985). These problems
related to setting up the Peacock Committee: the SMATV's
liberalisation decision indicated not only a conflict, but
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also a lack of coordination, on public policy involving
policy and politics, eventually creating uncertainty among
the players involved.
In France, however, the politico-administrative problems
were much more apparent. At this point, the portrayal of
the French state as a monolithic Leviathan is rather
illusory. In fact, the French state has been extremely
fragmented. Moreover, the French government is not a
cohesive body with a single set of policy preferences.
According to Mazey (1986:420), French bureaucracy is
neither as monolithic nor as isolated from politics nor as
self-interested as conventional, legalistic descriptions
suggest. Conflicts within the executive are
institutionalised within the administration as members of
ministerial cabinets. Local field services and
administrative agencies adopt the position of their
minister in an attempt to preserve their own power, which
is, of course, contingent upon that of their minister.
Conflicts in cable took place at government and local
levels, whereas it was mainly at the government level for
DBS, where conflicts took place among ministries and some
institutions too. More widely known conflicts were those
between the Ministries of Interior, the PTT and Culture, as
each of them tried to defend its respective constituency,
and, for some, to get a larger slice of the new media 'pie'
(82)
Additionally, it was not certain how much the PTT and DGT
wanted cable to succeed after 1984 because cable broadband
systems could potentially challenge DGT's monopoly status
on telecommunications. The DGT's attitude changed between
1981 and 1984. From 1984, the DGT was against cable because
it could not afford the whole financial burden. This
attitude must be seen in light of the 1986 elections and
the potential victory of the Conservatives, who could
deregulate the telecommunications section. However, the
most famous fights were between the DGT and TDF. The former
was arguing that its less-expensive and technically less-
complicated communications satellites, such as Telecom I A,
could to transmit programmes to head-end operators, who
would then distribute them to subscribers (Kuhn:l986,
Missika and Wolton: 1986). In effect, just before the
second TDF1 round, Jean Dondoux, the DGT's DG, publicly
announced his support for fibre optics and expressed his
fears that electoral suggestions - i.e. supplying the
cheapest possible programmes in the shortest possible time
- and lack of funds (83) might threaten the cable project.
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He also argued that it was necessary for the Government to
make a clear decision on the matter, recommending that
high-powered satellites should be abandoned or replaced by
medium satellites and that regulation over cable TV, but
not satellites, would be possible. These arguments clearly
expressed the DGT's opposition to the individual strategy
chosen by TDF. This was an example of lack of coordination
and policy fragmentation; the conflict was inevitable
because the DGT and TDF, two antagonistic bodies, had to
'cooperate' on projects heavily related to their future
status and existence. The DGT's aimed not only for the Plan
Cable, but also for the satellite TV business to justify
its third Telecom I platform. However, until 1984, TDF
remained weak compared to the DGT. As Brenac et al. (1985;
108) note, TDF could not initially respond to the high-tech
developments as DGT did. DGT managed to win the first
round, but in the second TDF1 round, and especially with
the Conservatives in power, TDF's status was re-
established. Both Britain and Luxembourg were preparing
their own 'birds', so France had to be present.
There was another conflict at the local level between the
PTT (or the CNET in particular) and the SLECs, the former
had the upper hand in negotiations with the latter. Setting
up of the Mission TV Cable to implement the Plan Cable did
little towards helping the SLECs. Moreover, various
questions arouse of the municipalities, ability to manage
television without any experience (Le Monde: 2 February
1984), and to what extent cable TV could be used for
partisan ends by local authorities (Pineau: 1984) (84).
On the political level, French Conservative Opposition
argued that the whole venture should be opened up to the
private sector, crushing the DGT's monopoly over the
networks, whereas the British Labour Party remained largely
a spectator without convincing policy alternatives. French
cable was somewhat contradictory to the Socialist
decentralising policy, but since the state was playing the
central part, decentralisation at that stage was hard to
develop. When nothing goes well, when financial and
technical problems increase, when the interested and
involved parties disagree at all levels, conflicts arise,
'noise' is inevitable and delays result. In both
countries, there were striking problems of compartmentalism
of governments with interdepartmental disputes leading to
the failure to deliver or, as Dyson and Humphreys put it
(1988; 6), 'necessary follow-up measures'.
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3.5.0 CABLE AND SATELLITE FOR THE GRAND DUCHY
Luxembourg is the only small country in Europe with its own
satellite system and high cable penetration. Considering
its tiny size, it is a unique case. Nevertheless, both
cable and satellite systems are owned by private concerns,
following CLT's example. Thus, Luxembourg has been a big
importer of programmes via cable, and cable TV is totally
unregulated. In 1986, its 106 cable systems were either
entirely run by private operators or involved in minor
municipal participation. A survey in 1980 concluded that
61,000 connections to cable networks were registered (50
per cent of TV households) whereas in 1985, these
connections reached 80,000 (or 70 per cent of TV homes).
Within the cable networks, which are at a more advanced
than those in Belgium, the Coditel company is the dominant
operator (85). Moreover, cable TV is backed by private
capital.
There has been little legislation; public regulation is
minimal, covering only some basic rules such as the
operation of cable networks and the reception of satellite
signals. The PTT is, however, concerned about dispersing
cable TV, the differing technical capabilities and the
pricing policies in connection costs, which varied between
LuxFr 10,000-30,000. Videotext was to be introduced after
1986, organised as a centralised system (86). The press has
shown a keen desire to enter this area. Finally, financing
takes place on a subscriber basis, similar to cable, or
with some public subsidies (Hirsch:1986a;193). Commentators
argued that the Government had to introduce comprehensive
legislation both in cable and videotext services. A
coherent framework is clearly needed for the Grand IDuchy if
it wants to avoid mistakes such as with the CLT.
Luxembourg's satellite TV project, GDL (87), announced in
August 1983 by Werner's Government and named the Coronet
project, entered a new period with the Santer Government.
The Société Européenne des Satellites (SES) (March 1985)
renamed the project Astra, it was launched in November
1988. Astra has been widely marketed as a product of Europe
and a result of a Luxembourg-led initiative to which many
European individuals and companies committed themselves
over five long years. The project experienced two rounds,
like British and French projects: the Coronet venture,
lasting from 1983-1985, and the Astra project, starting in
1985 and lasting until its eventual orbit above the equator
in November 1988. The names of both rounds are taken from
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the names of their respective projects. Satellite TV shows
the Luxembourg governments' willingness to secure the
country's participation in Europe's future audiovisual
landscape. However, the Coronet venture faced strong
opposition from the international community, being accused,
especially by France, of being a 'Coca-Cola' satellite
because of its US connections. Due to the minor progress of
the whole venture, the Santer Government restructured the
project, giving it a more European flavour and guaranteeing
bank loans until the Astra project could be self-financed.
If the Luxsat project (see Part 1) provoked alarm in
Eutelsat, France and West Germany, Coronet caused panic.
Astra also had to face similar reactions, mainly from
Eutelsat, who saw it as a potential competitor. But Astra
eventually managed to overcome these hurdles. There is
also the question of whether smaller countries, which
inevitably play a 'wait-and-see' role in new media
developments in their effort to harmonise with their larger
neighbours, are by definition condemned either to later
entry or a secondary role in the satellite business.
Both Werner's and Santer's Governments followed a market-
led approach concerning the country's satellite. They also
found themselves in the middle of internal and external
pressures. Their mistake was to involve foreign
shareholders, as in CLT and cable, without drawing any
lessons, especially from the CLT case. Both governments
supported GDL projects in a hostile international arena --
perhaps the Santer Government more constantly. However, the
latter's early mistake was to leave CLT in a comfortable
position without involving the company in this 'national'
venture. Both governments followed an extremely liberal,
market-led, traditional approach concerning both cable and
satellite TV. In conclusion, public policy has been minimal
and quite general for the sake of entrepreneurialism.
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3.5.1. A 'BIRD' FOR THE GRAND DUCHY: AN ACCOUNT
When CLT publicly announced its abandonment of the Luxsat
project in early 1983, the Werner Government decided that a
satellite for Luxembourg should still be the objective; it
came up with a new plan involving American expert, Dr Clay
Whitehead, who would promote a privately owned satellite to
use the broadcasting frequencies. Whitehead and his
company, Coronet SA, were to provide the technical
expertise; finance would come mainly from Europe, with a
little from the US. The project caused most concern to the
CLT, the French government and, in particular, the European
PTT's administrations, which saw Coronet as a challenge to
TDF1 and the Eutelsat venture, respectively.
Coronet aimed to establish the first private satellite TV
distribution company in Europe, enabling viewers to receive
16 channels or programmes by using only one reception
antenna. It differed from other projects by intending to
operate the satellite, but not programme it. Coronet, as a
sub-franchise holder, had the exclusive right to operate a
television distribution satellite in Luxembourg's allocated
orbit position. The franchise holder was a company called
'Société Luxembourgeoise des Satellites' (SLS), formed on
May 25, 1984, whose aim was to sell private investment in
the project with the SLS while the government maintained a
majority institutional control. The principal shareholders
of SLS were public Luxembourg financial institutions; the
Government granted SLS the exclusive right of operating a
communications satellite for television distribution. In
this sense, Coronet was still a national telecommunications
satellite. The second major shareholder in the venture was
Coronet SA, headed by Clay Whitehead (88). Coronet SA would
be responsible for financing, acquiring, launching and
operating the satellite. Coronet's Europe-wide, low-cost,
multilingual distribution network would enable European
programmers to develop both pay TV and advertiser-supported
services for the European market (Hirsch:1986c)
The total cost to launch Coronet was estimated at $180
million in 1984 prices; it was meant to be operational by
early 1986. Following developments in the US and Canada,
Coronet intended to use a medium-powered satellite (levels
of per cent 50- 53 dbw), built by Hughes Aircraft (see
also Part 4). As noted above, Coronet's significance was
its concept as a wholly private-owned satellite project
designed technically, politically and financially to tap
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the potential of the European commercial market.
However, this was an optimistic vision which exposed the
project to Eutelsat's direct hostility (see later). The
financing of Coronet SA was expected to come from a number
of equity investors, together with leasing or other asset-
based financing from a group of European investors. But the
project had to face the hostility of its large neighbours,
France and West Germany, the European PTTs and opposition
at home from the Socialist Party. French and German hopes
for Eutelsat were raised when Jacques Santer succeeded
Pierre Werner as Luxembourg's Premier. But the Santer
Government confirmed its backing for Luxembourg satellite
system by changing the name of the satellite and the
structure of the operating company's shareholding. The new
government saw a Luxembourg satellite as a guarantee of
continuing autonomy between the Grand Duchy and its two,
much larger, neighbours France and West Germany.
When the Socialists were in opposition, preparing
themselves to take over Werner's Christian Social
Party/Democratic Party Coalition in the June 1984 general
elections, they accused the Werner Government of risking
CLT's opportunity to join the French, of being careless
with the country's economic interests, also stressing the
US connection. The Santer Government regarded Coronet as an
ill-conceived idea, making it clear that the CLT would get
priority. Additionally, after the 1984 elections, very few
in the Grand Duchy believed in Coronet anymore (89).
Meanwhile, on October 26, 1984, an agreement was signed
between France and Luxembourg concerning the two CLT's
channels on TDF1. To a certain extent, this indicated that
the policy of the Santer Government was centred on CLT's
future. This agreement was a real bonus for both the
Government's and CLT's ambitions. The French, however,
pointed out that they could afford this generosity because
they believed that the agreement would signify the demise
of Coronet. In addition, threats came from the West Germans
who argued that they would not approve downlinks; the need
for Franco-German industrial support for Luxembourg clouded
Coronet's future.
Coronet would have great difficulty surviving without these
two key markets. Thus, the Santer Government decided that
it would be better to get rid of this project by
withdrawing the concessions given to Coronet SA. Then, on
March 1, 1985, the Santer Government decided to give the
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DGL project a new image by forming a new company, the
Société Européenne des Satellites (SES). The Government
argued that Coronet had failed to raise the necessary
capital - not a very convincing argument as SES had
initially only to raise half of what Coronet SA had already
achieved. This venture cost the company a total of $20
million, it employed 300 people and paid almost 60 per cent
of its revenues in taxes and royalties to the Government.
According to some observers, the Government had pledged to
the French and the company made good progress, but by the
end of 1984, Coronet SA had virtually no backer in the
Government, leaving the company weak. Coronet SA, according
to its proponents, spent more than half of its budget and
two-thirds of its management time dealing with 'government
matters' instead of building the business, which would
eventually be regulated and tax-paying (Koltai:l986). Then,
Whitehead who had invested a great deal of money and
effort, was left with a consultancy contract with SES.
However, Luxembourg still remained a convenient place for
solving problems of satellite-delivered television
services.
The Santer Government had realised that with Coronet's
American image vehemently opposed in Europe, the GDL
project would not work. It needed a large number of
European shareholders who could act for the project in
their countries of origin (90). Thus, the second round
commenced on March 1, 1985, with the establishment of SES
as the operating company. The project was now called
Astra, after the satellite's name. Its launch was
originally scheduled for 1987, but was eventually launched
by Arianne in November 1988 (Johnson 1989; 5-6).
The project was similar to its predecessor, Coronet - a 100
per cent privately owned satellite TV. But it would be
mainly European flavoured because its 11 original
shareholders were a collection of European banks and
financial institutions. The satellite chosen was 'US-made'.
SES, with initial capital of $5 million, began discussions
with both US and European manufacturers but received of
little response from the latter. The main reason was that
SES put an 18-month delivery date in the tender, knowing
that the average construction time for a satellite was
about 3 months. It also knew that RCA was building a
satellite ordered by COMSAT but later cancelled. Thus RCA
was awarded the tender.
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Astra, like Coronet, is mainly a communications satellite
for television transmission of 46 watts, offering 16
channels that could be received with a 65 cm aerial.
Located at Betzdorf, SES has launched a very ambitious
marketing campaign and plans to become Europe's 'hot bird'.
In its difficult days, two British companies, BT
International and Thames Television, came to back it but
the real progress caine, of course, before its launch, when
Rupert Murdoch gave it credit in summer 1988 by announcing
that his Sky 'range' channels would use Astra transponders.
Nevertheless, Astra, like Coronet, faced Eutelsat's
hostility, which cooled off in 1987. However, Astra remains
a high-risk venture, is more expensive than Eutelsat and it
still has no back-up satellite (91). As Hedges (1989;22)
put it, 'the stakes are high, the odds are steep, but there
are gamblers ready to bet on the satellite space race'.
3.5.2 CORONET AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
The Coronet project's significance seems to be that it
'collected' all the opposition, not only from the home
Socialist party, but also international criticism from
France, West Germany and Eutelsat. Coronet mainly faced
international anger, rather than the organisational
problems of projects in the UK and France. But Coronet,
like Unisat and TDF1 or other satellite projects, was full
of holes, making it vulnerable to internal pressures.
Eutelsat was Coronet's main opponent (92); its attack was
staged before the 17th meeting of the Eutelsat Assembly of
signatory parties in Paris (14-17 May, 1984). The General
Secretary of Eutelsat submitted a note on • Luxembourg
recommending that the Assembly conclude that the proposed
Coronet system, or any similar European system having the
intention of providing international telecommunications
services in Europe, be regarded in a similar way as
Intelsat's competitors over the Atlantic basin (93). Then,
in the deregulatory mood, the first 'breaks' of the British
Telecom monopoly, the PTTs considered that the whole market
might become open to internal and external competition. The
aforementioned note also recommended that all CEPT
administrations not allow access in their respective
countries for any type of international traffic carried via
Coronet or any similar system.
Luxembourg rejected this recommendation, considering it an
insult to its sovereignty rights. It regarded this note as
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full of misconceptions about Coronet's primary purpose,
i.e. providing audiovisual services, not international
facilities or international public telecom services. In the
other corner, Eutelsat insisted upon arguing that Coronet
could cause it 'significant economic harm' (94) (Financial
Times: 31 Nay 1984).
Eutelsat's main problem was that it could not legally back
its monopoly on international TV relays in Europe; with the
advent of pan-European satellite-to-cable services, the
PTTs' monopoly was weakening. Thus, Eutelsat viewed Coronet
as a first step towards an 'open skies' regime, as in the
US. Once Coronet was established, it could then be easier
for other European countries to deregulate their
monopolies. Eutelsat's main problem was that no
'international police' existed to stop such ventures,
although the organisation argued that Coronet was violating
at least three international telecommunications treaties.
Since 'international police' were not available, Eutelsat
went more political by accusing Coronet of being driven by
US private interests - in the spacecraft and distribution
of TV services - and that these interests would feed Europe
with US programming via Coronet. This argument found more
supporters, especially in France and West Germany.
The French, considering Coronet a rival to their project,
accused it through the words of the PTT Minister, Louis
Mexandeau, of being a 'Coca-Cola' satellite which would
attack France's artistic and cultural integrity (Financial
Times: 31 May 1984). In addition, Premier Fabius, backed by
the Minister of Culture, Jack Lang, viewed Coronet as the
Trojan Horse for US television (Le Monde: 17 May 1984).
West Germany appeared to be more careful in its
accusations, but after consultation with France's Premier,
Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared a careful and close
examination of the project. Coronet SA argued that it was
only the operator of the satellite system (Koltai:1986) and
that the accusations had neglected the various precautions
taken by the Luxembourg Government. In effect, the
agreements between Coronet SA and the Government excluded
US interests from the majority of Coronet's equity, as well
as excluding US media groups from Coronet's transponders.
The accusations that Coronet was not European enough in
terms of programming, equipment, new jobs, etc, were
refuted by arguments that it was spending much important
time and money proving its 'Europeaness', instead of trying
to look at the real difficult business tasks. It claimed
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also that all of its channels would be only used by
European programlflerS no more than 10 per cent of its
equity would be held by Americans; agreements with
equipment suppliers would be made with preference to
European firms; and the satellite would be launched by
Arianne space. They claimed that the a US satellite was
chosen because no European manufacturer made a serious bid
(Hirsh: 1984)
Moreover, some in favour of Coronet asked whether Europe
could still afford this sort of chauvinism since technology
and innovation respect neither nationality nor boundaries,
nor can be contained in any geographical area
(Koltai:1986). This, however, is not quite true. As noted
above, few European countries have the production structure
to feed multichannel and transfrontier television for the
simple reason that the production sector has been limited
or fragmented to a European one and the new channels are
heavily US based (see also Part 4). On the hardware front,
there were also European manufacturers, such as
Eurosatellite and Satcom, able, even with a time-lag, to
manufacture a medium-powered satellite if they were asked.
But from the very beginning, the choice had already been
made between US firms Hughes Aircraft and RCA Astra-
Electronics. For Eutelsat, having the previous 'open skies'
policy in the US as an example, it was reasonable to
protect its rights. For both the French and the West
Germans, Coronet was obviously a rival to their national
projects. Regarding the consumer electronics market, it
would be rather difficult for the European manufacturers to
cope with the Americans and Japanese when the
standardisation of equipment was non-existent (see Part 4).
Finally, the equity of a company can rapidly change hands
through various means, and the names of shareholders could
still remain the same. In Coronet, the Europeans had one
more reason to be afraid because the 'father' of Coronet
was an American with experience in telecoms affairs.
Nevertheless, the Werner Government succeeded in making
Eutelsat withdraw its note and replace it with a more
general text - a resolution not aimed specifically at
Coronet, simply restating the case for maintaining a single
international telecoms satellite in Europe and refraining
from any arrangement which could lead to the establishment
and use of any new satellite system providing international
telecommunication services which might cause considerable
harm to Eutelsat. Within Luxembourg, apart from the
Socialist Party's opposition, CLT was reluctant to go to
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Coronet for various reasons: on one hand, it was largely
dominated by French influence, and on the other, CLT was
promised the two channels on TDF1 (95).
Astra, as Coronet's successor, inherited similar problems,
especially Eutelsat's anger, which readdressed the
'economic harm' argument. Three years later, Eutelsat had
learnt an important lesson. To remain the main, or the
only, provider of satellite capacity for television
purposes, Eutelsat had to considerably upgrade the quality
of its services. Therefore, it planned a second-generation
system, modelled on the Coronet Astra type, due to be
operational in 1989. Moreover, Eutelsat became entangled in
a legal framework to fight Astra. The real core of the
dispute was the applicability of the coordination procedure
concerning economic harm according to the Eutelsat
Convention, again involving the Government and the SES. The
Santer Government filed a legal opinion (February 1986)
pointing out that Astra services did not constitute 'public
telecommunications services' as defined by Article 1(c) of
the convention, therefore Astra had no obligation to
coordinate with Eutelsat, and the Government claimed that
there was no way for the state to compromise on its
sovereign right (Interspace: 1 December 1986) (96).
BT's announcement that it would lease 11 of Astra's 16
transponders changed the whole game. After 18 months,
Eutelsat doubted that Astra would not cause it 'significant
economic harm' and opted for a coordination on four
transponders. This seemingly arbitrary figure took place
after evaluating BT and Luxembourg PTT capacity that they
would have placed with Eutelsat. Thus, at the end of 1987,
Eutelsat and Astra set down the 'principle-of-
coordination'. Any existing or new channels could leave
Eutelsat, in addition to the four agreed, but they would
have to agree with the organisation. Eutelsat also claimed
that any start-up channels booking on Astra would have to
be coordinated on the basis of opportunity costs to
Eutelsat. The whole arrangement created a precedent for the
mood of any future coordination. BT therefore gave prestige
to SES when badly needed and broke the position of the
European PTT's towards similar ventures. The fact that BT
also helped SES to reach a 'coordination agreement' with
Intelsat (September 1987) indicated a hard time for
Eutelsat. Thus, Astra directly affects the prospects of
Eutelsat II and vice versa. What may result, however, seems
to be the weakening of Eutelsat's monopoly status.
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The Coronet and Astra projects faced similar problems. The
international anger also indicated the possibility of a
small country being ambitious and having similar projects
to those of her much larger neighbours. The external
realities and pressures played the principal role in
developing both projects rather than the state policy.
State policy, to some degree, is associated with the
traditional 'free-way' entrepreneurial policy adopted by
the Luxembourg government (97). Such a strong statement is,
to a certain extent, unfair since a small country either
has to play a game given to it by its 'big brothers' or
find some funds, mainly from abroad. Small countries,
however, can also be used by other external interests to
play their own games simply because some of them,
Luxembourg in this case, have opened themselves completely
to external investors in their anxiety to restructure their
economies . The basic problem arises when the state policy
leaves everything to them, without taking domestic and
international implications into consideration.
3.6 A POLICY FOR CABLE AND SATELLITE TV
Both France and the UK saw a dramatic change in their
respective cable and satellite TV development since before
1981; there was a consensus to discourage this development
because of the considerations given to cable and DBS,
either domestically or internationally.
1982 was an important year for both countries concerning
the new media. In the UK, it was the year of IT with plenty
of propaganda regarding the communications technologies
(Murphy: 1983; 128-9). A similar cultural context was built
in France by the Nora-Minc Report (1978), Farnaux Report
(1982) and the latter's concept of 'filiére electronique'
(see also Part 4). In the UK, such an industrial
development would rely on a national electronic grid, based
upon expansion and integration of cable systems, through
which the vast amount of electronic data, crucial to an
'information society' could be transmitted. DBS and
satellites, in general, would come to fill the picture.
This environment was consistent with euphoric hype about
the prospects of cable and DBS.
Throughout 1982, the British Government's rhetoric of
reducing state intervention contradicted its practice of
selectively funding industrial development. This lack of
coherence threw government policies on communications and
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IT into chaos (Hughes: l983;6). In British cable and DBS
there was no general plan but both were associated with
hurry and industry hype, a condition largely reflecting an
overall lack of a national communications policy in the UK.
This also indicated how fragmentally the Government
understood the relationship between regulation and
technological change in communications. The situation was
associated with an absence of detailed government studies
of the new media. Reports on cable and DBS originated at
different times, from different departments and represented
different interests (Negrine: 1988; 228) . The overall
result was a series of ad hoc committees attempting to
respond to contemporary developments, resulting in policy
formulation by the back-door. This approach guaranteed fast
responses, as the 'slim volumes' to current developments in
the communication sector (Tunstall:1983, 1986a). It also,
to a certain extent, avoided forward planning and sifted
public discussion (Hughes: 1983; 3). Moreover, the
Conservative's policy has a 'privatisation by default'
approach due to the general adopted policy towards the
market and public sector. Negrine (1988;228) notes the
establishment of goals at the political level without due
consideration being given to (a) the impact of the
political policy goals and the regulatory framework on the
funding of the new media; (b) the nature, and economic
foundation of the specific media; and (c) effective
coordination of the respective regulatory and departmental
bodies to achieve coherence in planning and policy-making.
Thus, it could be seen as an 'anti-planning' policy
(Green:l984) in contrast to French 'planning' policy.
To better understand this French planning attitude, one
must go back to the general context. France is a 'société
planifiée' (Francois:1978), and French planning has been a
myth. Through various mechanisms, the state has also been
in a position to control allocating credit to the industry
by sometimes using its power to enforce an inciustrial
strategy (Zysman:1983). Generally, the Plan of the French
economy was the performance of the state's industrial
strategy to be implemented by hybrid actions taken by many
different agencies. A central figure here was a strong
agency (Ministry of Finance) to coordinate, in
collaboration with some interministerial committees, the
effectiveness and implementation of the Plan.
Under these conditions, a simple distinction has been made
between an 'indicative' and 'coherent' Plan. In France, as
in other capitalist countries, the Plan is indicative
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(Francois:1976) because it defined the suitable and
possible objects by proposing them. It is an information
'stir le possible', but does not carry elements of planning
policy. In addition, the Plan's success, with respect to
its performance, is associated with politics. Hall
(l986;l13) notes that with the declaration of Plan
objectives, some actors would be affected more than others
and would react, impeding rationality. This is also related
to the debate on social and political choices
(Bonnaud:1986). Broadly speaking, this situation
intensifies (98), rather than reduces, social and
administrative conflict, questioning the existing policies,
punctuating the inadequacies of the regime and threatening
the strength of public policies to be approved by the
majority (Hall:l986, Birnbaum:1977, Danderdorf:1969). Some
of the above-noted features of the Plan could also be
applied to the Plan Cable. Cable TV had economic,
industrial, social and cultural dimensions (La
Corres pondence Municipale: May 1983) and also involved
various administrative bodies and one interininisterial
mission (Mission TV Cable). Moreover, it was involved with
politics because of conflicts among administrations, local
authorities and with the the central government. Plan Cable
was indicative too, because fibre optics was not the only
option.
For other reasons, the Socialists' cable policy was
partially planned. Secondly, and most importantly, the new
terrestrial channels indicated (and manifested) a lack of
cohesive policy. The Bredin Report's suggestions regarding
complementarity between cable, satellite and terrestrial
television did nothing to restore a coherent general
television policy, but ignored the problem. The Bredin
Report also showed that the Government surprisingly started
abandoning its cable policy at a time when the DGT
compromised with the SLECs. Therefore, there was a turn in
the cable policy. This became obvious when the Government
realised the gap between its Plan Cable aspirations and the
local and economic realities. Thus, the Government changed
its policy by looking at both coaxial and optic fibres, as
well as at the broadcasting dimension of cable TV.
On the TDF1 satellite project, the Government remained
largely undecided. Barrach and Barratz (1962) argued that a
non-decision was essentially a product of a decision - the
results would be difficult to detect. Such 'decisions' are
instrumental in preventing an issue potentially threatening
to the state interest from reaching a decision-making body
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in the political system. An undecided policy could be
considered in several ways through the setting-up
committees, enquiries, etc. (Jenkins:1978; 118, Webb:1972).
It seemed that the French Government followed a non-
decision policy on the TDF1 project because it took a non-
definitive decision with respect to TDF1 in the first
round. Three other factors could lead to the same
conclusion: (i) the TDF1 project was envisaged by
d'Estaing's Administration, while the Socialists had
neither declared any satellite TV project in their 1981
election campaign, nor committed themselves to a DBS
policy; (ii) the famous Moinot Commission had not
recommended a national satellite service, suggesting only
that any satellite system should be managed by a new
regulatory body; and (iii) the Gerald Thery Report (1984)
concluded that major improvements in the effectiveness of
reception equipment for satellite transmission had cast
doubt on the need for high-powered satellites, considering
them too costly. However, the Thery Report did not
recommend ceasing DBS.
The above indicate that the eventual government policy, via
a 'non-decision' path, was somewhat negative. Moreover, the
DGT and the whole industry lobby were more in favour of
cable for obvious reasons. The space industry had lost its
faith in high-powered satellites due to the changing
demands for medium-powered satellites (see Part 4). On
another level, this salient abandonment of the TDF1 project
was rather a wise policy because cable was given priority
within the information society framework. Simultaneous TDF1
development could have jeopardised the whole plan. In
addition, DBS could not only compete with cable but also
the newly formed C+. Nevertheless, this policy was largely
associated with the depression in cable development. Thus,
the plans for modernising France faced a real risk. The
Government saw DBS as a means of convincing its electorate
of its plans for modernisation (see Part 4). Consequently,
in 1985 TDF1 appeared to have the advantage. TDF1 was also
given a commercial approach, abandoning its previous plans
for psb DBS channels. DBS policy seemed, if not haphazard,
at least incremental, but without declared aims. For
example, setting up TPS confused instead of clarified the
game. Mitterrand's personal involvement further complicated
the whole issue. The announcement of the new terrestrial
channels posed questions about their impact on both cable
and DBS channels. Looking back, one could not be positive
whether the Socialist Government had really decided to
proceed with the TDF1 project.
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Rhetorically, in either cable or DBS proj ects, any
initiative came from the state. Thus, the State: (1)
determined the technology (optic fibres, high-powered
satellite); and (ii) played the dominant role in funding
both projects, unlike the British. Overall, it was a policy
that followed the traditions of statist modernisation and,
not least, involved the complex ideology of a government
that fused together a faith in economic rnodernisation and
statism with the new theme of autogéstion (self-management)
(Dyson and Humphreys: 1988a; 310). Theoretically, the
Socialist Government's policy could not be coherent,
despite giving this impression, since political ideology,
tradition, pragmatism and speculative politics were
interwined with the broadcasting and new media strategies.
In the UK, the Conservative Government adopted a clearly
incremental approach based on a series of small steps
holding market and entrepreneurial orientation and action.
Thus, one sees market-led development and competition with
technology choice left to industry. This policy was more
applicable to cable than to DBS. However, the overall
policy for new media in the UK was characterised by a step-
by-step method, supposedly reducing uncertainty by testing
a number of options. The latter would help it collect
information and facilitate a decision on the best course of
action. But not so. The framework intensified the
uncertainty. First, the DTI's dominance over the HO was not
a good sign. Second, some of the ITAP's concepts were
idealistic. The Hunt Report also created uncertainty about
the future of any particular medium of information
transmission. Will entertainment concentrate on cable,
satellites (99) or a mixture? Will business data be
transmitted on cable, microwave or radio? There was a great
deal of misunderstanding and lack of information about how
far the cable industry had developed, and about the nature
of the new business it involved. By contrast, the second
ITAP Report, Making a Business of Information (1983),
emphasised the dangers implicit in excessive fragmentation
of government responsibility and industrial representation
in IT.
It was somewhat unclear whether the Government saw the IT
revolution, including cable, as being market- or
technology-led (Irwin:1983) . If it were market-led,
explicit recognition of the problems encountered in the
development of an infant technology appeared to be lacking.
It needed a management approach that would appreciate both
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the advisability of proceeding incrementally and the
specific market failure problems requiring interventionist
policies (Gibbons et al.: 1984). The Government looked to
the market, but as far as technology was concerned, the DTI
appeared to lack faith in an unfettered free market.
Equally, however, the Government was reluctant to commit
state money for large investments opposing the French
government. The whole idea of company taxation further
increased the existing confusion concerning the driving
purpose and plan of cable development. The issue of tax
allowances was usual in other sectors of the industry; it
was applied to cable since it was in its infancy and
regarded as a long-term investment. Surprisingly, the
Conservatives appeared to be 'dirigists', perhaps to a
lesser extent than the French Socialists. But this kind of
dirigisme, also seen in terrestrial television policy, was
one of the Conservative Government's contradictions.
The British cable plan, if it existed, was that while
entertainment would provide the basic turnover for
different cable companies, IT (home shopping, specialised
services, etc.) would provide the 'jam investment'; in
France, the Plan Cable took a more technology- and
industry-led approach. The British hoped that cable
expansion would be 'entertainment-led' through pay TV
delivered to subscriber's homes through high-capacity
cables. Once in place, these cables could also be used for
transmitting business data.
How realistic was this plan? The cable companies did not
have the incentive to upgrade their separate networks since
they would get pay TV on all four national channels under
the 1984 Bill's recommendations anyway. Moreover, upgrading
the old systems required a huge amount of money. The
expectation that private industry would modernise cable
networks or build up high-tech systems was also unrealistic
because the investor expected quick pay-back, easy money,
and large revenue streams from the 'interactive services'.
Cable has been financially successful, it is essentially
an entertainment-led industry. This has been largely
attributable to the tax structure in a given country (e.g.
limited partnership in the US) or government
involvement/ownership (e.g. Belgium) . In this respect,
France's Plan Cable appeared to be more realistic because
the state was committed to 'feeding' the industry until it
'stood up on its own feet' and to follow an 'économie de
mixte' throughout privatising the tasks policy. The French
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mistake was heavy state involvement. In contrast, the UK
had the tax-structure or the state investment to really
make cable successful. Thus, the franchise holders became
cautious about their investment plans. The general
disappointment reflected the original expectations, not the
reality, of cable; cable has been regarded as an
essentially long-term investment.
Many think that the Conservative Government emulated the US
model. On the other hand, US cable is not a business, but
an industry, in that it has its own manufacturers,
wholesalers and retailers like all other industries (100).
The US has a long payback, as many of its cable systems
were only introduced where there was a great demand (101).
In other words, the US experience suggests that financial
success breeds success, but also that failure breeds
failure - a situation largely forgotten in Western Europe
(102)
Similar problems emerged in the Unisat round. There was
more confusion over the eventual policy option: market-led
or technology-led, free trade or state-led policy? If,
within this context, one adds the Government's insistence
on a 'British-made' satellite - much more expensive than
other foreign systems (technology-led) - and on private
funding without any public subsidy (market-led), one sees a
confused policy. While in France one notes general
government tendency to back the new media, in the UK there
is a tendency to 'pick' winners and back them by
restricting market forces, under the disguise that certain
safeguards are needed to protect established industries and
new firms. But that is not quite the case. In a wider
picture, one sees the setting up of the Peacock Committee
and liberalisation of SMATV. In other words, more ambiguity
which, finally, means an inconsistent policy. The policy is
closer to, albeit more complex than the incremental
bargaining model offered by Linbiom (1977) : the ideal
versus the real: British technology funded by private
sources versus public money and foreign technology.
To an outsider, the Conservative Government's cable and DBS
policy appeared contradictory. This contradiction consisted
of the Government's attitude for free market (here via
private funds and development) associated with a strong
element of dirigisme (insistence on technology). This
contradiction was realised in the second round when the
Government followed a strict market-led policy without any
obligation in technology and psb guidelines. Cable was a
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similar situation with the tax allowances of the 1984
Budget's decision. The White Paper's announcements for a
fifth and sixth channel surely do not favour cable's
promotion. Furthermore, there was no knowledge of consumer
demand in France or the UK. On the other continent,
Americans subscribed to get better quality reception and,
in country districts, to see programmes available in the
cities. About half the subscribers also paid extra for a
premium service like Home Box Office. The simple conclusion
was that US consumers merely wanted to have decent
reception and movies uninterrupted by commercials, both of
which were already available in the UK.
Additionally, VCR penetration, although high in the UK (44
per cent in 1985), compared to 33 per cent in the US, and
8-10 per cent in France in the same year, makes new media
less attractive. People rent VCRs for a minimum of six
months and return them until there are more new movies
available. Therefore, VCRs compete directly with cable
premium pay TV channels. Then, the policy of tax allowances
in the UK made borrowing very difficult. But financial
institutions do not lend money without a reasonable
certainty of return. They will do so after each cable
system has been built up and run long enough to prove
consumer demand. Therefore, in both countries, government
policies concerning the development of new media were
incoherent and unrealistic, but for different reasons.
Consequently, progress in both countries was inevitably
slow with no signs of the pace quickening.
For Luxembourg, satellite TV was seen as a considerable
attraction for the country's future and a help to
restructure its economy. A satellite would fit with this
objective by making the Grand Duchy a programme-production
centre. The Werner Government, despite domestic and
international opposition, defended Coronet and shared
responsibility. It followed a strictly market-led approach
based upon the concept of entrepreneurialism - the
traditional Luxembourg way, largely followed by the British
in the BSB round. This must be stressed because in those
days, the entrepreneurial-led policy was not at all typical
in Europe.
The Santer Government, despite following a similar policy,
gave a European flavour to the whole Astra project,
supporting it by guaranteeing the SES's financial debt. It
was also directly involved in the Astra venture as both
investor and guarantor without devaluating the market-led
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principle. Surprisingly, Luxembourg provided a rather
coherent strategy for the projects development. The only
criticism was that Werner's and Santer's Governments again
allowed foreign interests without guarantees into the Grand
Duchy. It is quite difficult to criticise this because
Luxembourg needed (still needs) these kinds of investments;
it is obliged to follow such a 'welcome-investment policy'
from abroad.
3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Both France and the UK were enthusiastic about cable and
DBS since both were closely associated with the IT concept,
and the restructuring of their respective economies and
industries.
In cable, both countries started ambitiously with similar
targets but followed different policy paths to complete
their objectives. However, both failed. It could be said
that the state is too bureaucratic and obsolete to develop
a new medium such as cable; but the private sector cannot
take on this role either, since developing a new product is
associated with too many risks for an investor seeking
short-term returns. Perhaps the middle way followed by
Luxembourg on the Astra project, i.e. state's guarantee
concerning the project while asking the private sector to
finance, could be a lesson for the other two countries.
Thus:
1. While the UK followed a succession of ad hoc committees
that produced 'slim volumes' on cable, France's policy was
based upon the Plan Cable, working within the framework of
Loi 82 and its revision in 1984.
2. Both the UK and France sought a speedy development in
cable, Britain through private means and 'light'
regulation, France via public funds but with less 'light'
(although still liberal) control.
3. The DGT was France's major player, whereas BT led
Britain, although it had a smaller say in cable. In France,
the municipalities played an important role throughout the
SLECs, while British cable was given solely to private
operators. The industries in both countries lobbied for
cable, but were reluctant to commit a large amount of money
due to low penetration and the inconsistence of cable
policies in both countries.
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4. While the UK followed an 'economy of demand' policy in
cable, France adopted an 'economy of supply'. The economic
rationale did not efficiently reduce the incoherence of the
adopted cable policies in both countries. The Plan Cable,
for example, little considered how the plethora of new
channels would be ready to feed already-produced
programming.
5. Setting up the CA and Mission Cable was representative
of the British and French way of responding to new issues.
A new body functioned as a buffer between cable and the
private sector and government in the UK, as well as
promoting the whole field, whereas a new interministerial
committee coordinated the implementation of cable
decisions, mainly on programme production. However, in
both countries one sees a lack of coordination and conflict
between the principal actors (DGT, TDF in France, DTI, HO
in the UK).
6. In DBS, all first rounds in the three countries were
associated with pressures in the political arena, as well
as financial and technical problems. The fact that high-
powered 'birds' were considered obsolete technology
accentuated their problems. Again, Luxembourg was
different. By using its medium-powered satellite project,
it came in a somewhat better place but its association with
US interests involved it in international politics.
7. Policy confusion was common to all three countries,
especially France and Britain. British cable and DBS were
largely contradicted by a wish for a market freedom-led
development with a strong dirigiste element - dirigisine
that did not support or guarantee such high-risk and
uncertain return ventures. In France, the Socialist
Government implemented the Plan Cable and followed a
'decision-less' policy on DBS, indicating an unwillingness
to commit itself to TDF1. However, in both ventures the
policy adopted also created confusion by putting rival and
antagonistic bodies together.
8. In Luxembourg's Coronet satellite project, the
Government's basic mistake was to give the impression of
the project serving US interests. Its characterisation as a
'Cola-Cola' satellite was associated with French antagonism
and paternalism, demonstrating how external pressures
influenced the state's action and decision. The latter not
only applied to Luxembourg, but also to much larger
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countries such as the UK and France, which appeared to
continue their own DBS projects for international sales and
culture protection.
In all three countries, the prospects and optimism for the
new media have been revived by the successful launches of
Astra and TDF1, and by the anticipated launch of BSB. Due
to the transnationa]. character of satellites, satellite TV
is becoming an internationally competitive industry; the
viability of each project can be assessed in international
terms. Therefore, either TDF1 or BSB have to compete with
Astra, while Astra has also to compete with Eutelsat's
second generation, medium-powered satellites (Eutelsat II).
BSB does not consider that Astra, despite carrying 11
English-speaking channels, will seriously affect its
penetration, mainly to British households, because Astra's
signals need bigger dishes - about 60 cm - whereas BSB's
signal needs a dish no bigger than a dinner plate.
Incidentally, the British Government certainly did not plan
for the first of the new channels to come from Astra. In
the longer run, Astra has won enough frequencies to
broadcast 48 channels from 3 satellites. So, even in its
first year, British viewers should have a choice of around
15 English-language channels (11 from Astra, 4 from BSB).
As things stand in 1989, anyone hoping to receive all these
satellite programmes will need - in addition to their
existing TV set and aerial - two extra dish or flat-plate
aerials on a roof or high wall, plus four decoder units
piled on top of their TV set. They will also have to pay
three subscriptions, totalling around £30 a month, to keep
the extra electronics working (Fox:l989; 6). However, these
considerations are mainly for the British market. Astra
also has to compete with TDF1 and Eutelsat; its choice not
to commit itself on a standard for transmission may
complicate things in the future. Moreover, TDF1's
successful launch in late 1988 could test Astra in central
Europe.
Finding a satellite signal is not easy, since even one
degree difference can spoil reception. Moreover, the
incompatibility of various satellite systems complicates
things for the viewers, only benefiting the cable operators
who can offer their subscribers a pick of services from
every satellite. In the late 1980s, cable and satellite
seem complementary, rather than antagonistic, as they did
in the mid-1980s.
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PART FOUR: TELEVISION'S INDUSTRIAL DIMENSION
In this part, both the hardware and software (programming)
dimensions of broadcasting, particularly the new media, are
described. Using itself as an umbrella, the EC produced
policies on both aspects, while individual members, such as
France, the UK and Luxembourg, also tried to implement
policies on these sectors. What will stand out in this part
is the fear that race has already been lost to Japan and
the US.
4.1.0 FROM HARDWARE TO SOFTWARE AND VICE VERSA
During the 1980s, the relationship between broadcasting and
the new media to the economy and industry has been
recognised. Broadcasting had previously been viewed as a
strategic sector of the service economy, offering new
opportunities for employment in a rapidly growing industry.
This has been seen in terms of both hardware and software
(programmes).
The hardware aspect of broadcasting has been largely
associated with the concept of Information Technologies and
the necessity of Western economies, on one hand, to
restructure their mature industries, and on the other, to
promote a comparative advantage in the international
markets (Luyken:l986; Dyson:1986; De Jonquieres:1986;
Locksley:1987). This situation results in broadcasting
being regarded as a part of the IT revolution and, to a
certain extent, splitting up the boundaries between
broadcasting and industrial policies. In the EC, in
particular, member-states were called upon to respond to
the dominant position of the US and Japan In this sector.
They had to 'marry' the conflict between their domestic
industrial need for access to that technology and the
inward investment and market dominance of US and Japanese
multinational firms. An example could be the relative
'consumer electronics' (1) sector in the Community.
According to Club de Bruxelles (1986), world production of
consumer electronics goods was $50 billion in 1985, ($55
billion in 1985, i.e. +10 per cent); Japan alone accounted
for 44 per cent of overall production ($21.5 billion), and
for no less than 86 per cent of video recorder production
($8.17 billion out of the total world production of $59
billion). Apart from the sectors of colour TV and magnetic
media, the US and EC recorded massive deficits. In 1984, EC
production covered 58 per cent of domestic needs (42 per
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cent had to be imported), 1 per cent of US requirements,
and less than 1 per cent of Japanese needs. Incidentally,
30.1 per cent of EC imports came from Japan, 2.3 per cent
from the US and 10 per cent from the rest of the world.
In comparison, the US produces 40 per cent of domestic
requirements, while the remaining 60 per cent of imports
come from Japan (38 per cent), the EC (1 per cent) and the
rest of the world (21 per cent). In 1984, the Community's
trade deficit with Japan in this specific sector amounted
to $3.6 billion (Club de Bruxelles: 1986). Of the
11,886,000 TV sets bought by households in 1985, 10,510,000
(89 per cent) were made in the EC, 700,000 (6 per cent) in
Japan, and 85,000 (1 per cent) in South Korea (2). To make
matters even worse, European industry is simply unable to
build up export potential funded on large home markets for
advanced equipment. EC products are inappropriate for
American markets, for example, shaped by city
administrators, demanding highly sophisticated services
(English: 1984; 266)
Programming is another major problem. According to the EC,
the four largest member-states produce around 1000-5000
hours per year of films, TV films, series and
documentaries. As the Community enters the 1990s, the
annual demand for programmes is expected to rise to
300,000-500,000 hours. Assuming that 50 per cent will be
bought from non-EC countries, and that 25 per cent will be
repeats, the European programme industry will have to
produce between 75,000 and 125,000 hours of material (DE
VRIES Report: 1985; 16-17). Again, the fear is that it will
be bought from outside - mainly from the US - unless Europe
does something.
The proliferation of new channels, either via terrestrial
or satellite-to-cable frequencies, not only means new
consumer equipment, but additional programmes to feed these
networks. Programming also has economic value since the
demand for new programmes evaporates a surplus for the
industry. However, in the early 1980s, programming's
industrial aspect seemed to be undermined by the hardware
aspect of the new media, translated into big risk
investments in space and electronics. Programming was not
considered a prime source for revenue. The so-called
'chicken-and-egg' problem fits this case well since a
little later, the decision-makers realised the equal
importance of programming and hardware.
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On another level, it was clear in the early 1980s that the
major challenges for broadcasters in relation to the new
technologies were largely a subsidiary of the industrial
imperative. Cable- and satellite-associated electronics
were seen as a panacea, an area of investment and growth
for the European governments faced with a recession of
record depth and duration (Locksley:1983;131). European
governments turned to the hardware industry as a saviour,
investing considerable political prestige in various new
projects, principally to capitalise on indigenous expertise
in the sector (3). Their major concern was to produce and
sell these electronic products successfully
(McKinsey:1983), to allow their traditional industries to
decline while providing employment for their skilled
workers and generating enough income to aid the support of
displaced workers (Locksley:ibid). This is closely related
to Marx's and Schumpeter's ideas about the process of
development (4). The foundation of this process is
innovation, not changes in customer demand, where the
former is considered to be a changed form of organisation,
product process or sources of supply. According to
Schumpeter (1976), the process was encapsulated in the
phrase 'wave of creative destruction'. Locksley (l983;l30)
points out that capitalism could be seen as a process of
restructuring, in which different groups, sectors,
industries, communities and countries experience a
redistribution of their relative positions (5), leading
industries to improve their performance to get a
comparative advantage in the international market. Both
cable and DBS and its associated electronics fit well into
IT's field and IT's macroeconomic perspective. Apart from
reasons of national prestige, there was now an increasing
awareness that a substantial world market for these
products was likely. Thus, both France and the UK, while
adopting different policies, had the same target: to put
their industries in a strong position to compete for these
world markets, especially against the US and Japan.
This form of 'positive restructuring' is often guided by
the state. However, restructuring is mostly the outcome of
decisions taken by firms driven by the profit motive and
also by state's delays. Nevertheless, mature industries
give away their resources and new undertakings emerge, but
they do not necessarily emerge in the same location and
certainly not in a profitable industry. Broadly speaking,
the state undertakes a support role in relation to the
restructuring process since it responds mostly through
various measures to allow business interests to realise
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some proportion of their capital outlay (6). These measures
are required to promote greater efficiency and
competitiveness. In other words, an industrial policy is
needed.
According to Hills (1984; 10-39), although defining
industrial policy is difficult due to its overlap with
other areas and policies, it could be seen to comprise the
mechanisms by which governments seek to control the changes
in the domestic economy brought about by alteration in
comparative advantage in the international economy. This
becomes much more complicated because governments have to
work within certain parameters of what is feasible and
acceptable. Hills (1986;l23-4) suggests that the mechanisms
used will first depend on the political system (whether it
is centralised or decentralised); the 'core' ideology of
the nation towards markets (i.e. whether companies should
be autonomous or subordinated to the state) ; and the
international structure of capital within a market.
Finally, the market-led versus state-led approaches for
developing new products seem to have priority, especially
with respect to the industrial dimensions of cable and DBS.
Burden and Campell (1985;48-5l) have constructed a typology
distinguishing these two approaches. A market-led strategy
is one of disengagement as it reduces intervention towards
private capital and seeks to break down barriers to the
competitive process. A state-led policy restructures
through state incentives, regulation and modifying market
forces. The instruments available to the state to pursue
these strategies can be divided into five policies on:
market discipline, competition, financial assistance,
regional assistance and ownership. These forms of positive
restructuring overlay the fundamental restructuring
process. Where economies are interdependent, the state's
actions will influence the strategies of other states. For
example, if France sets the objective of 'reconquering the
domestic market' in electronics, this will impinge on the
success of policies followed by other EC states and, of
course, a plethora of community-level intervention
policies. Clearly, the restructuring triggered by the
advance in electronics conforms to the patterns outlined
above.
In 1981-1986, French and British economies badly needed to
restructure their mature industries to become
internationally competitive and successful in their home
markets first. An early start in France and the UK in cable
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and DBS could generate new product development, while a
policy of programme production by imposing quotas,
coproduction and increased independent production could
provide a basis for internationally buyable programmes.
Because cable and satellite TV markets are still being
created, there are no definitive or reliable data - only
forecasts, speculations and estimates concerning their
potential growth. In 1981-86, a number of market research
estimates for new media in Europe had been published (7). A
Frost and Sullivan report (1983) noted that these forecasts
would depend on the type, number and range of services
since their growth would be the determinant variables
concerning costs and rate of time scales for returns on
investment. On the other hand, the growth projections
further complicated the picture. While CIT's scenario in
1982, with respect to the European cable market, was that
the market would be around 20 to 34 million by 1992, CIT's
estimates in 1984 for 1992 were much more modest, i.e. 17-
18 million cabled households with an annual growth of 3 to
4 million per year (8).
It was assumed that the West European aerospace industry
would make a large contribution to communication
satellite's technology over the years, although the
countries themselves had few commercial space launches. The
1986 Frost and Sullivan report noted French and West German
satellite plans for the rest of the 1980s. It also assumed
that adding revenues together from satellite operation,
sales and launches, and sales of dishes would put the 1990
European market about $711 million. An EC report estimated
turnover for 1987 at £150 to £200 million (DE VRIES Report:
1985; 14). Moreover, the 1981 Mackintosh Report's estimates
for a 10-year DBS investment implication were
conservatively calculated at $332 million for a three-
channel system, (9), with annual operating costs of around
$4 million. The EC estimates that for viable information
and communication networks to be established throughout the
Community, investment of over 100 billion ECU is needed in
the Common Market.
4.1.1 INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND IT IN 'SOCIALIST' FRANCE
Since World War II, French economy has followed a pattern
of state-led growth (10) because the architects of post-war
France decided to use the state to stimulate socioeconomic
change, aimed at economic growth and economy
(Hall:l986;139). Thus, the state has traditionally been
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both protector and entrepreneur, not only to intervene but
also to assume responsibility for leadership in economic
affairs (Shonfield: 1965;86) . Consequently, the French
state has been variably referred to as the 'player' and the
innovator' (11) (Zyslnan: 1983, Rhodes: 1988). This
interventionist role (12) has been related to the concepts
of dirigisme (13) and statism (14).
On the other hand, among West European countries, France
possesses the distinct peculiarity of having pursued
positive industrial policies for a long time (Stoffaes:
1984; 225). However, this industrial policy was related to
the fear of a technology gap summarised in the 'le défi
Ainericaine' (American challenge) (15) concept, and to the
ambition of becoming a technoscientific leader (16). France
had to face US superiority in strategic technologies such
as computers, aerospace and nuclear energy. Thus, French
policy since the Liberation tried to create and develop
strong domestic capability in certain advanced technologies
that spearheaded the industries involved. These
technologies have been often referred to as 'national
champions' (Grane: 1979; 39) (17). Broadly speaking, the
objective was the same in each case: large-scale
technological developments heavily funded at huge economic
and financial costs. However, these technological schemes
rarely materialised as anticipated by their visionaries
(Green:1981, Zysman:l983, Arduch: 1984). The famous
'L'Affaire Bull' failure had a profound impact on the
European opinion of the technology gap. In a competitive
and private market, a different policy was needed (Zysman:
1983; 162).
In the late 1970s, France saw spectacular modernisation of
its telephone network, and 'a buy French' user policy on
computer via the successive plans Calculs (18). Central to
this approach was the notion of a partnership between
public and private capital formalised in a number of state
programmes with the various Plans (e.g. digitalisation of
telecommunications network (Telematique plan), the
Symphonie (DBS) project). The Socialists, in opposition,
criticised the Conservative Government for failing to
promote both IT and the industrial policy in France,
arguing that the Conservatives could not provide policy
continuity, research and development funding, sufficient
use of public procurement, as well as control of
subsidiaries and aid to industry (19). On the other hand,
in their 1981 Electoral Campaign, they were declaring that
their responsibility was to invest in the future. When they
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came to office, however, they had to face economic
realities in their modernisation effort. Thus, their
economic policy adopted a mixture of Keynesian techniques
and dirigisme to provoke steady expansion of the economy
(Hall:1986;164). In industry, their aim was to 'reconquer'
the domestic market and 'get France out of crisis' (Rhodes:
1988; 78) by nationalising and rationalising industry for
production and for research, training and diffusion of
technological culture (Morran: 1985; 123).
Three industry ministers, Dreyfous (1981-2), Chevenement
(1982-3) and Fabius (1983-July 1984) were called to
implement this policy but the inflation of 1981 had some
serious side-effects that forced the Government to take the
austere measures of 1982-3, limiting the state's
manoeuvrability. IT, however, was seen as a strategic
industry that would close the 'technology gap' and make
French products more competitive in the international
market. Thus, a privileged role was given to the filiére
eléctronique'- but not to the 'creneux'-, a kind of process
of vertical integration in which all activities of the
economic process interconnect in a complementary fashion
(20) so that the output of one activity constitutes the
input of the other (Morran: 1985; 123). In other words, the
filiére' concept stressed the unity (21) needed if French
products were to be really competitive (22). The key was to
develop the weak points by taking advantage of existing
strengths (Stoffaes: 1984; 289). An overall framework for
development was created by the Programme d'Action Fillére
Eléctroni gue (PAFE), a plan rather more symbolic than
operationally significant (Rhodes: 1988; 79). The state now
controlled 50 per cent of production across the 'filiére'
and 70 per cent of the electronics sector through the
nationalised Cu-Honey Bull, Thornson-CSF, Matra, Alcatel
Electronique (a division of CGE) and CGCT (CITT's French
Subsidiary) (Locksley: 1983, Levacic: 1984; Braillard:
1984)
On another level, the 'filiére' was the recognition of the
weakness of the French electronics sector. The state,
through a protectionist policy, would reconquer the home
market and would, via financial transfer, rationalise
industry's output. Then, the logic of the 'national
champions' would facilitate the state's strategy to make
French products competitive in the international market.
This strategy led to a number of state-sponsored
development projects, including the Plan Cable. On the
other hand, French firms and the Government realised that
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they had to collaborate with other Europeans to compete
against US and Japan. Thus, Thomson, Bull and GCE were
involved in the EC's Esprit programme and also researched
computers and telecoms with other Europeans (23).
The Socialist Government's dirigist plans underline the
political, technical and financial constraints within the
country and also the willingness to modernise the industry
(Rhodes: 1988, Green: 1988). Therefore, cable and DBS must
also be seen within the 'filiére' concept since both optic
fibres and satellites were seen as 'shop-windows' for the
international markets. Both cable and DBS, on the other
hand, demonstrated that while state enterprise was
successful in certain fields, notably telecoms, it was
highly unsuccessful in others, notably cable TV.
Therefore, state involvement does not really guarantee
industry success.
4.1.2 INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND IT IN 'CONSERVATIVE' BRITAIN
The term 'industrial policy' means different things to
different people, as was obvious within the British
government. For some, represented by the DTI secretary, Mr
Paul Channon, the Government had been pursuing, since 1979,
a coherent and consistent industrial policy, designed to
establish a framework for enterprise in which industry and
commerce could thrive. Those represented by the 'Heseltine
School' put more emphasis on the need for the Government to
decide which industries - and which companies within those
industries - should be encouraged and supported (24).
The Government's strategy was not to intervene in industry.
Lame duck industries were targets and grants were
abolished. Contrary to France, public funds could be saved
and industry rendered more competitive if nationalised
industries became more profitable. On one hand, it made a
remarkable attempt to reduce state intervention in the
economy by selling off many of the nationalised industries
and reducing the funds available to the private sector. On
the other, in those areas where the Government remained
involved in industry, its actions were much more selective
and direct than the policies of the previous Labour
government. The DTI had a legitimate role in ensuring that
industry interests were taken into account in Government
policy. The Government also renewed its interest in
microeconomic measures to restructure the economy. Unlike
French Socialists, it followed a privatisation program (25)
and also took more selective forms of intervention, aimed
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especially at high-tech industry because, as in France, it
was regarded as a beneficial long-term investment in
industry performance. Principal objectives of this
microeconomic programme were, according to Hall (1986), to
limit the rate of growth of the money supply; reduce the
size of public sector deficit; cut total public spending
and lower levels of taxation.
As a result, the Government progressed slowly and soon
found that it had to prioritise these goals. In the UK's IT
policy, the various industries were traditionally treated
separately (Hills: 1986; 127). Telecoms, computers and
microchips were separated, cable and DBS were split from
the whole IT sector. Unlike the French 'filiére' concept,
the British observed, if not a lack of policy on the IT
sector as a whole, at least separate policies for separate
parts of it. Moreover, while the 'filiere' was regarded as
a means of establishing and reinforcing a French presence
over the whole domain, British policy moved to dismantle
the public utility altogether (Sharp: 1985; 127).
According to Hills (1986;l27), the implication of this
separate policy was that one part could conflict with
another. A traditional example is BT, which has been
regulated by Oftel, but Oftel cannot regulate BT on cable
and DBS. While France followed a policy of nationalisation,
the UK followed one of privatisation and encouragement of
market forces. As in France, the electronics sector was
perceived as one of the few bright lights in the general
gloom, but the UK saw the private sector providing the
needed boost. ICL - a leading computer firm - and other
members of the National Enterprise Board's group of high-
tech firms were returned to private hands; others went
either to Japan or to the US to 'get technology' (26)
(Locskley: 1983; 133). Lastly, in contrast to French
anxiety, there was less worry in the UK about foreign
technology and encouraging direct foreign investment,
especially from the US and Japan. This is partly because of
emulating the US model that the market in the IT sector
will yield optimum results (Robins and Webster: l986a;
126), partly because the UK was a late starter regardless
of the Imnos programme, and partly because of the
realisation of IT's international character by huge
corporate ventures.
4.1.3 IT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
According to the DE VRIES Report (1985;l5), the price the
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Ec was paying for the absence of a common market in
telecommunications and broadcasting was an expected growth
rate of only 6.7 per cent a year, from 1982 to 1987,
compared with annual growth rates of 7.8 per cent for US
and 10.1 per cent for Japan. Europe's comparative strength
was expected to decline even further. On the other hand,
the Commission was very active in encouraging technological
development in its member-states on the basis of IT. EC
projects, known by their acronyms, such as FAST, PACE,
ESPRIT or the wider EUREKA initiatives (27), were very
closely related to the hardware aspect, but in 1986 the
Community suffered a lack of cash, particularly for its
research programmes (Wardropper: 1986).
The Commission had tried to implement a policy promoting
Europe-wide action to counter the decline of IT in Europe;
the above-mentioned programmes were launched to fulfil this
aim. In short, it put forward a policy for the whole IT
industry, calling for common standards, increased
industrial cooperation and the opening-up of public
telecoms procurement markets to competition between member-
states. It also proposed a common family on standards for
satellite transmission and tried to 'wake up' Europeans on
HDTV (see later). Additionally, the Commission had to face
the well-defined Japanese investment strategy, which had
gradually been increased within the EC. They had also set
up a certain number of production - or rather assembly -
units in the Community (28). Through the PACE programme,
the EC aimed to develop the technological infrastructure
required to establish broadband integrated communications
in the 1990s, while ESPRIT and EUREKA played an important
role in sharing awareness of the global challenge. But it
has yet to be proven that intra-European collaboration can
form the basis for profitable commercial ventures or that
it will make the largest tasks of restructuring European
industries any easier.
The situation has been similar in the space industry, where
Europe used to be in the shadow of the two space
superpowers (US and USSR) (29). Here, the initiative came
from France's ambitions to collaborate with her European
partners to become a third power in space (Gilpin: 1968).
After some ups and downs in European space history, the
European Space Agency (ESA) was formed (30). Its main
development project has been the Arianne rocket launcher,
mainly paid for by France and West Germany as the largest
contributors in the Spacelab, and the communications
satellite programme undertaken at a national and regional
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level. The Symphonie project between France and West
Germany was the only practical result in the difficult
times the Europeans had in forming their space programme.
France and West Germany were also in favour of establising
national broadcasting satellite systems early, while the
other countries preferred a phased joint approach, starting
with an experimental phase. Both governments and industries
in France and the FRG wanted to compete in the expected
space industry boom, preferring an operational system,
abandoning ESA's L-SAT programme (experimental purposes),
leaving the British and Italians to this task (31). While
France was too active in space matters, Britain took a
narrow look at space programmes without any strategic plan,
without a major expansion of investment and activities.
Establishing the British National Space Centre in 1985 was
only a halfway initiative since the centre was not strong
enough (Sharp and Sherman: 1987; 4-7).
France was realistically ambitious, fearing the confusion
and political delays of other European countries. Apart
from the international level, France was concerned with its
own national development, pushing towards broadcasting
satellites (regarded as a boost for the industry) in
collaboration with West Germany. Another consideration was
the fate of the Ariane space programme, which was at the
heart of France's satellite strategy, to ensure a leading
role in the satellite business (32). The continuation of
satellites was essential for Ariane's space programme.
Moreover, potential competition from other launchers by the
end of this century (33), its own failure in 1986 and the
Challenger disaster (34) forced Ariane to adopt more
commercial strategies. Yet, in space industry, investors,
insurers, business people and politicians all needed
confidence.
Apart from the Shuttle and other US launching systems such
as Thorn, Ariane has to face possible future competition
from China, Japan and the USSR. China has already developed
a space programme for the 1990s. Japan, which actually has
little power to compete in commercial terms, has decided to
market the H2 rocket programme. The USSR is already a
competitor but due to Cocom rules, which do not allow
export of enhanced technology and satellites to the USSR,
its competition has been uncertain. Consequently, it was
necessary for the French Government to back Ariane's
commerciality. Announcing that Ariane would be the launcher
of TDF1 and TVSAT reconfirmed its confidence in Ariane
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after the 1985 failure (35).
4.1.4 PROM CONVENTIONAL TV SETS AND VCRs TO HDTV
European firms were doing well in the TV-set sector despite
Japanese dominance of TV tube production (English: 1984;
244). France used the 'national champion', Thomson, for
manufacturing TV sets; Britain not really recovered from
its collapse in the 1970s. The whole British industry was
subjected to competition policy and price investigations.
By 1983, British manufacturers were protected from Japanese
imports since the Japanese used a different system and
British Pal had to be licensed by AEG-Telefunken (36).
Then, both Labour and Conservatives welcomed direct
Japanese investment (37). Japanese firms saw Britain as the
best EC country for locating manufacturing facilities (38).
Additionally, they were integrated into the British network
of producer-government relations (39).
The VCR situation was identical in the EC, France or
Britain. At the European level, three VCR formats - Beta,
VHS and V-2000 -competed for consumer acceptance. The
European V-2000 from Philips and Grundig could not compete
with Beta and VHS from Japan; Philips and Grundig (40)
produced 5-10 per cent of world production (Japan Times:4
February l983;7). To make things worse, Japan's 10
exporters have 90 per cent of the EC's VCR market. The
Community imported about 5 million VCR units in 1983, up
from 2.8 million in 1982 (English: 1984; 246), alarming the
EC enough to announced raise tariff quotas in 1985 on VCRs
from 8 to 14 per cent. The problem remained the same
however, since the Japanese had already penetrated the
European market, mainly through their 'joint-venture
plants' strategy in the Community. The extinction of V-2000
resulted in VHS becoming a de facto standard. Nevertheless,
the EC's Trade and Industry Directorate, representing the
major industrial European firms, negotiated with the
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) in 1983 to limit Japanese exports of VCRs for 3
years to 4 million per year, including 600,000 units to be
constructed in Europe (41).
In France, due to the electronics industry's difficulty
coping with VCR demand, the Government took restrictive
measures, 'Poitiers' procedures (42), an approach adopted
by the Community in 1985. These practices were intended to
help a national champion produce competitive VCRs. The
launching of C+ fell within this framework since it was
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viewed as a rival to VCRs. On the contrary, in the UK there
was high VCR penetration as well as importation. This
situation has made some wonder whether the Conservative
Government's policy took into consideration the interaction
between VCRs and satellite channels. As with TV sets,
Japanese firms based in the UK were producing VCR sets, but
almost all components were still imported. In 1986, VCR
penetration in the UK reached 46 per cent, in France 8 per
cent, whereas in other industrialised countries, such as
Japan, the US and West Germany, it was 60 per cent, 33 per
cent and 18.1 per cent respectively (Channels of
Communication: August 1987).
The VCR situation, in particular, has created another fear
for Europeans in the case of High Definition Television
(HDTV). As with VCRs, they were in danger of losing out to
the Japanese. Europe's failure, in both TV sets and VCRs,
to invest adequately in these new technologies, despite
record sales,demonstrated the depth of fragmentation of the
European market, as well as the lack of a individualist,
compartmentalised approach on behalf of the Europeans. This
is one of the prices Europeans have to pay for the absence
of a common market. This failure also indicates the lack of
coherence on a political level, either national or
supranational, since the VCR was given so little attention
compared to the obsession with other broadcasting affairs.
Nevertheless, the policy adopted on HDTV indicates that
Europeans have drawn on some of the above lessons. HDTV is
the third TV revolution following black-and-white and
colour TV; it was invented by the Japanese broadcaster NHK
(Nippon Hoso Kyokai) and developed by Sony. According to
McKnight (1988), it was a desire for preeminence that
pushed the Japanese to propose a global standard for HDTV
(43). They sought an economic advantage in manufacturing
hardware. The Americans supported this, but for a different
economic motive: globalisation would open up the market for
standardisation and sale of TV programmes in a period when
the debate over standards in Europe was intense (see later)
(Rapoport:1988). These Japanese proposals caused Europeans
to unite, coordinated by the European Conununity, backed by
politicians and manufacturers, most notably Philips and
Thomson/CSF. Europeans were now gearing up to develop their
own HDTV standard, called HD-NAC, basically associated with
the Eureka project. Incidentally, terrestrial broadcasters'
participation in HDTV broadcasting would help them survive
against competition from non-broadcasting media (Cable,
DBS, VCR) (Rainasastry:l988;34).
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The EBU's technical committee expressed qualified support
for Japan's HDTV before the International Radio
Consultative Committee (CCIR) meeting in Dubrovnik in May
1986. European industrialists, broadcasters and PTT5
decided, at the EC Commission's instigation, to 'stand up
and fight'. Here, it must be remembered that the Japanese
entered the foray for HDTV nearly 15 years before the EC,
because competition from Korea and Taiwan in the US market
(in which they were the undisputed masters), led them to
improve quality to maintain prices. Once again the EC
reacted just in time to start work on entirely new
technologies.
Others said that the EC entered the foray at the same time
as Japan, but following a different route. Japan's basic
objective was to improve the quality of production, whereas
in the EC's prime concern was to adopt a uniform approach
to broadcasting by satellite (see later) since the quality
of the European image (PAL/SECAM) was superior to
US/Japanese image (NTSC) (44). Following six months of
meetings and discussions, the Europeans, and especially the
UK, West Germany, France and the Netherlands, finally
adopted common positions within the framework of the
various representative organisations (EBU, EC, CEPT). They
were granted a two-year breathing space to come up with a
valid alternative to the proposed Japanese system (45).
Through its EUREKA and RACE projects, they joined forces
with other European companies, such as Thompson, Philips,
Thorn-EMI and Bosch, to develop a broadcasting standard
compatible with existing equipment.
France took a more active approach by abstaining from the
aforementioned EBU meeting and making an alternative
proposal for armchair technology. This was drafted by a
working group headed by Michel Oudin of SFP. The group
included representatives of the public television
companies, TDF and the National Motion Picture Centre and
the division of electronics industries and computer science
from the Industry Ministry. The French idea is simply to
upgrade the world standard already agreed for digitally
coding a conventional television signal of 526 - or 625-
line pictures, instead of the Japanese 1125. Digitalisation
is easy to suggest but hard to realise, which is why the
Japanese system will initially work with analogue signals.
Once again, the decision has been more political than
technology-led, since in the long term, the US and Japan
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hope to create a new international market for domestic
television receivers. Now viewers and cinema-goers around
the world are condemned to poorer-quality pictures than
they already receive, when the aim should be to produce
better pictures. The consumer cannot have better and
brighter pictures on TV because the industrial hardware
game has been too closely associated with the quest for
more television. However, all HDTV approaches depend on the
arrival of DBS because traditional terrestrial transmitters
cannot cope with the band width of the signal involved.
But, the European strategy is only consumer-led because
Europeans have to fight for HDTV on Japanese terms. The
European strategy is still a network-led strategy and there
is still some reluctance to absorb the full implications of
the combined effect on the technical and regulatory changes
(Baker: 1988 ;47-8)
What might happen can be seen in the theory of Tsunio
Morita, Head of Sony's HDTV in the UK: 'one day homes will
have two quite different TV sets. There will be an ordinary
TV set for casual viewing of programmes like news. Then
there will be a large, flat-screen HDTV for special
viewing, like sport or feature films' (New Scientist: 8 May
1986,39). In other words, it could be another version of
the three incompatible present colour standards after the
disagreement of 1965. Or,as Keirstead (1988) puts it, 'the
world of HDTV has become three islands, Japan, North
America and Europe'. Until they reach agreement on MAC
packet standards (see later), the Europeans will find it
difficult to compete with Japanese or US HDTV versions.
4.1.5 CABLE AND IT...
The British Conservative Government's enthusiasm for the
information society was as comprehensive as the French,
though the Thatcher Government manoeuvred uneasily between
the desire to take a leading role and its hostility to
state dirigisme. But its discourse remained as unauthorised
as ever, looking in vain to Mr Baker when he was made
responsible for IT (Collins: 1986a; 294), to the slim
documents in comparison to the concrete theoretical
framework derived from the NORA-MINC report and after.
Moreover, the British telephone system was bad compared to
the newly digitalised, superior French system. However,
BT's monopoly was ending with the linking of Mercury's
telecoms system, competition in supply of terminals, radio
telephony, and value-added services -- all introduced
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through the 1984 Telecommunications Bill.
If 1982 was the year for the Plan Cable in France, it was
also the year for setting up the ITAP committee and the
Hunt Inquiry. Both conceived cable TV as a tool of special
interest, as the spearhead of a new growth 'information
economy' (Locksley: 1987, Collins: 1986a) Similarly, the
French government's enthusiasm for IT was analogous to the
Third Revolution (Green:1988); the enthusiasm for cable TV
had little to do with traditional broadcasting or with
local community television (Kuhn:l985). Rather, cable TV in
France was pushed due to the development of fiber-optic
technology, which was seen as an essential element of
France's adjustment to the changing world economy. France,
which had never fully completed its industrial revolution,
was seeking to ensure its place in the 1980s communications
revolution (Pigeat:l983). It is necessary to emphasise that
the Socialist Government's motives for cabling the country
were first industrial. In the UK, the ITAP argued not to
adopt the US model, but a more sophisticated system to
generate a great deal of economic activity, including
telecoms, consumer electronics and services. Thus, economic
and industrial arguments also took priority in the UK,
encouraging the development of cable systems.
Technological development and innovation in France
involved the state as a client and provider of funds, and
industry to accelerate high-tech development. Thus, one
million francs would be invested in 1983, 2 million in
1984-1985 and the industry would be given a regular
programme and figures to develop optic fibres (Le Moncle: 5
February 1982). The French PTT Minister, Luis Mexandeau,
had said 'the French industry of telecoms is confronted
with a reduction of orders on telephone equipment. If the
industry cannot dispose an internal market sufficient for
the new technologies regarding the optic fibres, it will
lose the international market and thus we will meet a big
crisis in our employment' (Le Monde 20 November 1985;22).
By cabling the country, the DGT simply confirmed these
Government views, as well as the Government's leadership,
in exploiting the new technology's industrial potential.
Similarly, in the UK cable was seen as profitable since the
investment for half the homes of the UK would be £2500
million consequently stimulating economic activity, British
industry and, thus, employment (ITAP: 1982; 27-8).
Underground installation would create thousands of jobs and
the DTI/HO Report The Develo pment of Cable Systems and
232
Services in 1984 pointed out that jobs would be created
especially for those concerned with the design,
installation and maintenance of cable systems and
programmes. Moreover, the construction industry would
benefit from 2000 jobs, as well as consumer electronics,
cable manufacturing, suppliers of studios; some 5000 jobs
would disappear if commercial cable ceased.
In both countries, cable expansion was, therefore,
perceived as a source of new wealth (and of electoral
success). Apart from creating employment in both countries,
as in Europe in general, the cabling of France and the UK
was to build an Integrated Service Digital Network (ISDN)
or, in French, a Réseau numéri gue a l'Integration de
Service (RNIS). The pro-cable lobbies in both countries
were persuasive, creating general euphoria about the
benefits of cable expansion calling it the Third Age of
broadcasting, a social and economic blessing to the
consumer and prosperity for their respective nations
(Hutchinson: 1984, Veljanovski and Bishop: 1983).
The British Government was not convinced that cable TV
should be used as a policy instrument to promote the fibre-
optic industry, particularly in view of its opposition to
any element of public subsidy to cable (Evans et al: 1983;
37). By contrast, the Socialist French Government gave
fibre optic's priority to encourage the industry to expand
enough to compete in the international market (Green:1984;
17). The French fibre optic capacity was, however, small.
The Fibre-Optic Industries (Conflans Sainte-Honorine, LTT
and SAT) could not produce the number of switches ordered
by the DGT. By the end of 1984, the DGT had only 120,000
switches amounting to FF700,000, against the 400,000 it had
suggested earlier. The further 180,000 were due to be
ordered by the end of March 1985 but by late 1985, coaxial
cable could be used widely, allowing the use of cheaper
switches. The announcement of new terrestrial channels
provoked a depression of the early optimism for both cable
and fibre optics. A similar problem arose over switching
gear. It was proposed that by 1985-1986, the local cable
operators would utilise a kind of integrated circuit
produced by RTC (a subsidiary of Philips). The problem,
once again, was how to produce and develop mass and
indigenous capacity quickly. A number of French firms had
expertise in the related telecommunications area and
several contenders (including French and foreign firms)
were working on 'models' for specific towns, such as
Thomson for Lille, SAT for Biarritz and Philips for Metz.
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However, no single group had the capacity to tackle a
national network (46).
In the UK, short-term licences were awarded for upgraded
systems. The application of advanced technology, although
still a factor in deciding franchises, did not represent
the central issue, after the first euphoria. In 1985
technology was de-einphasised, as in France. The DTI was
prepared to be more flexible on technical specifications
and timetables for cable building but wanted a commitment
within three years of a franchise award to install a
network capable of interactive communications with up-
stream ability of 80 kbit/second, enough to carry
telephones. The DTI also saw the merit in the operator's
argument over flexibility of roll-out; only an estimate of
homes passed by certain dates was now required, rather than
specifications of which areas would be covered at what rate
(47). Regardless of various facilities provided by the
Conservative Government, its general cable policy that the
establishment of a broadband cable network would act as a
locomotive drawing prosperity and a raft of information
services, remained a dream. Similarly in France, critical
delays and the failure of orders made the industry cynical
about cable. Therefore in both countries, the 'cable grid'
as a new industrial revolution, remained only a theoretical
possibility.
4.1.6 ...AND DBS TOGETHER
The case for DBS is also clear. In the UK, the W3's rert
pointed out the relationship between DS and industry,
stressing the likelihood of a substantial world market in
DBS and associated equipment over the following decade,
which would also help the market for IT. The aerospace and
electronics industries would benefit directly. Similarly,
as we see in France, DBS had more to do with space than TV
policy. The Socialist's priority was to keep the Arianne
case alive, giving credibility to its services in an era of
potential competition and the turmoil of the Shuttle
disaster and Ariane's failure.
Nevertheless, France followed a 'national champion' policy.
Matra and Aérospatiale were the main rivals, the former
being nationalised, the latter already state-owned. The
Government then attempted to rationalise the orientations
of these two competitors by making them collaborate in two
relevant sectors: Matra in telecommunications satellites
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and Aérospatiale mainly in broadcasting communications
satellites. Because the market was rather small, as well as
costly and risky, France preferred to collaborate with
another country (West Germany) to carry the task of
launching the DBS 'birds' together and to control the
recently ambitious West Germans in the space gamble. In
other words, France followed its space policy in building
up satellite systems. On the international level, it
formed the Eurosatellite consortium, with the Germans to
manufacture and sell high-powered satellite systems (48).
Also, the costs, investment and risk of launching were too
high for such a venture. For example, the TDF1 and 2
ventures represented approximately FF 25 billion. The unit
cost for a satellite system and launch was approximately FF
500 million in 1986. Therefore, both governments heavily
supported these projects, in contrast to the British
government. By following this policy, the French arid German
companies would have the necessary expertise to gain some
of the scarce export orders. For example, Matra had
contracts with China to build the Chinese telecoms
satellites, whereas Aérospatiale, with Eurosatellite, was
to build the second generation of Eutelsat satellites.
In the UK, there was a kind of 'blessing', rather than
state support, although the HO Report stressed that UK
exports of satellites could be strongly influenced by both
the decision for a UK DBS service and its timing
(HMSO:1981; para 7.1 and 7.2). A Key Note Report in 1985
pointed out that the British aerospace industry was hugely
diverse, the range of products available from the UK being
surpassed only by US and USSR industries (49). It was
believed that, as in France, there was a huge market for
satellites overseas that offered the prospect of big
profits for UK manufacturers (Locksley:1987) (50). To be
successful, however, UK manufacturers must be able to
demonstrate a successful domestic system. To this end, DBS
should be backed by the Government. The Thatcher Government
spend only marginally more each year on its space programme
than India and, as a percentage of the GNP, the effort was
actually far less (Rodgers:l987); no extra funds for space
activities were involved (Key Note Report:1985). In the
second DBS round, BSB will use two satellites from the US
Hughes Aircraft HS376 costing £200 million. Hughes offered
an irresistible combination of price, financing, delivery
and launch, overshadowing other offers by RCA and BAe (51).
BAe could also build the system but the policy was for a
'free-choice' satellite system by the operators, leaving
the British aerospace industry highly sceptical about its
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future.
The high-powered satellites ('big birds') faced definite
rivalry frort medium-powered satellites. Basically in
Europe, 'big birds' were regarded as obsolete technology
after 1984 (Marsh:1984). The main idea behind DBS and high-
powered satellites was that their signal could be picked up
by a conveniently small dish. According to 1977 wisdom,
when the European plans for DBS were laid, each satellite
channel would need more than 200 watts of power in the case
of TDF1 or TVSAT to allow DBS in the UK. In the mid-1980s,
technology has changed perceptions. The key component of
satellite reception equipment is an amplifier that
magnifies the signal scooped up by a dish without drawing
in background noise. This is crucial because the television
signal that reaches a home dish is about a million times
weaker than a broadcast signal picked up by conventional
aerials. In the 1970s, the sensitivity of these amplifiers
was improved by a factor of four, i.e. what a dish can
achieve with a 50-watt signal from a satellite today, it
needed a 200-watt signal to achieve in 1975 (Economist:
1986; 75). Moreover, these 'big birds' can carry up to four
channels, but a medium-powered satellite, looking at the
Luxembourg and some US examples, is to have DBS channels
with 16 transponders. In financial terms, this means the
more channels you install on a satellite, the cheaper it is
per channel. An additional problem on TDF1 was the
travelling wave tubes built by Thomson-SF. In 1987, they
were built by ITT's subsidiary in Italy. This factor,
however, was one of the reasons for the delay of the TDF1
launch also making French companies, Aérospatiale and
Matra, and also BAe, look towards medium-powered birds(52).
4.1.7 DISH YEARS AHEAD?
Jacques Pomonti, the TPS and INA president, in a Financial
Times conference held in London in 1985, said that the
benefits would come more from the components of the
satellites than from the birds themselves. One such
component is the dishes that the proponents of DBS believed
would sprout from the rooftops. If, for example, 10 per
cent of viewers purchase individual dishes at a cost of
£200 each, the total domestic market would amount to £3-400
million. The actual size and growth, however, depend on
whether DBS programmes are attractive (i.e. programme
quality and choice, price of dish, ease of installation and
use of dish), and the extent to which individual reception
is preferred to SMATV. 1989 has been considered the 'year
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of the dish', but the same can equally be said of 1985,
1986, 1987 and 1988.
All the major European electronics companies - from Thomson
and Philips (France) to Amstrad and Sinclair Research (UK)
- have announced their plans for developing suitable
receiving equipment. Whether the market will justify their
optimism remains to be seen; the manufacturers themselves,
regardless of the successful launches of TDF1 and Astra,
have been plagued by uncertainty. They cannot offer the
product at a reasonable price. BSB still hopes for a mass-
market demand for TVROs, which will be in full swing by
1990. Forecasters say it will take up to the year 2000 to
persuade 750,000 households to buy a satellite dish. Then,
most satellites are going to be incompatible with each
other. For example, Astra and BSB are targeted at the same
market, but they transmit on slightly different
frequencies within the Ku-band. This means that
manufacturers will not get the economy of scale they need
to bring down the cost of the equipment. At worst,
consumers could be so confused by the different products -
a case reminiscent of VCR format -that they decide not to
buy at all. For example, purchasing a dish is one-off
investment. If the consumer believes further changes in
receiver technology are inevitable, he will be less willing
to buy. The hopes in the first year to sell about 400,000
and 200,000 units in France and the UK, do not take into
account that manufacturers will deal with a product for the
first time. Adding uncertainty over transmission standards
(see following pages), the whole issue does not guarantee
good business conditions.
In the UK particularly, the TVRO market has been
deregulated since May 1986; until late 1986, the HO issued
over 1100 licences (Cable and Satellite: May 1986). At a
rate of £1500 per installation, the business concerned had
been worth £2 million (New Media Markets: 29 May 1987).
This was not spectacular but frightened cable operators and
the Unisat consortium into thinking that TVRO and SMATV's
liberalisation would compete with cable penetration and DBS
dishes. This indicated how vulnerable the business was. An
old, but also fashionable, option has been renting rather
than buying, particularly popular for TV sets in the UK,
unlike Europe; the rental chain's involvement has been
pivotal in building up the TVRO market. Dish manufacturers
in the UK are British and foreign, not strictly EC. In
France there was a policy for either French (Thomson) or EC
(Philips) dishes. In the UK, it is possible to market
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'Taiwan-made' dishes, along with the French Ferguson (but
its current range has been based on American TV receivers
modified for European use) , Luxor, the Scandinavian
electronics manufacturers (sister of Salora), the Japanese
NEC and the British Rediffusion (53).
It could be said that the British Government gave no
special attention to either protecting the British dish and
the consumer electronics industry or, as in cable and DES,
to its development, whereas the French Government,
throughout the D2-MAC policy, adopted a rather protective
attitude. This is important because the dish aerials and
related electronics in early 1980s have an estimated
turnover of £l50-200 million (DE VRIES Report: 1985; 14).
The Thatcher Government's belief that private capital
should be able to take advantage of the potential for
profit in IT, wherever possible, has made British industry
lose its advantage over the MAC standard (see next
section), while creating problems for the rest of European
industry due to Japanese dish penetration.
4.1.8 LUXEMBOURG'S SATELLITE TELEVISION
Luxembourg's main objective in the satellite business was
to attract investment, particularly foreign, and to make
the Grand Duchy a European programming-production centre.
Both Coronet and Astra had chosen US-made, medium-powered
satellites, which can cover about 90 per cent of the
metropolitan western European areas during a lifetime of 10
years, beginning in 1988. The implicit assumption was that
broadcasters would use the PAL transmission standard rather
than any MAC version. Adopting PAL made Astra compatible
with all current European TV sets, although sets geared up
to SECAM would only be able to show monochrome video
pictures. In early 1986, SES invited the European
manufacturers to a presentation of Astra's specifications;
as a result of that meeting, a working party was formed
(54). About £20 million would be invested in Luxembourg's
channel and telemetry uplinks and their associated
electronics. However, a contract placed for the telemetry
uplink went to TWI Electronics, a US company which would
supply the reception equipment under the supervision of RCA
Astra Electronics, the satellite supplier. American
satellite, American reception equipment: both indicate that
France and Eutelsat's anxiety was not groundless. SES
argued that it was keen to have European companies
supplying the consumer equipment in the light of its
satellite being US-made, but European suppliers apparently
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could not compete on this $10-million telemetry contract.
SES claimed that a 65-cm dish would be appropriate for
reception, despite some technicians' disagreement (55). SES
used the 16-channel argument to make Astra attractive
enough for consumers to buy an antenna at £200 when mass
production starts. It also argued that Astra's signal would
have immediate access to the existing TVROs (56). As is
known, Luxembourg does not have a satellite industry, thus
it is beneficial to choose the optimum technology. European
manufacturers, such as Eurosatellite or Satcoin, already
built these systems but SES was in a rush to get a
satellite as soon as possible. The US companies were ready
to offer their systems at competitive prices. Both
governments, even Santer's, observed the procedure. This is
one of the consequences of a strictly market-led approach
and the attitude of a small state participating in the
high-tech gamble, to attract foreign investment and
restructure its economy. The competitive prices of the US
firms show something else as well: the US has a comparative
advantage in this sector (price, skilled labour and
technology) making it hard for rivals. To uphold their
competitive edge, Europeans need access to bidding
opportunities for sales in foreign markets. Without foreign
sales to allow for increased production runs, they argue
that US industry must be restricted to its own market.
Whether or not one US-made satellite creates a breakthrough
to European industry and technology is a matter of personal
opinion. But when this case creates a model for successive
US satellites, Europe's whole attempt to compete with such
powerful rival is destroyed.
4.1.9 THE PROBLEM WITH THE TRANSMISSION STANDARD: THE MAC
DEBATE
The debate over transmission standards has rocked the
future of satellite TV so far. Originally, it was proposed
as a technical breakthrough by the IBA in its C-MAC form
and quickly became a banner around which politicians
rallied. D2-MAC resulted from the Franco-German
collaboration and both governments declared it to be the
new European transmission standard.
Until 1989, no European manufacturer had managed to produce
the D2-MAC or C-MAC packet decoders at a price- and -
quality level sufficient to meet consumer demand. Mass
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production is not expected before 1990, making the
satellites unattractive for both consumers and programmers
during the first theoretical year of their existence. The
success of satellite TV is largely based upon the ability
of broadcasters to make money charging viewers who see a
particular programme or channel. To do this, the
programmers ask for fewer encryption systems, preferably
only one. The C- and D2-MAC debate increases the need to
cooperate on technical standards. To make matters worse, C-
MAC and a new MAC, the B-MAC, in Norway (57) have been
declared compatible in theory, but no one has been able to
determine what this would cost the consumer. This is
especially important since the MAC 'family' is considered a
first step towards high-definition systems adapted to
European technical parameters and industrial potential in
the race against the Japanese HDTV system. MAC can improve
picture quality and will be used later for terrestrial
broadcasting, ending the archaic division in Europe between
PAL and SECAM, bringing sound and picture quality
improvements to all viewers in the second stage. The
importance of common standards, especially within a
fragmented Europe, could be seen in the TV market where
Philips has to supply over 100 different types of TV sets
to meet differing European standards (English:l984;244).
This section tries to describe and analyse the MAC debate
and the associated problems for the European industry and
consumers.
4.1.10 THE EVOLUTION OF THE 'MAC FAMILY'
Up until 1981, it was assumed that DBS broadcasts in Europe
would be based on the transmission of conventional
television signals, i.e. 625-line pictures using either the
PAL or SECAN colour system. Both systems were developed
about 25 years ago and designed for terrestrial
broadcasting on AM (Amplitude Modulation) not on FM
(Frequency Modulation) that must be used for a satellite
(58). Unfortunately, broadcasting on FM tends to produce
much picture noise (or grain) on heavily coloured parts of
the image. Furthermore, colour information is interleaved
with brightness information in conventional systems (PAL or
SECAM), meaning that the picture shimmers whenever the
image carries a lot of details (59). The BBC and IBA were
actively pursuing different lines of development with a
view to making sense of the extended bandwidth available to
satellite users. The BBC saw the whole issue more narrowly
than the IBA, going for an extended PAL system, whereas the
IBA chose a Multiplexed Analogue Component (MAC), which
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would precondition the emergence of HDTV systems and be
suitable for European use (Powel:1982, Lucas and
Windran:1982). The MAC system (incorporating separate
component signals) could, be suitable for large screens,
high-definition displays and high-quality signals. Its
superiority was clear, thus, the UK Pratt Report
recommended it as the technical standard for various
seasons (60). Then the IBA came up with C-MAC, an
improvement of the MAC system (Winrdman et aL: 1983).
In 1983, the EBU proposed three methods for sound
transmission and chose C-MAC as the European standard (61)
after a long study, but also argued the need for
compatibility between D2 and C-MAC. (Waters:1986). Later,
the EBU compromised, making the D2 and C-MAC versions
compatible, but D2-MAC was not a full broadcast signal.
However, by late 1984, the British and French seemed
prepared to compromise with the solution of '20/10'. At an
EBU meeting in Spain (April 1985), after the French
threatened to walk out, the EBU agreed to document the D2-
MAC as a full broadcast standard rather than as one suited
for distributing converted signals down to narrowband cable
systems, thus the EBU compromised in the true sense of the
word. This compromise was because the C-MAC version is
superior to D2-MAC and D2-D-MAC is also a downgraded
version of D-MAC (as its name suggests, it has half the
subcarrier capacity - four instead of eight) (62)
(Torsteensen: 1986, Dosh: 1985, Burkitt: 1986).
European manufacturers welcomed that decision and realised
that the new developments should be instantly applicable.
Then, the compatibility of MAC packet systems with the HDTV
system made the Europeans push for a 'Euro-MAC' option.
However, C-MAC was resisted in favour of D2-MAC; the
industry, fearing the Japanese competition, was trying to
find ways to make the MAC versions compatible. The decision
of France and West Germany to go on with D2-MAC in the
satellite link gave an impression that D2-MAC would become
a cIe facto standard. The UK, through the IBA, now openly
indicated it would accept the D-MAC as the standard. To
make the things worse, the Norwegians adopted the B-MAC
version and the manufacturers were confused. In a technical
sense, if MAC is related to enhanced television, the D2-MAC
version is inferior to C-MAC because D2-MAC cannot
accommodate the data burst needed (63) . The programmers and
the UK Cable Programme Providers Group have also backed a
MAC system compatible for all versions.
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The European Commission asked, in a final Directive (COM
(86) 146 final) in 1986, for a common family for satellite
transmission standards (i.e. the MAC family and, also,
throughout the Eureka project, has pushed for it on a more
practical basis) (64). In Britain, the Government has,
until now, backed C-MAC for UK DBS, although the Home
Secretary has indicated that commercial forces will affect
the final decision. Generally speaking, the UK Government
did not adopt any particular strategy for developing and
imposing C-MAC, perhaps because of the disappointment in
the Unisat 'crash'. The French, as will be shown later,
followed a more precise policy on their standard.
4.1.11 THE FRENCH WAY: FROM SECAM TO D2-MAC?
Three different colour TV systems exist today: the US NTSC,
the French SECAM and the German PAL. All three were
competing to become the European standard and all three
were incompatible. Therefore, there was international
interest in adopting a single colour television standard
for all of Europe. The competition to become this standard
was politically intense; the nation whose system was
selected would gain large economic revenues and political
prestige (Grane:l979;6-8).
To an extent, the traditional French policy regarding SECAM
was similar, to that of the Socialist Government on D2-MAC.
Firstly, if SECAM was adopted as the standard, it would
serve as an ambassador for French technology, opening up
international markets for French television equipment. If
D2-MAC was adopted as the European standard, it would help
the credibility of French technology as a leading
industrial power for enhanced equipment in the reception of
DBS television. Secondly, if SECAM was not chosen as the
European standard, the French could ensure the development
of their colour television industry by creating a different
market for its products. If C-MAC was the single standard
for DBS in Europe, D2-MAC would go on the TDF1 and TVSAT
systems, ensuring the German- and French-speaking dish
markets. Here there was no case for non-tariff barriers as
with SECAM. Thirdly, if SECAN was the standard, it would
promote the French culture via the sale of French TV
material. If D2-MAC was the standard, it would help promote
French culture through the direct reception of satellite
programmes as well as the sales of French dishes. Both
could also be used as symbols projecting France's space
glory. Fourthly, for the manufacturing of SECAM TV sets,
France used the 'national champion' strategy, Thomson-CSF.
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The same company was also being used in collaboration with
Dutch Philips to construct D2-MAC and reception equipment.
According to Neil (1988), the national champion concept
does not fit well in this case, despite unquestionably
close industry-state cooperation. This study's view is that
the 'national champion' concept could not remain the same
as de Gaulle's vision on SECAM because France is within the
EC framework. Now, collaboration with other European
'national champions' (Philips) is necessary. The French
concept of 'national champion' is also adopted by the
Eureka project, proposed by Mitterrand.
In terms of strategy, there were slight • similarities
between the two cases. One dimension used by the French in
their European campaign presented SECAM as a European
standard. Although MAC was a British invention, the fact
that the US intended to use it for their own USC1 DBS gave
the impression that D2-MAC was more European than MAC - an
impression stimulated by the French. In the case of SECAM,
EBTJ's studies concluded that no single standard was better
under all conditions; now they decided that C-MAC was
superior to D2-MAC. The French threat to walk out of the
EBIJ if the organisation would not adopt D2-MAC as a full
broadcast standard forced the EBU to accept the French
terms. The French could do this because they had drawn
their lessons from the SECAM case where they did not
appreciate both Germany's technology and alliance. In the
SECAM case, the French did not realise until the end that
they needed the backing of another strong, West European
country. They chose the USSR because they could not go
elsewhere. In D2-MAC, as well as in the satellite gamble,
they considered the West Germans as a strong ally for
France's ambitious plans on satellites. The German market
could also be lucrative and this collaboration meant that
the risks, as well as the profits, would be shared.
In both satellite and reception equipment ventures, the
risks have been too high and France, despite ambitions,
does not have the means to take them all alone. It could
not ban other European manufacturers from 'building up'
dishes since the Common Market perspective impedes any
strict national approach. Therefore, the Government decided
that it would be wrong if did not allow Philips to make
dishes. Philips is not only European, even though
multinational, but has large-scale interests in France
through its subsidiaries. A French technical argument is
that if one is in the UK or France and wants to receive
both TDF1 and BSB, one needs two dishes due to the birds'
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different orbital positions. A not - too -convincing
argument, however, since a dish can be mobile.
4.1.12 THE MAC DEBATE: THE COMPANIES' THORNY ISSUE
MAC, either D, D2, C, B, E, or as 'MAC family' in itself,
constitutes a technological and industrial stake for
European reception-equipment manufacturers. Estimates of
the potential dish market put it in billions of pounds but
the companies involved, such as Philips, speak about modest
productions of 100,000 units in the first year, 300,000 in
the second, and eventually a million in the third (Cable
and Satellite: November l988;36). It is worth remembering,
moreover, that it will be a long time before viewers
actually see MAC signals because they will all have to be
changed into PAL or SECAM for their existing TV sets. This
is why Sky TV uses PAL on Astra and WH Smith TV has also
chosen PAL, with a provision to change to MAC when
reception equipment becomes available.
On the other hand, Philips and Thompson have practically
formed a consortium, including Salora, ITT's International,
Fuba and Logica to 'create one European Satellite
Television Transmission and Scrambling System' (65)
Meanwhile, a rival consortium, the so-called Anglo-Nordic
Group (Philips (UK), Plessey (UK) Tandberg (Norway), Nordic
VSLI) have been working on a 'multi-MAC chip', expected by
the end of 1989. However, the whole situation creates not
only confusion but also higher prices. In consumer
marketing, smaller markets through disparate standards mean
higher prices for equipment and slower, much slower, take-
off. In broadcasting terms, this condition diminishes any
hopes for pan-European television services. The whole issue
has also been influenced by the 'chicken-and-egg' problem,
i.e. between programming and equipment, because companies,
especially in the mid-1980s, were (and still are) hesitant
to go on with cable's limited penetration but programmers
need the manufacturers commitment for mass production. Will
the 1989 Sky venture on Astra change things? Perhaps, even
though Rupert Murdoch does not really believe it. The MAC
issue has been the only way for European firms to confirm
their influence on the European market and to make this MAC
market the cornerstone of their strategy in the 1990s (66).
Here again, the French seem to lead the way. The DGT is to
buy a million D2-MAC dishes (over perhaps 5 years) in
relation to C+, which is planning to use D2-MAC for its
encryption and is translated to a possible 3 million units
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of a similar specification to replace the decoders
currently in use (Cable and Satellite: January 1989;34).
The dual standards have affected both consumers and
manufacturers. For the consumer, the confusion over MAC
makes him unwilling to buy. This uncertainty also leads him
to doubt the necessity of a new dish, delaying immediate
purchase. For manufacturers, this has meant higher
production and marketing costs, as well as a lack of firm
commitment to the product.
A solution would be a satellite receiver that included not
only the MAC versions but also PAL and SECAM, something
pursued by Astra in the late 1980s, leaving the choice, in
the absence of such a standard, to each programmer. It
would be ironic if, in view of 1992 and the vision of a
united Europe, politicians still played with the strategies
and terms of PAL and SECAM to compete with Japanese and
other Far East products. Japanese telecoms deregulation and
the JCSAT and SCC satellite ventures will bring Japanese
electronics companies to satellite services. By this time,
European satellite services will be operating and a real
testing period will begin. If the Japanese and other Far-
Eastern satellite suppliers are ready with large quantities
of new equipment to supply it, readied by the
competitiveness of their internal market, another European
game appears to be lost already. This is reminiscent of
the VCR situation, but with an extra twist. With VCR
equipment, there was initially confusion between the three
systems, but consumer demand was high enough to support all
sales until the market finally standardised with VHS. With
satellite dishes, market demand does not seem high enough,
causing the whole satellite industry to suffer
(Bradshaw: 1988 ;2).
4.1.13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In France, the UK and Luxembourg, the logic behind the
development of cable and satellite TV was clearly
industrial, at least initially. In France and the UK,
because cable and satellite involve xn ny business
activities, we do not see any political deb te about the
desirability of their development. In France, managing the
new media, rather than their quality, was the issue and, to
some extent, there was a 'silent consensus' between the
political elite regarding government plans.
In both countries, as in other major western countries,
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cable and satellite were seen as the locomotive for the
British and French 'information societies' in general, and
the IT infrastructure, in particular. This concept is
easily seen in France with the 'filiére éléctronique'
concept and the Plan Cable. Thus, the expansion of
broadcasting media was seen within the 'filiére' and was
justified by the country's industrial need. The latter
meant that broadcasting decisions were influenced by the
industrial policy framework. The new media technologies
were part of the Socialist Government's strategic concept
that the domain of communications could save the
manufacturing and service sectors of the declining French
economy. The British Conservative Government and private
concerns related to hardware which were lobbying for the
development of new technologies thought similarly.
To a large extent, the French Socialist Government
continued the ways of the previous Conservative
Administration, but appeared more committed to leading
France in IT. Major sectors of industry were nationalised
to rationalise industry's outcome, whereas the British
Conservative Government's heavy commitment to 'roll back
the boundaries of the state' left this rationalisation to
the market forces. In the UK, the choice of network design,
the scale of investment, and generally, the nature of
growth and demand were left to the market. DBS took a
similar approach with the difference of a 'British-made'
satellite in the first phase. Both cable and DBS were
basically industry- rather than merely entertainment- led.
In France, cable and satellite TV interlinked with other
objectives. Firstly, as in the UK, they could stimulate
employment and investment in fibre-optic industries,
satellites and related components. Secondly, they could
ensure or win exports for French industry in a key sector
of economic activity, and protect potential weakness in the
general communications field. Thirdly, they could provide
the business and service sectors with an interactive
communications system important for the future way of doing
business. Fourthly, cable and DBS could be a part of the
Government's general objective for modernising economy and
society. Fifthly, they could ensure France's place as the
third space power and give credibility to the Ariane
programme where France has been the major contributor.
Sixthly, a share of this 'prestigious France' would be
given to the Socialists as the major contributors to
modernising or restructuring modern France after de Gaulle.
To understand how broadcasting was under a general
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industrial policy framework, one could look at Canal Plus
which, while no new technology for transmission for the
service was required, gives an industrial view because
descrainbling devices, new VHF aerials or multiple TV sets
had to be purchased in many cases to receive it; one must
also consider that C+ has been used to compete with VCRS,
especially Japanese ones.
In both countries, in sharp contrast to 1982, cable is now
realised through less-expensive technology rather than via
optic fibres, which are now not considered good for short-
term results. By contrast to the initial years, when the
medium, especially in France, appeared to be more important
than the message, by the end of 1986, the message was
considered equally important. In the early 1980s, the
message with its meaning, quality and power was a problem
for the next stage when the new media would be well
developed. In the mid-l980s, the attractions of the message
took more careful industrial consideration. However, during
the whole period there was non clear indication to what
extent the heavy VCR penetration or new channels on over-
the-air frequencies would compete with cable and satellite
TV's take-up rate. Moreover, SMATV and TVRO look as if they
will grow inside and outside cable franchise areas, but
liberalisation policies, like the British Government's,
might compete with cable's take-up in the foreseeable
future. The industry in TVRO and SMATV in the UK is
penetrated by overseas companies and interests, reminding
us of the open-market policy in VCR5 adopted by the UK's
Conservative Government. This open market may be good for
foreign investment (especially Japanese) but gives little
consideration to British industry, contrasting sharply with
the French. Finally, as in France, the message in the UK
will take priority for cable and DBS TV development since
both are entertainment-first industries.
4.2.0 THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF TELEVISION AND THE
DOMINANCE OF US PROGRAMMING
During 1981-86, it was (and still is) thought that European
TV programmes could be an answer to US cheap exports. This
idea related directly to the potential proliferation of new
channels, and also to the increase of programming hours,
meaning that Europe would need additional programmes.
Television Task Force observed that while broadcasting
hours have increased in the last 10 years by 30 per cent,
the amount of original programme production has diminished
by an average of 45 per cent (ElM: 1988; 77) (67).
247
According to Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana (1987),
responsible for the EC's media policy, 'the US industry was
the only one to have penetrated all the world markets;
although its 1987 cinema production was 360 films, compared
with almost 600 films in Europe, most US productions were
shown on every continent'. More seriously, 80 per cent of
TV films and programmes produced in European countries do
not leave their country of origin, i.e. they do not even
circulate within Europe. This is supported by the findings
of the 1983 and 1985 Vans analyses, which indicated that
the bulk of imported programmes (44 per cent) originated in
the US while more than 10 per cent of the total
transmission time in western Europe was filled with US
programmes.
Clearly, unless European film production does something, we
will witness a higher importation (and production) of US
programmes. However, US programme dominance over
international markets in general, and western Europe in
particular, is nothing new. Many analysts have tried to
explain the strength of US products in the world market. It
is tempting to resort to traditional arguments: high
production, technical standards, an efficient marketing and
distribution system, professionalism, power to impose block
booking, the mastery of adventure and action, carefully
planned scenarios, the 'pilots' system, rapid rhythm, the
star system, etc. Another reason is the notion of 'cultural
discount' (Hoskins and Mirus: 1988; 499-505), meaning that
a particular programme, rooted in one culture and thus
attractive in that environment, will have diminished appeal
elsewhere as viewers find it difficult to identify with its
style, values, beliefs, institutions and behavioural
patterns. On the contrary, US programmes are characterised
by low cultural discount due to their long-standing
experience of producing material appealing to a wide range
of diversified audiences. The consequence is programming
designed for the lowest common denominator (Collins: l986b;
67-8)
Audience maxim jsation, on the other hand, leads to revenue
niaximisation - the major objective of US programmes.
American producers regard programmes as products and see
viewers as consumers, whereas Europeans are used to talking
about programmes within the public service prescriptions.
The difference is that a profit-oriented producer should
increase his production budget to the point at which the
revenue associated with the anticipated increase in
audience is just offset by added production expenses.
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Because TV programmes are predominantly public goods, a
decision to increase a production budget will influence a
larger potential audience in the larger market than in a
small market (Wildman and Siwek: 1987; 74). Therefore, the
calculus of profit maximisation dictates that budgets for
programming produced for larger markets will be bigger than
budgets for programmes produced for smaller markets. The
implications for trade in TV programmes budgets in larger
markets are straightforward. US producers enjoy a large
market, Europeans a smaller one. Thomson (1986) notes that
the US industry has been able to deprive its chief European
competitors of their outlets in other parts of the world
since the World War II, permanently damaging the ability
of, for instance, French and German companies, to recoup
their investments in foreign markets. Having to share their
domestic markets with US films and being excluded from the
US market by vertically integrated majors and collusive
trade practices, condemned European producers and
distributors to the periphery of global film trade.
On one hand, there was a highly professional and mature
industry which developed a commercial model of
entertainment without equal (Mattelart et al.: 1984; 96-7);
and on the other, a European industry struggling to compete
with 'Hollywood products' (read US programmes), even in
their own domestic market. Statistics show that total
foreign revenue for US distributors rose 34 per cent (to
over $2 billion) between 1985 and 1987. Television alone
leaped 53 per cent (to $480 million) in the same period.
Some US companies reported a 50 per cent increase in 1987
alone (Guardian: 29 August 1988; 19). Films produced in the
US in 1983 cost $11.8 million on average, while average
film budgets from French and Italian films in the same year
were in the $l-l.25 million range. (Wildman and
Siwek:l987;75). Comparable data on TV production budgets is
not available, but according to Wildman and Siwek, the
relationship is similar. Indeed, a one- hour episode of
Dallas cost about $1 million in 1985 prices, whereas an
hour drama in the UK cost about £ 200,000 (DE VRIES Report:
1985; 18), and a 55-minute episode in France (1982 prices)
cost an average of £ 100,000 (FilmAction: February-
December: 1982) . The competition becomes much more
difficult, considering that the 1985 Dallas episode was
sold for about £21,000 in France and for £25,000 in the UK.
A number of US production company executives expect the
upward trend to continue. There always will be a market for
US series in foreign countries, and this market may be
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expected to grow with the number of new channels available.
The Television Task Force gives two reasons for this: the
cost per hour for purchased programmes tends to rise as
competition to secure them increases and channel schedulers
tend to favour programmes that cost less to bring to the
television screen than do original productions (ElM: 1988;
78). Both elements clearly favour tJS programmes.
Comparing France and the UK, the the UK's position is, so
far, the most favourable: its receipts from exports in 1985
were 440.6 million ECU for cinema films and 187 million ECU
for TV programmes; while in France the corresponding
figures were only 54 and 1.6 million ECU (ElM: 1988; 82).
Furthermore, the UK makes some 16 per cent of the imported
programmes in Europe (Varis:1985). Language plays in
important role for the promotion of British programmes to
international markets. To an extent, US domination over
international markets and the internationalisation of the
English language, as the lin gua franca, helped British
productions' relative success, compared to its European
counterparts.
b4.2.]. PROGRAMME QUOTAS AND THE STATE
It is tempting to explain the success of US programmes
through their design and formu1a rather than trying to
find an answer to the issues raised by these programmes
within the programmes themselves. This approach makes us
forget the historical development of television. The answer
should perhaps be seen in the weakness or strength of a
programme industry in a particular country. If a programme
industry has not been developed, it is partly because of
the weak development of capital in the cultural industries,
itself linked to the fact that a public service implies the
sacrifice of economic profitability. This is partly true.
The state has made many attempts to establish and develop
its domestic programme-production industries both in the UK
and France. This policy has been supported by import
controls, screen quotas or state loan production designed
to assist and establish an infant industry that could then
mature enough to compete both domestically and
internationally.
The EC Commission reckoned that the lack of production
material would pose a major threat to the European TV
industry by the end of the century unless steps were taken.
Its policy on this subject, more visible in the final
Directive, proposed a quota for 'EC-made' programming,
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rising from 30 per cent to 60 per cent within 3 years,
which must not be news, sports, advertising, or teletext
(Directive: Articles 3, 4, 5). It had initially planned to
accommodate small countries with heavy imports, encouraging
them to import more from their EC partners. However, the
exception of news and sports created a gap that allowed US
news and sports channels to broadcast in Europe with little
or no European programming. The Commission aimed to control
the channels operating very cheaply on advertising, popular
series and soap operas obtained at quasi-dumping prices
from third countries. It was obvious that the Commission's
major objective was twofold: to impose barriers to US
programming entering EC countries and to endorse increased
trade in programming between both traditional broadcasters
as well as newcomers, especially transfrontier channels. In
this the Commission was also backed by the European
Parliament, which wanted a European television channel
(OJEC: 5 April 1982) with a pure European perspective
(OJEC: 30 April 1984) (68). Finally, amending the Final
Directive, the European Parliament became stricter than the
Commission. It modified the proposed 30 per cent quota to
60 per cent while asking that independent production should
be increased to 10 per cent (69). But in mid-1989, the
Commission speaks about a 'majority of programmes' rather
than numerical quotas - a provision identical to the
proposals of the C0E.
Not surprisingly, the French Minister of Culture, Jack
Lang, in the 1984 meeting of EC Ministers of Culture took a
very active role against the 'wall-to-wall Dallas'.
Surprisingly, in 1989 he stated his opposition to any
quotas, either obligatory or voluntary, declaring the
Directive 'buried'. He is pushing for a plan that would
obviate any quota by requiring TV stations to devote a
certain percentage of their turnover to production, as with
C+ (Television Business International: July/August 1989;
2). The anxiety about Americanisation had a central place
in French programming policy and culture (see later). The
Socialist Government regarded television programme
production as basic to its economic and cultural status.
Although cinema attendance was declining, France produced
some 150 feature films a year, but its 6 TV channels
screened 1200 feature films annually. Looking at the TV
programming guidelines, there are similar (if not
identical) quotas to those proposed by the EC. These
applications of the programming regulations - monitored by
the Service d'observation des programmes (SOP) -which
answered directly to the Prime Minister's staff - meant
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that 60 per cent of programming time, consisting of non-
documentary works produced for television or the cinema
were reserved for works originating in EC member-states.
Moreover, France had been the first European country to try
to copy Dallas, committing substantial resources to the
attempt and imitating not only its content but also the
production process, a policy reminiscent to its hardware
strategy. Thus was born the Châteauvallon 'feuilleton'
(70), a series of 26 episodes (Silj et al.: 1988; 122).
Châteauvallon was introduced when Dallas was at its peak
and caused great concern over American pre-eminence in the
TV market (71).
In comparison with the UK, France, according to Table 10
(page 302), broadcasts more US-made programmes than the
UK. The official quotas on public service networks in
France allowed only 8 per cent, whereas 14 per cent was
allowed in the UK. Both quotas are misleading since these
official figures change with the composition of imported
feature films or series. The picture also changes if one
concentrates on programmes transmitted during prime time.
Dunkley (1985; 100-1) notes that the UK's 14 per cent quota
is misleading when examining this percentage from 7:00 pm
to midnight. In his 1982 example he shows that between
December 15-21, 26.6 per cent of the BBC's and 36.6 per
cent of ITV's prime-time programmes were American.
Nevertheless, in both countries, as well as in other EC
countries, Dallas and US serial fiction in general, always
lost when competing with European-produced fiction.
According to Silj et al. (1988; 199-204), however, if each
country's national programmes occupy the top positions in
the audience ratings, the public's second choice is never
programmes produced by other European countries. Silj also
concludes (op cit., 203) that in the UK, it was extremely
difficult to find a US programme in the first 5 slots on
the BARB chart of the 100 most-viewed programmes; in
general, the quota of US programmes in the Top 100 was not
more than 20 per cent (72).. 'Entertainment' was (and still
is), without doubt, the category of programme most imported
by Europe's public TV networks. The figures for some
stations make alarming reading, suggesting that own
productions account for less than 30 per cent of all
programmes (BEUC:1987;62). France imported more than the
UK.
The situation with RTL becomes much more confusing.
Contrary to common belief, films screened by RTL are more
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European than those of both French and British channels.
Moreover, RTL is much less American than French and British
channels. In comparison to West Germany and Italy, France
and the UK are less European. Moreover, the new networks
appear to follow the same pattern of importing more
entertainment programmes. There is not a systematic study
on this subject, but it seems fair to say from the 'hints'
in the market that the share of imported programmes is very
considerable. Regarding the new terrestrial channels, 50
per cent of La 5's programmes were of Italian origin, and
80 per cent of its series came from the US. It is obliged
to broadcast an average of 25 per cent of French-made films
over 5 years and, of course, it will also have to obey the
EC quotas. RTL+, on the other hand, gave precedence to
European films (37 of the 43 films showing in 1986 were
produced in Europe) (BEUC: 1987; 63).
There seems to be a similar pattern for satellite-to--cable
channels. In the UK, Children's Channel programmes were
mainly from the US, 30 per cent of Music Box's programmes
were US while the rest came from the EC. Screensport,
despite producing 20-25 per cent of its programmes, also
depends heavily on programmes from the US sports satellite
network, ESPN. In 1984-86, Sky Channel claimed that more
than 30 per cent of its programmes were US, 20 per cent of
various origin (non-English), and 30 per cent Australian.
Various commentators put the quota of US purchases at more
than 50 per cent.
Some conclusions could be drawn regarding the success of
programming quotas:
1. In general, quotas have been established to assist
either an infant domestic industry or to make it
competitive in both domestic and international markets.
Implementing such policies is usually unsuccessful. As in
the 1950s, the US answer to such measures has been runaway
production where subsidiaries available in the UK, France
or Italy turned from making. US films to British or Italians
(73). Thus European countries subs idised their film
industries instead of making them rely on the box office.
2. Implementing French quotas has mainly been based on a
system of tax-shelters (see later). Quotas depended more on
principle and less on the actual content or origin of
programmes. On the other hand, British quotas were based on
the traditional 'self-discipline' approach, i.e. respecting
the general 14 per cent quota, rather than on strict
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guidelines. Although the strict 60 per cent objective was
adopted in France in the late 1970s, 10 years later, only
A2 had just managed to reach the 60 per cent level of EC
programmes (including repeats) (EIM:].987;92). In 1989, TF1,
La 5 and M6 are to be disciplined for their excessive
screening of US programmes.
3. Lessons drawn from the French experience did not seem
to be adopted by the Commission, since the latter proposed
quotas similar to the French - a requirement not even
fulfilled by French channels. It seems difficult for EC
broadcasters to respect these quotas, especially smaller
countries or stations. CLT, for example, argued that the
Directive should not have been extended to programming
areas because quotas would artificially stimulate demand
for a product in short supply, not increasing EC
productions in prime-time as long as US series remained
popular and cheap. Through these quotas, the Americans
argue that there will be a dearth of competitive
programming in the market and new media will not be able to
grow. This is the reason for backing Lang's 1989 idea of
fostering European production rather than quotas because
the Americans confident that European will continue to
prefer US products to buying from each other.
5. In the UK and France and other EC member-states, given
the threefold increase in the number of programming hours
expected in the near future and the lack of 'deep
libraries' of commercial feature films, a larger share of
total programming will have to come from US-based
libraries. Industry analysts point out that the clearest
winners from the trend toward proliferating television
channels in Europe are US studio companies with large
libraries of valuable feature films (Wiley: 1989; 49).
Thus, it seems that quotas will have little effect.
6. The EC quota system has barely considered the small
country. The larger EC countries are better equipped and
prepared than their smaller partners. It is hard for
countries like Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal
or Luxembourg to compete equally. The potential that some
of them hold for much larger foreign markets - such as
Belgium to France, Portugal to Brazil, etc. - is not great.
For example, the Belgium film market is heavily dominated
by French feature films (Mattelart etal.: 1984; 96). It
would be unfair to claim that the Commission tried to
undermine the smaller countries. It attempted to find ways
to overcome the 'défi Americaine'. Since the programming
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sector is identified as one of the few labour-intensive
economic sectors whose market is expected to expand over
the next decade, the Community tried to protect one of its
more promising industries.
7. Programming quotas at the EC level, as with hardware,
show that a domestic/nationalist protection is replaced by
a supranational one. Therefore, policies protecting
programme industries, policies imposing quotas or even
differentiated quotas during the following decade may
become much more complicated and important than the
national ones. This situation again demonstrates the
state's position between external and internal factors,
actors and pressures.
8. Reactions to the proposed EC quotas were divided into
favourable, favourable with some alteration, neutral, and
hostile. France, presumably due to non-official reaction,
must belong in the 'favourable' category, whereas the UK
was opposed to the principle of quotas with the HO,
preferring a 'reasonable proportion of EC programmes'.
Although Luxembourg did not establish its own position, it
was hostile since CLT was against and SES unfavourable.
Although quota policies do not always work, without them
Europe's production industry would lose its competition
with Hollywood products.
In conclusion, import quotas could undoubtedly stimulate
the quantity and viewing of domestic productions - but in
the short term. In a long-term competitive audiovisual
landscape, however, quotas tend to undermine these
objectives. The proliferation of new channels in relation
to the increase of VCRs, could undermine these restrictive
practices as well as the development of strong
infrastructures for the new television environment, capable
of supporting both production and the general media scene.
An alternative to the 'European programme famine' could be
coproductions.
4.2.2 TOWARDS COPRODUCTIONS...
In its effort to stimulate EC production, the Commission
also, in the Final Directive, asked for coproductions
amongst EC producers, and sketched the definition of
'European criteria'. Article 4 of the Directive set out
what was to be understood by works of 'Community origin':
(a) those originated by producers in a member-state; (b)
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those originated by producers in more than one member-
state; and (c) those originated by producers in one or
several member-states and from third countries, where the
EC's share of the total production cost is greater than 70
per cent. However, the 'EC origin' definition was
criticised because it was based exclusively on the
nationality of producers (74). Article 4 stated that
coproductions and co-financial productions between
producers in member-states, and those in third countries,
were to be considered as national productions from a
member-state. Coproductioris were defined as films produced
within the framework of reciprocal international
agreements. Co-financed productions were defined as those
produced according to national regulations by producers in
one or more member-country and producers in one or more
third countries. For both coproductions and co-financed
productions, the artistic and technical contribution from
the member-state(s) must not be less than 35 per cent.
Similarly, France and the UK imposed some principles for
coproductions. In France, decree law 59-733 of 16 June
1959, last amended on 16 November 1986, dealt with
financial support from the state for the cinema industry
and set out the conditions for 'grants-in-aid'. However, it
laid down a number of criteria which these coproductions
had to meet to benefit from financial aid. Decree 85-983 of
17 September 1985, passed by the Socialists, established
the conditions which cinematic and audiovisual quality must
meet for the fiscal advantages laid down in the decree 695
of 1985. These decrees were specific and aimed to eliminate
confusion. State aid was to be no less than 15 per cent but
no more than 50 per cent; the original version should be in
French; French scripters must participate; it must be
filmed in approved studios located in metropolitan France
(75), etc. In the UK, Paragraph 4 of the First Schedule of
the 1985 Film Act also provided criteria, similar of
France, regarding the nationality of a film (76).
The coproduction target has been difficult and sometimes
tricky, regardless of these criteria. The 'runaway
productions' loophole in quotas has been replaced by
another American producers' strategy: 'international
coproduction', which means co-financing, joint acquisition
and, finally, money savings in contrast to the EC's policy.
The Marco-Polo case, a 10-hour series, is a good example.
It was a coproduction between RAI, Italy's public
broadcaster; NBC, a US network; Proctor and Gamble, the
soap company; Dentsu, the Japanese advertising agency; and
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the People's Republic of China. Despite PAl's colossal
outlay producing these series 'internationally', the final
outcome was total dependence on the US. Scripts and stars
were overwhelmed by Americans, the shooting was in English,
but ironically, the project was to have an 'Italian-epic'
style. However, this production was regarded as European
due to RAI's participation. Another example was Anno
Domini, a 12-part NBC, BBC, Canale 5 (Italy) coproduction
with a $34 million budget.
C4 adopted a European dimension by coproducing with other
Europeans. Since 1982, it coproduced programmes such as The
Price with RTE (Ireland). Recently, in collaboration with
ORF (Austria), RAI (Italy), ZDF (FRG), A2, SRG
(Switzerland) and RTV (Spain), it produced the Euro-Cops
series, each of them contributing DM 15 million the project
(Financial Times:19 March 1988). French/European
coproductions have been more frequent than UK/European,
despite the BBC's coproduction strategy (77), since the
early 1980s, to share the costs of programmes (such as Anno
Domini, Fortunes of War). ITV has followed a pre-sales
agreement, mainly in the US.
More specifically, the MEDIA project, concerned with
producing and distributing audiovisual works intends to
involve funding for European coproductions, as well as
encouraging multilingualism. It aims to encourage
cooperation between countries by creating new formats and
scripts, specifically by setting up script-writing
scholarships. The MEDIA programme is within the framework
in completing the Single Market by 1992 and promoting a
competitive European audiovisual industry. At a proposed EC
cost of £40 million, it will create a European film
distribution system to facilitate exchanges of national
productions and support pilot projects on R&D of computer
graphics (78).
One must mention the TV5 French satellite-to-cable attempt,
as well as the unfortunate.Europa TV, which was the major
beneficiary of the EC's encouragement policy towards
European programmes. Other French attempts are the so-
called 'SEPT' (Société d'Edition des Programmes de
Télévision) and France's 'hidden' seventh channel. This was
created because of a report in 1984 asking Pierre
Desgraupes to take action with respect to the new situation
of the French media. Although his project was not
implemented, being too expensive, SEPT was set up. It
functioned under the Chirac Government as a publishing
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company, similar to C4; instead of producing its own
programmes, it coproduced culturally orientated ones with
other European channels and independent producers aiming at
building up a stock of programmes for the future TDF].
satellite.
In conclusion, the French seem, not surprisingly, to follow
a similar course to EC-expressed policy on coproductions.
On the other hand, British producers and broadcasters have
'gone European' for coproduction without state incentives.
It appears that market principles can also succeed in this
situation.
4.2.3 ...AND INDEPENDENT PRODUCTIONS
Under Europe and Britain's new adopted policies, the clear
winners seem to be the independent producers. On the EC
level, the Commission, through Article 5 of the Directive,
asks for an initial 5 per cent of the broadcasters'
programming budget to go to independent productions. This
percentage will be progressively increased to 10 per cent
within 3 years. The MEDIA programme is also intended to
promote independent production in cinema, television and
video, particularly in the major European audiovisual
markets. The Commission's policy on this issue was modelled
on C4's independent production success (Table 13).
It could be said that British broadcasters, including the
pioneer C4, were more committed to independent production
than their French counterparts. C+ or 'SEPT' were mainly
influenced by the 'British way'. In France, however,
because the channels had to buy from the SFP (see later),
they could not use largely independent productions. The
independents asked for protection and quotas on public
broadcasters imposed by the state. In Britain, especially
with the White Paper, independents seem to be the main
beneficiaries. Both the BBC and ITV committed 100 hours for
independents in 1987/8 at a cost of £5 million, 200 hours
in 1988/9 at £10 million, while the goal has been 500 hours
for the network, and 100 for the regions for 1991/2
Review:March 1988; 17).
Regardless of the exact programming hours, independent
production is important for various reason:
(1) Since their beginning, public broadcasters in the
whole of Europe have had their own productions. Own
productions were (or were supposed to be) a first-class
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cultural weapon, although they were sometimes costly. With
independent producers, they seem to follow a more cost-
effective rather than culture-effective programming policy.
(2) Public service broadcasters's role as broadcaster and
producer appears to be transformed to 'publisher-
contractors'. In future, private TV companies with a large
production staff and well-equipped studios, such as Thames
and London Weekend Television, might become 'publisher-
contractors' with a small number of commissionary editors
and no production staff at all.
(3) The weakening of television trade unions (see also
Part 2).
(4) Financial pressures on existing broadcasters will
encourage a drift away from staff production and the
farming out of an increasing proportion of programmes to a
growing army of independents (Snoddy: 1989; VI).
Last, British and French independents have been concerned
about their future (Broadcast: 18 August 1989, 21),
particularly their independence. So far they have been
considered independents because of their small size, which
allows competition. They fear that because of the
potentially profitable future of the sector, large new
companies will be attracted to the domain (79). A kind of
'mergermania' could occur, as in 1970s with computers.
There have already been signs of new entrants from outside
the traditional independent sector in the UK (Island
Records, Leo Burnut). Fears have been expressed that the
independent sector will need a degree of media
concentration and will coalesce into half a dozen super-
independents, functioning on both international and
domestic levels with some programmes commissioned to
smaller companies to keep the 'character' of the sector!!
4.2.4 PROGRAMMING POLICY ON TERRESTRIAL TELEVISION
The French Government was more supportive of TV programme
production than the British. But outcome was similar:
broadcasters in both countries knew a dramatic increase in
broadcast hours while their own productions decreased
(Table 11). However, British channels offered a wider range
of programmes to their viewers. Programme quality was again
similar. Finally, in both countries we see major
broadcasters getting the bulk of advertising revenue and
the smaller ones around them trying to get a share of the
259
'pie'.
According to Blumler et al. (1986; 167), the range of
programming available in the UK was the most extensive of
traditional broadcasters from other countries. The choice
in peak viewing time was also extensive in the UK. In terms
of overall range, according to this study, the greatest
variety was provided by the BBC, ZDF, PAl and ABC. The BBC,
in comparison to TF1, provided a wider range of programmes.
However, it must be noted that the pattern of French
terrestrial television has a similar trend to its British
counterpart. According to SOP, of the 10,869 hours
transmitted in 1981, premium material accounted for about 8
to 9 per cent, light 12 per cent, informative 23.3 per
cent, while a large percentage (about 17 per cent) was
cultural programmes, thanks to the Minister of Culture, Mr
Jack Lang. It is most interesting that within Plan IXeme
(1984-88), priority was given to developing the 'industries
de la communication' -a budget of FF21 million was
allocated for that purpose. Once again, the relationship of
culture and economy involved more than one ministry. The
Plan had four main axes (Miege et al.: 1986). The first
concerned financing and developing those industries, the
'Institut de Financement du Cinema et des Industries
Culturelles'(IFCIC) (81) in 1983. The second was to find
ways of making the industry more competitive through the
' plan-researche-ima ge', by modernising its techniques or
using new production methods. The third axis was to make
the public broadcasters order new productions. The forth
was concerned with decentralising production based mainly
on FR3. Its regional programming had to be increased from
6400 hours in 1983 to 13,000 hours in 1988, as well as
creating regional production centres in collaboration with
the Ministry of Culture . The whole aim was to 'reconquer'
the home market and to support its commercial markets
overseas.
That policy hoped to help the industry resist foreign
competitors or maintain its position in this sector.
However, the number of French films produced between 1981
and 1984 was dramatically reduced from 208 to 136. On the
other hand, in 1984, the public service channels helped
produce 53 new films, financing them with a total of FF133
million, in order to help cinema to find a 'nouveau
souffle'(Bredin Report: 1985; 125). Canal Plus must be
included in this category of helping the film industry. In
the same year, C4 ordered 236 hours of original
programming, of which 114 hours were drama and fiction in
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coproduction with 30 different French producers.
Practically, this '1Do1iticue de soutien a la production'
was cinematically inspired i.e. supporting programme
production and co-financing film budgets. This can also be
seen in the regulations of decree law 1985/893 of 17
September 1985, as well as in the regulation of 31 October
1985 on shares issued by film and audiovisual industry
finance companies (SOFICA). The production sector was also
dominated by the public company, 'Société Francaise de
Production', which was based on a system of compulsory
orders. This meant that each channel had to order a certain
amount of programming from the SF? according to their
operating conditions, FF602 million for TF1, FF571 million
for A2 and FF45 million for FR3. But during the last 10
years, the results of this 'paradoxical system'
(Lacan:l983) have caused problems. The state-run channels,
facing financial constraints, started buying US material 10
times cheaper than the French programmes. Thus, SFP
presented a deficit because 95 per cent of its income was
based on the orders of state-run channels. Additionally,
the increase in cost production made the French realise
that its market could not support it. A programme like Les
Enfants du Rock cost FF450,000 per hour; Chateauvallon FF2
million per hour; or a half-hour of news programme on TF1
FF200,000 (Nouvel Obsérvateur: March 8, 1987). New channels
demanded more programming; French TV used to air 500
feature films a year. It 1989 roughly three times that many
were broadcast. To make matters worse, feature films are
the French viewers' favourite kind of programme. Then, the
internal production of the channels represented 25 per cent
of TF1 and A2's expenses, whereas their orders represented
90 per cent of SFP's activity (Bredin Report:l985). When
Chirac came into power, he privatised SFP to have more
flexible production.
The private production sector had developed in the shadow
of the public service for two reasons: because it took a
supplementary character within the psb framework and
because its international coproduction strategy made it
lose money. Thus, the production in private fiction was
actually reduced by half from 1981 to 1984 (in 1981 it
represented 150 hours, i.e. one third of total fiction
production, in 1984, only 75 hours. This situation probably
caused the Government to look at SFP's policy. According to
SOP, there had been a general weakening of production.
Thus, the broadcasting time in fiction was reduced from 479
hours in 1980 to 407 in 1984 (i.e.-15 per cent). During the
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same period, imported foreign films increased from 315
hours to 537 hours (+70 per cent), whereas the volume of
first broadcast fell from 40 to 28 per cent between 1982
and 1984.
Both French and British broadcasters, while increasing
their broadcast transmission time, had from zero to
negative increase in their own programme production. The
British Conservatives did not created any aid scheme, or
'tax-relief' measures for their producers, leaving the
whole issue, apart from the remit of C4 for independent
producers, to BBC/ITV (82). Basically, the Government aimed
to increase production through independent production. It
would be fair to say that during C4's five years in
operation, hundreds of small independents were created to
provide programmes for the new channel. Some of those, like
People to People, were also intended to give a voice to the
broadcasting silent majority: the non-white, non-male, non-
Oxbridge, non-middle class. The hostility against
corporatism was one of the main elements of the
Conservatives' general policy. By and large, the Government
did not have a policy like the French for creating
incentives for film and programming production. The outcome
was similar, however, i.e. a decrease of both French and
British programmes. Although the 'Big Five' dominate ITV's
general output, regional programming performed better in
the UK than in France.
Regarding programme quality, the term 'quality' could
represent various interpretations. In general, both British
and French programmes stood well, despite rather
'lightweight' series in the mainstream of their schedules;
pressure to move to more competitive and less quality
programmes had increased. In France, particularly,
competition between the six channels had led to more shows,
varieties and US-type soap operas. The great difference
between Socialist French TV and the deregulated TV under
Chirac was that now everything was up for sale at the TV
stations, including once-untouchable programmes, like films
and the evening news (83). 'Even the weather was carved up
as television became the advertisers' new El Dorado'
(Jampol:1988;26). Where French TV once emphasised high-
quality programmes, such as Apostrophes, TV channels in
late 1980s sought light programmes, since the advertisers
had (still have) a much freer hand. The programming
strategy for all networks followed the classic pattern:
films and major series were all shown during prime-time for
maximum audience.
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Although the effects of this policy are related to the
Chirac Government, the Socialist Government stated the
excessive competition which has led to an 'Americanisation'
of French TV. Their British counterparts, on the other
hand, had the choice of watching even high-quality
documentaries in peak-time because of the so-called
vertical duopoly in which broadcasters compete for
audiences, not for the same revenue, by using high-quality
programmes. But even given the wide range of programming,
much material was middle brow and aimed at largish,- not
huge - audiences (Tunstall: 1986a). Whereas the ITV figures
between 1980-85 show little change in patterns of
programming, the BBC figures show a fall in drama and an
increase in foreign, particularly American, films. ITV has
consistently shown a higher proportion of 'lighter
material' than the BBC in peak-time, similar to the
relationship between TF1 and A2 (84). Tunstall (1983;31)
notes that in terms of scheduling, there was indeed the
most brutal kind of direct competition in which similar
popular programmes competed 'head-to-head' in the same time
slot to attract viewers. This could also describe 1981-86
French TV, although the HA's attempt to harmonise
programmes was less effective than the IBA's 'Programme
Policy Committee'.
Creating C4 completed the duopoly system, giving each
monopoly two channels: one for big audiences, the other for
more selective and/or minority audiences. BBC1 and 2
enjoyed 46 per cent of the audience, whereas ITV and C4
took 54 per cent of it. The French channels have a similar
pattern: TF1 32 per cent, A2 29 per cent, FR3 10 per cent;
the 1988 pattern has been:TF1 45 per cent, A2 27 per cent,
FR3 10.4 per cent, C+ 3.5 per cent La 5 10.4 per cent and
M6 2.1 (Mediamétrie:17 May 1988, Paris). Putting these
figures together, one sees that the big channels in the UK
and France enjoyed 72 per cent and 85 per cent of the
audience. One could argue that the new channels might stay
small since the big ones would remain big, and the
newcomers have to find either more aggressive ways of
conquering the audience or of orienting their strategies
for specialised audiences. One could also argue that there
is not much space for additional channels, with the
existing ones struggling to survive.
Advertising has become increasingly important, especially
in France. Whereas advertising in the UK was controlled by
the channels (ITV, C4), in France, deregulation led
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channels to be under the advertising's thumb. In 1988, the
previous Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, admitted that
advertising had to be reduced on the public channels (85).
In the UK, control over advertising had been among the most
comprehensive in the world. In France, advertising went up
from 25 per cent to 27 per cent of the daily time in 1986,
when the Minister of Finance proposed reductions of about 2
per cent of the expenditure on administrative costs.
Introducing new channels and loosening advertising
regulations, as well as privatising TF1, has led the
channels to be thrown open to advertisers and their US-
tailored techniques: sponsorship integrated into shows like
interviews, and bartering (advertisers furnishing shows in
exchange for ad space) such as La Rue de la Fourtune (US
replica of Wheel of Fortune) against ad space totalling
FF90,000 a day. More important, the competition between the
channels has led them to lower their prices, especially La
Cinq and M6, but advertisers still prefer the nation-wide
coverage of TF1, A2 and FR3, although A2 and FR3 have been
declining. In 1988, TF1's advertising time was rapidly
increased from 18 minutes per day to 8 minutes per hour
(86). However, with the new channels, British TV may meet
a similar situation. It is uncertain whether advertising
expenditure will lead to new revenues which will, in turn,
stimulate production.
It appears that the French Socialists again followed a
voluntarist policy on terrestrial television programming,
but it was largely consumed in plans and contradictions. To
give an example: the cuts in 1984 on TV's revenue effected
decreased production for the first time since 1980. Thus,
in the first 4 weeks of 1984, 3500 hours were 'French-
made', whereas 4330 hours were made abroad (87). Then,
introducing the new channels obviously destroyed the
balance of programming orientation, competing now for
advertising rather than for programmes as in the UK. The
UK, on the other hand, maintained its usual, middle-brow
programming policy through the mechanisms of self-
determination and self-regulation.
4.2.5 PROGRAMMING POLICY IN THE GRAND DUCHY
There were no specific guidelines regarding programming in
Luxembourg, apart from general directions contained in the
operating conditions of the CLT that the station should
transmit high-quality programmes that must not offend
foreign governments. Additionally, CLT had to provide
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airtime, if requested by the government, for political or
social programmes appealing to the Luxembourg audience.
CLT's slogan had always been 'information and
entertainment'; for 30 years, its programme-makers worked
successfully under these guidelines, broadcasting films,
news and popular series.
Programming policy depended largely on RTL's goodwill,
since its broadcasting activities were mainly targeted for
audiences outside the country; but some of them had to be
for the Luxembourgers - not a very profitable market for a
commercial broadcaster. Consequently, services offered . for
Luxembourg viewers or listeners were underdeveloped. For
example, only two hours per week were devoted to the
country's TV programmes; radio in the Luxembourg language
was only broadcast for about seven hours per day
(Hirsh:1986a). This situation had, however, motivated some
cultural associations such as Radio Organique, Radio Gregne
Fluesfeukelden and some newspapers to offer a service
dedicated to Luxembourgers. But until 1986, two of them
were operating without a licence, outside Luxembourg's
territory (80), whereas the third was broadcast from
Belgium to Luxembourg. Some attempts to legalise local
radio had been blocked by CLT's monopoly and by the
government's preference for certain projects through
newspapers. CLT initiated 51 per cent of its total
programming output (magazines, game shows, variety shows,
news flashes) 'in-house' and has been dedicating 2 hours
airtime on Sunday mornings to special children's
programmes, including animated cartoons and series since
September 1984. However, 49 per cent of its programming was
feature films and series and video clips.
CLT's recent failures ii
influential Luxeinbourgers
more nationally flavoured
CLT's audience are in
Luxembourg.
the satellite arena made some
lobby stress the government for a
company. This is difficult since
Belgium and France, not in
4.2.6 PROGRAMMING POLICY ON CABLE IN FRANCE AND THE UK
In both the UK and France, one observes a relaxation of
programming rules on cable and satellite channels. In the
UK, most of the responsibilities were given to the CA by
the 1984 Cable and Broadcasting Act. These responsibilities
concerned the regulation of the content of cable programme
services. Similar, and to some extent stricter, rules were
also imposed on French cable TV, expressed in the decree of
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18 January 1985. In the UK, however, a number of cable
programme services were already being supplied to the
public even before the CA was set up. These services were
operating under the interim rules laid down by the HO,
creating a pattern whereby the local cable operators were
both the retailers of programme channels and programmes
suppliers - described as programme-providers. The latter
did not require the CA'S licence or other approval to set
up, but their services became subject to control when they
were carried on licensed cable systems.
The major regulations regarding cable in both countries
were:
1. Cable operators must carry the existing public service
channels as well the five DBS channels in the UK, whereas
in France, this requirement is supposedly defacto. UK cable
operators also have to relay IBA and BBC radio services.
Existing cable operators had their 'must carry' requirement
dropped (88). According to paragraph 131 of the 1984 Cable
and Broadcasting Act, the CA should be required to impose
specific obligations on cable operators to provide services
for minority and specialised interests. For example, it had
been suggested that channels be reserved for a variety of
different uses, including education, community access,
local authorities, the deaf, and Christian organisations.
The British Government thought it unwise to legislatively
oblige cable operators to reserve channels for particular
uses other than those set aside for the public broadcasting
services. Thus, according to paragraph 130 of the 1984 Act,
cable operators would be judged according to the CA's
quality criteria.
2. In both countries, we do not see any specific rules
imposing a high general standard, especially in content and
cTuality , similar to those applied on terrestrial
television, but cable operators broadcasts should not
offend public taste and decency, especially in the UK.
However, this shows that the British Government rejected
Hunt's recommendation for adult channels, unlike France's
C+. Nevertheless, this recommendation would be increasingly
difficult to be adopted as a firm policy guideline.
3. In both the UK and France, advertising would be subject
to similar rules as ITV and local radio in the UK, and to
those governing commercials on public service channels.
This was mainly because of problems receiving foreign
channels and selling them abroad. Classified advertising -
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channels supported by advertising and sponsorship - were
permitted. However, the UK's CA concluded that the IBA's
code of advertising standards, applied to cable programmes
by the HO, were basically apposite enough not to warrant
early efforts to draw up an alternative version in the 1984
Broadcasting and Cable Act. Nevertheless, it required the
CA to consult the IBA's Advisory Committee on Advertising,
but potential problems like misleading advertising were not
addressed. The same applied to French cable's advertising
policy. The potential possibilities of advertising revenue
in the UK rather than in France were more closely
considered, probably because British cable TV was more
under market-forces guidelines, whereas French cable was an
économie de mixte. In both countries, the advertising aimed
to give local business the chance to advertise on local
cable channels, providing them with considerable revenue.
The French Government went so far as to assume that by the
year 2000, all cable channels would be totally supported by
advertising - a rather optimistic vision. In 1986, the CA
issued a provisional 'Code of Practice on Programme
Sponsorship'. Early sponsors on cable included NatWest
Bank, Volkswagen, Coca-Cola and British Gas. Sponsorship
was also welcome on French cable but potential sponsors saw
little of interest and were mainly attracted by the
terrestrial channels.
4. Pay-per-view (PPV): The British Government did not
accept the Hunt Report's recommendations and permitted PPV;
in France, C+ had already opened up pay TV. In the UK cable
operators would not be permitted exclusive rights for major
national events and events customarily covered by the
public service broadcasters; the CA would draw up a precise
list of these.
5. There were no precise restrictions on foreign material
in the UK, whereas French restrictions were detailed. In
France, according to the decree law of 18 January 1985,
foreign channels (including RTL, RMC-TV) could not take up
more than 30 per cent of a system's total capacity.
Moreover, 15 per cent of the system's capacity must be
'local-made', whereas 60 per cent of feature films must
come from the EC and 50 per cent from francophone nations.
Films could be screened two or three years after their
general release, a similar regulation to that imposed on
the public service channels 'les canaux du basic', and
could be broadcast at peak viewing times but they could not
cast for advertising revenues. In short, foreign material
must be limited to one-third of the networks' capacity,
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although this measure would not be applied during the
launch period. Finally, 30 per cent of each network's
revenue would either have to be directly invested in
programming or go towards financing new programmes
(purchase and rights of productions). The latter indicated
that the Minister of Culture's proposals or pressures at
least had some influence. These regulations were quite
hard, effectively killing the already-stagnant cable
development in France.
In the UK, as noted above, there were no precise
restrictions. Initially, a high level of imported
programming was expected but the CA required franchise
bidders to state the proportion of expected British or EC
material. In granting franchises, the CA was also concerned
that the production of UK-produced programming should
increase over time. Cable operators were allowed to relay
foreign programmes as well as the channels of other cable
operators. The full rules covering non-British channels
have yet to be established. Nevertheless, the non-quota on
cable did not produce any immediate change in the character
of British television, like the coming of cable itself. The
effects might be gradual, and the consequences more complex
(Hutchinson: 1984). It seemed more likely that British
cable would be more influenced by US programming because
little money was injected into the programme-production
side. According to Screen Di gest (April 1984; 67), the
costs of making and distributing material proved
prohibitive; future programme-suppliers would have had to
find a way of producing material at a fraction of the cost
if they were to use cable operators as customer.
Local programmes have been made on a modest scale. Cable
operators, such as Aberdeen Cable and Swindon, who began
with ambitious plans for local programming, were forced to
spend a lot that was claimed by these services due to the
small revenue. When considering applications for new
franchises, the CA was required to take proposals for local
services into account. Whereas in France, the Ministry of
Culture had a considerable say on cable programming, in the
UK, the HO significantly controlled cable, regardless of
the 'light' regulation objectives. Both the HA and CA -
especially the latter, since the HA had little say in cable
- had to align their regulatory processes with those that
occurred on terrestrial services. Interactive services were
given priority in both countries. In France, they were to
be provided by optic fibres under the Plan Cable. In the
UK, the DTI made a total of £5 million available through
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the Support for Innovation Programme to provide new systems
and demonstrate that cable could be exploited for much more
than programme distribution.
Economic sense was missing in both countries. Cable
operators, whether private or 'inixte', like the SLECs did
not understand the programming costs. The fact that none of
them could afford to produce any programmes for cable TV
illustrates this lack of realism.
4.2.7 THE NEW MEDIA AND PROGRAMMING DILEMMAS
The new media services, particularly satellite channels,
troubled all the interested parties in the field because
they had to adopt a programming policy to make their
channels attractive to viewers. The American, and the
already-existing European, evidence indicated that
potential customers would only pay for better reception or
something completely new. Since the former did not
constitute an important problem, the latter was emphasised.
Most newcomers concentrated on two options: either
providing a general diet of new entertainment, or offering
premium services modelled upon HBO- or C+ -type movie
channels. It appeared that in both cases, the consumer
would only subscribe when these services were offered
fairly cheaply. It also seemed that larger nations, such as
Britain and France, could not easily provide what was
needed.
During 1981-86, decision-makers and programmers were
anxious to find an appropriate diet to make new services
successful. In the early 1980s, thoughts were on satellites
carrying public service channels. tJnisat was considered for
the 'Best of BBC1 and 2' services, whereas TDF1 was to
carry TF1 and FR3. However, Coronet's approach, going more
for thematic and less for generalist channels, was found
attractive. Both TPS and 'Club 21' changed plans, now
adopting the thematic approach. 'Club 21' chose three
services: films, news and general entertainment. Similarly,
TPS was going f or thematic channels, but saw them as
complementary to national terrestrial networks and each
other. Its thématigue approach would encompass channels on
sports, news, music, entertainment and cultural
programming. The most successful and widely distributed
general entertainment services so far have been Sky, TV5
and Super Channel. On the other hand, thematic - or
narrowcasting - services were modelled on cable channels in
the US, aimed to attract specific segments of the audience
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(children, young people, women) or special interest groups
(sports, films, the arts) (89). Most of these services
aimed to attract segments of the audience whose numbers at
the national level were too small to be viable, but which
could become important as part of the larger audience
reached by transfrontier signals (ElM: 1988; 106). Those
thematic channels could be news and information (such as
Cable News Network or World Net from the US); popular music
(Tele 5 (FRG)); Music Box; MTV Europe (UK)); children's
programmes (Children's channel; Canal 1 (France)); sports
services (Screensport (UK)); film services (Premiere (UK),
Film Net (Holland); Canal Plus); arts and culture (Arts
channel (UK) women's programmes (Lifestyle (UK)); and
religious programmes (New World channel (US)).
The 1980s experience, however, has shown that broadcasters
feel more confident going for a mixture of either
generalist and thematic channels. Thus, BSB opts for four
services in its three channels: a subscription film service
- the Screen channel (90) a family service - Galaxy, based
on advertising; a news channel - NOW, supported by
advertising; and a day-time children's channel - Disney.
BSB's budget for programming stands at £110 million to
cover all four channels and up to 72 hours of programming a
day, which means it will remain a cheap channel. Similarly,
Sky Television on Astra adopted a similar mixture of
generalist (Sky) and thematic channels (movies, Eurosport,
arts, children). In their anxiety to get audiences,
broadcasters offer a variety of programmes and services.
The problems remain the same, however, i.e. whether and
when they will start making money. This question has
largely been unanswered. To calm the satellite broadcasters
down, regulators gave very loose guidelines regarding
content, financing and advertising, as well as quantity of
news programmes and quality in general. The IBA's
guidelines on DBS were quite contrary to its strict rules
on terrestrial broadcasting. As Robert Maxwell said,
'regulation is the death of enterprise'.
Another dilemma was who would broadcast the satellite
ventures: the state or private sector? Although the state
was seen as initiator at the start, very soon the
broadcasters were coming from the private sector. Even in
France, a partnership of state and private elements was
under either the 'soclété de mixte' umbrella or the state's
guarantee. Elsewhere in Europe, the so-called media moguls
were heavily involved - a revision of the previous press
moguls (91) - in most of the projects. This was inevitable
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due to the economic rationale adopted by the governments
for developing new media. Thus, Silvio Berlusconi, Rupert
Murdoch, Robert Maxwell, Bertelsmann and Robert Hersant
represented crossnational enterprises: the combination of
TV operations with newspapers, periodical and book
publishing, cinema production, radio and cable/satellite
ventures to form horizontally integrated information
empires. They had adopted a 'Euro-strategy' in both video
and press but had also relied heavily upon consortia
arrangements and political connections by becoming highly
partisan in the political system. Berlusconi and Maxwell,
for example, gained channels and transponders under the
Socialists, whereas Hersant and Murdoch were seen as right-
wing partisans, gaining momentum from the Conservatives.
The Commission was also encouraging a European programme-
production industry by providing a new style of
commercialism, as described in Part 2. This trend obviously
helped the moguls' strategies to enter new markets and new
fields - mainly the audiovisual industry -with a promising
future. A 1989 analysis by Booz Allen & Hamilton of recent
corporate trends - Consolidation is Key to Euro TV survival
under Publications and Media - points out that mergers,
joint ventures and acquisitions are crucial for European
broadcasting industry if it hopes to survive competition
from the US (Screen Digest: August 1989; 170). It seems
that media moguls in the late 1980s have been greatly
involved in merger and joint ventures in European
broadcasting.
Finally, new media broadcasters faced a problem about the
content of their programming. Apart from some who found a
solution by offering hard-core pornography films, the rest
found it difficult to attract viewers. Their campaign for
more choice and better programmes was not realistic since
most offered 'oldies' or poor-quality programmes. Moreover,
most channels broadcast in English, limiting their
attractiveness to foreign viewers. Tracey (1987;78)
analyses this 'facility logic' by using Super Channel's
story as example. He notes that 'Super Channel's error' was
to put together a naive equation: British television has
masses of high-quality programmes appealing to British
yuppies; since there are lots of yuppies throughout Europe,
with lots of disposable income, if a channel can deliver
those programmes, it will be a profitable business. This
faulty logic grossly overemphasised social commonalties,
underestimated the impact of national culture on TV-viewing
preferences and ignored the fact that not all those yuppies
reside at the end of a cable system. In other words, there
271
was no comprehensive, empirically and conceptually adequate
model, only some scattered clues concerning the TV markets
of the future.
4.2.8 THE NEW AUDIOVISUAL LANDSCAPE AND THE VIEWER
The 1980s, broadcasting policies have led to a consumer-
driven broadcasting market. Consumerism attempts to redress
the imbalance of power that exists between those who
produce goods and services, and those for whom they are
provided (Potter: 1988; 150). Encouraging the 'consumer-
choice' argument played a major role in the media policies
concerning the reshaping of the audiovisual landscape, not
only in France and the UK, but in the whole of western
Europe. Nevertheless, this argument differed from those of
the early 1970s, when cable TV was considered by many
progressives in western Europe not only as the ideal
technology to end the centralised broadcasting systems, but
as something that would also encourage interpersonal
communication and democracy by stimulating participation in
the local community in a society characterised by
individual alienation and anomie.
Unfortunately, this was not the result with cable or
terrestrial TV, or even radio. For example, the 'radios
libres' in France had a completely different meaning then
than it does today. Whereas free radio had once been an
essentially non-profit-making activity by specific interest
groups, generally of the Left, it now became big business.
Even Reagan's political economy could not have gone
further. Brecht's vision that radio was to cause the most
thorough-going socialisation of communication took on a
basis of technical possibilities, which still remain a
Utopian vision. CLT, as shown elsewhere, preferred foreign
audiences to its local people. In the UK, despite C4, the
main mass networks, BBC1 and ITV, downgraded their quality.
Moreover, within this new media revolution, the term
'viewer' had also been transformed. Now other terms, such
as 'participant' or 'consumer', are becoming preferable,
'indicating a radically different market-oriented view of
the media user' (Negrine and Goodfriend: 1988; 306). Would
the subscriber-viewer on cable be treated as a citizen or
consumer? What interests would the new services show to the
'viewers'? What about the egalitarian aspect of public
broadcasting? Some areas would be more expensive than
others. Would their inhabitants pay more or not? What about
the rural areas? Would cable TV be out of reach for the
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lower-income population? To what extent would reforms on
broadcasting affect the dominant ways, forms and flow of
communications? Would the new services form new perceptions
of information tools and/or information and communication
together? Unfortunately, few social-science researchers
have paid attention to the impact of the new media on the
'viewer'. On the contrary, most research is market-
oriented, looking at him/her as a consumer. As Svennening
(1987) commented, 'we know remarkably too little about how
people view different programmes, what are typical forms of
response to different programme types, how other demands on
time are accommodated within the overall framework of
television availability, and how TV and social life co-
exist'.
Unfortunately, governments also pay little attention to the
television viewer as a citizen, although they argue for
him/her. Both the British and Luxembourg Governments,
preferring market forces, did not really consider these
issues. The French Socialist Government, moreover, did not
try to tackle any of these social questions by approaching
a rather 'techno-made' logic. All three, in addition to the
EC's adopted economic rationale, fixed the citizen in the
role of consumer with no right other than to choose
services partially competing with each other.
The industrial imperative was preferred to build up the
information societes, and open the door to experimentation
strategies, which often contrasted with the extreme
rigidity of what they were to serve finally leaving the
field to be dominated by media conglomerates and tycoons.
The French viewer went from being a silent partner to a
valuable consumer; various agencies such as Mediamétrie,
Sofres, CESP, Motivaction, or even the British AGB, tried
to find his/her preferences on an 'already-served diet'. In
both France and the UK, programme-makers and schedulers
seemed puzzled by audience data in their attempt to find
potential 'consumers' for new services. Various findings,
as in France, have come out (JICARR, BARB), but were mostly
made by the industry lobbying for new channels.
Generally speaking, the pattern of commercial TV programme
viewing was very unselective; viewers would seem to watch
whatever was shown (Curran: 1986b; 326) . Moreover,
marketing pressures had given rise to very different styles
of production from those pioneered by the BBC. Since the
late l970s, there has been less drama, less variety and
more conformist products. In the late 1980s, British drama
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was threatened but bounced back. Its practitioners were now
likely to do it more as a career than as a crusade. In
France, as described elsewhere, game shows and cheap
material had increased. Ironically, 'quality' has become
the broadcasting buzzword in the late 1980s. In the UK in
particular, somewhat unexpectedly, the debate on the future
of broadcasting has shifted to a discussion of quality -
its definition, manifestation, measurement and chances of
survival after the new Broadcasting Bill.
4.2.9 PROGRAMMES, CULTURE AND ECONOMY
As noted programmes were initially seen as a subsidiary to
the industrial imperative. Besides, culture was (and still
is) always an industry (Miege et al.: 1986; 22). The
industrialisation of culture was not a new phenomenon but
its 'reconnaissance' progress went too fast. Thus, in the
1980s, the cultural industry became economically important
(Miege et al.: ibid). For the Community, the programmes
were linked to economic, technological and cultural
development of the EC with the competition of the internal
market in 1992. Moreover, the cultural dimension of the
Community's audiovisual policy was to safeguard both
national and European cultural identity (92). However, Mr
Jacques Delors, the Commission's President, speaking to the
European Parliament on March 12, 1985, gave the real
dimension of that policy: 'under the terms of the Treaty of
Rome, the EC does not have the means to improve a cultural
policy. It will, therefore, have to tackle the problems
from an economic point of view'. In the UK and Luxembourg,
little consideration was given to any cultural invasion by
foreign channels since they considered themselves the main
exporters. The British Conservative Government, it must be
said, was more open than it's Labour predecessor. It 'iou1d
also be quite contradictory to speak about information flow
when the Conservatives, with the Americans, were the major
proponents of the free flow of information and programmes
in Unesco. Nevertheless, allocating the two DBS channels to
the BBC in the first phase, and the regulations about
pornography, public taste and decency show that the
cultural impact was also considered. This was somewhat
contradictory to the Government's general policy about
programming flow, the minor incentives given to programme
production industries, or the 'light touch' of the IBA and
CA on DBS and cable TV, respectively.
In France, however, cultural considerations attracted more
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attention, partly because of the •active Minister of
Culture, Jack Lang. Another reason was the fear that France
would lag behind anglophone nations. The French were
obsessed with American cultural imperialism and the UK
'spoil system'. A Unesco meeting on the national culture of
France called for a crusade 'against financial and
intellectual imperialism, that no longer grabs territory,
or rarely, but grabs consciousness, ways of thinking, ways
of living' (in Tracey: 1988; 16-7). In 1988, the Péricard
Report noted that France's audiovisual presence outside
France was going to adopt a 'backseat role'; there was also
the feeling that it was quite difficult to confront the
enormous US and Anglo-saxon influence. France, regarding
itself as the guardian of European culture (this could be
seen in the accordance of the Directive to French TV
guidelines), also had to follow an expansionist policy in
this field. TV5 must be seen in this context (93).
Introducing new channels without the appropriate
preparations for new programming production showed a lack
of coherence. Although Canal Plus and Régie Francaise des
Espaces, the state production company, were entitled to
draw investments for productions or the call for sponsors
(Le Monde: 20 November 1985), the industry was reluctant
and remained dubious about the return of investment (94).
Both Ministries of Culture and Communication objected to
using cheap and popular programmes, which would be
commercially and politically profitable. They insisted on
general guidelines to defend national culture and foster
the expression of local culture. In 1985, however, when the
programming production situation became more visible, it
was obvious that the French programme-production industry
was much weaker than its British or German counterparts;
the re-run stock of ORTF (mainly black & white) and state
channels was only about 2000. Because cable audiences would
be small for the years to come, commercial motivation for
new productions would be low. This paucity was also due to
30 years of state monopoly and, within it, the oligopoly
enjoyed by a handful of producers.
According to Flichy (1980, 1983), the problem was not just
expanding the cultural industries to supply the home media
but that French programmes could slow down the erosion of
the French cultural position abroad. Bettrand (1985) notes
that if French producers geared themselves up for export,
they could take advantage of the spread of programming
demand for new media and possibly enter closed territories,
like the US. Or, as President Nitterrand himself declared,
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'cultural industries are the industries of the future...
investing in culture means investing in the economy'. Lol
82 and the HA also warned against underestimating the new
challenge on French culture and French economy by the
accelerated and global evolution of the communication
industry (Liberation: 28-29 April 1984; 2-4).
The above discussion indicates that while the programme
content of the media (old and new) was not given the first
consideration or priority in government development, the
message was not totally ignored. Both British, and
especially French, governments intended to grasp new media
development to benefit their home programme industries.
French programming quotas, particularly, must be seen in
this light, as well as the relation of C+ to support the
film industry. In France the last decisions of the
Socialist Administration indicated that both programming
and cultural policies were more to impress French voters
before the 1986 elections. However, France and its Culture
Minister, Jack Lang, affected the way the whole issue was
approached since it was realised that the whole attempt of
the security of quality of culture could not be solved by
France or any single European state alone. Once again it
followed the two-dimensional policy, national and European,
in order to preserve French culture and Europe's perhaps.
The latter, as shown in Part 2, was taken over by the
European Community but again through an economic rather
than cultural logic.
4.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The EC regarded the development of the new media as an
opportunity to restructure their already-mature industries
both in hardware equipment and software programme
production. The logic behind developing both cable and
satellite was in accordance with the industrial imperative.
The new services were seen either in Britain or France, or
even Luxembourg (as in the rest of the EC countries), as
somewhat similar to the steam engine - something that would
revolutionise economies and eventually lead to the
information society. In reality, they had to face
competition in both hardware and software from US and
Japanese products.
1. In France, the Socialist Government once again adopted a
paternalist policy in both hardware and software, whereas
the British Conservatives followed a rather market-led
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approach but with a paternalist attitude concerning the
programme content of the new media. France also linked its
satellite venture with the fortunes of its space policy,
whereas Britain appeared less interested in space policy.
2. Initially, the medium seemed to be considered more
important than the message. It was soon realised that both
were necessary to develop and establish the new media
services. Therefore, software was given as much
consideration as hardware. Besides, programming production
is considered an intense labour sector with great potential
for expansion and profit.
3. Programme producers and broadcasters in Europe,
traditionally having had only the state public broadcasters
as clients, now had the opportunity to sell their products
to more available buyers. But European fiction programming
was not enough to feed the existing and new channels.
4. A cooperative approach, either through coproductions or
common ventures through Eureka or Symphonie agreement on
hardware was implemented. The EC initiated this strategy.
The MAC disagreement, however, indicated how important the
nationalistic approach still was. The new fear of losing
the battle made Europeans follow a collaborative approach
and reassess their 'nationalistic' features.
5. Independent producers seemed to be the clear winners of
the new policies on broadcasting, not only in Britain but
in rest of the EC. Regardless of increased broadcast hours,
programme production has either remained stable or even
decreased. Thus, the fear is that unless the Europeans
start producing programmes, the new channels will be used
as new 'Hollywood windows'.
6. The 1981-86 period indicated that the message would not
only be equal to hardware - medium - but might be more
important since the new services needed more attractive
programmes to appeal to the 'viewer-consumer'. This also
indicated that more active policies would emerge in the
years to come on broadcasting, but more in terms of
production and less in terms of content.
7. Programming policy, however, could be applied in the
same way to both terrestrial and new media channels because
of the risks the new media faced in the first stage of
development. Therefore, 'lighter' regulations were
necessary. France, nevertheless, appeared to impose
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somewhat tougher regulations compared with its British
counterparts. Both C+ and C4 were seen to boost the film
industries in their respective countries. However, both
film industries remained in a state of decline. Both
Britain and France appeared to have similar high-quality
programmes with a strong public service element, as well as
increasing competition among terrestrial broadcasters. In
the UK, this competition led to a greater range of
programming at any time compared to France. The 1988 White
Paper, with 'quality' in the sub-title, refers to the
'quality of British Broadcasting' being 'safeguarded and
enhanced into the next century'. Unfortunately it does not
say how 'the quality of British broadcasting' is to
recognised and cannot therefore say how it is to sustained.
8. In cultural terms, regardless of France's protective
practices against a 'Coca-Cola culture', programming was
seen more as economic-industrial product than a cultural
one.
Lastly, the 1981-86 period demonstrated that new media
cannot be dissociated from their industrial, programming
and cultural dimensions. In other words, the new media once
again verified Tunstall's 1977 definition: that the media
are 'politics, business and technology'.
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PART FIVE: BACK TO THE FUTURE?
5.1 OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
The deregulatory mood in the l9SOs afiecteci the adopted
policies of the countries concerned in this project. While
Luxembourg had a minimalist policy on public service
guidelines, both British and French Governments felt that
they had to reshape some of them. The British Conservative
Government seemed to maintain a consistent policy where the
public service element was apparent, whereas its French
Socialist counterpart appeared to reduce this element. A
comparison of the operating conditions of C4 and C+ shows
the difference.
On the EC level, the Commission's proposals gave priority
to advertising, considering it one of the main revenues of
future television and setting out minimum codes for it.
Advertising was also treated as a basic revenue source by
France and the UK, since their new channels were
advertising-supported, whereas Luxembourg was one of the
leaders on the subject. The EC policy on advertising was
influenced by mercantile ideas and ignored the transitional
state of television. In doing so, the Commission pushed for
liberalising public monopoly. Moreover, the framework that
it had tried to set up was vague. Standards that were
unacceptably low for one member-state might prove too high
for another. In its policy, the Commission had adopted its
usual 'harmonisation' attitude, which was translated to a
straight compromise between opposing positions; a situation
fairly obvious on issues such as on copyright, right to
reply and protection of youth. Furthermore, in adopting a
method of self-discipline, the Commission forgot that it
was difficult to apply even general regulations to all
countries with the same strength. However, the EC policy
was similar to the one adopted in French television. Thus,
France was one of the members in accordance with the
Community's proposals for an audiovisual policy in Europe,
whereas the British and Luxembourg Governments appeared
reluctant since restrictions on both programmes and
advertising time opposed the market-led approach adopted in
those countries. However, the EC proposals aroused a big
debate within Europe that will probably continue for a
while. The Commission adopted 'middle-range', 'reactive-
policy', which called for 'humanisation' and 'coordination'
among the member-states. The Directive, in a more
programmatic approach, was only one of the 300 planned
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Directives; by 1988, only 100 had been approved by the
Council of Ministers.
In the UK, the Conservative Government had to strengthen
its position to 'roll back' the role of the state and
initiated a series of 'forceful battles' with societal and
broadcasting/media actors. The first result was a number of
ad hoc measures derived by ad hoc committees producing a
series of 60-page 'slim volumes'. These volumes recommended
changes in broadcasting and communication which would
overturn the existing order.
Ad hoc committees were also used to give an 'independent
judgement by reviewing current issues in policy areas'
(Marsh: 1987a) and to create a dialogue between the
interested parties. In an era of widespread confusion about
appropriate policy, the Conservative Government, with a
strong belief in liberal economics, elaborated a similar
policy on broadcasting. While the Conservative Government
did not achieve a coherent media policy (the UK had never
had a coherent media policy), it successfully put these
issues on the national political agenda. Most importantly,
the British Government might also believe that the
broadcasting system is cybernetic: any change in one aspect
of the system would produce responses elsewhere which, in
turn, will generate feedback and additional rounds of
readjustment. The Conservatives followed a step-by-step
policy towards a deregulated broadcasting system. Radical
questions, such as advertising on the BBC, received
negative or less optimistic answers from committees and
consultants, as well as ministers and markets.
In France, the Socialist Government was far more ambitious.
The declared overall aim was highly demanding. Cable and
satellite television were intimately linked to other
objectives, such as telecoms and space. Television policy
differed from that pursued by the previous government. The
Socialists appeared to adopt three closely interlinked
directions. First, to defend and reinforce the public
service, which was under pressure from private groups and
professional unions. Second, the belief in the new
technologies - cable, satellite and pay TV - made them try
to renew the audiovisual industry, thus engaging in the
ambitious programme of 'cabling France'. Third, the freedom
of communication clause in Article 1 of Loi 82, which said
that the communication was free, and their support of
radios libres. But most importantly, as Miege and Salaun
(l989;59) note, the Socialist Government, 'rather than
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trying to renovate the public sector or better still,
define new and more appropriate missions for the public
service, those responsible for modernisation tried.., to
develop an ambitious new media policy. On the basis of this
policy they were going to organise a different system of
networks in which the state kept for itself a driving role,
not only in the planning and financial support of the
networks but even in the preparation of the programmes'.
In Luxembourg, two slightly different governments had to
find ways to secure the comparative advantage in their
country as a location for international broadcasting;
thus, to secure the Grand Duchy's future in the satellite
age and to avoid depending on France again, as in the case
of CLT.
In the UK, the Conservatives' policy in both cable and
satellite was 'privatisation by default'. They believed
that cable and satellite would have some impact and would
eventually break up the duopoly governing the terrestrial
frequencies. A step in this direction seemed to be the
allocation of C+ to the IBA not to the OBA. Within this
framework, one could include the Hunt Report's
recommendations and the subsequent 1984 Cable and
Broadcasting Act. The process, therefore, was to open the
broadcasting system to more extensive private sector
competition. This can be seen in the CA's 'light touch' or
in the phrases for 'consumers' choice' rights, rather than
the defence of those social and cultural values emanated by
the public service concept. However, the relation between
the last two appeared to be the Conservative Government's
'fatal contradiction'. There was a consistent policy of
trying to help the traditional benefits related to public
service broadcasting with competition - liberalisation
which did not carry these elements. The policy towards
liberalising British broadcasting seemed to be the ultimate
goal. The first step appeared to be a policy towards
competition, driven by new technology. If C4 could be seen
as a preliminary stage, cable and DBS seemed to complete
the first step. The next step was against the vertical
duopoly, expressed in the campaign for advertising on BBC
and the Peacock Committee. The latter heralded a major
regulatory shake-up within the audiovisual sector. In these
expansionist steps, however, the traditional moves appeared
to be more successful - with the new effects (cable, DBS,
advertising on BBC) not working. This indicated that even
though the Conservative Government did not have a concrete
media policy, it had a definite target: deregulating the
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broadcasting sector.
In France, the Socialist Government's policy appeared more
coherent than incremental in the beginning. Cable and DBS
channels were to develop to assist the insufficient
terrestrial channels. DBS would help and feed cable
networks, also going to areas that would not have cable TV.
The whole audiovisual landscape was to be slow, step-by-
step, 'limited liberalisation', in which the state would
have a major say. Loi 82 and setting up the HA indicated
this. The legal framework created by the Act, regardless of
its complexity and confusion, allowed some space for
audiovisual liberalisation before it could become a de
facto situation, as in radio. This whole framework
indicated that the public initiatives were to be opened via
a mixed system to private capital - very common in France.
This policy, nevertheless, could not stop economic
liberalism forcing its way into audiovisual systems - what
the British Conservative Government was persistently
looking for.
New channels, inevitable or not, further confused the
situation. Whereas C+ seemed to be within the general
framework or a part of the new cable channels, the new
private channels indicated the opposite. This U-turn in
Socialist policy should be related to the strategic U-turn
of the Socialists towards a liberal economy, which was
transferred into the television field by favouring private
initiative. The Conservatives' increased power also
demonstrated the preference of the French people for
private initiative (e.g. conflict for écoles privées,
pressure for liberalising the market, etc.). Therefore, the
new channels had to fit in with this new conjecture. The
Socialists allocated them to political sympathisers. Apart
from this, the U-turn policy also indicated the Socialist's
switch from the new technologies thesis to a policy of
creating a private sector in the terrestrial audiovisual
domain. This was important because on one hand, it showed
that the state had lost some of its influence, and on the
other, the state was still maintaining a
influence on the PAF, now favouring private, rather than
public, entrepreneurs.
Compared to the British Conservatives, the French appeared
less persistent in their goals, more volatile to the
political conjuncture. Thus, developing regulatory policies
for television and the new media would reflect something of
the heritage of traditional attitudes and practices in
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broadcasting. The 1980s showed a reversal, with the
traditionally ad hoc British Conservatives being persistent
and the traditionally 'plan-seeking' French being volatile.
Dyson and Huniphreys (1988a;98-9) put this in terms of the
difference between 'tradition' and 'modernity', and between
restraint and promotion. Deregulation could be expected to
embody a complex mix of the old and the new in both
ideological and practical terms. Besides, as noted in Part
2, the rhetoric that the French state was a coherent unit
was largely untrue. Deregulation also made both governments
realise that the real revolution was to be on the
terrestrial frequencies, rather than on new media, and that
deregulation generated interventionist responses from the
state to balance inefficiencies. This is equally important
because, in contrast to the 1970s and early l980s, since
the mid-1980s, French and British broadcasters are
witnessing fundamental changes in their sector.
In Luxembourg, the government had traditionally been a
less-decisive actor. The CLT, pioneer of international
broadcasting, was dominated by French and Belgian
shareholders. The government also could not upset CLT since
it was one of the Grand Duchy's major tax-payers. The
principal actor, who lost power within the company in the
1980s, was France. Now other shareholders started imposing
a different policy, upsetting the French government. This
situation politically coloured the company. Within this
picture, the Luxembourg governments played the role of
observer, despite trying to influence the company. As a
result, in 1986, CLT appeared to be seriously lagging
behind in the race to seize a share of the European
television market. This situation developed mainly because
of France which, having lost control of CLT, consistently
outmanoeuvred the company with the extreme causes of La 5
and TDF1. In Luxembourg, there was too large a gap between
the international strategy and the requirements of a decent
national media policy. Luxembourg's anxiety to be 'in
touch' with international developments could not fit in
with a national policy. What was worse, the country with a
specialisation in international broadcasting appeared to be
losing its important comparative advantage in the
broadcasting world.
Creating Channel 4 gave the British government strength; a
channel for minority and cultural tastes with relative
success. C4 represented, perhaps, a reinterpretation of
psb. Although the Conservatives did not follow the Annan
recommendations, they gave the British public a very
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progressive channel, as opposed to C+, through which the
French Socialists gave their public popular taste, far from
psb prescriptions. The decision to put C4 under the IBA's
ownership was quite realistic, whereas the French
Socialists could not afford to lose control of their
majority stake. The new private channels, La 5 and TV6,
were to be, 'by default' (especially La 5), for public
taste.
During the same period, both British and French television
had morning and daytime programmes, preparing themselves
for 24-hour TV. Within this environment, the traditional
stations realised that they had to develop new strategies
for potential competition from the newcomers. In France,
the programmes became highly competitive but decreased in
quality.
The British government realised that the one-way attack
against the BBC would not alone create considerable
problems to the duopoly. Its first target was the IBA/ITV
system. In France, the situation was different. Whereas the
British were trying to break up the duopoly, the French
were building one. Having the French Conservatives in
office further deregulated television. Cable and DBS in
both countries were a failure. Moreover, cable plans in
both countries reflected the centralist political systems
in either nation, regardless of rhetoric to the contrary.
Despite the stress, especially in France, on local systems,
the central elements were powerfully present. The UK was
the only country in Europe, apart from Luxembourg, to
insist that the entire capital cost of laying down cable
systems be paid by the sellers and producers of the
productions. But the UK was not tiny Luxembourg, and the
financial incentives given in the start (tax allowances)
were cut later. Therefore, private investors proved
reluctant to invest money in such a high-risk business with
low take-up rates. In France, the state was to lay down and
invest the main bulk of money for cabling the country.
In both countries, the years of euphoria (1982-84) were
replaced by years of scepticism and depression. The
government plans, either based on the belief in
entertainment-led services (UK) or technology-led services
(France), were proved unrealistic. While the state was too
bureaucratic and incoherent, the private sector could not
afford the high risk of such ventures.
The British government was also unrealistic over Unisat
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whereas the French appeared undecided over their own TDF1
project. The British Government, like the French, insisted
on a British technology system, but without public subsidy,
whereas the French would heavily invest in the TDF].
project. Insisting on a British system, which was much more
expensive than its competitor and funded entirely by
private money without any public subsidy, caused the
project to collapse. It was clearly a policy where reality
conflicted with the ideal. In the second round, the
Government seemed to have learnt its lesson and asked for
fewer obligations and gave very general guidelines; again,
it expected the market to support the whole venture.
In France, the situation was equally strange. The whole
period was characterised by hesitations and uncertainties.
But the problems with cable development made the Government
go ahead with DBS as well. The 1984 Théry Report,
characterising high-powered satellites as obsolete
technology in relation to technical as well as financial
problems on TDF1, made the Government less enthusiastic
about DBS again. However, this could not cause them to
reject the project since it was tied in with industrial, as
well as international political, considerations. France was
a leading space nation in Europe and had to preserve its
position. Satellites are proven lucrative markets,
especially in terms of consumer electronics. Thus, the
Government had, at least rhetorically, to continue a policy
for DBS. This policy was again to be directed by the state,
as in all major French projects. Because of the enormous
risk, the Government preferred to continue collaborating
with West Germany, a strong space nation, to share the
risks. The Socialist Government appeared to leave the final
decision over TDF1's fortunes, and thus the costs and
benefits in political terms, to its successor, the Chirac
government.
In Luxembourg, after the abandonment of the LuxSat project,
the Werner and Santer governments decided that a Luxembourg
satellite should still be the goal. Behind the main
objective to secure the Grand Duchy's future on the
satellite age, and avoid the French influence, the hope was
to attract foreign investors for the satellite project.
Both governments followed a strict liberal policy, similar
to those on terrestrial and cable television. Following
this, both governments adopted an international
expansionist strategy, but Luxembourg did not have the
means to influence such a strategy. Both Luxembourg's
'satellite rounds' faced the reactions of Eutelsat and
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France and, to a lesser extent, West Germany. The Coronet
project was accused of being a Coca-Cola satellite, whereas
its successor, Astra, consistently attempted to maintain a
strict European character. It was also accused by Eutelsat
and France of being a 'US Trojan Horse' to European
technology because of their choice to use a US-made
satellite. For Eutelsat, moreover, both projects were seen
as first attempts to break up its monopoly as a carrier of
European telecommunications. The previous Intelsat example
made Eutelsat a strong opponent to Luxembourg's satellite
project. Luxembourg's case, however, did not answer the
question of whether small countries that 'wait-and-see' in
the new media gamble (in their effort to 'harmonise' with
their larger neighbours) are, by definition, condemned to
later entry into the new media business.
The external pressures were mostly coordinated with the
internal ones. The Coronet project not only faced European
hostility, but also had to face the home reaction of CLT
and the Socialist Party's opposition. Thus, the whole
project involved long discussions within the government.
The Santer government, which considered Coronet an 'ill-
conceived idea', transformed the project: a new company,
SES, based on Coronet's plans, would have European-origin
shareholders, mostly banks. The main difference was that
the government would be more active by guaranteeing the
finance debt the company had. It adopted a liberal policy
towards the market. SES' progress by 1986 was relatively
insignificant because of similar problems faced by the
Coronet project. But in early 1987, BT's backing, the
compromise with Eutelsat and Murdoch's commitment for four
channels in 1988 gave the impression that Astra could
become Europe's 'hot bird'.
Putting the three projects together, one sees that they had
two rounds. Luxembourg, moreover, appears to lead the way
for an entrepreneurial approach to satellite TV since BSB
and TDF1 followed its example.
Cable and satellite television development was strongly
linked with the industrial imperative in Europe for
restructuring a mature industry and economy, •giving
European hardware and programmes products a comparative
advantage in the international markets. This blurred the
boundaries of broadcasting and industrial policy - a
situation similar to the beginning of television in the
1920s. Television in the l980s was especially seen as a
means of achieving industrial goals in the production of
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satellites, cable switches, consumer electronics and the
like. The fear of competition, especially from Japan and
the US, made them, as well as the Community, give priority
to the hardware aspect of television, isolating it from
programmes and viewers. Decision-makers, however, realised
that programmes were not only important for feeding the new
channels, but also that the programme industry was rapidly
expanding with a huge potential growth.
For the whole EC, the industrial imperative took priority
in decision-making. The Community, with its programmes,
ESPRIT, EUREKA, FAST, RACE, and its policy on programming,
tried to stimulate European production. For France, cable
and satellite meant space competence, the information
society and international competitiveness. For the UK, the
aims were similar, but with a preference for the
international audiovisual market. Luxembourg wanted to
restructure its economy from its declining steel industry
by making the Grand Duchy an advanced European centre of
programming production.
In all three countries, the viewer was seen as king, but
with no control over his kingdom. He was regarded as a
'consumer', but in both countries at least initially, his
demands were barely considered. The policy of quotas in
programming imports appeared to work in the short term, but
it was doubtful for the longer term. The policy adopted,
mainly by the Community, France and the UK, on independent
production appeared to be more appropriate. Europe's
'fiction famine', however, gave the impression that it
would further strengthen US products in European and
international markets.
Media moguls, notably press tycoons, had steadily sought to
occupy a place in the new media developments. Since their
sector experienced a relatively slow growth rate,
confronted with potential erosion of their share of the
information market, they tried to diversify their interests
in the broadcasting sector by affiliating themselves with
political parties. In both countries, boundaries between
broadcasting and publishing sectors were eroded, indicating
that broadcasting policy and politics were losing their
traditional autonomy. On the other hand, British television
constantly pursued balance across programme scheduling,
with a heavy public service element and a wide range of
programmes - wider than those of French TV. Both had to
discover new forms of popular culture; comedy and drama
were not good enough, for example. Introducing
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interdependent production might inject 'fresh blood',
especially in to the British TV duopoly.
Nevertheless, British TV productions were in good shape in
international terms; the British Government proved somewhat
reluctant to follow the Europeans in a European production
team, quite opposite to France, which saw itself as the
guarantor of European culture. The British believed that
the English language alone would open the doors for British
production. However, British output did not excite viewers
around the world. English-language programmes could (and
can) be easily made in other countries. Coproductions
between Europeans appeared to be a good solution. The key
role of UK-based programmes in Europe was in the new media
industry as a whole. Sky and Super Channel have led the way
in terms of European audiences, whereas TV5 has adopted a
policy of being a 'cultural window' for French programmes.
In cultural terms, France seemed more sensitive than both
the UK and Luxembourg, since the latter had adopted the
role of programme exporters.
British policy was a familiar market-led approach with a
will to restructure the duopoly through more competition
and the public service element. In France, the policy of
'controlled liberalisation' was transformed into a policy
of 'competitive liberalisation', mainly because of
political speculations rather than an initial formulated
policy. The Government did set the basis for new media
development. These plans could therefore be paralleled to
de Gaulle's policies in the 1960s.
The lack of a clear policy in relation to the difficulty of
implementing adopted policies made things worse. Both the
British Conservative and French Socialist Governments
failed to appreciate the limitations inherent in the
complexity of public policy-making. The lack of experience
on the French side was to some extent understandable, since
most of its Cabinet Ministers held office for the first
time. In both countries, there were many actors involved at
the various levels. With such a proliferation of actors
pursuing differing and conflicting goals, there was an
acute problem with coherence and coordination, compounded
by the divisions between and among the major decision-
makers, who attempted to iriaximise their own narrow,
sectional interests. With such an extensive, fragmented,
divided state machine, the policy was inevitably 'éclatée'
(splintered).
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Broadcasting in France and Britain was largely fashioned by
a close relationship to the political system. While the BBC
declined as a purely impartial institution, French PAF once
again became a politicised environment. Both governments
rapidly lost their enthusiasm for new media. The outcome
was a picture of confusion, unpreparedness and
incompleteness.
5.2 SOME LESSONS FOR A FUTURE BROADCASTING POLICY
It seems to be extremely difficult to draw lessons from the
past because things are changing so fast. However, since
situations appear similar to present situations, some
general lessons could be useful:
1. Policy-makers should better understand technology and
its potential capacities and limitations. The past over-
emphasis of technology, such as cable and satellite,
created false impressions which led to over-ambitious
decisions and a failure to appreciate the impact of the new
television services.
2. It is true that technology is forcing a certain kind of
European media unity, but this does not mean that national
policy-makers and regulators have lost control of drawing
the policy on their broadcasting field. In the late 1980s,
nevertheless, they need to take external pressures and the
environment - especially within the EC - into account.
3. A proliferation of actors involved in the new media has
led to conflicts among them when they attempt to maximise
their own narrow, sectional interests. This leads to an
acute problem of imposing coherence and coordination,
curtailing the policy's effectiveness. Thus, it is
necessary to have a single coordinator, not those various
interministerial bodies, as experienced in France. The
single coordinator would undoubtedly ensure cooperation
between top policy-makers or ministerial bodies and would
facilitate a degree of coordination. This single
coordinator, however, must have the power to impose
penalties on, as well as limit responsibilities of, non-
efficient members. Despite some inconsistencies, inherent
in the complexity of public policy-making, this could help
us implement the policy adopted by the decision-makers.
4. When dealing with such a rapidly changing technology,
some inconsistencies are inevitable in the decision-making.
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Moreover, when the state is squeezed by conflicting social,
financial and technological requirements, policy-makers
must be flexible in their decisions and readjust by slowing
down or accelerating their policies.
5. It has been said many times that deregulation is a
matter of policy-making and the economic needs of a
society. Deregulation also leads to further politicisation
of broadcasting policy since new rules come to replace old.
Some actors do not feel comfortable with the new
environment and react in various ways. Consequently,
ideology is always present.
6. Simultaneous development of cable and satellite, and
readjustment of over-the-air television seems unrealistic.
It is necessary to prioritise and, most importantly,
divided, these services. For example, cable TV could serve
the cities and DBS the country, whereas over-the-air
television could either be on a local or national level,
with more of a psb element than the other two. By doing
this, DBS and cable would complement, rather than rival,
each other.
7. The new television landscape must also lead public
service broadcasters to collaborate with the state to find
new ways of reinterprenting the future of public service
broadcasting. Channel 4 seems to show the way.
8. Initially, cable and satellite television's development
needs the involvement or commitment of the state, but
without extremes. An extreme state-led or market-led policy
does not seem appropriate. Private involvement and
investment under the state's guarantee seems more
reasonable. Luxembourg's Santer government's approach to
Astra could be a model, with some adjustments regarding the
state's role and influence. The government is, and will be,
the most important actor influencing the development of the
infrastructure, even if it aims to reduce its long-term
influence. The state action not only acts through its
regulatory decisions, but also through fiscal,
environmental and competition policies.
9. Decision-makers must start seeking different
regulations for a new competitive audiovisual environment
before the de facto imposition of cable and satellite
television on the audiovisual landscape.
10. A competitive audiovisual infrastructure and
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environment, including privatisation of existing or new
channels, should be seen under a wider social perspective.
This may assist policy-makers to achieve the social
objectives historically pursued by media policy in Europe.
Replacing 'viewer' with 'consumer' signifies not only the
lack of social policy on television but also the
Americanisation of the European television pattern. Beyond
the smoke screen of technorazzaxnatazz, new media
technologies do not make money unless they bring
perceivable and understandable benefits to the consumer.
Moreover, new systems that offer greater consumer benefits
will falter if their added value is not exploited and they
only provide what is already available.
11. Programmes are products that carry a cultural element
as well. The new commercial approach has all but wiped out
the traditional forms of genuine television, such as
dramatic plays and, especially, arts features. In the end,
the culture of a single country could be undermined. Thus,
policy-makers should put down some cultural requirements
for the new products to show Europe's cultural diversity.
12. Regulations on cable and satellite channels appear
extreme since these channels could be encrypted. On the
contrary, the 'must carry' public services channel rules
seem justified if government's plan is to replace the
conventional dish on the roofs of houses in the cities with
cables.
13. Hardware equipment and programmes appear to be equally
important. Therefore, policy-makers have to consider both
equally in new media development. The EC and individual
countries have to protect these sectors since they seem to
be industries with huge growth in the future. Cases like
the MAC debate are too nationalist at the EC level; a true
compromise should already have been found. Japan, Europe's
main competitor in hardware, may provide a lesson, although
it is humble enough to learn from its mistakes and make
courageous corrections without caring about loss of face.
It would be unacceptable if the MAC case led to another
disaster similar to Philips' VCR 2000.
14. The programme industry needs to be protected by short-
and long-term policies. In the short term, the adopted
import quotas help it to stand up, whereas in the longer
term, co-productions between Europeans and the increase of
independent production look to be more appropriate.
Moreover, both the EC and governments must give more
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incentives, and even subsidise programme production, since
the increase of broadcasting hours is not being matched by
increased original production.
15. European communications are becoming the theatre of
deregulatory trends affected by the US and are in a
transitional stage. If Europe is going to have its own say
in this domain, it is necessary for the policies derived
from the EC to have greater status. The EC, as coordinator
and harmoniser between different regimes, creates a new,
collective regime. This has better status and gives a
European character to the 'foggy European audiovisual
landscape'. The EC, therefore, has become too important to
be excluded by national governments; individual members
must now consider the EC factor more than before.
5.3 TOWARDS THE FUTURE: A POST SCRIPT
Many reports in the early 1980s imagined a new world of
television through cable and satellite channels. Although
their impact was initially disappointing, Europe realised
that a 'wind of change' was approaching. The audiovisual
industry also realised that politics and state action were
very influential actors in the development of that
situation, i.e. the transition of the European television
landscape, and it tried to influence this state action for
its own benefit.
Now in the late 1980s, very little seems to have been
developed, especially in the fields of the new media. This
project's main argument is that state action and the
broadcasting sector are influenced by both internal demands
and external pressures and influences. The political
agendas were covered by issues such as channel
proliferation, deregulatory trends, competition and
industrial restructuring. However, these issues were also,
as it was shown, within an international context. Before
1992, the year of the Single Market, one observes a second
wave of optimism for the new media, similar to that in the
early 1980s. The difference now is the lesson learned: that
technology cannot lead to the envisioned 'information
society' without constant state support and private
backing.
In the early 1980s, pressure groups were asking for public
monopolies to be abolished or the television structure to
be deregulated. In the late 1980s, we realise that
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television is too important to be left entirely to market
forces. Full-range competition would, without any
regulation, treat the viewer as consumer, leaving
television in advertisers' hands. Some regulation must be
maintained. Italy has shown what might otherwise happen.
This reshaping of television may lead service broadcasters
to be more aggressive and commercial to compete in the new
environment, eventually leading to a commercial system
similar to that in the US, where the public service element
attracts a small audience. It seems that imposing new
channels, mainly by satellite transmission, will further
internationalise the character of television in terms of
audience and programmes. In Europe, in particular, for the
next decade, the programmers will be trying to find
formulae with a European flavour for an audience that will
be European, rather than national.
The audiovisual market seems to be a major growth industry
of the next decade for both hardware and programmes. It is
certain that European co-productions and independent
productions will increase. This may lead to further
integration of the media, especially in methods of film
productions and television programme-making since film
production will be in the service of television, and
television with HDTV sets will be somewhat like a cinema
screen. The lack of programmes to feed the new satellite
and terrestrial channels may lead them initially to buy
cheap US programmes. This means that there will always be a
market for American series in European countries; this
market could be expected to grow with the number of
channels available.
On the European level, the EC may become more important in
media matters. Although some disagree with this, the EC,
because of its powers, is the only body which can cover the
complete lack of media policy in Europe. The Europeanism
which comes with the EC's policy, or even with that of the
C0E, and the potential of television channels, will lead to
further European entrepreneurship in media and television,
driven by media moguls and multimedia consortia.
For Luxembourg, the lack of comparative advantage in terms
of international broadcasting could be replaced by a lead
in transborder technologies. It could, via microwaves, feed
Belgium or West German cable operators. A future fibre-
optic cable network in Luxembourg, in relation to satellite
communications, could make the Grand Duchy the centre for
telecommunications and video conferencing again. If Astra
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goes well, it looks as if Luxembourg's new target is to
make the Grand Duchy a centre for European production by
following a familiar policy based on tax incentives.
One could say that the structure of British broadcasting is
being radically reshaped, whereas in France the audiovisual
landscape seems to be in a constant state of change,
depending who is in power. The second Mitterrand
Administration will certainly change some of the choices
followed by the Chirac government, which also changed the
Socialist Government's laws. Although France has entered
the modern age of audiovisual technology, it seems to
undergo continuous broadcasting reforms until a balance is
struck. Although the deregulation of French broadcasting
was launched by the Socialists, the pace of reform was
dramatically accelerated by the Conservative Chirac
government.
The result has been fierce competition between the
channels, resulting in decreased quality of general
programme output. The new Socialist government seems
certain to clear up the 'audiovisual fog'. CNCL has been
replaced by a new body, the Conseil Superieur de
l'Audiovisuel, similar to the HA. While TF1 and A2 will be
the dominant channels, the rest will compete for the
margins of the viewership. La 5 could also enter as a third
big channel, whereas the other three have already accepted
the role of small or minority channels. In the longer term,
it seems that the public channels will either carry less
advertising or none at all. The former seems more likely
because of the pressure of the other channels competing for
advertising revenue whereas public channels are also
supported by public funds (taxes).
Satellite TV needs to reassess its position alongside
national commercial channels. Should it be a competitor or
a complementary service? It looks as if TDF1 will initally
carry Canal Plus and the cultural La Sept. It will also
have to compete with Astra, but to a lesser extent than BSB
since Astra will transmit predominantly English-speaking
channels.
French production is less confident than its British
counterpart. It seems likely that the new government, and
every government, will emphasise the cultural industry,
since the French feel that they have been 'invaded' by
American and Anglo-Saxon programmes. The European project,
'Eureka audiovisual', proposed by Francois Mitterrand
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within the EC, shows that culture will be a policy
priority.
The UK's 1988 White Paper seems to describe British
broadcasting's future. Britain is likely to be the first
country, if we believe the media pundits, to witness a
contest among satellite channels, i.e. Sky and the rest
from Astra and BSB's channels. But the question remains the
same: is the market strong enough to support all these
channels? Moreover, regardless of the very general
provisions of the White Paper, cable seems to have a future
due to the incompatibility of satellites transmitting to
the UK. It will be very interesting to see whether the
Broadcasting Bill, based on the 1988 White Paper's
proposals, will have to be redrafted if it does not agree
with the final-final version, of the EC Directive.
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TABLE 1: TECHNOLOGY
MERGING OF	 TECHNOLOGY
	
BLURRING OF
DEREGULATION ------>	 INNOVATION ------> INDUSTRIAL ----I
TECHNOLOGY
	 BOUNDARIES
TABLE 2	 THE PROGRAMME COMMISSIONING PROCESS FOR CHANNEL FOUR
-	 DeveLopment
-	 Ideas submitted to commisisoning editors
-	 Commissioning editors acknowledge
-	 Commissioning editors evaluate ideas 	 and costs	 with proposer
and programme cost controLLer
-	 Proposer notified of programme status
-	 Recomended projects submitted to commissioning meeting
-	 Idea	 accepted:	 commisioning	 from	 signed	 and	 programme
acquisition executive assigned
-	
Proposer notified(no commitment) and precontact memo set 	 out
-	 Commence negotiations
- InternaL deaL memo compLeted for programme finance 	 consideration
-	
DeaL Letter issued by Programme Acquisition(C4 now committed)
-	 Contract issued and signed
-	 Production started
-	 Monitoring	 of	 editorial,	 financial,	 contractual	 and	 IBA
requi rements
-	 Production completed
-	 TV TIMES bitting drafted
-	 Programme manager notified of comptetition
-	
Outstanding materials deLivered and acknowledged
-	 Material processed and viewed
-	 Presentation prepare for transmission
-	 Programme transmitted
-	 Audience figures asserted
-	 Programme distributed
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TABLE 3	 CHANNEL FOUR TELEVISION
Income form the	 IBA and programme payments	 to	 the	 Independent
elevision companies and independent producers. The net advertising
revenue obtatined by the ITV companies for advertising on C4 in the
year to march 31, 1985 was £75,2 million.
Wet advertising revenue on ITV(ecxluding TV-am, C4 and S4C) in the
same year was £826,4 milLion. The subscription of £111 million paid
on C4 therefore represented 12,3% of total ITV and CS advertising
revenue for the same year.
Year ended March 1985
Subcr ipt ion
	
Programme Payments
received by
	
by C4
the IBA
£mi It ion
	
£mi It ion
Ang Ii a
Border
Central
Channel
Crampi an
C ranada
HTV
LWT
Scottish
Television South
Television South-West
Thames
Tyne- Tees
Ulster
Yorkshire
I TN
	
8,1
	
1,2
	
0,1
	
0,3
	
18,0
	
1.7
	
0,5
	
0,2
	
18,9
	
3,5
	
8,7
	
0,8
	
15,7
	
5,3
	
7,2
	
0,8
	
15,1
	
1,2
	
2,1
	
0,1
	
22,8
	
5,3
	
8,0
	
3,3
0,2
13,6	 3,1
-	 8,0
total 139,0
Less amount paid by the IBA to S4C Channel Authority
(28,0)
Subcription received by C4 and programme payment
made to ITV companie	 (111,0)
---------------Source: IBA\Channel Four 1985
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TABLE 4: THE MAIM PEACOCK RECOMMENDATIONS
1. ALL new television sets sold or rented in the UK market should be
required	 form the eraliest convenient date, 	 and not	 later than
January 1, 1988, to have a peritelevision socket and associated
equipment which will interface with a decoder to deal with enctrypted
signals.
2. BBC television should not obliged to finance its operations by
advertising white the present organisatiOn and reguattion of
broadcasting remains in being
3. The licence fee should be indexed on an annual basis to the
general rate of inflation
4. The BBC and liv should be required over a ten year period to
increase to no less than 40X the production of programmes supplied by
independent producers
5. Non-occupied night-time	 hours (1:00am to 6:00am) of the BBC and
ITV TV wavwlengyts should be sold 	 for broadcasting purposes
6. Franchise contracts for ITV contractors should be put to
competitive tender. Should the IBA decide to award a franchise to a
contractor other thanthe one making the higest bid it should be
required to make a full, public and detailed statement of its reasons
11. Franchises should be awarded on a rolling review basis. There
would be a formal annual review of the contractor's periods, perhaps
to 10 years
12. Consideration should be given the option of setting up its own
advertising time and would than no Longer befocused by a subcription
fron ITV companies
13. C4 should be given the option of selling its own advertising
time and would then no longer be funded by a subscription from IIV
comapn i es
15. DBS franchises shoud be put to competitive tender
16. National telecommunications systems(eg 81, Mercury and
subsequent entrants) should be permitted to act as common carriers
with a view to the provision of a full range of services, including a
delivery of television programmes
16.	 The restriction of cable franchises to EEC-owned operators
should be operated
17. All restriction for both pay-per-channel and pey-per-prOgramme
should be removed, not only for cable but also for terrestialo and
PBS operation
18. As regulations are phased out the normal	 laws of the land
relating	 to obesnity,	 defamation,	 blasphemy,	 seduction and other
similar matters	 should be expected to cover the broadcasting media
and any present exemptions should be renewed
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TABLE 5: PEACOCK COMMITTEE-BEFORE
1951	 THE BEVERZOGE COMMITTEE
recommended that the BBC's monopoLy continue
1962	 THE PILKINGTON COMMITTEE
came out strongly against pay-as-you-view, and in support
of the Licence fee as the BBC's soLe source of revenue
1977	 THE ANNAN COMMITTEE
..calted for a fourth channeL to challenge the BSC-JTV
duopoly in the interests of the bradcasting diversity
TABLE 6:	 THE PEACOCK COMMITTEE'S PLAN
1. sateLlite and cable devetop,but most viewres	 indixetion of
Listeners continue, to reLy on BBC and ITV 	 BBC licence
and ILR
	 fee
2. proLiferation of broadcasting systems, 	 I subcription
channels and payment methods 	 I replaces main
part of
Licence fee
3. idefinitive number of PPV channels or Pay-Tv I
	
multiplicity
channels available, technology reduces costs	 of choice
of muLtipLicity of outLets and changing	 I	 Leading to
systems	 fuLl market
a public service provision will continue throu g h all three stages
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TABLE 7:BROADCASTINC STRUCTURE IN FRANCE UNDER THE SOCIALISTS
HAUTE AIJTORITE
CONSEIL NATIONAL	 SPF
Societe de Commer-
TDF	 INA	 ciaisation
SW de Radio ----------s.N de Radio et TV Outre Her -----SN-FR3
S.N de Radio pour L' EtraNger
S.NSociete Nationate
Source: TF1, Documentation Française, Paris 1984
TABLE 8:	 TDF	 OBLIGATORY	 SPENDING	 OF	 THE	 THREE
STATE CHANNELS IN 1986
------FF500* ------TF1 -----FF600M+--
TDF------------------FF500* -------A2 ------FF600+ -------SPF
I -----FF5OO -------FR3 -----FF45+--- I
*transmjssjon fees
+fees for ob'igatory programme purchases
Source: Secretary of State Communications, 1986
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TABLE 9:	 COMPAGNIE	 LUXEMBOURGOISE DE TELEDIFFUS!ON
S ha r eh o I de rs
Audiofina	 54%	 Group Lambert-BruxelteS	 38%
Havas	 16%
Information et Publicite	 14%
ELectrafina	 15%
Schtumberger	 12.6%
Paribas
Hachette(mow Moet-Henessy
	
8.2%
Edmond de RothschiLd and others 7.7%
TeLevision
g IL TV
Rh	 plus in assocuiatjon with Bertlesman
Programming
DIC cartoons(80% equity)
Tele Union Monte Car[o(50%)
Tele Union Paris (50%)
Hamster Productions (51%)
Pandora(100%)
ConsoL idated Product ion(UK)
Ci riema
Stand d' Art (100%)-productions
Studios BiLL iankourt(43%)
GaumOnt( 11,5%)
Video International(50%)
CofiLoisirs(10%) financing of cinema
Video
Ru	 production (100%)
VCI (96%) dubbing
VTF (94%) video broadcast production
Press
TeLestar (100%)
daily Le Bien Public (42%)
Actuet (15%)
Comapgnie Europeene de Publications (9.5%)
Publications and other
RTL Editions (95%)- books
Radio Music	 International	 (100%)	 and Radio	 Music	 France	 (lOOh)-
records
Information-Publicite (5%) advertIsing
Source: Guide des Medias 1984
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TABLE 10: TELEVISION PROGRAMME IMPORTS IN EUROPE. MARCH 1987
NB:	 In percentage of total	 fiction (all	 programmes except news,
current affairs, sport, etc.) programmes aired unless indicated.
COUNTRY/BROADCASTER	 % IMPORTS FROM EC	 %FROM US	 DATE
BE! GlUM
RTBF	 51.3	 48.7	 1986
DENMARK	 alt progr:	 21.6	 11.3	 1985
DR	 fiction	 35.5	 58,6	 1986
F RAN CE
TF1	 1.7	 44.1	 1985
A2	 4.0	 29.3	 1985
FR3	 6.8	 30.9	 1985
GERMANY FR
ARD	 films shown:	 14.3	 37.1	 1986
ZDF	 33.8	 36.1	 1985
SAIl	 films shown:	 31.5	 48.1	 1986
ITALY
RAI	 27.6	 57.4	 1986
Reteitatia	 +60.0	 1986
LUXEMBOURG
RTL-TVI	 45.0	 55.O**	 1986
RIL PLUS	 films shown:	 68.0	 9.3	 1986
NETHERLANDS
NOS	 30.0	 56.0	 1986
SPA! N
RTVE	 27.2	 48.0	 1986
TV3 Catalan	 all grogr:	 11.7	 20.1	 1986
UNITED KINGDOM
BBC1	 films & series:	 4.0	 24.0	 1986
BBC2	 5.0	 9.0	 1986
ITV	 5.8	 13.8	 1986
Channel four
	
5.0	 12.0	 1987
Sky Channel	 5.8**	 35.6	 1986
** figures considered unreliable
Sources:
BELGIUM & LUXEMBOURG: Commission Consultative de Ia Communaute
Française de Belgique
DENMARK: Denmark Radio, direct
FRANCE: Commission Nationale de Ia cjnematgraphie
GERMANY FR: ARD Jahrbuch 1987; ZDF Jajrbuch 1987;
Media	 Perspectiven (August 1986)
ITALY: Variety 22 September 1986 and 6 May 1987
RAI, direct
NETHERLANDS: NOS, direct
SPAIN: RTVE, direct; RTVE Annuario 1987
UNITED KINGDOM: BBC; IBA; ITVA; c4 all direct
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The changes in programming practices
Table' 1
 . Increase in broadcast hours and change in the
volume of national drama production on some
European television channels, 1975-1985
Television	 Qiange in broadcast
	 Change in drama
channel	 how'	 production
Austria
Belgisim
France*
FRG
Iti1y
Spain
United King-
doin
* peiiod 1980-1985.
OP.F
RTBF
TF1
A2
FP3
ZDF
LI1
PAl 2
RTVE
BBC
rrv
+ 17.7%
+ 39.4%
+22.4%
+20.6%
+26.7%
+ 28%
+ 29%
+25%
+ 150%
+ 14%
+ 3%
na
—80%
- 24.8%
0
+ 17.8%
- 4%
—50%
—77%
—50%
0
0
Sources R. Chaniac, "Evolution de la production de fiction tivisudile en Europe"
Dossie, de l'cuidiovisuel, INA/La Documentation francaise, Paris, Februaiy 1987;
L'Europe desprogrcrznmes, INAJLa Documentation &ançais Paris, Mai-June 1987;
P. Florenson, M. Brugière & D. Martinet Doue a'is de tElé .ision 1974-1986,
CNCLILa Documentation francaLse, Paris, 1987; On vous raconte des hiscoirej,
SACD, Bruxelles, 1986; compilation ElM.
From the ElM 1987
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'lAULE 12: rNvESTMEN1 BY rELEvisroN clIArJNI;I.s IN
NATIONAL fILM PRODUCTrON TN 1Y88 ($ US)
Country	 Channel	 Co-prod.	 Broadcast	 Contrib.	 Technica	 Total
	
Co-finance	 Rights'.	 to funds	 support
Austria	 ORF	 1,600,000	 1,600,000
Belgium	 RTBF	 250,000	 80,000*	 500000	 830,000
Denmark	 DR	 1,000,000	 1,000,000
Finland	 YLE	 750,000	 750,000
MIV	 80,000*	 80,000
France	 TF1	 6,200,000	 9,300,000	 15,500,000
A2	 5,100,000	 5,100,000	 10,200,000
FR3	 5,200,000	 5,700,000	 10,900,000
La5	 3,400,000	 4,550,000	 7,950,000
La7	 2,450,000	 750,000	 3,200,000
Canal+	 32,200,000	 32,200,000
W. Germany ARD	 6,700,000	 2,100,000	 8,800,000
ZDF	 6,700,000	 2,100,000	 8,800,000
Greece	 ERT	 1,000,000*	 i,000,000:
Italy	 RAt	 320O0,000	 32,000,000
Rete.	 40,000,000	 40,000,000
Netherlands NOS	 3,800,000	 3,800,000
Norway	 NRK	 1,500,000	 1,500,000
Spain	 RTVE	 22,000,000	 4 , 500 ,000*	 26,500,000
Sweden	 SVT	 1,100,000	 .1,100,000
Switzerland	 SSR	 3,750,000	 450,000	 4,200,000
UK	 Ch 4	 18,000,000	 550,000	 18,550,000
ITV	 30,000,000	 30,000,000
Sorcc. TV channels, national film tuniis, producers associations, CNC, LOU 	 • Iliune which can bu ansussod separably *estin%ale
SOURCE: TELEVISION BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, JULY/AUGUST 10B9
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Table 13 . Share ofprogrammiiig devoted to productions
commissioned or bought froiu independent producers
in 1985
(in	 (1I1/.)/(fl,'11/flh)k'.	 Jul !/jU.( 1Ii)iI
B.tgiu zii	 II]F	 IL
___________________ 	 1 .()
Dennutrk DR
F'RG	 ARI)	 3.9
______	 ZDF	 17.5
France	 TF1
Greece	 ERT	 1S.4
Iriaiid	 RTE	 2.7
italy	 RAt	 2.4
Spain	 RTVE	 U.3
__________ TV3	 11.7
U.K.	 BC	 0.1
__________ C4	 24.
1984 figures.
S.juvcs: 11iL: .1 -'' ehnnds; .OflpILlIiOI) L1.\I.
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1985
Subsidies (*)
Box office 13%
Cable 2%
Exports 2%
Video 10%
Subscripti
1990t
Structural changes in income sources
Table	 Comparative share of different income sources
in the audiovisual industry in 1985 and 1990
Subsidies ()
Box office 9%
CAble 2%
Exportsa 2%
Video 17
Stibscriptions 4%
•Shwe less f/ia/i 1%	 f Estimate
Source:: European Instiwte for the Media
Advertising 35%
Cable advertising (1
Ucence fees 36%
using 41%
Cable advertising (*)
ence fees 25%
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NOTES FOR PART OWE
1. For a quick Look see LaswetL(1951), Dror(1971), Wildavsky (1979),
Jenkins(1978), Ham and Hi(l(1984), de Leon (1981) etc. Moreover, this
approach is more fLexibLe with respect to what Dye (1976; 61) said
that "governments do, what they do it, and what difference it
makes". This Leads to what is government poLicy and for Kerr
(1976;53) is consisted of two features: an agent and a conditional
imperative. But due to complexity of our current times, one would be
confused if foLLowed such a simplistic form. Hecto(1972; 84) points
that a policy due to the complexity of the relationships of the
pubLic with its government made the state action to be considered aas
a course of action or inaction rather than specific decisions anf
action. Euston (1953), Jenkins (1978), Roberts (1971) all agree about
the compLexity of defining the government action.
2. Even the term is vague for some, insisting on media poLicy.
During the last years the term communications policy has been
internationaLLy recognised as dominant with some variations.
3. Or for some is regarded as sub-sector or field
4. The others are (1) the problem-oriented contextuality which
gives us the opportunity to put the social probLems in their
political, economic, social and cultural environments, (2) this is
rooted in an appreciation of human values and goats
5. This is more drawn by LasweLl and especially by his wartime
experience.	 LasweLL also stressed the necessity of behavioural
studies.
6. Their research is based on pure legal matters and regularly
issues, and is centered for assisting media managers, communications
attorneys and top-executives and the industry of the field.
7. It could be argued that the frequent intervention of economists
into the communications sector, and especially with the deregulatory
mood has upgraded their position. This easily is considered if one
thinks that previously regulation over communications was a matter
between civil servants, engineers and finance administration and
parliament in a second instance.
8. See for exampLe the theories of functionalism, Marxism anf their
variations
9. This, to some extent, has led to an underdevelopment of policy-
making and the sociology of the media.	 McQuail's (1987a,b,c,) works
have been determined towards the fuLfiLment of this aim.
10. Take for example names such as Toqueville, Marx, Pareto, Mosca,
Spencer, Weber, Durkheim and you wiil see that their theories can be
easily fitted to aLL disciplines.
11. "TechnoLogy push" thesis is based on the assumption that, if the
technoLogy is made available through state funding of R&D, someone,
somehow, wiLt find a use for it.	 "Technology pull" or market demand
positions tend to be more popular with economists. It is based on
the asumption that market forces and consumer demand stipulate
innovation.
12. See	 also	 Laswell	 and	 Lerner(1951),	 Laswell(1971)	 and
Lazarsfeld (1975).
13. This	 was because communications research was necessary for
advertisers to assess the size,	 composition,	 predisposition and
reactions od leaders, listeners and viewres.
14. These trends are apparent when someone looks at Lazarsfeld's
Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia in 1930s, and the
general communication and journalists research institutes appearing in
the 1940s and 1950s and other grand US universities.
15. With Administrative Reserch I also mean the on going 	 of the
empiricist tradition which adopts the stability and equilibrum. By
Critical, one also cat Is into question and focus upon changes in
assymetrical political and economic relations and contradictions of
the structure.
16. By administrative	 ideological	 perspective,	 one means the
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Linking of administrative type of probLems and methods with
interprentation of results that supports or does not not seriousLy
disrupts the status quo. By CriticaL ideologicaL perspective, the
interprentation involves radicaL changes in the estabLished order.
17. Such communications poLicy studies are on Ireland, YugosLavia,
Sweden, Hungary and Germany.
18. This could be also
	
objected by someone since as Castoriadis
(1987) points out there are various Marxist interprentations.
19. There is an interesting	 variant that the media really produce
audiences in the sense that they deLiver audience attention to
advertisers, and shape their behaviour od media publics in certain
dinstinctive ways.
20. Miege (1979) distinguishes between the characteristics of
commodities in generaL, and those of "cuLturaL industries which are
ascribabLe to their specific nature. Hughes(1981) suggests that a
major feature of cultural commodities is that in them the baLance in
primary characteristics between the material and the ideological is
shiffted towards the Latter, especialLy when produced by socially-
owned "public srvice broadcasting institutions.
21. Even if there is no necessary or intrinsic connection between
the two.
22.. Coalition theories are also addressed in Gourevicth,P.A (1977)
'International Trade, Domestic Coalitions and Liberty: Comparative
Responches to the Great Depression of 1873-1896" in JournaL of
InterdiscipLinary Histor y 8(August 1977) 281-313 and Aderson, .E and
R. Friedland(1982) 'CLass Coalitions in the aking of West European
Economics' in Political Power and Social Theory 3(1982)1-50
23. Conversely difference in policy result from differences in
coaLitions	 roups will	 enter	 into coalitions according to their
interests,	 whether defined in economic class 	 terms(income,market
share,	 economic hegemony or by sectoral, 	 regional	 and cultural
criteria.
24. In media, this perspective has mainly been led by Lazarsfeld
and Merton's studies on mass media and public opinion as welL as by
the effects approach, especially on political campaign studies which
viewed politics largely in terms of voting, and votinf Lartgelly in
terms of campaign infLuences and the result of voter choices.
25. Given Miliband's earLier dinstiction between the owners and
managers of capitaLism, Poutantzas uses the term "manager" in this
present context as it makes it appear that the "state" is separate
from "managers" whereas Miliband has already characterised them (such
as poLice, military) as a part of the state.
26. The whole discussion has held some structuraLists in the media
to go far beyond this problematic by attemting 	 to combine the
analysis of media signification practices semiotics and
pshycoanalyses which in some cases has held to an argument about
autonomous discources on the media especially interested in Barthe's
and Lacan's semiotics and pshycoanalysis respectively. This is, to
some extent, related to Frankfurt School which was interelated the
media with mass culture and its relation to monopoly capitaL.
27. WhiLe those relationships are subject to incremental changes,
and more radical changes at criticaL conjuctures, they provide the
context in which most normal politics are conducted.
28. This	 is	 of	 course	 directly	 influenced	 by	 Al.Lison's(1971)
"bureaucratics politics" model.
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NOTES FOR PART TWO
1. Their members are apointed by, on the advice of the government of
the day, and are independent, especially in reLation to editorial
matters, in conduct of the day-to-day affairs, and the content of
the programmes.
2. BBC RoyaL Charter ArticLe 3a and IBA Act of 1973 Section 2(2).
3. "Broadcasting PoLicy", Government White Paper on Broadcasting
1946, HMSO, Gmnd 6852.
4. BroadLy the activities of the Authority are specified in some
detail in the Broadcasting Acts. With an Act introduced when a major
new departure such as a new channeL is pLanned.
5. In charge of programming and functional.
6. IncLuding the power, never yet used, of the Home Secretary to
cease broadcast.
7. Together they are taking up onLy 18 pages in the BBC Annual
Report and handbooks.
8. The Crawford Committee (1926) Laid down the basic constitution
for the BBC as a public service.
9. In a Granada Guidhall Lecture in 1972
10. This is because the networks have committments to put on
programming
11. According to the BBC booklet of 1985 "Facts and Figures":
London, the national regions of ScotLand, Wales and Northern Ireland
respectivetly produce 136,59 and 26 hours of weekly network time
while the English regions account for 46 hours.
12. Their trade association is the Independent TeLevision Companies
Association (ITCA).
13. One of the prominet Ministers of Information under several
yovernmnets of the French Fourth Republic, was Francois Mitterrand,
who during the coLd war virgoursLy promoted the notion that RTF was a
crucial instrument of defence of the nationaL interest, and had to
remain under direct state controL. According to MontaLdo (1974), it
was Mitterrand who set the tone of the Ministry of Information
throughout the Fourth Republic, creating a concept unique amonst
Western democracies where broadcasting was considered directly tied
up to the government of the day and its politics.
14. Communists were isoLated in a cold war getto, folowing their
excLusion from government in 1947 as well as Gaulists who regarded
the parLiamentary system as weak for government.
15. De GaulLe had an aLmost overstruck belief concerning the
importance of television, as a crucial tooL to his political power.
De Gaulle had also imposed no less than 18 times restrictions to the
journaLists and newspapers which violated the honour or dignity of
the President. Besides, his famous phrase was "my enemies have the
press, I have television and radio".
16. Radio deveLopment was slower in France than in other European
countries.	 In	 1936,	 France had only 60	 radio sets	 per	 1,000
inhabitants whereas FRG had 105, the USA 153, the UK 158. In 1958,
there was less than one million TV sets in France and in 1964 more
than 5 milLion. In 1967, it was the first time which TV owners were
more than those who had just one radio set. IN 1969 more more than
10 million homes had a TV set and in 1974 about 14 million households
had a TV set.
17. GauL Lists were the major parliamentary force in the governmental
coalition.	 Pompidou might have been privatellY sympathetic, but he
refused it in pubLic.
18. For a few days, television did not report on the student "demos"
whereas headlines on the press front pages	 and widelty reports on
peripheraL radio stations were daiLly.
19. How equal airtime was provided to political canditates to present
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their programmes.
20. FR3 was to run the regional channeLs. SPF to take charge on
fiLms and video installations, 	 INA for research archives and
professional training, TDF for the transmitter network.	 Each company
was run by a Board made up by six directors who were,	 two
representatives of the stae for a period of three years. ALL seven
companies were independent but they had to abide by the conditions
set out in a very detailed "dossier" of diractives established by the
government after consuLtation with the ParLiament.	 The dossier
contained very precise directives on programme content , and on the
adininistartive and financiaL reLationships between the companies, and
the other organisations which were 'elaborated' out of ORTF.
21. FolLowing the example from Radio Verte.
22. The Licence fee was created in 1933 to compansate fro the
banning of commerciaLs on the state media.
23. The GauLtist approach was minimaL to say the Least: the
regionaL evening news, cLoseLy controLLed by Gautists sympathisers,
But Giscard did LittLe better in spite the "ecLatment" of ORTF.
24. ITA,	 "liv	 2:	 submission	 to	 Ministers	 of	 Posts	 and
TeLecommunications", 1972
25. The Independent TeLevision Authority felt thath the BBC 	 was
given a second channels it should be given to the ITV (see note
24). When Labour came into power (1974) the Home Secretary formed the
Annan Committee to Look at the future of broadcasting. Annan
recommended a fourth channel which would allow for diversity, new
ideas and experimentation.	 IT also advocated the setting up of an
Open Broadcasting Authority. Funding of programmes was to come from
sponsorship, block advertising and special interest groups. On
financing the proposals were iLl-researched and neglected views of
the advertising industry. ITV contractors vulnerabi lity was an
unfavorable economic climate. Moreover, competition between OBA and
IBA would affect the whoLe broadcasting structure. The Committee, in
proposing this Authority, was attempting to satisfy a whole range of
demands that were being made of broadcasting institutions; that they
should be more accountable, more open to outsiders and representative
of a widening range of social and political views.	 Yet,	 block
advertising not appeaLing to advertisers since a 30 second commerciaL
had more of an impact on the public's attention.	 As for charities
and speciaL interest groups , it was never made cLear what accounts
if any, they could contribute in the making of programmes. For
example, Annan's recommendation that six to seven differnent periods
for rate cards to reflect the varying size of audience during the
day.
26. Sponsorship was not adequately defined, nor the extent or
effect on programmes were taken into account.
27. In 1982-83, C4's total revenue was about £100 million.
28. New purchased material cost only £12,800 per hour. Thus the
cost of TV programmes was determined by the availability of the
channel to pay.
29. If, as was to happen, the subscriptions exeeded the advertising
revenue, the ITY companies were given permission to charge those
Losses against the advertising levy. In effect, their losses would
be reimboursed from public funds. This way of fundin g was formed to
protect the channel from direct pressures from advertisers in search
for Larger audiences.
30. According to the IBA,	 independent production commissions
arnmounted to less than 25% of C4's output in 1986.
31. This percentage holds the broad-ABs and DES; old and young, the
solitary and the big families, in London and Northern Britain.
32. It is rather a channel which most people watch, as Jeremy Isaacs
said,	 "some of the time and no one 	 all	 the	 time"	 (in Evening
Standard: 31 August 1979).
33. Some said that the BBC was spending valuable resources of cash
and manpower on spoiling operations of dubious value.
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34. The audience	 for these new TV versions has been the youth,
housewives and retired.	 Night-time TV has
	 been centered around
youngsters, students and the unemployed.
35. Whereas in the tate 1960s, it cost around £150 a minute per
singLe play, in 1986 cost was £1,500 a ten foLd "jump" in just over a
decade (including inflation, of course).
36. To Paris, Amsterdam and Belgium cable networks.
37. The BBC,however, hopes to get some subsidy in the future.
38. It thus decided Ci) to unite aLL its commercial activities with
a new executive; (ii) to abandon grandiose pLans for a £100 million
headquarters and settle for something more modest; (iii) to reduce
the number of staff and start purchasing more equipment and services
from the marketpLace, a change that could
	 cost up to 4,000 jobs;
(iv) to open its doors to independent producers in a serious way for
the first time; Cv) to reorganise BBC Commercial Enterprises while
simuttanepusty cutting the central bureaucracy to direct more money
programme production; and (vi) to Launch the Datacast (October 1986),
a new date servic for business subscribers Like teletext, datacast
would use spare capacity on the existing television signals. 	 The
corporation hoped that the service, which provides high speed,
scrambLed information without telephone charges, wiLL turn into a
muttimiL lion pound business with the next few years.
39. Despite Peacock's recommendation to raise the a 81W Licence fee,
the Government decided that it should remain broadly at its present
level, indexed on the basis of £20. Moreover, the Government
rejected the recommendation for a separate car radio licence but
accepted the very general view that the BBC should be given a bigger
role in coLlecting the Licence fee. It was doubted that the BBC
should act as a managing agent on a consultative basis to the HO
because it might well 	 lead to a confusion of	 responsibilities.
Spending for 1988 financiaL year of £61,59 according to the baseline
the Government set, would be less in reaL terms due to the inflation
rates.
40. The appointment of its new DG,	 Michael	 Checkland,	 with an
accountancy background, may prove that the new strategy is to
strenghten its commercial and marketing face for potential direct
compet i t i on.
41. See also an interview of Mr CheckLand to Financial Times on 24
September 1987, p.18.
42. The case with the TVS and other ITV companies showed that a
company the Less it produces the more money it makes.
	
The Network
Agreement was organised into various programme poois. 	 The first and
most important of these was the category A which covered the output
of the "Big Five", that the whole network was committed to showing.
Rather than haggle over the price of each individual programme, the
Large companies had developpeci a tarrif system of supplying
programmes to each other. Thus, there was no incentive to make
programmes at a competitive price because the tab was picked up by
advertisers.
43. The return of the capital(before levy) for four of the "Big
Five" averaged out at 62%. The rest of British industry managed 8%.
To the embarrasment of the ITV advertising revenuecontunued to rise
sharply with air-time inflation running as high as 25% a year at the
same time as audience was declining. In August 1987, for example,
ITV net revenue rose by 19,4% compared with the same month in 1986,
which itself was up 34% on August 1985.
44. Thorn-EMI and BET were willing sellers, Carlton had the money
nand proven management expertise.
45. Granada's franchise is for the North West England.
46. Furthermore,	 ChanneL	 3	 wiLl,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 have	 a
statutory obligation to provide programmes for and made in the
regions. They wiLL be free to form network arrangements but their
schedules will no longer be scrutinised.
47. It required the 1TV companies to provide "evidence of hardening
the market by speciffically under seLling airtime to inflame prices",
and called for details of cancelation clauses,	 share and parity
311
schemes and alt pre-enipting deals.
48. After this came the criticism by both the Prime Minister and
Home Secretary over programme standards and the potrayaL of sex and
violance on the screen.
49. There have been investments in other projects such as Thames TV
on	 Astra,	 Granada	 in	 BSB,	 TV	 South's	 acquisition	 of	 MTM
Entertainment.
50. The broadcast	 time was for Tories,	 Labour, ALlience 5:5:3
respectiveLy.
51. Nevertheless,	 the BBC had to face similar problems	 in	 its
history and especiaLly in the 1950s and 1960s.
52. TV faces similar problems as well.
53. Much of Licence fee's unpopuLarity arises from the annuaL Lump
sum payment and the butden it confLicts on the poor, many of whom are
depended on the TV information and education.
54. The French had Levy too
55. It must be also noted that the Government believed	 that the BBC
was biased against it. However, the Ministerial conflicts with the
BBC over the "Real Lives" programme came after the Committee's set
up. As S. Brittan (1988; 3) one of its members put it, "no political
complaints featured in the evidence presented by the Home Office to
the Committee".
56. The ISA wouLd require the ITV companies to open their schedules
to indepent producers for about 500 hours a year within two years.The
SOc is wilting to spent £20 milLion on 400 network, and 100 regional
programming hours-in addition to an aLready cominited 100 hours-
commissioned from and coproduced with the indepemdents by the of
1990.
57. These are Ci) item by item budget meetings to approve the
initial	 programme	 budget;	 (ii)	 the	 overhead	 rates	 are	 set
reatisticaLty,so that none can make much of a profit out of inflated
carpets, rent, heating etc; (iii) since overspending is going to lead
to your profit being reduced, there is a pressure that does not exist
in the BBC or ITV to stay within the Budget.
58. C4's great succes was Brookside and the string of prgrammes from
the subsidised workshops. S4C has created a WeLsh production sector.
But, if the Governemnet Looks at the costs for a cost-effective
formula, it wiLt be inevitable that the vast majority of programmes
will be made in London.
59. See the Broadcasting Reserch Unit Report to Peacock Commitee in
1986	 The Public	 Service	 Idea	 in	 British	 Broadcasting;	 Main
Principles",	 London: 1986.
60. As concerns decentralisation, the Moinot Report recommended the
creation of "CinseiLs Regionaux de La Communication" in metropolitan
France and others	 in the "outre- Mer"	 (overseas) provinces and
territories.	 The dominant debate was over the independence of state
media from state control.
61. A commercial channel was now favoured by Giscard.
62. The Communists also wished	 to censure the SociaList Governement
for not proceeeding	 fast	 enough	 to	 journalists	 with	 Communists
sympathises within the sate media.
63. The whole Act was published by the Journal Officiel de La
Republique Française, 15551, Paris 1983 with the title "Communication
AudiovisueLte: Loi du 29 Juiltet et Textes d' Application". For a
more detailed analysis see Les Cahiers de La Communication, Paris:
1983.
64. There were the two major public television companies-TF1 and A2-,
plus the FR3 which under the new regime was to coordinate the 12
regional companies; a national radio company(radio France) which also
had to finance the regional radio companies; an unspecified number of
regional radio companies to manage the local public radio stations
(Societés de Radiodiffusion Sonore; a public corporation(TDF)
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responsible for the infrastructure and maintenance on a technical
Level as well as transmitting the programming of television stations;
a pubLic institution, the Institut National de (a Communication de I'
Audiovisuet (INA), responsibLe for broadcasting research, for achieve
conservation and staff training; a national programme company, the
Societe Francaise de Production (SFP), which was to make programmes
for the TV companies; a national programme company to co-ordinate the
operations of the broadcasting services in the overseas regions and
territories (Socièté National de Radio and Television pour I' Outre-
Ncr); a national company responsible for radio external services, an
equivalent to BBC external services,	 (Societe Nationale pour
I'Etranger or France International). Finally, a separate company had
the task of publishing and selling radio and television programmes to
foreign broadcasters.
65. Except in a few cases where the majority shareholding in one
company was held by other state broadcasting companies.
66. In 1986, the three channeLs had to pay FF 500 million for
transmission fees to TDF from their budget, while A2 and TF1 paid FF
600 million to SFP for purchaging obligatory programmes. FR3 was
buying only FF43 million from SFP. In 1986, the viewers rating were
40 per cent for A2, 38 per cent for TF1 and the rest for
FR3.Furthermore, the radio "peripheriques" were indirectly controlled
by the state, through SOFIRAD, a body which with public funds plays
the bankers'role on radio broadcasting. Europe 1 and radio Monte
Carlo finenced wholly from advertising, but their haedquarters
located in Paris, and their transitters were situated outside French
territories. The state via SOFIRAD was also responsible in practice
for the appointments of key managerial staff on these stations plus
the RTL via Havas.
67. The President would appoint 3 members including the chairman, 3
by the President of the Assembly, 3 by the President of the Senate.
68. The paradox was that the Conseil Constitutionel was severely
critised by
	 the Socialists	 for	 its	 alledged	 political	 bias	 in
holding up the nationaLisation Legislation.
69. From the "nine wise men", only two were regarded as sympathisers
of the Conservative oppposition, one of the Communists, three of the
Socialists and two had no clearly defined political leanings. The
composition of the HA, indicates, to a certain extent, the continuous
association of broadcasting with partisan ends. In addition, the HA's
chairperson was Mrs Michele Cotta, a socialist sympathiser. In terms
of the background of its members. Ms Cotta was en experienced
journalist whose professional reputation was enhanced due to her role
as omne of the two interviewers used in the Mitterrand-Giscard TV-
debate between the two ballots of the 1981 Presidential Elections.
Her political sympathies were probably to the left of the centre.
70. These members were appointed for five years made up for 7
representatives	 from each	 of	 the	 following	 field:	 culture,
scienc,regional	 broadcasting,	 counciLs,	 cutatral	 and	 educational
bodies,famity and consumer organisations,broadcasting staff as well
as representatives of the press 	 and main religious groups.
71. However, HA's interventions were not welcome by the channels and
especially the journalists. 	 Their union voiced their resentement at
what they regarded as illicit on their professional territory.
72. Personal communication with Mr Henri Arnstam.
73. Socialists were sympathetic to the flourishing pf radio "libres"
during the later half of the Giscard Presidency. 	 In addition, they
set up yheir own private radio station, radio Riposte.	 Thus, it
would be quite difficult to follow a represive policy. 	 So,
legislation was	 a	 priority	 which	 initially	 accomplished	 by
legislation in autumn 1981, and confirmed in the Loi 82.
74. Approximatelly 850 opened legally.
75. These include politically marginal groups, previously ignored by
the state media: ecologists, feminists,immigrants,religious bodies,
ethnic minorities, newspapers and magazine publishers (L'HumariitC, Le
Matjri, L'Unit6. L'Express), community associations, music lovers took
advantage of the new freedom.
76. WhiLe most of the state broadcasting was supported by
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advertising, the private broadcastin g sector was not.
77. For example, the secret advertising of commercial products
created great difficulty to control it.
78. Antenne 1, TIME ( Television Id et Maintenant Experimental),
Canal 35, and canal 5 ranged in content from "soft core" to modest
studio presentations and in influence from "gadfly" to major
"inVintant" (Television Weekly: 26 October 1984; 21).
79. In his plans, these locaL TV networks would broadcast from 9am
to 7:30pm. Each would broadcast to a region with as many as 2 million
inhabintants.	 Like national channels, they should 	 have a ninimum of
60% quota for French and EC made programmes.	 They would function
independently from the national networks and local newspapers.
80. Fabius went further. He spoke for a tax shelter for investors to
put their money into new films or TV productions. 	 These investementS
would become tax deductive sponsors.	 Yet, the HA had an average of
15 appLicants per day in the first two months, including multimedia
groups	 (Hersant,	 Hachette),	 "peripheral"	 radio	 staions(RTL,	 RMC,
Europe 1).
81. Ci) TF1 would remain a state run channeL, while A2 would be
privatised (with 15 -20 per cent of its capitaL to small investors);
(ii) FR3 would be opened up to the interest parties of private
sector; (iii) local cable TV would be given to private hands and
TeLeMonte Carlo would be sold; (iv) the HA would be responsible for
technical supervision and minimal regulations on programme output.
82. For example, one of the former Havas Presidents, Yves Canac, was
an ex member of Giscard's cabinet at the Elysee. 	 Canac was largelly
respomsibLe for the 1974 broadcastin g statute.	 RousseLet was
director of Mitterrand's presidential Cabinet tilt summer 1982. He
also actively invoved in the Loi82 and supervised the top
appointments of broadcasting companies by the Socialists in the
aftermath of their 1981 victory.
83. C+ shareholders in 1988 were:
Havas-25%; compagnie des Eaux-21,2%; L'Oreat-10,41%; Societe
Generate-lOX; Perrier-5X; SGGM-5X; Granada-3%; Compagnie Saint
Germain-2X others 18%. In 1985, Havas had 47% of the equity.
84. For example C+'s operating conditions included 39 articles,
whereas TF1's were 121 articles, In particular C+ is neither obliged
to carry news, educational programmes, nor to screen a particular
quota of French-made programmes (PresSe ActuaL ite: June 1984).
Avertsing initially was not allowed but because of the initial
problems of C+, the Government reconsidered the whole case, In 1986
It provided 15% of income on top of subcriptiofls.
85. However, c+'s management argues that the presence of porn films
was never a marketing device, and that its introduction was not
mathced by a sourge in subscription.
86. During the summer of 1983, a small team worked on the
pro g ramming aspect and came up with a channel which would have a
particular emphasis on sports, entertainment and films.
87. C+ bought about 320 films whereas it spent about FF 500 million
on purchasing rights of transmissions. Now 50% of them are French-
made, 35% of European origin.
88. The Conservatives accused the Socialists that they granted La 5
to •Re rLu sc oni\S e Yd oux (60% and 40% resoectivety) due to their
pol'tiical	 Links.	 Berlusconi's connection was	 the then	 Italian
socialist Prime Minister,' Bettino Craxi, 	 who brought	 him in
communication with the Sicialists in the EEC's summit in Rome 	 in
1985.	 According to his estimates, La S's venture to launch was about
FF 1,5 bn in the initial year. On the first day, for example, there
were about 49 advertisers including Candy, Colgate, Pegeaut, Philips.
adv er tisers had to book a minimum of 20 groups of 30 slots costing
FF1, 2 million in all. In 1986, La 5 was transmitted clear via
Telecom 1A in order to distribute it to the rest transitters. Till
1988, La 5 was stilt constructing new transmitters in order to cover
the whole of France but up to 1989 It covered about 70% of
it (Personal Communication with Ms P. Michon of La 5).
89. M.D of Gaumont was none other than Mr Hicotas 	 Seydoux, the
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brother of Jerome Seydoux.
90. see note 88
91. For the events of May 68, a most detal Led and perhaps
authoritative	 account	 is	 L.	 Rioux	 and	 R.	 Backman	 (1968)
"L'exptosftion de Hal", Paris : Laffont; a description of the events
in P. Labro et al(1968) "Mai-Juin'68: ce n'est g u'un debat", Paris:
Scull; an interprentation of the events in A. Tourrain (l972)"i.j
mouvement de Hal ou La Communisme Uto p i g ue", Paris: Seuil, and V.
Wright(ed)(1979) 1'Conflict and Consencus in France", London: Franc
Cass
92. According to personal communications with some executives in
Paris in June 1987 and June 1988.
93. According to an interview of Mr Gust Graas, DG of RIL given in
the Le Film: France 18.11.1983.
96.	 Of which CLI took a global stake of 47%, in early 1982.
95. Participation (50%) in relation to Rothschild in "Video
International", a production company, coproduction via Stand Art
(1983) with Gaumont.
96. Video Ide-France was enriched by the creation of one of the
most modern studios in Europe.
97. More precisely, CLI was involved with (i) Tele Union Paris
and TeLe Union Monte Carlo in producing variety and game shows, (ii)
DIC for production of cartoons highly successful in the US market,
(iii) Consolidated, a company which produces in the UK drama series
from UK and Us tetevision,and (iv) Pandora, a 100% CLI'S subsidiary
for teledistribution.
98. The seven departmets are: Mossetle, Meurthe, Messelle, Ardennes,
Lower Rhinetand. 885,000 viewers regularly watch RTL. Daily audience:
mean 556,000 equally to 47% of the population receiving the projects.
99.In the French market, CLI's abition has gone with the creation of
the VisuaL-Image, a subsidiary of RTL television, Information et
p ubticite. The objective of this company was to open up forms of
programming which would be adaptabLe to each network, and to create a
huge potential profit for CLI. 	 Moreover, it got a stake in TVEC
(20%), pay-TV for Francophone Canadiens and anothe Francophone Pay-TV
channel, Premier Fox. Apart from the opportunity to materialise its
profits, CLI tried to enter this new field in order to enforce its
competence in new developments, and especially in potential
programming outlets of which CLT did not dispose.
100. CLI was hoping to operate a sateLlite channel	 in	 three
languages (French, German, Dutch) which would provide news and
entertainment. Once the CLI was to collaborate with French partnerS(
a 40% equity going to Europe 1 and RMC) and with Berttesmann for
RI Lp I. us
101. Pomonti was to be directly involved with the future management
of CLI according to the French press in 1985. The French candidate
for the number two job at CLI, that of "admonistateur-deLegue", in a
resuffle which took place for the new chairman of the company in 1985
(see also New Media Markets: 14 May 1985).
102. Gaston Torn former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, and President
of the EC Commission.
103. Pierre Werner former Prime Minister of Luxembourg.
104. i.e. Pomonti for the position of " administrateur-delegue".
105. The question of editorial control over RTL's output was an
underlying factor in French attempts to get rid off MD Jacques
Rigaud, he was appointed by Giscard just before Mitterrand's
ascendancy to power at the end of 1980. It is instructive to remember
that the GIG only became involved within the CLI through a historical
accident: when the company was re-activated in 1949 after the War,
French interests were banned from participations due to tight
exchange restrictions. Due to a considerable increase in the equity,
the GLB seized the opportunity and stepped in, after an invitation by
the Luxembourg Government.	 In 1974, cooperation	 within Audiofina,
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and particuLarly between Havas and GLB, made GLB a major partner,
hoLding more than the haLf of company's shares. 	 Therefore, the
French aLLowed GLB, firstLy in 	 1949, and then in 1974 to become too
important a player in the company's affairs; but for almost ten years
GLB was a "steeping partner". In a meeting between the Premiers of
Luxembourg anf France, the French objected to certain commentators of
RU. Like Phitipe Alexander whom the French wanted to fire but the
Luxembourgish intervienned. Then, French sociaLists said that RTL's
journalists were not enough to Left. On the other hand, RTL's
journalists were not on the right either and the previous French
Conservative Government had aLso criticised the situation with
similar arguments.
106. French officials and the press gave the impression that Murdoch
was already a CLT sharehoLder and a fuLL-partner in its bid for La 5.
On the other hand, CLT responded that the whoLe assumption as
fictionaL and argued that the Frere-Murdoch company would be one of
the hundred springing up in Europe. Companies Like CLT need theni
aLongside programmes' investors. But Media International was not just
another	 company in the European audiovisuaL scene. 	 Frere himseLf
suggested that GBL was acting as an intermediary between 	 CLI and
Murdoch (Cable and SateLLite: September 1986). What an irony!
Berlusconi's reputation within the French media	 industry was no
better than Murdoch's.
107. CLT aLso considered of going to Court but French officials said
that CLT did not make any format appLication. It was quite clear,
however, that CLI was a candidate for the channel. During a press
conference teLevised on the RTL's news programme on July 31,1985 the
French Minister of Communication, G. Fitlioud, confirmed that he had
received an application from the CLI.
108. In effect, CLT said it wouLd be interested in the remaining
channeL of TDF1, if it was going to be granted a terrestiaL channeL
because Seydoux\Bertusconi received a huge network thus,leavIng no
room enough for CLI.
109. Even if the FRG Government would Like to allocate a TVSAT
transponder on CLI, the Lander must alt agree. Another option for
RTLpLus was Eutetsat.
110. The rest of the equity was heLd by a TV team, a CIT wholly
owned subsidiary,	 and Audiopresse,	 a	 consortium	 of	 Belgian
newspapers.	 Then, it was also planning through ELectrafina to bid
its equivalent, a Flemish speaking channel.
111. Using its No 8 transponder.
112. The apparent CDt) poLitical	 bias had also worked	 in	 the
channel's favour in the FRG's CDU\CSU governed Lander.
113. UFA, a subsidiary of pubLishing house of which	 Bertelsmann
owns 38,9%. Westdentscher Altgemeine Zeitung (WAZ) holds 1% as does
FAZ( Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeintung) also a former SAIl investor.
The remainder is held in trust by the Deutche Bank untiL additionasl
shareholders are found.	 The commitment of WAZ, the Largest
publishing group in FRG's most populous state, North Rhine Westphalia
is	 significant	 since	 it	 could pay an	 instrumental	 role	 in	 the
aLLocation of the terrestial frequencies in the state.
114. During 1984-7, the capital outlay	 for RTL+ was increased from
DM 25 milLion (8.3 miLlion) to some DM 90 million.	 Advertising
revenue went up between 1985 to 1987 from DM 18 milLion to about DM
50-60 milLion.	 But of over DM 18 million spent on advertising in the
FRG in 1987, only DM 2 mit Lion went on new channels like RTL+.
115.Iwo come from the UK, France, W. Germany, Italy and Spain and one
from Greece, Portugal, Luxembourg, Danemark, Belgium, the Netherlands
and EIRE.
116. While the Directive speaks about both radio and television, the
TWF is mainly focused on television. However, most, if not all of
Directive's provisions are basicaLLy oriented to television.
117.Ihe MEDIA programme has ten main project (now renaimed to MEDIA
92). In the distribution area, it aims to create a European co-
operative for distributing Low-budget films, a fund for multilingual
productions, and a means to heLp independent producers market their
works.	 The seven production projects span	 HDTV, new scripts,
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animation, training in computer graphics and management as well as
regional aid.
118.	 It should be noted that the EC was aLso invoLved in film
production	 in the 1970s when it tried to find ways to overcome US
competition.
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NOTES FOR PART THREE
1. This meant that a satelLite would appear to remain stationary
above a fixed point and couLd be used as a transmittin g station. In
the 1950's, Little though was given to those thesis as the Americans
and Soviets engaged in the race to perfect intercontinentaL baLListic
missiles and put men into space. In 1962, there was the Launch of
Tetatar, the world's first communications satellite but was not
geostationary. It could therefore be used only to establish temporary
Links between continents, during the period that it couLd be traced
across the sky at Large, cumbersome and expensive tracking stations.
By 1964 the captions "Live via satellite" brought the space age into
miLLions of Living rooms as the Tokyo OLympic games were flashed
around the world. The age of sateLlite transmission had begun. For
the following ten years sateLlite broadcasting remained a somewhat
exotic medium, used exclusively for the international relay of news
and sports programmes,	 at	 enormous costs,	 the transmitting and
receiving station atone were costing miLLions of pounds. In the
beginning the power of satellite transponder was very Low but Later
it couLd be made acceptable TV reception from TVRO (Television
Reception OnLy) dishes with 3 metres in diameter. Today satelLites
operate at 3 LeveLs:
1) internationaL in intercontinentaL such as Intelsat
2) regionaL or continental such as EuteLsat and
3) domestic or national Like Telecom I.
2. Moreover, there are military systems and some satellites designed
for data relay, maritime and communications purposes.
3. When Looking back at the history of home video, it is uncLear
which developments may realty have been predictable. Videotape
technology was originaLLy developed for the broadcast industry in the
1950's. Manufacturers first attempted to refine the technology from
home application in the 1960's but high price and price and technical
difficulties remained barriers.
4. By the end of World War El one million households were receiving
their radio over the "wire".
5.	 These	 were:	 Greenwich,	 Bristol,	 Swindon,	 Sheffield,
WelL ingborough.
6. Such as: no advertisements, tape, delay or transmission of feature
films were allowed.
7. The Technical Advisory Committee argued that 60% of the TV reLay
systems were based on the high-frequency multi-pair system and only
40% on the more advanced coaxial cable System. As it argued neither
system could offer more than half a dozen TV channels.
8. There were only a few hundred cable TV systems tolerated.
9. in Creteit and Cergy-Pointoise (Paris suburbs), Rennes, Metz,
Chamonic, Grenoble and Nice. Only the Grenoble-Echiroltes project was
actuaLly carried out through it did not Last long.
10. Ic Monde (4.1.1976) wrote "cable distribution is still considered
as a diabolical device whose effects should be limited by strICt
r e g U I at i on s"
11. A five-year	 investment programme,	 the funding of which was
written into the 7th National Plan.
12. Interactive communication systems were tried out in a pilot
scheme involving 2200 homes in the Velizy area (Teletel was launched
in 1977 after the DGT saw Prestel. in operation at a Radio and TV
exhibition in Paris); videotext was provided collectively vial Local
authorities (initially at Nantes and Grenoble) with terminals at Post
Offices and other public places; an electronic telephone directory
was installed initially in 1300 houses in Rennes; a private
telecommunications network, Transpac, was set up to transmit data
packages to private firms.
13. The reason was that cable compared to telephone was highly costly
and not a priority.
14. Both were to	 lose out as disseminators of 	 information and
beneficiaries from advertising revenue.
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15. But quite different in another respect.
16. ACARD was formed by the Labour Cabinet Office in 1976 to develop
an IT thrust for the UK's industrial strategy.
17. The Committee on the Film Industry (chaired by the former Labour
Prime Minister, H. WiLson) expressed their concern as to the effect
of the British FiLm industry of this intrusion into the Home market
of films in EngLish transmitted from the Outer Space to the UK. WhiLe
senior figures in commerciaL TV, like Howard Thomas talked about an
"invasion from the outer space via Madisson Avenue".
18. ALthough one representative was from Rediffusion Computers
Limited, a subsidiary representative with cable interests.
19. It was given a mere six months to Look at the most advantageous
ways to "secure the benefits" of cabLe but in " a way consistent with
the wider pubLic interest, in particular the safeguarding of psb". By
the end of the summer 1982, the Hunt Committee had received over 200
submissions from interested parties. It reLeased its report on
September 1982.
20. Traditional media's concern was the	 impact of cable on
advertising revenue.
21. Controversy ranged across numerous issues concerning the
culturaL, social and economic implications of cable systems
development as well as over appropriate regulatory policies.
22. According to Hunt Report, this monopoly should last for a period
of eight to ten years in order to strike a balance between the time
needed to guarantee an economic rate of return to the cable provider
and to ensure the abuse might be restrained by the knowledge that the
franchise may be subjected to competition.
23. This was	 intended to reduce the amount of American "junk"
programmes	 that would be screened with lower quaLity, the fear of
the "wall-to-walt 	 Dallas".	 This may encourage	 the	 domestic	 film
industry and lead to a certain amount of networking.
24. The figure was substantially lower of the recommended one in Hunt
Report of a 500,000 havin g the intention to retain cable as a LocaL
system.
25. Despite the short-notice given there was only 6 weeks between the
issue of the Guidance Wote and the closing date of 31st August, 1983,
37 applications were received and eventually it were chosen by the
Economist Intelligence Unit. This non-governmental body was allocated
the task of examining proposals and selectin g the winners. Many of
the applications had come from consortia of business and media
interests set-up with the specific task of exploitating cable
deve I. opments.
25. Up to a full year after their applications were approved.
26. The Government offered to extend operators' licenses by three
years in compensation, but all eleven still had to radically alter
their investment plans. The Cable Authority pointed out that even if
the affects of the Budget were not as bad as some had feared it stuck
in potential investors' minds as a reason why they should not invest
in cable (C.A. 1986, 11). As of January 1985 only one pilot.
IncidentalLy, the Government had decided not spending any public fund
for R + D of advanced cable system.
27. WhiLe most of the applicants to upgrade dd systems were approved,
the costs delays and lack of Government commitment had taken their
tolL. BET (British Electric Traction) sold its cable interest to
Rediffusion (Robert Maxwell); Visionshire withdrawn from new cable
ventures; the PLessey (UK) and Scientific Atlanta (USA) consortium to
supply equipment was disbanded as did the Racal (UK) - OAK (US)
consortium and BICC was scalling down its scale activities.
28. These were Bolton Telecabe for Bolton; CotswooL Cable Television
Co.	 Ltd.,	 for	 Cheltenham	 and	 Gloucester;	 East	 London
Telecommunications Ltd, for London Boroughs of lewham and Tower
Hamlet; Wandsworth Cable Ltd. for London Borough of Wandsworth and
British Cable Services for West Surrey and East Hampshire.
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29. The Royal Borough of Kensinghton and CheLsea in South West
London.
30. The Board would be comprised by four members of the BBC Board of
Governors and four of the IBA.
31. Copies of the contract specifications were sent to over 120
different groups and individual groups during ApriL 1986 and the
venture received wide press coverage. The deadlines was the 29 of
August 1986.
32. Thorn-EM1 though somewhat less surprising given its diverstiture
of alL new media interests.
33. The dish would be 45 cm in diameter or no bigger than a dinner
plate.
34. This wilt come after a massive promotional drive. There was in
1988 a consideration of giving free the reception equipments.
35. The investors now in BSB (1987-1988) Were
Founding shareholders	 £ million
AngliaTetevisionptc	 11,5
Granada Group plc	 35,0
Pearson plc	 30,0
Virgin Group pI.c
	
25
First Round investors
Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd. 	 50
Chargeurs S.A.
	
24
investment International Holdin g S.A.	 5
London Merchant Securities
	
10
Next pLc	 10
Reed internationaL plc	 20
Trinity International Holding pLc	 2
Reed International has substantial interest in paper, packing
retailing and recently in book pubLishing. Bond Corporation HoLding
is the UK unit of the AustraliaL brewery, construction, media and
financial services. Chargeurs S.A. . globaL transport agency, (see
France). Next, the fast growing UK fashion retailer with new interest
in financial services an mail order. investment international
Holdings, a Luxembourg investment agency which is committing its
clients' fund to BSB rather than its native Astra. London Merchant
Securities, a UK institution normally associated with investment in
properly development and the energy industry. Trinity, another
investment agency.
36. The French videotext/minitel strategy is viewed as a success for
the DGT, combining the advantages of monopoly in network supply and
the advantages of private initiative in communication service supply.
37. Local operators would determine its own levels or in effect
whether it wanted to provide cable TV as a social service rather than
as a revenue export. Subscription rates would be determined to a
certain extent by the amount of advertisin g carried. Finally the Lo
82 stipulated that the advertising revenue should not overturn the
80 of the total income of the cable network. By and large the
Government could in relation to article 85 of the Loi impose some
decrease on this percentage since it could relate SLEC to this of
TeLe Monte Carlo. This came, to a certain extent, contradictorY the
general spirit of the Loi 82.
38. France was divided into 36,000 municipalities and only 500 of
them had a population over 30,000 inhabitants. A quarter of France's
population lived in five major urban conglomerations.
39. 1,2 million in Paris, 1,5 million in lIe de France and the rest
in the provinces.
40. It was an accommodation to the swing from the left in the 1983
municipal elections with the most of the larger cities held now by
Conservatives.
41. There were also other options such as allowing the private
channeLs to set-up muLti-point distribution systems to block of Flats
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which could then go on cabLe.
42. In practice three very different commercial. policies could be
impLemented and fund to be generaLLy accepted: (1) universal cabLing
with the initial stress on interactive services. The cost would be
included in the LocaL rates as was pLanned in Geneviltes (near
Paris); (2) a Low penetration poLicy, at a 25 per cent LeveL, with
high cost charged to subscribers and no use made of the municipal
budget, as planned for Paris; (3) a combination of the above (1) and
(2) with a 50% take-up as projected in MontepetLier.
43. It was estimated that the initial househoLd connections wouLd be
be in the cost of FF 800; the basic cable service in a cost between
FFr 500 to FFr 800 and the subscriber wouLd have to pay about FFr
1,800 for extra products and services.
44. In effect, there have been so few rivaLs to the DGI, such as
Region Cable, so OCT remains in a defacto monopoLy position.
45. IncLuding towns with	 more	 than	 100,000	 inhabitants	 and
representing about 4 miLLion households.
46. More information about every town see JournaL de La Mission issue
of 1984.
47. This agreement was made between p resident D'Estaing and
chancellor Hetmut Schmidt.
48. ActuaLLy, in 1978 it was decided to examine the possibilities of
such a program.
49. DBS was expected to be especially attractive to developing
countries without sophisticated broadcasting system.
50. This must also be related to the decision of D'Estaing
Administration of giving priority to DBS and not to CabLe TV
considering as highLy competitive for the vast media.
51. The head of DCI, J. Dondoux said that he might chose various
forms of terrestrial distribution or even satellite broadcasting.
52. J. Pomonti, was calLed in, in the beginning of 1985 by Fabius to
run the operating company for TDF1.
53. That was the Latter TV, and MG. And contenders for this slot on
TDF-1 were Europe I and Music Box.
54. The whole picture of the co-operation between the H.O. and DII
could be found in the White Paper of 1983 which contains "ritual
objectives" tO the santified principles of protectin g the public
interest through administrative measures, but the dominant motif was
that of the market.
55. C.A.	 in 1986 had 10 people only staff, 	 and of all	 the
institutions of the British TV industry was arguably the Less
visibLe. Its D.C., J. Davey, was not invited to the Prime Minister's
October summit on broadcasting policy at No 10 (Sunday Times 17 July
1988;C7).
56. UntiL 1986, its start-up costs were covered by a Loan from the
Government.
57. For example, it should favour applications from those offering to
use the most British programmes and the fewest cheap imports - no
quotas down for this.
58. Or "Mission stir La TeLedistribution" but also known as "Mission
Schemer" due to the name of its chairman, deputy socialist Bernard
Schemer, also know as "Monsieur Cable".
59. Mission Cable, actuaLLy, was alLocated a small budget of FFr 30
million out of which could provide initial finance for a small number
of special projects.
60. From this was the characterisation of Mission Cable as the
Governments nursemaid on the national cable industry.
61. With an annual budget in 1985 of 50 to 60 miLlion FF money were
tight.
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62. By the early 1980's, 061's telephone system ws the envy of most
European tetecoms engineers. In relation to the UK. In 1986 France
had 42 main Lines per 100 inhabitants whereas the UK 39; onLy half as
many "incidents" per 100 Lines in France as in the UK; and higher
productivity in France (7 empLoyees per 100 lines, against 11 in the
UK).
63. This was Launched in 1979 and Telecom 1 was Launched in August
1984.
64. TDF has been since 1980 under the authorities Ministries of
Communications and PIT and because of this it has to harmonize its
actions with DGT.
65. From 1950's, CDC, a non profit organisation, has aimed to provide
loans and expert advises to LocaL authorities regarding their
development projects such as national health system which are
required to deposit their funds.
66. OnLy Clyde and Croydon of the UK pilots opted not going with 81.
67. These figures from come private communication with Ms C. Enders.
81 invested	 15m to uiv (or it holds 25% of its stake), in TCC, and 1
mit lion (25%), Premiere 3m (30%) Vision
	
3m. In 1986, BT took a 33%
stake in Chitdrens channel and Lifestyle ventures.
68. The City of London is oe of the three Key financial centres and
lies in the middle of New York and Tokyo, also speaks the world's
language: English.
69. CGE made an agreement with Mission Cable by which it wouLd become
a stepping store for any local authority wishing to set up a cable
network having also a consultant role CGE had also experience in
cable since it was one of the first French companies to get involved
in 'cabling France' in 1970's. With the "Plan Cable" CGE became
active in signing up other customers for its cable expertise. In
1985, it had set up cable in 15 towns among them Lyon, Toulon and
Versailes. CGE's attraction to municipalities was that was prepared
to take up most of the costs in settig-up the systems operating
company (SLEC). The CGE would pay this, leaving only administrative
costs and local programming input to SLEC'S. Thus, SLEC had in its
setting-up little to Loose, Moreover CISE owns 15% of Canal PLus.
the investment was partly made to show that it was a natural partner
in any major media development. Pro g ramming was the third aspect of
CGE's multimedia strategy. In addition to its access to programming
through its stake at Teleservice and Canal Plus, also signed a
contract with the I.N.A. for a 500 hour tong catalogue of programmes
to be put via CGE at the disposal of the cable networks and the
potential Local TV stations. CGE stated publicly that it had non
ambitions to be involved in DBS because DBS situation was too unclear
to guarantee such a step (Cable and Satellite: August 1985).
70. CLE in 1984 became the operator of the prestigious Paris cable
system. Major Chirac also went to CLE 49% of the equity with the City
of Paris building the rest. From this 49%, 10% was given to C30.
There were strong reasons to believe that LyonnaiSe used its
political connections with Chirac to get the franchise.
71. dEL was composed of ten Large "syndicates" or associations of
the electronics industry.
72. Subsidiaries of Thomson-CSF and St Gobain formed a special
company to g o into cable but both were nationalised companies.
73. These losers were (i) NBS: James Lee - the Bell Group (Holmes a
County Belt owns former ACC assets and has TV and newspaper interest
in Australia. Main owner of Astratia's Largest company Broken Hill,
(ii)	 QBj:	 News	 International,	 Cambridge
	
Electronics,	 Electronics
Rental Group, Feranti, Sears, British Commonwealth Shippin g . (iii)
DBS UK Ltd: Dixons, Hambros Bank, Robert Fleming (Merchant Banks).
(iv) SAT UK: Bond Corp, Lonhro (Observer) Trilton (London facilities
House.
74. In the US cable systems tended at that time to be cheap
consisting of wires string along poles rather than burned in the
ground as in the UK, and most of Europe. They are also designed to
deliver entertainment at a low-cost rather than being a genuine
communications system. Less than 5% cable systems in the USA
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interactive systems.
75. FFr 5 biLlion in the period 1983-1985.
76. Estimated cost FF 1,5 bilLion.
77. It was a chock in 1983 to discover that with optic fibres the
cost per household cabLed would be three times the amount forecast by
DGT
78. Municipalities were especiaLLy Lukewarm because under the "plan",
had to finance preLiminary feasibility studies.
79. Estimates from the DGT argued that the mean cost of a system was
FF 5,000 per connection, but the Conservation opposition chalLenged
this estimate cLaiming that the costs were grossly underestimated. It
argued that a connection would cost FFr 12,000-15,000 not 5,000. DCI
rejoined saying that the charge was unfounded, and the 1985 cost was
about FF 7,000 but in no-way 12,000 or 15,000 FF.
80. The originaL TPS's prospects (summer 1985) suggested that the
rate would be about 11 million a year from the second. Since then,
the price appeared to have fallen to £9 million in November 1985. The
argument, now, was related to reception equipment's price and
considered that the bulk of initial audience would come from cable
systems. The difference, now, was that the price on Eutelsat Fl
transponder cost £ 1,5 to 2 miLlion a year in 1985. the TPS prices
were opposed by the Ministry of Communication which demanded that the
price should be somewhat between £5 to 6 milLion. FinaLly, the Chirac
Government found this price too low and undesired that the price of
12 milLion might be near the basic leasing rate.
81. InitiaLly for 12 years, becoming 8 years thereafter.
82. For example white the PTT insisted on requiring SLEC'S to pay 30%
in advance, the Interior Ministry reacted and opposed it on behalf of
municipalities. Another conflict was between the Ministers of Culture
and PIT concerning programming because PTT was interested only on the
hardware aspect of cable.
83. Due to the austerity policy imposed by the Government in 1983,
DGT recorded its first-ever deficit.
84. There was also some challenges from the local authorities to the
Government with most eminent that of the Mayor of Paris, Mr J.
Chirac, who challenged governmental guideline over content control.
His demand was the freedom to receiving and broadcast foreign
commercial programming or according to Chirac "cabLe-tv had to secure
freedom of expression". (Cable and Satellite: December 1984;18).
Another case was the "Socialist City of Lille" which sought to extent
the authority given by Loi 82 by asking to become the owner as well
as manager of the local network by setting-up a joint stock company
which would have a major shareholding.
85. It operates about 30,000 of the cabled households and runs 300
MHZ systems which can take up to 24 channels.
86. The PIT would provide centraL terminals whereas personal ones
would be by private sector.
87. GDL stands for Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and refers to EutetSat'S
and other European Governments' jargon to the Luxembourg's satellite
system.
88. Dr Clay Whitehead was former director of the US office of
Telecommunications. He became later Director of Hughes Communications
Inc., a subsidiary of Hughes Aircraft Company. He was also involved
with Hughes' satellite systems Galaxy and Leasat.
89. He was aLso president of Caise d'Epagne.
90. Like the two shareholders: Dresher and Deutche banks from the
FRG
91. However, in 1989 SES announced two other birds to accompany Astra
as back up sateLlites.
92. Eutetsat is a twenty-six national orgariisation owned by the main
European PIT'S and based in Paris.
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93. The US proposals for trans AtLantic transmissions of telecoms
traffic including cable relay service, and even direct Live
transmission from America (InternationaL SateLlite Inc., RCA, Orion,
SateLlite Inc., Cygnous, Pan Am Sat and Cygnous Satellite
Corporation) gave further concern to European PTT's which are aLso
members of Intelsat.
94. The	 result	 would	 be	 "runius"	 competition	 with	 Eutelsat's
operating and scheduLed sateLLites because as its D.G., Andrea
Caruso, said "one system's far too much" and expressed his new that
Coronet would not materiaL ise.
95. CLI aLso accused Werner Government that was risking the company's
opportunity and thus the country's economic interests by backing
Coronet. However, Werner was Looking for a transponder for RTL plus
and could not wait for TDF1, took into consideration the Coronet
choice.
96. SES also succeeded to attract CLI to go for two transponders when
CLI was basically reluctant to join it. In effect, that was because
Santer Government left CLI in a comfortable position by reserving two
of Astra's transponders for CLT.
97. The buckers on the GDL projects were: SIS was consisted of public
Luxembourg institutions such as the State Saving Bank, the national
Credit and Investment Company, the National EmpLoyees Pension fund.
Whereas Coronet, S.A. the operator of Coronet headed by C. Whitehead
and its financing was expected to come from a number of equity
investors together with Leasing or other asset based financing from a
group of European financiaL institutions but is was understood that
the us Leading investment ban, Solomon Bothers was also involved.
(one investors were also tried to be fund in the European market who
would downpay $5-b	 milLion of the sateLlite. 	 By early 1985,
potential investors started emerging such as Beijer, a Swedish
investment company which took an 80 equity stake, and options on two
transponders. Dutch and French companies were also negotiating for
Coronet's transponders whereas Home Box Office (USA) held a smalL
equity position (Ogilvy and Matter Euromedia:January 1985). It
successor SES company invoLved cLass A shareholders who held 80 per
cent of the equity and 66 per cent of voting power mainly
Luxembourgish and European financial institutions and class B
sharehoLders each acquiring 10 per cent equity and between them 33
per cent of voting power. The whoLe Astra project benefit from the
Law of January 1986 under which the Government offered guarantees of
up to 3,5 bilLion LF in order to heLp SES to raise the necessary
funds. However, if one looks at the eleven original SES shareholders,
they die not incLude the type of media 'interests that could be
expected to join a sateLlite venture. The shareholders were five
banks, the two Luxembourg's state-run banks, two Scandinavian
companies, one French-private owned company and one specially created
Luxembourg company. Regarding the commercial banks the information
about their pLan were suggestions rather than anything specific
(Cable and SateLLite: July 1985). What is important, perhaps, Lies
with the fact that banks are not usually involved in such a new high
risk projects on their own whatever their ignorance on these matters.
Some observers suggested that they were acting as agents for
customers during SES' Launching wanted to remain anonymous (Cable and
SateLtite:May 1985). On the other hand, it was fashionable in the
1980's for banks to put a small amount of money into high risk areas.
However, they need, especiaLly institutions Like Dresador or Deutche,
to have a good reason to risk large amounts. This new capital was by
dept finance of the same vaLue giving the company total funding of
$96 million but it needed to find more since the totaL cost of the
system was estimated of about $125 milLion for Astra including
insurance and launch costs, this increase of capital necessitated a
restructuring in company's equity. Thames Television took permission
by IBA to take a 3,5 milLion (5%) of equity stake late 1986. FinalLy,
its licence period, even though there is a Little chance to loose it,
is for 22 years and should be renewed without much trouble.
98. The liberalization policy of Giscard's Administration and the
international economic developments had Limited the efficiency of the
Plan as welt as its feature to predict future trends.
99. Both the hAP and Hunt Reports repeated the urgent message for
research and study on the DBS impLications.
100. The manufacturers fall in two categories: those who make the
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hardware and those who make programmes. The whoLesalers are the Likes
BT in the case of hardware, and Ten, HBO and so in the case of
programmes. The retaiLers are the systems operators. Each of these
functions is a business in itseLf, and all of them together form the
industry.
101. For example, $1000 per subscriber in early 1980, so a 5,000
system equals $5 milLion. With such finances bank borrowing wouLd be
eas i er.
102. NevertheLess, some other special factors also pLayed an
important role. For example in BeLgium there was no advertising on
TV, so there was strong advertising support for RTL. But both UK and
France had no such speciaL factors.
325
NOTES FOR PART FOUR
1. The term 'consumer electronics' covers the following audiovisuaL
equipment: bLack/white and colour TV sets, radios, car radios, video
recorders, video cameras, video disk pLayers, digitaL record players,
tapes and cassettes, tape recorders, Hi-fi, reception equipment and
video games.
2.	 However, to correctLy estimate the European products one has aLso
to take into account products assembly in the EEC by Japanese firms.
3. These products associated with new technoLogies Suit to European
needs. Because they invoLve reLativeLy Little in terms of resources,
require skilled manpower, consumer small amounts of energy in
production, and most importantly they are high in vaLue added.
4. First, the impetus for evolution is internaL rather than a
response to externaL factors. Second, the process of deveLopment is
discontinuous i.e. there is no steady progression along an even path,
rather developments are 'bunched'. Last, developments produce changes
in quality not quantity, so that the new products and processes are
different from, or better than existing conditions.
5. A decLine in X accompanies the ascendancy of V. but X and V can be
widely separated in their location within the poLitical and economic
body.
6. The measures taken incLude state-funded 'rationaLisation
programmes', 'crisis cartel', tax concessions, trade barriers and the
'sociatisation' of toss-making concerns. Alt of these measures
invoLve a transfer of funds from the public sector to private hands.
Similar 'crash movements' characterise the methods the state uses to
promote 'new areas'. These include protection of 'infant industries'
state-funded R+O procurement practices, tax incentives for new
inventing, see (LocksLey:1983;131)
7.	 MainLy from CIT, Mackintosh, OgiLvy, and Mather, J.W. Thompson,
and Frost and Sullivan.
8. According to Luton and DunstabLe modeL (Economist InteLLigent
Unit 1983) "Cable Television in Western Europe", EIU:London costs in
densely popuLated European areas:
Cable and purchase and installation
Runnin g costs
Connection per subscriber
Decoder
Head end and Operational faciLities
first year
9.	 This is divided as:
Cost components
S 23,000 p/mile
$ 575 p/mile
S 175
S 144
5	 1,3	 miLLion	 in	 the
S million
3 x satellites at S 60m (md	 R+D)	 180
2 x Launches at S 36 million	 72
2 x insurance at 5 30 million	 60
Ground control installations	 20
Total	 332
10. In the Late history, France was stiLl a nation of smaLL
producers, heavy agricuLturaL and industrialLy stagnant. Most French
firms were much small and less aggressive than their counterparts
abroad.
11. The political and administrative apparatus of the state may be
more or Less unified or fragmented.
12. The "state above" is a characteristic of many French regimes
ranging from the Ancien Regime to the French Republic.
13. It becomes active when it acquires the capacity of controLLing a
set-ofpoticyretated Levers, providing access to critical
information and expertise, control, over domestic and international
capitaL f Lows etc.
14. This is also associated with the poLiticaL authority of a state
and its is reaffirmed regularLy in contemporary political discourse.
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15. The "Defi Americaine" by J.J. Servan-Schreiber was published in
1967 and warned Europe, being in period of economic decline, that It
would become subsidiary bf the USA if the European countries did not
integrate their economies and resources more effectively.
16. See note 21.
17. These include the fastest plan (Concorde), the TGV train, the
first Largest solar energy and tidal power plants, the most powerful
electronic microscope and Laser, one of the best TV system (SECAM),
nuclear centres of graphite gas, facilities and atomic submarines
etc.
18. The concept of "fitfére electronique" was seen in the Farnoux
Report submitted to the Minister of Research and TechnoLogy in March
1982 and presented to the press in May 1982. (Ministere de La
Researche et de La Technologie, Extraits du rapport de synthese de La
mission fit iere etectronique') and confirmed during a cabinet meeting
on July 28, 1982 giving generaL guidelines for the development of an
industrial strategy in the electronics sector.
19. A "filiére" of branch describes all sectors involved in
production from raw materials to final product.
20. Electronics was seen as a basic technology and any aspect of
economic activity escaped it. It was at the heart of strategic
products ranging from defence systems to systems of communication. It
was the essential eLement for technological and national independent.
ALL sectors of eLectronics industry are irterdependent from software
and information systems, office computerisation and automation to
consumer eLectronics without forgetting the military.
21. In effect, the term fitiere electronic" was used for eleven
sectors of electronic production:	 components,	 products,	 for	 the
General Public,	 office automated equipment, software data banks,
robotics,	 medical	 electronics,	 scientific	 instruments,	 telecoms,
military electronics, aerospace industry.
22. See the Farnoux Report Anexxes 12 and IV:7-8.
23. On new generations computers Bull has set in collaboration with
Siemens and ICL a research centre in Munich In telecorns (TI,
Alcatel, Siemens, Plessely and Itatet (Italy) are conducting joint
research into new exchanges and new transmission techniques. There is
also participation on the project.
24. For more see Financial Times: 20March87, p.20.
25. By the end of 1985, at least 50% of the shares in over a dozen
companies formerLy under state ownership was soLd to the private
sector.
26. GEC, Plessely, Rocat were importing US technology for a new
breed of digital	 telephone	 exchanges	 and mobile cellular	 radio
communications equipment.
27. ESPRIT	 -	 European Strategic	 Programme for	 Research	 and
Devteoprnent in Information Technology
RACE	 - Research and Advanced Communications in Europe
FAST	 - Forecasting and Assessment in Science and Technology
EUREKA - European Programme for High Technology Research and
Development
28. Such as 13 in the UK, 8 in the FRG, 6 in France, 4 in Ireland, 2
in Belgium, i.e. no less than 33 Japanese points were operating
within the EEC in 1985.
29. For background see Ptoman (1984).
30. ESA replaced the European Space Research Organisation and
European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO).
31. See also Ploman (1984a, b).
32. Arianespace is now a private company and
include 36 European space components manufacturers,
French CUES (the Latter with 34% of Arianne space)
been the major contributor, providing over 60% of th
its shareholders
11 banks and the
and France has
budget.
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33. Test flights for Ariane V are planned for 1994 with commercial
operations beginning in 1988/9. the Ariane programme employs around
10,000 personet in Europe and there have been more than 40 launch
vehicles in production. The cost of the programme in 1986 prices,
including all versions of Ariane up to IV and the facilities at
Kourou, was of the order of $ 12 billion and had orders in its books
worth $16 billion. Between 1985 and 1995, it planned to produce 80
launch vehicles at a cost of $ 80 miLlion each, or nearly $ 7 biLlion
worth.
34. The US mistake, according to ArianeSpace 0.0. t.as to "put alt of
their eggs in one basket" (Cable and Sateltite:JanUary, 1985).
35. Matra and BAE formed in 1981 the Satcom International consortium
targeted to build medium powered satellites.
36. UntiL 1974 the TV industry in the UK prospered. The b/w TV market
was protected by incompatible technical standards and by the absence
of any serious international competition. As the b/w market reached
saturation point, coLour TV was introduced in 1967. UK's colour
system was PAL and manufactured under Licence from AEG-Telefunken
(FRG). This Licence protected the UK companies from exporting PAL TV
sets of 20" screen size and above until 1983.
37. From firms Like Sanyo, Sony, Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi.
38.	 The most commonLy
second technological
trading relations and
political environment.
cited attractions include: Low Labour costs, a
base and hence components,	 suppliers,	 good
a large home market as well as an attractive
39. They were admitted to the British Radio and Electronic Equipment
Manufacturers Association and the Consumers ELectronics Sector
Working Party.
40. Grundig is linked by PhiLips' 24,5% equity in its shops.
41. In addition, the agreement provided by MIT! to establish a floor
price for exports. It was designed to align retail prices of the
Japanese units with those produced in Europe.
42. A curb on imports and a staff tax as well as licence fees.
43. NHK spent more than $ 300 milLion on HDTV technology. NHK
sponsored the development of HDTV cameras, VTRS, display equipment
and teletine (Satellite Communications:April, 1988;34).
44. Or as NTSC's nickname in the US: "Never The Same Colour".
45. The Europeans also argue that acceptin g a standard based on 60HZ
Frequency - the number of fields (half frames) a second - would place
the three quarters of the world, including Europe, which is on 50HZ
at a considerable disadvantage. But the fears of the European
manufactures are really about more than the electricity system.
46. The Biarritz pilot-scheme in which 1500 homes were to be linked
with an optic fibre network was interesting and shows the objectives
of the French government: (i) an industrial experiment which used
optic fibres, (ii) It used laser transmitters and needed 10,000 km of
optic fibre cable, a third of France's annuaL output and (iii) it was
to be used as a shop window for French industry and technology to the
worLd.
47. Oftel also had the discretion of alLowing alteration , of a
timetable if it wouLd facilitate the successful cabling of the whole
area.
48. Other shareholders of Eurosatetlite were Thomson (France), AEG
Telefunken (Germany) and ETCA (BeLgium). Aerospatiale's ties with MSB
in aircraft, missiLes and heLicopters go back 27 years. Now in order
to adapt to changing demands for smat ler and more efficient
satellites and to increase the fLexibility of their product range.
Aerospatiale and MBB unveiled a new formula for co-operation. In
1983, they announced collaboration on building a "family" of
satellites called Spacebus services. This was intended to meet the
international demand for DBS and tetecoms satellites covering a far
wider range of uses than ordered by the EuroSatellite grouping. But
the decision was prompted by the failure of EurosatetLite to live-up
to initial	 hopes of success on the world satellite market. 	 The
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EurosateLtite group formed in 1978 and each French and German company
has a 24% equity whereas ETCA has only 4%.
49. The aerospace industry according to this report employed
directLy some 165,000 people, with an additionaL 35,000 people in the
electronics sector working in avionics. its total turnover for 1984
was approximately £6 billion, of which haLf came from exports.
50. BAe, Marconi Thorn-EMI, Ferranti, Plessey, Logica and Software
sciences Limited had been involved with sateLlites as the providers
of sub systems for a wide range of international customers (Key Note
Report: 1985)
51. AlL bidders had guaranteed delivery in orbit with launch
insurance down to them. Hughed did all these and tipped the balance
with a booking on the first commercial Launch on the McDonald
Douglas, Thor Delta launcher brought back on steam to fuLfiL US Air
Force orders and agenenus financing deal.
52. Matra and British Aerospace (BAC) formed in 1981 the Satcom
international consortium targeted to building medium powered
satelLites.
53. Rediffusion, however, has been absent for years from the British
electronic market.
54. Members of that group included representatives of companies such
as Philips, Thomson, Fuba, Salora.
55. Some argued that they would need bigger antennae since a 85cm
dish would be totally unacceptable for reception for clear picture.
56. Some other Astra's technical benefits would be (1) its full
eclipse protection on alt channels would allow a 24 hours services
throughout the year, (2) full control of the transmission parameters,
(3)High Gil satellite performance wilt allow Astra to be accessed
with considerably small uplink terminal compared to existing
satellites, (4) less rain attention on the uplink path and (5) better
applicable due to its bandwidth for television transmission.
57. AustraLia goes for B-MAC while thee is E-MAC too!!
58. Effective satellite broadcasting on AM would require satellites
100 times more powerful.
59. The forgetful news-reader wearing a check-pattern jacket is the
most common exampLe.
60. Some were because MAC improved picture quality,over the current
PAL, and can also be used as a bridge for digital transmission and
encryption of signals and finally offers increased audio and sound
capacity on a DBS channel.
61. MAC because of its superior picture quality compared to PAL and
SECAM C, because of its capacity for digital sound and data signal
and Packet due to is Flexibility as a system to multiplex digital
sound and data signaLs.
62. In comparison D and D2 MAC packet originally intended for cable
distribution (Dosch:1985). D2-MAC uses frequency modulation for both
the video signal and the data burst and has only half the capacity of
GMAC but requires almost exactly the same corner-to-noise ration to
achieve the same bit error rate (Torstenssen: 1986, Morgan:1987).
This is hardly optimum use of the physical transmission medium.
Another feature of the C-MAC is its facility of changing the duration
of the data burst. Then the compatibility of the MAC packet systems
is still in doubt.
63. The enhanced television is far better suited with GMAC than D2-
MAC. By reducing the length of the data burst to accommodate only one
sterophonic sound channel (for a TV programme) space capacity is
released. This approach is unfortunately not practical for D2-MAC,
particularly if stereo sound is required for the enhanced service.
This means that a high powered satellite which carries four channels
of sound uses D2 MAC has wither 4 monophonic sound channels or 2
stereo channels but in no way 4 stereo sound channels as with C2-MAC.
64. The Eureka project has brought such further developments in to
what called is Phases Iii and IV. Phase Iii concerns the introduction
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of a wider aspect of TV and additionaL picture enhancement
techniques, but says with 625. Phase IV is a fuLL HD MAC standard
expected by 1995. Sets to receive this standard would cost £1,500
approximateLy. One of the reasons for some deLay is the need to
further develop the bandwidth compression techniques.
65. So that (i) consumers must not be obliged to purchase more than
one receiver and conditionaL access system in order to view the
sateLLite programme of their choice and (ii) programme providers may
devide the cost of development of one system which wilt provide
conditional access to aLl their programmes amongst the themselves.
66. Philips experience on VCR and Thomson's with the Far East
products have made them to keep a momentum behind MAC to stop 'Hi
Vision'. This arrangement has been agreed in outline by the IBA,
Thomson, Philips and TDF since aLl hold some relevant MAC patterns,
but Intermetall (ITT) for one has Let non-European manufacturers know
that it intends to licence its chips to a wider range of suppliers.
67. The European TeLevision Task Force is a gathering of politicians
and broadcasters ancient and modern to produce a report on the future
in an era of privatiSation, commercialisation and satellites and
funded by the European CuLtural Foundation, a private Dutch - based
outfit.
68. The Commission aLso supported this initiative: the so-catted
Europa-TV.
69. Such as soft Loans, tax exemptions, and above aLl a Community
fund to subsidize the making of European programmes. See resolutions
of EEC Council of Ministers in July 1984 and OJEC 2.5.1983, 13.
Moreover the consideration for a Community fund was presented on
April 23, 1983 from the Commission to the Council on a regulation on
a Community Support Scheme for non-documentary cinema and TV co-
production. The Council of Culture Minister was supportive to this
idea.
70. "Feuilteton" is a French style soap-opera, 	 is a genre that
reached French TV screens fairly Late in the day.
71. Other "DaLLas'a La Francaise" were considered "Le Paria", "Alto
B e a t r i C e"
72. SimilarLy in France Dallas was ranking second.
Dallas	 Chateauvat ton	 Alto Beatrice	 Paria
	
1984	 28%	 37,7%	 13%
	
1985	 22,5%	 30,7%
Paria was on FR3, thus the 13% is reasonable (SiLJ et aL:1988).
73. Reasons of quota systems being not so successful in relation to
those of 1920's and 1930's were the dependence of European economies
on the USA during the post war, thus it made it difficult for them to
insist on quotas.
74. It does not correspond exactly to the nationality criteria used
in nationaL legislation in support of cinema production adopted by
Member States applying the Directive of 15 December 1963 and intended
to bring cinema industry within the overall programme of dismantling
restrictions on the free availability of services. This Directive,
laid down in the framework of the overall programme for the
suppression of restrictions on the free circulation of services
adopted by the EC in 1962, was seen as a transnationat act.
75. For more information look at European Institute for the Media
(1987) "Towards a European common market for Television" Manchester,
pp 137-157.
76. ibid.
77. From a lecture of BBC's D.G., M. Checkland in the Media Guardian
Series, National Film Institute 18 March 1989.
78. In this situation, producers and distributors from the 12 EEC
countries have worked out a model for a European co-operative for the
Distribution of Low-Budget Films. This model is based on a co-
distribution mechanism receiving half of its income from advances on
receipts and half from the distributors.
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Table
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
79. PersonaL communication with John Woodward.
80. Radio Organique, Radio 104.
81. This body had as its main aim to support the production
industries and help the restructuring of the cinema industry. IFCIC
was also abLe to provide the banking sector with guarantees to cover
requests for credit made by new companies or be companies which were
anxious to grow.
82. AdditionalLy, the Bredin Report used liv as an example for
regional programming on French TV. From 102 hours of ITV's week, 49
came from the "Big Five", 10 from regional, 7 for information and 28
hours for programmes. Thus, it is not clear why ITV should be
considered as an example for the rest (82). Moreover, estimated from
the knowledge Research (1987) put that total BBC TV output wouLd have
risen to 16,215 by 1988 LargeLy as a result of the introduction of
early morning and daytime scheduLing. Production of new originated
network programming would have risen to 6,O49hours, whereas the
regional programming wiLL hav-e risen from 3,016 hours in 1982/83 to
4,228 by 1988. For the commerciaL teLevision system the totaL output
is expected to rise to 13,660 hours and production of new originated
network programming wiLl have risen from 2,458 hours to 4,095 hours
whereas local programming wilt have risen from 5440 hours to 5662
hours before becoming steady.
83. The French people, however, in 1984 in a CIT survey were asking
for more programming and 68 per cent of the respondents were willing
to see more feature films whereas 20 per cent of them were prepared
to pay to see fiLms. They also desired a wider range of programmes
(Broadcast: 7 September 1984).
84. Nevertheless, the ITV companies continued to transmit 100 hours
of factuaL programming in peak-time (7pm to 10pm) as required by the
IBA. But in prime-time lighter material had been increased between
1975 to 1985 from 44 per cent to 65 per cent on liv, and from 34 per
cent to 51 per cent on BBC1. Much of this programming was built
around star personalities, celebrities, star writers etc.
85. From an interview in "Multimedias" Magazine No. 36, June 1982
p22.
86. In relation to the UK and FRG, France lacked in ads expenditure
in 1985 expenditure in USS on television, France had 324 miLLion,
whereas the FRG 496 million and the UK 1,766 million.
87.
Table
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
S.F.P. Production
TF1	 A2	 FR3
90h00	 116h00	 5h00
79h00	 101hOO	 2h00
52h00	 74h00	 5h00
77h00	 116h00	 lhOO
60h00	 136h00	 6h30
43h44	 62h26	 7h22
FR3/Sept	 SFP( 1)
2h 10
	
21 hOO
(1) SFP produces its own programmes and also seeks for their salLe
Source	 STTI/CNCL 1986/87
French TV Internal Production
TF1	 A2	 F3
	
52h00	 15h00	 44h00
	
12h00	 15h00	 47h00
	
5h00	 14h00	 55h00
	
9h00	 7h00	 56ho0
-	 5h00	 49h00
-	
-	 70h00
	
5h00	 8h00	 42h00
-	
-	 22h(1)
Source: STTI/CNCL 1986/87
88. The "must carry" rule would not apply to existing limited
capacity systems arrangements were made for subscribers to receive by
alternative means, the BBC and Iiv/C4 services. One way of doing this
would be to supply aeriaLs to households so releasing the cabLe
network from carrying the broadcasting services.
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89. Thematic services were first seen in Europe in 1984 with the
development of cabLe networks in the IlK and FRG, and with a
terrestrial popuLar music service in Italy.
90. Screen is to cost £10 a month, the equivalent of renting one and
a half video cassettes a week, and would be devoted to screening 25
feature films a month, including, perhaps, two major features. BSB
aLso claims that it wants to stimulate independent production by
producing 12 fiLms per year made in the UK, and to offer 400 fiLm a
year. It aLso announced that £14 million wouLd be invested over three
years into British film production.
91. Press moguLs used to be called those who belonged to the first
era of the mass popular press in the early years of the 20th century.
Media-moguls re-appeared in force in the mid and Late century.
92. Since 1969, however, the Community through the commission has
produced a series of documents and the CounciL of Ministers adopted a
number of Resolutions aimed at maintaining and encouraging the
Community cultural heritage. Two pamphlets provide usefuL background:
CulturaL Action in the European 	 Community. European Documentation
1980, and the European	 Community and CuLture. European File 14/85.
93. TV5's primary aim is to strengthen the position of the French
speaking world, and to be a showcase for French - Language television
productions - and in a world to give peopLe a francophone view of the
world (see also E. Roy:1988;30-1).
94. The scheme for a teLevision fostering third sector investors was
entrusted to Regie Francaise des Espaces which made use of the
existing state-run channeLs. RFE wouLd hire out time of the 3 state
channels outside their normaL transmission hours to companies,
associations, groups and so on. Trade unions and politicaL parties,
however, were not to be allocated to rent the avaiLable TV time. For
anything between five minutes to an hour, the groups which would
have purchased this facility would be able to use it for public
information programmes, staff training, company communication,
educational or cuLtural programmes Le Monde :27 October 1983).
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APPENDIX A
METHODS IN ACTION: DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT
This project followed a previous, in-depth study of the EC
Commission's Television Without Frontiers policy in 1985.
The Final Directive, as well as new thoughts about the
whole way that the EC works, enriched my understanding of
the policy and general policy process within the EC, making
me realise that communications policy, particularly
television policy, concerns an interrelationship and
reaction between the external realities and domestic
internal needs and pressures. Thus, when we speak about
television policy today, we have to distinguish between
conventional TV and the new means of transmission by cable
and satellite. A second question concerns the kind of
policy followed for the development of cable, and satellite
TV's impact on conventional TV and vice versa. But the EC's
policy alone could not clarify certain points. The
Commission speaks about television in general, especially
about regulations on legal aspects and quotas. Thus, I had
to look at particular countries.
France was very special, not only because I lived there
during 1984-85 but because I witnessed fundamental changes
in this country's television structure. Then, I wanted to
see what, why and how a Socialist Government formulated its
television policy. Why did it follow that policy path? Was
it coincidental or planned? Other things made me look at
France. The first was how policy changes- in the
broadcasting system of this country depend on who is in
power. Since the Liberation, every government has wished to
apply its own legislation to the audiovisual landscape. The
Socialist Government was the first Left administration to
govern France since the constitution of the Fifth Republic.
It was also interesting because it represented a new kind
of socialism in Europe, or rather a new tendency in
European socialism to adopt commercial policies. Secondly,
France is a leading European country, mainly due to its
'defi Americaine' anxiety. Changes in France influence
other European or EC countries.
When I came to the UK to continue my studies, I started
looking at the policy and broadcasting of this country more
critically. In effect, I learnt how British broadcasting
differs from the rest of the Continent. British
broadcasting has always been surrounded by myth in Europe;
changes in this system seemed to be significant in the rest
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of the Continent. It has always been used as a point of
reference by Europeans. Thus, living in the UK led me to
start making some comparisons with other countries. Why did
the UK adopt the C4 approach? And France the C+ one? Who is
conservative and who is progressive? I started comparing
France and the UK, as well as French Socialists and British
Conservatives. Then I looked at cable and satellite and
here the puzzle increased: in both countries, development
was too slow whatever the policy path followed. This was
one more incentive to compare these countries.
Why Luxembourg? The whole fuss Coronet created with France
made me wonder why this country should not go ahead with
its projects. Why did France react so strongly? It would
have been hard to exclude Luxembourg; it was always in my
French resources: 'CLT does this', 'CLT reacts in that
way', 'Coronet is a Coca-Cola satellite against the French
culture'. Why, finally, does Luxembourg risk going into the
satellite business? Because I come from a small country as
well (Greece), I am sensitive to their position in the
world.
Despite being a very European study, it is also somewhat
impartial. During the three years of investigating and
searching, the London-Brussels-Luxembourg-Paris-London
loop was repeated many times. I met people in all four
cities; all of whom were helpful - or most of them - and I
would like to thank them again.
This project is strongly based on documents, interviews,
press cuttings, database searches and a wide range of books
and articles on the subject. Documents were a prime source
for their capacity to define a policy, or policy path, at
least to a point. Here, I mean official government
documents that show government intentions, including all
public documents relating to the issue under examination.
There are also 'personal' documents, which I have
classified as private correspondence and annotated
documents. The official documents have also been seen under
the light of various articles and books of the field
concerned with some of the issues. Then all of these
sources have been linked to press cuttings. Press cuttings
have been used to indicate how the policy debate has been
represented in the media, inevitably including active
publicity-seeking. However, a feature of this field is the
frequency with which press stories are quickly denied by
events (or some 'judicious' statements) . Therefore,
official documents have been used as primary sources.
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Academic articles also helped, while some press cutting and
articles from specialised magazines gave some other
perspectives.
One problem was too many written 'peripherals' that were
mainly useless. Being selective does not imply reliance on
a few sources only. I tried to incorporate as much foreign
literature as possible to be able speak about France with
French references. This gave me the chance to review some
French thinkers on policy and the media, largely ignored in
the Anglo-Saxon school.
This dissertation has had many versions. At the beginning,
each country was examined individually. At a second stage,
I started making comparisons in the major points and,
finally, wrote a first draft of the whole project.
Interviews were used to support or enrich my ideas, or to
clarify some misunderstandings. As noted above, this study
is very European, thus the interviews for were conducted in
three phases in London, Brussels, Luxembourg and Paris. The
questionnaire was an 'open-ended', 'elite-style' interview
with a checklist of questions. Sixty interviews were
carried out with a median length of 90 minutes. (20 in
Paris, 5 in Brussels, 6 in Luxembourg, 29 in London). They
were not tape-recorded; written notes were the only record.
The interviews consisted of oral evidence, suggestions and
critiques.
334
APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY*
Analogue: information can be scored and transmitted via analogue signals (frequency
modulations) or digitally (in streams of numerals). Analogue form is slower, less
versatile and more prone to interference than digital form. See digital.
Bandwidth: a measure of transmission capacity in communications. Full colour
television pictures require wide bandwidth; much less is needed for voice cornmuni-
cations. See cable.
Broadcasting 'Off-Air': the process of transmitting information (generally TV or
radio programmes) to the public over the radio (hertzian) airwaves. By definition,
it is a form of 'mass communication' only. See narrowcas'ing.
Cable: is one of three means of transmission in telecommunications (microwaves and
- satellites are the other two). This form of communications by wire is provided by
three types of cable which vary in bandwidth. The greater the bandwidth of cable,
the more information it can carry simultaneously and the more complex that
inlormalion can he (e.g. video as well as audio signals). Multi-pair copper cable
has been traditionally used for television reception; it has a narrow bandwidth
with four to six channels. Copper-coaxial cable and fibre-optic cable offer broad-
baud (high-capacity communications). Cable's development proceeds in the
following phases: making broadcast signals available in areas of poor 'off-air'
reception; making distant stations available thereby increasing the number of
channels received; making new types of local, 'telematic' and pay-TV channel
available (including uiarro wcasting); and integrating (elevision services with
interacIii'e services.
Cable Television: a telecommunications system that delivers TV channels and by wire
(cable) to a subscriber's TV receiver. New developments in cable technology mean
that modern cable systems can carry other services such as 'home shopping', 'home
banking', data transmission and telephone.
CCITT (Coinité Consultarif International Télégrap/iique ci Télépli onique): the Inter-
national Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee is the committee,
through which the ITU regulates telecommunications standards. It is essentially
consultative with no legal jurisdiction over its members. Nevertheless, CCITT
standards are generally accepted throughout the world. They cover the transmission
of data in many forms via telex, telephone and other public data networks.
Cellular Radio: uses the airwaves more efficiently than traditiohal radio telephone
technology for the purpose of mobile communication. A country is divided into
a honeycomb of small cells around low-powered transmitters/receivers. Mobile
subscribers are connected to other cells or the main telephone network by means
of cables linking the local transmitters/receivers to a computer-controlled exchange.
Microprocessor technology is at the heart of the technique. The largest service in
operation is the Nordic Mobile Telephone system which spans Sweden, Norway,
Denmark and Finland and had by 1985 over 150,000 subscribers.
CEPT(Conférence Européenne des A drninist rations de Postes et Télécommunications):
the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations is
the European branch of the ITU, organising 26 member administrations. Its basic
aim is technical standardisation, in order to 'harmonise and improve the adrnin-
istracive and technical services' of its members. It is essentially a consultative organ
with no legal jurisdiction over its members.
Closed User Group: an arrangement giving designated users exclusive access to part
of a videocex data base.
* From Dyson and Hurnphreys (1987)
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CwnputerPrograinme: a set of instructions fed into a computer enabling it to handle
data which are also fed into it (see software).
Copper Coaxial Cable: has a higher bandwidth and thus larger capacity than traditional
cable technology. It uses a copper conductor and amplifiers or repeaters at
intervals to boost the signal. This technology can offer up to between 30 and 50
channels but typically has limited interactive capacity compared optic-fibre cable.
Digital: information can be stored or transmitted in digital (as a series of distinct
pulses) or analogue (as a signal fluctuating in intensity) form. In digital form the
information consists of a series of separate characters that usually have only two
possible states (e.g. 'on' or 'off', 1 or 0, etc.). Information stored or transmitted
digitally is resistant to interference, can cope with much more in formation and can
integrate voice with data and pictures. Digital signals can be more easily stored
and manipulated.
Digital Television Sets: produce better-quality television pictures and allow the viewer
to 'play' with the image on the screen, e.g. 'freezing' the picture or displaying
several different signals simultaneously (windowing').
Direct Broadcasting Satellite: (DBS) a geostationary satellite which picks up broadcast
signals from an earth station and then retransmits them back to earth. The signal
is powerful enough for it to be received direct (by the consumer) by means of a
domestic dish aerial fixed to the roof (or in the garden) measuring as little as 90cm
in diameter.
Display technologies: Liquid crystal display technologies replace cathode ray technology
as television receivers and enable small television sets and flat screens for 'wall-
hanging' to be made.
Electronic Mail: a service which combines teletex and facsimile; subscribers are
provided with 'electronic mail boxes'. An example is British Telecom's Telecom
Gold.
Electronic Switching: effectively replaces electro-mechanical systems of telecommuni-
cations switching by computer control. The British 'System X' is an example.
European Broadcasting Union (EBU): was established in 1950 and has 40 members
(mainly West European public broadcasting organisations) in 33 states. It is
perhaps best known for its daily Eurovision news exchanges. EBU has three main
activities - programming (including programme exchange and co-production), legal
(e.g. copyright issues) and technical (e.g. transmission standards). Under its auspices 	 -
a number of West European public broadcasting stations experimented with a joint
European television programme (Eurikon), eventually launched on satellite as
Europa-TV in 1985.
European SpaceAgency: is an organisation founded in 1975. It reflects the ambition of
European states to develop an independent space technology programme, including
satellites and launchers. It produces the Ariane launcher (mainly a French product),
and the ECS and Olympus satellites. It has 11 members, but is heavily reliant on
finance from its larger members, notably France and West Germany (and to a lesser
extent also Britain and Italy).
Eutelsat (European Telecommunications Satellite Consortium): is an association of
26 European PTTs, established in 1982 to provide satellite services in Europe. It
manages the OTS/ECS satellites (Orbital Test Satellite/European Communications
Satellite), allocating available transponders.
Facsimile: a service that enables documents to be copied and transmitted from one
location to another at great speed via the telephone network, thus bypassing he
postal services.
Filière: describes a web of relationships and interdependency between industrial actors
in and among sectors; typically it involves a how of goods and is based on a
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strong technological relationship (e.g.fi/ière
 électronique). Analysis of these chains
of relationship is aimed at providing a basis for rational government intervention
aimed at 'strategic' points in the fi/ière. It had a strong influence on French
industrial policy under the Socialists.
Footprint: (of a Direct Broadcasting Satellite): Geographical area over which a
satellite signal can be received.
Frequencies: radio waves are one form of electro-magnetic waves, which consist of
electric and magnetic vibrations and were discovered by Herz. They carry radio
signals and are described in terms of wavelength (with radio waves being the
longest) and frequency (the number of waves passing a given point in a given time).
Gateway: in videotex, an arrangement providing access to a third party computer.
Geostationary Orbit: if placed in orbit 36,000 km above the earth, a satellite's speed
matches the earth's rotation and hence its position relative to the earth's surface
remains constant.
Hardware: A  general term to describe the electronic or mechanical components of a
communications system: e.g. satellite, computer terminal, TV set, etc.
High Definition Television: developed by NHK, the main Japanese broadcasting
organisation offers high picture quality by using 1,125 lines (as opposed to the
625 lines now in use for colour television and earlier 405 for black-and-white) and
60 fields (picture repetitions) per second to reduce screen flicker. The main
competitor is the British 1BA's C-MAC, which seeks a more evolutionary approach
using fewer lines (625) but achieving much sharper picture quality by keeping
colour and brightness separate. Extended C-MAC will permit cinema screens in
the home.
HoineBankiag/Telebanking: term used to refer to the ability to call up information
about one's bank account, transfer money from one account to another, pay bills,
etc., from one's home terminal by means of an interactive videotex or cable system.
Home Shopping/Teleshopping: terms used to refer to the ability to order goods, make
transactions, etc., from the home by means of an interactive videotex or cable system.
Information Provider: an orgariisation that supplies the information stored on the
computer ofa public videotex or private 'value-added' or data service, e.g. banks,
news agencies, mail order firms, travel agencies.
Integrated Circuits: complete electronic circuits on tiny chips of semi-conductor
(silicon). They make possible the microminiaturisation of electronic equipment.
late/sat (International Telecoinin un ications Satellite Organisation: is an international
organisation with over 100 member states. It is under the overall direction of a board
of governors representing these states, but in fact its technical and operational
functions are supplied by COMSAT (the American Communications Satellite
Corporation). It manages the Intelsat communications satellites, and is responsible
for running the majority of the world's communications satellites.
Interactive: a term to describe 'two-way' communication or a 'two-way communication
system' that permits transmission as well as reception of messages. An interactive
facility on a cable or videotex system can be used for a wide range of purposes:
including home shopping, home banking, automated dealing in securities etc.
lnternaeiona/ Te/ecominunicwions Union (ITU): an international body under the
auspices of the United Nations that is responsible for the allocation of radio
frequencies. It has been traditionally dominated by technical experts and engineers.
In recent years politicians have increasingly recognised the ITU's strategic import-
ance. Consequently its work is becoming more and more 'political' See also WARC,
ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network): ultimately this system will transform
telecoininunieation.s into 'videoeoiiiznunjcatioiis'. By means of a combination of
digital signals and new cable systems, much more information will be transmitted,
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at greater speed and efficiency, on a single s ystem; this will permit the integration
of voice with data and graphics, e.g. cable television, high-speed facsimile trans-
mission, videophone.
Microprocessor: silicon chips that are themselves miniature computers, combing the
di ffereiit functions of a computer - memory, cont rot unit etc. They can he
incorporated in all types of equipment, revolutionising telecommunications and
broadcasting.
Microwave: very short wavelength radio waves which are used for high capacity
terrestrial point-to-point links.
Ivioclein: is a modulating/demodulating device used to process electronic signals for
transmission: for example, a telephone modem translates signals from a home
computer for transmission over a telephone line to ar1othcr computer. These devices
allow a remote terminal to be used when connected to the computer over the normal
telephone system.
Narrowcasiing: term used to refer to the aiming of programmes at specialised interest
groups. It involves a step beyond 'broadcasting', where programmes have to
contain a mass appeal, and is facilitated by broadband cable systems.
Online: direct contact between one computer and another; or between a terminal and
a computer.
Opiical-fthre cable: a 'vanguard technology' (tee/,nulo,'ic depoiiic'), this type of cable
is more modern and complex, but also much more costly at present than copper-
coaxial cable. It has a high 'interactive' capability. It use light pulses to transmit
a large amount of information through micro-thin glass or plastic fibres. It provides
a very wide bandwidth with much less signal loss (with distance) and distortion than
copper-coaxial cable.
Overall (of a Direct Broadcasting Satellite's signal): signals from DBS satellites may
cover parts or all of countries, other than the country to which the WARC conference
allocated a particular channel.
PA 13X (Pri vale A  utomatic Brai:c/: Exchange): modern digital PA I3Xs can switch
computer data, telex messages, and even facsimile as easily as voice conversations.
The PABX lies at the heart of any modern office system.
PTTs: the term traditionally refers to the authorities that have sole responsibility for
he operation and regulat ion of the telecommunications network.
Satellites: to an extent replace and to an extent augment terrestrial technologies like
cable and microwave relay systems. Located in space, they receive and transmit
signals across huge distances and can be used tor international or domestic
communication. There are different types: general communications satellites (like
he I utelsat and ECS satellites), weather, cart h-mapping, scientific research.
navigation, military reconnaissance and surveillance, and direct broadcasting (DBS
satellites. The European Communication Satellites have been launched by the
European Space Agency and are managed by Eutelsat. Like the Intelsat satellites they
handle broadcasting as well as telecommunications transmission. Broadcasting from
these satellites requires large receiving dishes and is typically suited to the pro-
gramming of cable television systems. DBS (direct broadcasting by satellite) e.g.
France's TDF-1 has a more powerful signal that can be picked up by a much smaller
dish. Many satellites arc in geostationary orbit.
Semi conductor: a material, such as silicon or germanium, which can be arranged as
an insulation or a conductor of electricity, dependent upon the direction of an
externally applied current.
Silicon chip: a wafer-fragment o I pure silicon, only a few milimetres square, upon
wlmftlm an 'integrated Lircuit' i' printed. See i,li'cra(e(Ieirc,,iI. '/)iF/)rees.c()rand
semiconductor.
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Software: information and instructions that have been specially designed to provide
the user with something useful when combined with a particular item of hardware,
e.g. videotape, tv programme, computer programme etc.
Switching equipment: opens up a circuit for a subscriber when he/she requires it. See
electronic switching.
Teleconferencing/Videoconferencing: two or more people can be brought together
by videophone for a conference. This facility can be supported by other 'interactive'
services, e.g. facsimile.
Telemwics: refers to an extension of services beyond voice to data and video communi-
cations; telematics has been made possible by the microprocessor which enables
terminals to become 'intelligent'. It signifies the totality of techniques involving
the 'marriage' of telecommunications and computing.
Teletex: a service resembling Telex (but much quicker and more versatile) in which
messages can be transmitted via word processors.
Teletext: information (text and very simple static graphics) displayed on the television
screen, which is transmitted on the back of the broadcast TV signal. Only a limited
number of pages (frames) can be broadcast per TV channel. The system is not inter-
active. Examples are Antiope in France and the BBC's Ceefax or the ITV's Oracle
in Britain.
Terminal: a term used to refer to an item of hardware that allows information to be
displayed (usually on a screen) and allows information input (usually by a keyboard).
Value-A dded Network services (VANs). combine communications and the power of
computers to provide a wide variety of information and transaction services, e.g.
electronic mail, videotex services, reservation and billing services.
Video-Cassette Recorder: plays back video-tapes on which are recorded video (or
vision) signals as well as audio (or sound) signals. When the original electronic signals
are reproduced, they can be transmitted as a television picture.
Videophone: permits 'audiovisual' (sound plus sight) telephony by means of 'intelli-
gent' terminals and broadband cable links. At present, it is being tested in Western
Europe, notably by the French at Biarritz.
Videote.v or Viewdato: a term used to refer to a communications system tha makes
computer-based information available on a visual display unit orTV screen. It uses
the telephone lines or a cable network to connect the screen to the computer.
In formation is called up by the user by means of a keyboard.
Visual Display Unit (VDU): a screen attached to a computer or word processor by
means of which the user can see the information that is being fed into/called up
on the system.
WARC: World Administrative Radio Conferences: they allocate radio/satellite
frequencies and orbital positions. The WARC are convened by the ITU. At WARC
71 (in 1971) the first allocation of frequency bands to the broadcasting satellite
service were made. At WARC 77 (in 1977) a complex international plan for satellite
broadcasting was drawn up, which will be valid until at least 1994 and possibly
into the next century.
Word Processor: a specialist function of a computer which processes information,
manipulates texts, etc.
339
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allison G.T. (1971) "Essence of Decision", Boston : Little Brown.
Almond	 C.	 and PareLl 0.	 (1966) "Comparative Politics", 	 Boston
Little Brown.
ALtheide D.L.	 and Snow P.R.	 (1979) "Media Logic", Beverly Hills:
Sage.
Attheide L.D. (1985) "Media Power", Beverly Hills: Sage.
Aithuser L. (1969) "Pour Le Marx", Paris: Maspero.
Annan	 Committee (1977)	 "Report of the Committee on the Future of
Broadcasting", HMSO March 1977, Cmnd. 6753.
Anon	 A. (1981a) "Du coté du pouvoir" in Liberation, 19 June, p.p.2.
Anon	 A. (1981b) "Radios et Liberté" in Le Monde, 20 June, p.p.8.
Anon	 A. (1981c) "53	 des Français estiment normaux les 	 changements
desres pousabte" in Le Monde: 10 October, p.p.23.
Anon A.	 (1981d) "I.e Rapport Moinot:Unvetais entre audiovisuel et le
pouvoir Liberation 15 October, p.p.6.
Ardach J. (1984) France in the 1980's, London: Penguin Books.
Attali J.	 and Stourdze V.	 (1977) The Slow Death of Monologue in
French Society, Mass:MIT press.
Balle G. and Rogers (1985) (eds), The media Revolution in American
and Western Europe, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
Batle F.
	 and Eumery 0.
	 (1984),	 Les Wouveaux Medias, Paris: Cue-
sais je? P.U.F.
Baker S.
	 (1988) "Mac comes into cLearer focus" in Cable and
SateLlite, p.p.46-7.
Baker S.	 (1985), "TDF-1 DBS For Europe" in
	 Cable and Satellite,	 June
1985, p.p.18-9.
Baker S.	 (1984), "Ready	 with	 the dishes	 for	 TDF-1"	 in	 Cable_
and SateLlite: September 1984, pp.18-21.
Barach P. and M.	 Baratz (1962),	 "Two Faces of Power" in American
Political Science	 Review 56(1962), p.p.997-52.
Barach P. and	 M. Baratz	 (1963), "Decisions	 and Hon-decisions" in
American Science	 Review 57(1963), p.p.645-51.
Barouch D.	 (1986), "L" Etat assure La moitié du financement de TDF1
et TDF2 in Le Monde: 19 March 1986, p.23
Barry 8.	 (1978),	 "Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, 	 Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Baudouin P.	 (1986), "La Communication est 	 l'affaire de tous"	 in
Medias et Pouvoirs No.2, Marsh 1986, p.p.77-83.
Baudrillard	 J.	 (1972),	 Pour une Critique de l'Economie Potitique
du Signe, Paris.
BaudriLlard J. (1983), SimuLations, N York: Semiotext.
Baudrillard J.	 (1978), A t'ombre des Majorites Silenciences ou Ia
Fin du Social. Utopie, Paris: L'Impre-merie Quotidienne.
BBC TV (1985), Facts and Fi g ures London, The BBC Booklet.
Beddard R. (1980), Human Ri g hts and Europe London: Sweet and Maxwell.
Bell D. (1973), The Comrning of the Post Industrial Society, New York:
Basic Books.
Bendix	 R.	 (1968)	 (ed),	 State	 and	 Society	 :	 A	 reader	 in
comparative Political Sociology, Boston : Little Brown.
340
Bennet T. 1982), "Theories of the media; theories of society" in
Curran et at (eds) Culture, Societ y and the Media, London: Methuen.
de Bens E.	 Knoche 14.	 (1987),	 Impact	 of New Communication
Technologies on Media Industry in the EC-Countries (FinaL Report),
Fast -Occasional Papers, 	 No.	 160	 (Rev)	 February 1986.	 CEC:
Directorate-General for Science, Research and Development.
Beresford P.	 and JAY (1986),	 "Bonanza from the sky" in Sunday
Times: 31 August 1986.
Betrand C.J. (1985), "Cable TeLevision in France" in Negrine R.
(1985) Cable Television and the future of broadcasting, Croom Helm:
London.
Betts	 p .	 (1986),	 "A	 new	 political	 row	 looms	 into	 view"	 in
FinanciaL Times: 18 June 1986.
Betts P.	 (1985)	 "A noisy entrance to a new TV age"	 in
Financial Times: 27 November 1985.
Betts	 P.	 (1984),	 "Government	 encourages	 closer	 European
collaboration" in Financial Times: 11 JuLy l984,p.4
BEUC (1987), Help, they have changed our Television Research
carried out by the Centre D'Etudes de Ia Communication - Cecorn,
%Jniversité de Louvain - La - Neuve, Belgium: Brussels May 1987.
Bicknett	 14.	 (1986),	 Television Distribution without Frontiers:
The Market opportunity for	 SES Astra, Luxembourg: SES.
Birnbaum P. (1977), Les somrnets de t'Etat Paris: Points-Politique.
Blanchad 14. (1982), What's this channel Four?, London: Comedia.
Blondel J.	 and E.	 Brexel/Godfrey Jr (1986), The Government of
France London: Methuen and Company Limited.
Blum S. (1984) "Le fin de tabous?" in Le Monde Diptomatigue, May
1984, p.p.2l.
Btumter	 J.	 and Gurevitch 14.	 (1977) "Linkages between the Mass
Media and
	 Politics:	 a Model	 for the analysis of	 political
communications systems" in Curran et at (eds),
	
Mass Communications
and Society, Hong Kong: Arnold.
Btumter J.G. (1980), "Mass Communication research in Europe:
some origins and prospects" in Media. Culture and Society 1980 (2)
367-376.
Blumter J.G. (1986) (ed), Research on the Range and Quatity of
Broadcasting Services; A Report for the Committee on Financing the
BBC, London:HMSO.
Btum(er J.
	
et at	 (14.	 Brynin,	 T.J.	 Nossiter)	 (1986),	 "Broadcasting
Finance and Programme	 Quality:	 an InternationaL	 Review",	 in
European Journal of Communication, VoL 1 (1986), 343-69.
Bombardier D. (1975), La voix de Ia France, Laffort: Paris.
Bonnaud J.J.	 (1966),	 "Participation by works and employers	 in
planning in France", International Labour Review, 93 (4), 337,61.
Bonnaud J.J	 (1975),	 PLanning and Industry in France" in J. 	 Hayward
and	 Bonnaud J.J. (1975)(eds) "Planning Politics and Public Policy"
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Book	 A.	 (1984),	 "French,	 British	 Cable	 Systems	 being
developed differently in database INSPEC, p.p.112-13 search November
1986.
Book	 K.	 (1984),	 "French	 British	 Cable	 System	 being
developed differently" in INSPEC Journal, vol 47, No.4, p.p.112-1l3.
Bottomorre 1.8.	 (1972),	 Sociolgy:
	
A guide	 to problems and
Literature, London: Unwin Gross Limited, Revisited edition.
341
Bottomorre T.B.	 (1972),	 Sociolt,gy:
	
A guide	 to	 problems	 and
Literature, London: Unwin Bross Limited, Revisited edition.
Boucher	 Le	 E.	 (1983),	 " L'industrie	 francaise	 devra	 mettre
tes bouchees doubles" in Le Monde: 20 January 1983, p.p.4-5.
Boudon J.
	 (1986),	 "Le statut de l.a television en	 France,	 un
consesus inovouabte?"	 in Intervention No.5 January/February/March
1986,	 p.p.44-51.
Boyd-Barret 0.
	 (1980),	 The internationaL News Agencies,	 London:
Constable.
Boyd-Barret 0.
	 (1982),	 "Cultural	 dependency	 and	 the	 media"	 in
Curran	 et at.	 (eds)	 CuLture Societ y and the Media, London: Methuen.
Bradshaw	 D.	 (1988),	 "LeveL	 of	 demand	 stilL	 causes	 concern"
in Financial	 Times:	 Special.	 Section:	 Broadcasting	 Revol.utj9. ,	 16
December 1988, p.p.2.
BraitLand P.
	 (1985),	 a: "France : going private?" Intermedia, vol.
3, January, p.p.45.
BraiLtand P.	 (1985,	 b:	 "A	 new	 era	 daws",	 Intermedia,	 vol.
4, September, p.p.34.
Brailtand P.
	
(1984)	 "France	 - cabLe and eLectronics have 	 a
bright	 future, Intermedia, vol. 12/No.3, may, p.p.34.
Bredin	 J.	 0.	 (1985),	 Les nouvelles tétvisions hertziennes,	 La
Documentation Francaise: June 1985 Paris.
Brenac E.
	 et at	 (1985),	 "L'entreprise pubtique comme acteur
poLitique: La DGT et La genese du plan cable", 	 in	 Sociologie du
TravaiL:	 march 1985, p.p.3O4-315.
Brewer G. (1974), "The Policy sciences emerge: to nature and
structure discipline" in Policy Sciences 5(3), p.p.239-244.
Briggs A. (1985), The BBC, The first fifty years", Oxford: OUP
Briggs	 A.	 and Spiccer J.	 (1986),	 "The Franchise	 Affair",
London: Century.
Brittan	 S.	 (1987a)	 "The Fight for Freedom in Broadcasting" 	 in
PoLitical QuarterLy, January-March 1987 vol.58 No 1, p.p. 3-23.
Brittan S.	 (1987b),	 "The clear-cut	 case	 for Pay-TV"	 in	 Financial
times: 6 August 1987, p.p.6.
Broadcast (23 September 1983), Television Tommorrow: Costs and
QuaLity, p.p.14-19, (RTS Report).
BRU (Broadcasting Research Unit) (1983),
	
A Report from the Working
Party on the New Technologies, London, B.R.U.
BRU (Broadcasting Research Unit), The Public Service Idea in British
Broadcasting - Main Principles, London: B.R.0
Brown	 H.	 (1986):	 "Tempting	 trails that viewers	 can't	 resist"
in Ouardian: 7 July 1986, p.p.17.
Brown R.1.	 (1970),	 "Approaches to the Historical Development of
Mass Media	 studies" in J.	 Tunstatl (ed) (1970) 	 Media SocioLgy: A
reader, London: Constable.
Buchanan J.M. and Tutlock J. 	 (1962),The Calculus of Consent, Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Budge I. and McKay D. (1988), The Changing British Political. System
into the 1990's,	 London: Longman 2nd edition.
Bulrner	 S.	 (1983),	 "Domestic Politics	 and European Community
Policy-Making",	 in	 Journal. of Common Market Studies, 	 No.4,	 (June
1983), p. p.349-63.
Bunce	 R.	 (1976),	 TeLevision and the Corporate Interest
	 N.
York: Paeger.
342
Burden N. T and Campbel N (1985), CapitaLism and Public PoLicy in the
UK, London: Croom Helm.
Burgelman S.C.	 (1986),	 "The Future of PubLic Service Broadcasting:
A case	 study for a "new" Communications Policy" in 	 European Journal
of Communication, vol 1 (1986), p.p.173-201.
Burkitt	 A.	 (1985),	 "Prospects for estabLishing a 	 European
DBS standard" in Communications System Worldwide, March 1985, p.p.18-
20.
Burns T.	 (1977)	 The BBC:	 Public	 Institution	 and Private World,
London: Methuen.
Busson A.	 (1987),	 "Les premiers	 pois d'un	 reseau"	 in Media
Magazine, No.25, April 1987, p.p.24-25.
Busson	 A.	 (1986),	 "Cable: Le tem p s du comerce"	 in	 DGT-SPES
No.18 December 1986, p.p.2-3.
Cabinet Office,	 Advisory Council	 for Applied Research	 and
DeveLopment (ACARD) (1980), Information Technology, London: HMSO.
CabLe	 85 (1985)	 Proceedings of the International Conference on
Cable and Satellite TV, Brighton, July 1985; On Line Publications.
Cable Authority (1986), Annual Report and Accounts, London 1986.
Cable	 Authority	 (UK)	 TV without Frontiers: views of the
Cable Authority on the Euro p ean Green Pa p er undated, London.
Les Cahiers de La Communication 	 (1983), Radiottvision le fin
du monopole: La lol du 29 Juillet, Dunod, Numero SpeciaL No's. 1,2,
Paris.
Les	 Cahiers Luxembourgeois: Radio Tél1 Luxembour g , 1961,
Carey	 J.	 (1975),	 Sociology and Public Affairs; The Chicago
School, Beverly Hills: Sage.
Carey J. (1977), "Mass Communication Research and CuLtural Studies:
an American View in Curran et al (1977) (eds), Mass Communications
and Society, Arnold: London.
Carey	 J.	 (1978),	 "Ambiguity	 of	 PoLicy	 Research"	 Journal
of Communication, 28(2), p.p.114-119.
Carroll	 0.	 (1984),	 "Organisational	 Ecology"	 in	 Annual Review
of Sociology, No.10, p.p.7l-93.
Casile	 N.	 and	 Drhey	 A.	 (1983),	 La	 sur	 La	 communication
audiovisuelle Documentation Francaise", Paris: Seuil.
Castels N.	 (1981), "Toward a Sociological theory of city Planning"
in Lemert	 C.E.	 (ed)	 (1981)	 French Sociology Rupture and renewal
since 1968, New York: Columbia University Press.
Castoriadis	 C.	 (1984),	 Crossroads	 in	 the	 Labyrinth,	 London:
Harvester.
Castoriadis	 C.(1987),	 the	 Imaginary	 Institution	 of	 Society,
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Cazenave F. (1980), Les radios tibres, P.U.F. : Paris.
Charon,	 J.M.	 (1988),	 "France	 Telecom	 se divise sur le	 cable"
in Medias Pouvoirs, June 1988, p.p.8l-9.
Cheney G.A. (1983), Television in American Society, New York:
Franklin Wattes.
CIT	 (Communications	 and	 Information	 Technology)	 Research
Limited (1982) Cable TV in Western Europe; London: CII Reasearch.
CIT (1984),	 "CIT Survey II - governments must free cable", 	 Cable
and SateLlite, April 1984, p.p.14l7.
Club	 de	 BruxeLles	 (1986),	 "The Future of Television in
Europe", Conference organised by the Club de Bruxetles, Press
343
Document, October 15,16 1986, Brussels.
Lord Cockfietd	 (1986),	 "E.C.	 Proposes Common Standards
	 for
telvision", in europe, December 1986, p.p.16-18.
Cohen D.	 (1988), What caused the rise of conservatism: a French
View", in Eronomic Policy April 1988 (6) 195-218.
Cojean A. (1985), "Service public?" in Ic Monde: 10 December 7985.
Collins R. (1986a), "Broadband Black Death cuts queues. The
Information Society and the UK" in Collins et at (eds) (1986) "Media.
Culture and Society; A Reader", London: Sage
CoLlins R.	 (1986b)	 "Wall	 to waLL Dallas? The US-UK
	 Trade	 in
Television" in Screen 27(3-4), p.p. 66-77.
CoLlins L.
	
et at (Garnham and LocksLey G.) (1988), The Economics of
Television; The UK Case; Sage: London
Comley	 W.	 Jr.	 (1976),	 The efferts of Newspaper Television
Cross Ownership on News Homogeneity, ChappeP. 	 Hill:	 University of
Nortler California.
Commission of the European Communities:-
-Television Without Frontiers, Green paper on the establishment of
the Common	 Market	 for broadcasting,	 especiaLly by satellite and
cable, Communication from the Commission to the Council, 	 CON (84)30,
Final, Brussels: 14 June 1984.
-Proposal for a Council Directive; on the co-ordination of certain
provisions laid down by law, re g ulation or administrative action in
Member-States concerning	 the pursuit	 of	 broadcasting	 activities,
COIl (86)146, Final; Brussels: 29 April 1986.
-Amended proposal for a Councildirective on the co-ordination of
certain provisions laid down by law,	 CON (88)154, Final; Brussels:
21 March 1988.
-Report drawn u p on behalf of the Committee on Youth, Culture,
Education.	 Information and Sport, DOCAZ 78/85, Rapporteur: Mr W.
Hahn, BrusseLs: 5 July 1985.
-Completing the Internal Market White Paper from the Commission to
the European Council,	 COM (85) 310, 14 June 1985, Brussels.
-Interim Report on Realities and Tendencies on European
Television: Pers p ectives and Options, COM (83)229, Final; Brussels:
25 May 1983.
-European Cinema and Television Year, Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European ParLiament and the Social
and Economic Committee.
-Proposal on a Council Directive: on the adoption of Common technical
specifications of the MAC/packet family of standards for DBS,
COIl (86), Final; Brussels: January 1986.
-Towards a European Television Policy,
	 EEC FiLe,	 Brusselsc
December 1984.
-Provisions	 Governing	 Broadcasting	 Activities	 in	 OJEC
(Official Journal
	 of	 the European Communities) 22 February 1988,
C49	 vol	 31 88/C49/O1.
-The Community's Broadcasting Policy: Proposat	 for a Council
Directive concerning broadcasting activities,	 Bulletin	 of	 the
European Communities, Supplement 5/86, Brussels.
-The	 Audiovisual	 Media	 in	 the	 Single	 European	 Market,
Luxembourg: European Documentation: Periodical 4/1988.
Council of Europe (1988) Draft European Convention on Tranfrontier
Television, Stassbourg, 30 June 1988
Compaine M.B.
	 (1984)	 (ed),	 Introduction in "Understanding New
Media, USA: Balligner.
344
Couprie E. (1984), Advertising. Cable and Satellite: the Elements 	 f
the European Debate,	 The European	 Institute	 for	 the Media,
Manchester.
CPS (Communications Studies and PLanning 	 International)
Report to Home Office on Subscription Television,	 (1986) London:
HMSO.
Crometin	 0.	 (1987),	 "RTL-ptus-crossing	 the	 border"
in Cable and SateLlite, December 1987, p.p.32-3.
CROPPM (1981),	 (Commission de Reftexion et d'orientation presidee
par	 Pierre	 l4oinot),	 Pour une Réforme de	 L'audiovisuet,	 La
Documentation Francaise: Paris.
Curran C. (1979), A Seamless Robe, London: Constable.
Curran et at. (1982),	 "The study of the media:	 theoretical
approaches", in
	 Curran	 et	 at	 (eds)	 Culture. Societ y and the
Media:	 London: Methuen.
Curran J. and Seaton J. (1987), Power Without Responsibtity: The
Press and Broadcasting in Britain, London: Methuen, 3nd edition.
Curran J.	 (1986a),	 "The difference approaches to media 	 reform";
in Currari	 et at (1986) Bendin g Reality: The state of the Media,
Sussex: Pluto Press.
Curran .1.	 (1986b),	 "Advertising and the Mass Media in Collins et
at (1986)	 (eds)	 Media, Culture and Societ y : a Critical Reader,
London: Sage.
Cyr, A. and de Lean P.
	
(1975), "Comparative Policy Analysis" in
Policy Sciences, 6(1975), p.p.375-364.
DahL R.A. (1961), "Who Governs", New Haven: Vale University Press.
Dahl R.A. (1963), "Modern Political Analysis", New Jersey: Prentice
Halt.
Dandedorf	 R.	 (1959)	 "Class	 and Class	 conflict	 in	 industrial
society", Sanford, Stanford University 	 Press.
Dandedorf R (1964)	 "Recent changes in the class structure 	 of
European	 societies" in Daedalus, 93(1) Winter, p.p.223-70.
O'Angeto M. and	 Busson A.	 (1986) "Un essor compris"	 in Media
Magazine, No.18 Sept 1986, p.p.3l-32.
Darey	 0.	 (1985),	 "Programming for viewer loyalty in Intermedia
July/Sept 1985, vol 13 No.4-5, p.p.46-49.
Davies E.
	
(1985), "EEC's Green Paper" in Iriternationl Media law,
February, p.p. 14-15.
Deartove J.	 and Saunders P.	 (1984),	 "Introduction on to British
Politics", Cambridge: Polity Press.
De Fleur M.L.	 (1970a),	 "Themes of Mass Communication" 	 (2nd ed),
New York: David McKoy.
Dc	 Fteur	 M.L.	 and	 Ball-Rokeach	 S.	 (1975),	 Theories of Mass
Communication, London: Longman.
Dc	 Jonquieres G.	 (1986),	 "Communications,	 the world	 business
market" in Financial Times: 6 January 1986, p.p.18.
De	 La Haye V.
	
(1980),	 "Etat opacite et communication - analyse
des	 travaux	 et	 des	 resultas de	 La	 communication d'enquete
parternentaire sur ('information publique" in
	
Actes du II Congres
des Sciences de l'Information et de La Communication, Bordeaux.
De	 Le Haye V.	 and Miege B.	 (1983),	 "French Socialists and the
question of the media; Fundamental issues in social	 communication
today" in Media, Culture and Society, 1983 voL 3, p.p.32l-338.
Delugach A.
	
(1988) "America profits from the Skies of Europe" in
the Quardian, 29 August 1988, p.p.23.
345
Dessaucy J.	 (1973),	 La tivision pour cable,
	 Prese Actualite:
Paris.
Dror 1.	 (1983), "Public Polic y -Makin g Re-examined", New Brunswick,
N.J., USA: Transaction Books.
DE VRIES	 Report	 (1985),	 Report on the economic aspects of the
Common Market for Broadcastin g ,	 Corn	 (84) 300 Fin,	 Document A2-
102/85,	 Brussels,	 30	 September	 1985,	 A	 Series,	 European
Part iament.
Deutch K.W.
	
(1963),	 "The Nerves of the Government",	 New	 York:
Free Press of Glencoe.
Deutch	 K.W.	 (1966),	 "Nationalism and Social Communication" 	 (2nd
ed), Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Dias	 et	 at	 (1979),	 "National Communication Policy Councils:
Principles and Ex p eriences", Paris: Unesco N83.
DilLon	 A.	 (1983),	 Cable Television & voluntary sector issue,
London.
Dizzard	 W.	 (1966)	 Television a World View,	 Syrause:	 Syrause
University Press.
Doherty D.	 et at (Morrison E.D.	 and Tracey N.) (1988),	 Keeping
Faith? Channel Four and its audience, London: John Libbey.
Dosh D.T.	 (1985),	 "0-and D2-MAC/packet,	 system-members of the
MAC-TV standard family with closed base band representation" 	 in
Rundfunktech,	 vol 29,	 no.5,	 Sept-Oct 1985,	 p.p.229-46,	 on Line
Search Datastar in INSPEC Database November 1986.
Downs G.W.	 and Rocke D.M.	 (1981),	 "CompLexity, Interaction and
Policy Reasearch" in Policy Sciencies 13 (1981), p.p.281-29J.
Downs A. (1967), Inside Bureacracy, Boston: Little Brown.
Downing J. (1980), The Media Machine, London, PLuto Press.
Dowse	 R.E.	 and	 Hughes	 J.A.	 (1986),	 Political Sociology,
Chichester, John WiLey and Sons.
Dror Y (1971), Design for Policy Sciences, New York: Elsevier.
Dror Y (1983),	 Public Policy Making Re-examined,	 New	 Brunswick
N.J.: Transaction Books.
Dunkley	 I.H.	 (1985),	 Television Today and Tommorrow;	 Watt-to-
Wall Dallas? London: Penguin.
Dunteavy	 P.	 and O'Leavy B.	 (1987),	 Theories of the state: the
Politics of Liberal Democracy, London: MacMillan Education.
Dupuis P.	 (1984),	 "L'an 2 de l'ére du cables" in Antennes,	 No.
87, May 1984, p.pl5
Dutton W.H.	 (1987), "The Politics of Cable Television in Britain:
Policy as the Outcom e of an Ecology of Games", Paper presented at
the	 1987	 AnnuaL	 meetin g	of 	 the	 American	 Political	 Science
Associtaion, The Palmer House 3, 6 Sept 1987.
Dutton	 et at (Blurner J.	 and	 Kraemer	 K.)	 (1987),	 Wired Cities;
Shaping the future ofcommunications; London: Casel.
Dye T.R.(1976), Polic y Analysis, Alabama: University Press.
Dyson	 V.	 (1986),	 "The	 Politics	 of	 Cable	 and	 Satellite
Broadcasting: Some West European ComParisions" in Kuhn R. (1986),
Broadcasting and Politics in W. Europe,	 London: Frank
	 Cass,
pp. 152,171.
Dyson	 K.	 and	 Humphreys P.	 (1987),	 Policies for New Media
	 in
Western	 Europe:	 Deregulation of	 Broadcasting	 and Multimedia
Diversification,	 in Dyson and Humphreys	 (eds),	 The Politics of
Communications Revolution in Western Europe, London: Frank Cass.
346
Dyson	 K.	 and	 Humphreys p .	 (1988a),	 (with R.	 Negrine and	 P.
Simon),	 Broadcasting and New Media Policies in Western Europe,
London: Routtedge.
Dyson K.	 and Humphreys	 P.	 (1988b),	 Dere g ulatin g Broadcasting:
The West European Ex p erience,	 Paper Presented in Plymouth,
Political Studies	 Association: Conference, 14 April 1988.
Easton D. (1953), The PoLitical S y stem, New York: Knopf.
Easton	 0. (1957), "An	 Approach to the Analysis	 of	 Political
Systems" in WorLd Politics, IX (ApriL 1957),
	
383-400.
Easton D.	 (1965), A
	
Framework	 for Political	 analysis,	 Englewood
Cliffs New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Edelstein	 A.S.	 (1982),	 Comparative Communication Research,
London: Sage.
EdairP.	 and RahimS.A.	 (1983), "Introduction" in Communication
Polic y in Developed Countries, London: Kegan Paul International.
Ehrenberg A. and Barwise P. (1983), "Do we need to reguLate TV
programmes?" in Intermedia; July/September 1983, vol 11, No. 4/5,
p.p.l2-13.
ElM (the European Institute for the Media) 	 (1988),	 Europe 2000:
What Kind of Television?	 The Report of the European	 Television
Task Force: Manchester: ELM.
Etkin	 S.L.	 (1985),	 "Regulation	 asaPoLitical	 Question",	 in
Policy Sciences 18(1985), 95-108.
Ellis	 J.	 (1986) "The 25 per cent solution" in 	 New Statesman,	 5
December 1986, p.p.19.
Emery	 W.	 (1969),	 National and International Systems of
Broadcasting, London: East Lousing.
English 14.	 (1984) "The European Information Technology Industry"
in	 A.	 Jaquemin	 (ed),	 European Industry: Public Policy and
Corporate Strategy, Oxford: UPO.
Eskenazi F.	 (1982),	 Radios tibres	 Parisiennes;	 Liberation,	 21
July.
Eskenazi	 F.	 (1987)	 "La	 Cinq	 joue les marchaux	 de	 soap"	 in
Liberation, 6/7 June 1987.
Etzioni	 A.	 (1976),	 Social Problems,	 Englewood	 Cliffes,	 New
Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Eugster	 E.	 (1985),	 Television Programming Across National
Boundaries: The EBO and DIRT Experiences, Denham: Abtex.
European	 File	 (1988),	 Towards and Large European audio-visual
market, February 1988, Cecom: Brussels.
European Television Task Force (1988),
	 "Europe 2000 What Kind of
Television?" Amsterdam-Brussels.
Evans J.	 et al	 (1983),	 The Development of Cable Network in the
U.K.,	 Issues in the formulation of a Technotocy Policy, 	 London:
The Technical Chage Centre.
L'Express	 (1986	 - 28	 February),	 Fabius: taissez-moi Recolter,
p. p. 19-21.
FaLse H.	 (1981), "Les Satellites Europeens de diffusion directe"
in	 serie Probtemes audiovisueLs, 	 No.3,	 Documentation Francaise
Paris.
Farrtoux	 Report	 (1982),	 "Ministére de La Recherche et de La
Technotogie",	 "Extraits	 du	 rapport	 de synthese de	 La	 mission
filiere electronique, Paris: Franco, March 1982.
F.O.	 (The	 Social	 Morality	 Council	 (1973),	 The	 Future	 of
Broadcasting,	 A Report presented to the Social Morality Council,
London: Methuen.
347
Fiddick p .	 (1986), "Whose Finger on the shift button?" Quardian:
8 December 1986.
FitmAction	 (1982),	 Les Ecrans Colonisés, 	 February-March	 1982,
p.p. 18-26.
Flash	 D.	 (1985) "DBS - what wiLt it take to make a profit?" 	 in
CabLe 1985, On Line, London, p.p.8994.
Flash 0. (1986), "SateLLite broadcasting - an introduction to the
current state-of-the-art" in ELectronic TechnoLo gy ,	 vol.	 20,
February 1986, p.p.252-253.
Ftichy	 P.	 (1980a),	 "Current	 approaches to mass	 communication
research	 in	 France" in	 Media. CuLture and Society	 1980,	 (2),
p.p. 179-188.
FtichyP. (198Db), Les industries de L'imaginaire, CoLLection
Media et Companie - INA - universite de GrenobLe, Paris
FLichy	 P.	 (1984),	 "Media ControL in France:	 ConfLict	 between
PoliticaL and Economic NationaLe" in Mosco V. and Wasco J. (1984)
(eds),	 The Critical. Communications Review. Vol. II: Changing
Patterns of Communications Control, New Jersey: Ablex.
Ftichy	 p . (1983), Ima g es pour I.e cabLe, Paris: Documentation
F ranca i se.
Flichy P.	 (1980), Les industries de L'imaginaire, Grenoble, P.IJ.
de Grenoble.
Forester 1. (1987), Hi g h Tech Society, Oxford: BasiL Btackwett
Fox B.	 (1989), "Watching the Dishes" in the Listener: 2 February
1986, 6-7.
Francois	 L. (1976),	 Les institutions poLitigues et
administratives de La France, Paris: Hachette.
Freches J. (1985), La teit'ision par cabLe, Paris: PUF, QSJ.
Frost and SaLtivan (1986),	 "SateLLite Communications Market	 in
W.	 Europe" Frost and Salt ivan market Research Reports, 	 No.E820,
Spring 1986,	 300pp in: Datastar of Radio-Suisse, on liMe search,
January 29, 1987.
Frost	 and SaLtivan (1983),	 "European Cable TV Market" Frost and
SaLtivan Market Research Report, 	 No.E642,	 FaLL 1983, 259pp, in:
Datastar of Radio-SuiSSe, on Live search, January 29, 1987.
(FTBIC) Financial. Times Business Information Consuttancy	 (1982),
Ke y Issues. CabLe and the USA and UK, London: FTBIC.
GaLLoway	 F.J.	 (1972),	 The Politics and Technolo gy of SatelLite
Communications, M.A. Lexighton: Books.
Garnham	 N.	 (1979a) "contribution to a Political Economy of Mass
Communications"	 in	 Media. CuLture and Societ y ,	 Vol.1,	 No.2,
February 1979, p-p.1-19.
GarnhamN.	 (1979b), "PoLitics and the mass media in Britain: the
strange case of Dr. 	 BtumLer in Media. Culture and Society, vol I,
No.1, January 1979, p.p.23-4.
Garnham N.	 (1983),	 "Toward a Theory of CuLturaL Materialism" 	 in
JournaL of Communication, Summer 1983, voL 33, No.3, p.p.314-33O.
Garnham (1986),	 "The Media and the Public Sphere" in Intermedia:
January 1986, vol 4, No.1, p-p.28-33.
Garnham	 N.	 (1987),	 "Three Goats for Regulation" in Intermedia:
July-September 1987, vol 15, No.415, p-p.65-68.
Gautt	 P.	 (1983),	 "Le	 project	 TDF1/TUSAT"	 in	 RadiodiffUsiOn
TeLevision, No.79, september/October/November 1983, no.4/5, p.p.26-
32.
348
Gavi,	 P.	 (1982),	 "Comment Radio Libre Paris a 	 tombe",	 Ici et
Maintenant, Liberation: 24-25, JuLy 1982.
Geogy J. (1984), "The French broadcasting satellite system TDF-1"
in	 Links	 for	 the future,	 Science.	 S y stems and	 Services	 for
Communications.	 Proceedings	 of the International Conference 	 on
Communications - ICC 1984, Amsterdam, NetherLands 14-17 May 1984,
p . p .l OB4 - lO87 , voL 3.
Gerbner G.	 (1977),	 "Comparative Cultural Indicators" in 	 Gerbner
(ed),	 Mass Media Policies in Chan g in g Cultures,	 New York:	 John
WiLLey and Sons.
Gibbons	 et	 at.	 (1984)	 "TechnoLogy	 and	 Policy	 in	 cable	 TV
deveLopment	 in the UK" in	 Telecommunications PoLicy, 	 September
1984, p.p.233-236.
Gilpin	 R.	 (1968),	 "France in the A g e of Scientific	 Age",	 New
Jersey, Prinenton University Press.
Giovani	 S.	 (1970),	 "Concept	 and Misformation	 in	 Comparative
Politics"	 in	 American Political Science Review,	 LIXV:4,	 1970,
p.p.3l -42.
Giraud	 A.	 (1987),	 "Le	 Mouvement	 de	 Deregulation"	 in
Reseaux. Communication. Technologue, Societe,	 Marsh S87, No. 23,
CNET, p.p.87-96.
Goguel F.	 and Grosser X.	 (1975), La Politigue en France, Paris,
Armand Cot in.
Goldstein-Jackson K.	 (1988) "ExpLoding the myth of Channel 4" in
Sunda y Times, March 13, 1988, C7.
Gotlieb A. (1986), "The daydream Machine; A survey of television;
The Economist: December 20, 1986, Special supplement.
Gough	 I.	 (1978),	 the PoLitical Economy of the Welfare State,
London: Macmillan.
Gould-Jonhson-Chapman 	 (1984),	 The Structure of television
Structure: The World of Television, Pion Limited: London.
Gourevitch	 A.	 (1978),	 "The	 Second	 Image	 Reversed:	 The
International	 Sources	 of	 Domestic	 Politics",	 International
Organisation, 32 (Autumn 1978), p.p.88l-911.
Gouvernment of France (1981), "Loi portant derogation du monopole
d'Etat de Ia radiodiffusion", in Journal Officiel, Paris, 9-10
November 1981.
Graham	 D.	 (1987),	 "Public	 service and popular taste"	 in	 New
Statesman, 2 October 1987, p.p.19.
Grand-Duche De	 Lumxembourg Presidence Du Gouvernement	 (1986),
Information Relating to the 'CDL' sateLlite system furnished to
EuteLsat, Luxembourg, February 21, 1986.
Grane R.J.	 (1979),	 The Politics of International Standards, New
York: Ablex.
Grantam B. (1984), "How advocates of free TV are taking Mitterand
at his word" in Television WeekLy, 26 October 1984, p.p.12.
Graugnard G and Hugo J. (1983), L'audiovisiel pourtous, La Chronique
Sociale: Lyon.
Grausen	 B.	 (1985),	 "The Green Paper Proposals on the Right	 to
Reply	 and the protection of Minors" in	 Broadcasting Policies in
the EEC, Manchester 1985, Proceeding, Manchester: E.I.M.
Gray	 A.	 and	 Jenkins	 W.I.	 (1985),	 Administrative Politics in
British Government, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Limited.
Gray	 D.	 and	 Grant	 Glive	 (1983),	 Cable Television in Western
Europe: A licence to print money?, 	 The	 Economist	 Intelligence
Unit	 Special Report No.150,	 London: The Economist	 Intellligence
United Limited.
349
Green B.	 (1986),	 085:	 A UK view" in Intermedia, July/September
1986, voL 4, No.4/5, p.p.73-76.
Green D. (1988), "The political economy of Information Technology
in France, in Foffney J. (1988), (ed) France and Modernisation,
London: Abecoube.
Green D.	 (1984),	 "Cable TV in France:	 a Won-Market Approach to
Industrial	 Development"	 in	 National Westminster,	 Quarterly,
August 1984, p.p.l3-24.
Green 0. (1981), Managing Industrial Chan g e?, HMSO 1981.
Grozier	 M.	 (1982),	 Strategies For Change: the future of French
Society, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
Grumbach P. (1985), "La Loi Berlusconi" in Le Figaro, 20 November
1985.
Guback T.
	 (1977),	 "The InternationaL Film Industry" in	 Gerbrer
(ed)	 (1977) Mass Media Policies in Changing Cultures, 	 New York,
J. Wiley and Sons.
Guidance Note (1983), Cable: Interim Licencing of Pilot Projects,
July 1983, London.
GuiL Lou	 B.	 (1985),	 Les strategies multimedias des groupes de
communications, Documentation Francaise: Paris.
Haberrnas J. (1976), Le g itimation Crisis, London: Heinemann.
Hahn	 Report	 (1985),	 On a Framework for a European Media Policy
based on the Commission's Green Pa p er.	 European	 Parliament,
Working Documents, Document A2-75/85, Brussels: 5 July 1985.
Hahn W.	 (1988), European Media Policy: An Important ste p towards
European Union, WG(VS1)/7325E.
Hall	 P.A.	 (1986),	 Governing the Economy; The Politics of State
Intervention in Britain and France, London: Policy Press.
Halt	 S.	 and Jacques (eds)	 (1983),	 The Politics of Thatcherism,
London: Lawrence and Wishartet.
Halloran J.D.
	 (1986),	 "The social implications of technological
innovations in communications" in Traber,	 M.	 (ed),	 The M y th of
the Information Revolution, London: Sage.
Ham	 C.	 and	 Hill	 C.	 (1984),	 The Polic y Process in the modern
Capitalist State, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books.
Hanley	 D.L.;	 Kerr A.P.	 and Waites	 N.H.	 (1984),	 Contemporary
France, Politics and Societe y since 1945,	 London:	 Rout Ledge	 and
Kegan Paul.
Hardin R. (1982), Collective Action, Baltimore: Resources for the
Future.
Hartman	 P.	 and Husband L.	 (1979),	 "The Mass Media and	 acia'
conflict"	 in	 McQuaLL	 (ed),	 Sociology of Mass Communications,
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Havick J.J.	 (ed) (1983), Communications Policy and the Political
Process, Westport: Greenwod Press.
Hawker	 P.	 (1986),	 "Conflicts,	 Funding	 confuse	 progress	 of
European	 DBS"	 in	 Television/Radio Age International, 	 February
1986, p.p.13-l6.
Heclo	 H.	 (1972),	 "Review Article:	 Policy Analysis" in British
Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), p.p.32-34.
Heclo	 H.	 (1974),	 Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden,
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Hedges M.	 (1989),	 "Astra Nomical Risk" in Broadcast: 27 January
1989, 22-3.
Helter C. (1978), Broadcasting and AccountabiLit y , London, BFI.
350
Hetherington A.
	 (1988),	 "The politicaL map of broadcast poLicy"
in Independent: 26 August 1988, p.p.15.
Higham N.
	 (1986), "ITV Companies adjust their sets" in Observer,
2 November 1986, p.p.33.
Hill	 A. (1985), "Is the UK ready for the next phase of
broadcasting?" in Accountancy; December 1985, p.p.61-64.
HiLL	 R.A.	 (1983),	 "The development of Cable TeLevision in 	 the
United Kingdom",	 The Business Economist, 	 voL 14,
	
No.3,	 Summer
1983, p.p.4-46.
HilLs J.
	
(1986), "IndustriaL Policy in Britain and the IT sector"
in	 Information technology and Public Polic y ,	 voL	 14,	 No.2,
(March) 1986, p.p.123-129.
Hilts J. (1984), Information Technolo gy and Industry p olic y , Kent:
Groom Helm.
Hins	 W. (1985), "The Law and Economics of Transborder
Telecommunication";	 Report	 on	 NetherLands,	 Part 3,	 Radio	 and
TeLevision; Hambourg: Max-PLanck-Instutar.
Hirsh N.	 (1984),	 "The doldrums of Europe's TV landscape"	 Paper
submitted to the
	 research	 conference,	 Tracing	 new orbits -
Competition and Cooperation in
	
Satellite Development, November 330,
1984.
Hirsh N.	 (1986a),	 Luxembourg	 in kleinstenber H.,	 J et al	 (eds),
Electronics Media and Politics, Aarchus:Campus.
Hirsh	 N.	 (1986b),	 Luxembourg	 big	 ambitious	 in	 Intermedia,
JuLy\September 1986, No.415, p.p.3l-32.
Hirsh N. (1986c), "The Doldrums of Europe's TV landscape: Coronet
as Catalyst" in Demac, D.A. (ed) Tracing New Orbits, New York:
Columbia University Press.
Hirsh	 N.	 (1986d),	 "La	 CLT serai-t-eLLe ingourermentabLe?"	 in
Communication et Languages, No.671, trimester 1986, p.p.Yl-89.
Hirsh N.	 (1987), "A monopoly challenged" in Cable and Satellite:
February 1987, p.p.48-51.
Hirschman A.	 0.	 (1970,	 Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Res p onses	 to
Decline in Firms, Organisations and States, 	 Mass:	 Havard
University Press.
Hirschman A.O.	 (1976),	 "The Search for paradigms as a hindrance
to understanding" World Politics, 22(3) April 1976, p.p.329-343.
HMSO	 (House	 of	 Lords	 Select	 Committee)	 on	 the	 European
Communities:	 Television Without Frontiers, 	 Session	 1985-86,
Fourth Report, Ordered to be printed 17 December 1985, HMSO 1986.
Hofferbert N. (1974), The Study of Public Policy, Bobbs Meril.
Hoffrnann	 S.	 (1960),	 (ed)	 Contemporary Theory in International
Relations, Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Hoffmann S.	 (1983),	 "Reflections on the Nationstate in
	
Western
Europe	 Today"	 in Tsoukalis (ed) (1983)
	
The European Community,
Oxford; Basil BlackweLl.
Hogwood	 B.W.	 and Peters G.B.
	 (1982),	 "The Dynamics of	 Policy
Change:	 Policy Succession",	 in Policy Sciences, 14(1982), 225-
245.
Hoywood	 B.	 (1987),	 From Crisis to complacency? Shaping public
policy, in Britain, Oxford: OUP.
Hot lins	 T.	 (1984),	 Beyond Broadcasting; into the Cable Age,
London: 8FI.
Holt R. (1967), "A proposed structural-functional framework" in
J. CharLestworth (ed), Contemporary Political Analysis, New York:
Free Press, 86-108.
351
Home Office (1984), CabLe and Broadcasting Act 1984, HMSO 1984.
Home	 Office	 (1983),	 Department	 of	 Industry	 (1983),	 The
development of Cable Systems and Services,	 HMSO,	 London:	 ApriL
1983, Cmnd 8866.
HoodS. (1976), The Limits of Administration, London: Witley.
Hood	 S.	 (1972),	 "The Politics of Television" in
	 McQuaiL	 (ed)
(1972), SocioLogy of Mass Communications, London: Penguin.
Hood	 S.	 (1986),	 "Broadcasting	 and the PubLic
	 Interest:	 from
Consensus	 to	 Crisis,	 in	 Isolding et	 al	 (1986)	 (eds),	 Mass
Communications and the p olitical p rocess,	 Leciester:	 Leceister
University Press.
Hoskins C.	 and Mirus R. (1988), "Reasons for the US dominance of
the	 internationaL	 trade	 in teLevision	 programmes"	 in	 Media.
Culture and Society, vol 10(1988), p.p.499-515.
Housham D.	 (1987),	 Playing the access card" in The Listener, 9
April 1987, p.p.8-9.
HowardS.K. (1973), "Analysis Rationality and Decision Making" in
Marini (ed), Twoard a New Public Administration, Man: Lexington
Books.
Howell	 W.J.	 (1986),	 World Broadcasting in the Age of the
SatelLite, New York: Ablex.
Howkins	 J.	 (1982),	 New technologies. New Policies?, 	 London,
B.R.U.
Hughes	 P.	 (1981),	 British Broadcasting Programmes and Power,
Kent: ChartwetL-Brat.
Hurnphreys	 P.	 (1988),	 "Whither	 European Broadcasting?" in	 EBU
REVIEW, No.2, (March 1988), p.p.35-9.
Hunt Inquiry	 (1982),	 Report of the Inquiry into Cable Expansion
and broadcasting policy, London: HMSO 1982, Cmnd 8679.
Hutchinson A. (1984), CabLe, DBS and the Arts, London: PSI.
Hyder	 M.	 (1984),	 "ImpLementation	 the evolutionary	 Model"	 in
Lewis,	 David Wallace,	 H. (eds) (1984), Policies into Practices,
London: Heineman.
Irwin	 C.	 (1983),	 "Regulation and deregulation",	 Outline
Contribution to Manchester Broadcasting Symposium, 	 Manchester,	 2
March 1983.
ITAP	 (1982),	 Cabinet Office,	 Information	 Technology	 Advisory
Panel Reporton Cable Systems, London: HMSO, February 1982.
hAP (1983), Making a business of Information, HMSO: London.
Jampol	 J.	 (1988),	 "Not-so-prime	 time	 for TV	 in	 France"	 in
Campaign, 27 May 1988, p.p.26-8.
Janus N. (1984), "Advertising and the Creation of GlobaL Markets:
the Role of the New Communications Technologies" in Mosco et al
(eds) 1984), "Critical Communications Review II", New Jersey.
Jarret	 R.	 (1985),	 "The	 Rote of the	 European	 Commission"	 in
Broadcasting Policies in the EEC,	 Manchester 1985,	 Proceedings,
Manchester: ElM.
Jeanneny S.N. and Sanvage M. (1982), Television Nouvetle Memoire,
Paris, Scull.
Jenkins S.	 (1987), "An Answer for the Beeb's new boom" in Sunday
Times: 1 February 1987,p.C7.
Jenkins	 U.!.	 (1978),	 PolicyAnatysis, A Political and
Organisational Perspective, London: Martin Robertson Limited.
Jessop B. (1982), The Capatilst State; London: Martin Robertson.
352
Johnson	 C.	 (1989),	 "Sowing the Seeds" in 	 Cable and Satellite:
January 1989, p.p.557.
Johnson	 N.	 (1987),	 "Regulating American Style" in 	 Intermedia,
JuLy/September 1987, voL 15, No.4/5, p.p.31-33.
Jones E.J.	 (1967),	 The Functional Analysis of Politics, London:
Routtedge and Kegan PauL.
Jordan A.G.
	
and J.J. Richardson (1987), British PoLitics and the
Polic y Process, London: Allen 	 Unwin.
J.O.R.F.	 (JournaL	 OfficieL	 de	 La	 Repubtique	 Francaisse),
Communication Audiovisuetle: 	 Loi	 du 29	 Juiltet	 1982	 et	 textes
d'a pp Lication,	 1551,	 1983,	 Paris;	 Direction	 des	 Journaix
Off I ci e L
J.O.R.F.	 (Lois	 et decrets)	 (1984),	 101 modifiant La Loi du 29
'a autorisation,	 No.84-742 de Ic Aout 1984, 2
August 1984.
J.O.R.F. (Lois et decrets No.84-143 du le Aout 1984), Loi sur
L'exptoitation des services de radiotelevision mis a La disposition
du p ublic sur un reseau cable, Paris, 2 August 1984.
J.O.R.F.	 (Lois et decrets (1985), 	 (No.85-54 du 18 Janvier 1985),
Decret et cahier des charges sur La service de radioteLevision mis a
disposition du public sur un reseau cable, 	 Paris,	 18	 January
1985.
Journal	 de La mission	 InterministerieLLe,	 TV Cable: La Loi sur Les
Societes d'economie mixte locale,	 No.7,	 Septembre-Octobre 1984.
JuLy	 S.	 (1982),	 "L'An du Mitterandisme" in Liberation, 	 10 May
1982.
Katz E.
	 (1977),	 SociaL Reasearch on Broadcasting: Proposals for
Further Development, London: BBC.
Keirstead	 P.O.	 (1988),	 HDTV-drogging Technology and Consumers
into the 20th Century, UnpubLished Draft.
Kelly	 M.	 (1988),"Comparative Research on New TechnoLogicaL 	 and
Media Developments" in European JournaL of Communication, 	 vol	 3
(1988), p. p.483- 490.
Keohane R.0.	 and Nye J.S.	 (1977),	 Power and Interdependence; New
York: Little Brown.
Keohane	 R.	 and	 Nyc	 .S.	 (1981),	 "ReaLism	 and	 Complex
Interdependence" in Smith M.
	
(ed)	 (1981), Perspectives in World
Politics, London: Open University Press.
Kerr et aL (1962),
	 Industrialisation and Industrial Nan;	 London:
He i neman.
Kerr D.H.	 (1976), The Logic of "Policy" and Successful PoLicies" in
Policy Sciences, 7(1976), p.p.351-363.
Key Note Report	 (1985),	 Aerospace: An industry overview: 3rd ed Key
Note Publication,	 London: February 18, 1987.
King A.
	
(1975) "Overload:	 Problems of Governing the 1970's"	 in
Political Studies, No's 2/3, June 1975, p.p.284-96
King	 R.	 (1986),	 The State in Modern Scoiety: New Directions in
Political Sociology; London: McMiLlan.
KinLoch	 G.C.	 (197),	 SociologicaL Theory:	 Its Development and
Major Paradigms; New York: McGaw Hill.
Kitschelt H.	 (1986),	 "Four theories of public policy making and
fast	 breeder reactor deveLopment" in	 International Organisation 40,
1 Winter 1986.
KLopfenstein	 B.C.	 (1986),	 "Forecasting Use of Home Information
353
Technologies"	 in	 the	 Bulletin of the American Society for
Information Science,	 vol 13, (No.1) October/November 1986, p.p.l6-7.
Kottai S. R. (1986), "Lessons of Coronet" in Cable and SateLlite;
June 1986, p-p.33.35
Kottai S.R. (1987), "Comming Attractions in European TV: Problems
and Prospects for CabLe and SateLLite Television" in Columbia
Journal of World Business, FalL 1987, p.p.3?-63.
Korlin D. 1983), "QueLLe nostalgie de t'O.R.T.F?" in Le Monde 24-
25 April 1983.
Krasner	 S.D.	 (1978),	 "Defending	 the	 National	 Interest:
Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Forei g n Polic y ", Princenton
N.J.: Princenton University Press.
Krasner S.D. (1982), "Structuat cases and Regime Consequences" in
International Organisation, (Spring 1982), p.p.188-99.
Krasner	 S.D.	 (1985),	 Conflict:	 The	 Third
BerkeLy:	 University
of CaLifornia Press.
Krasner s.D.	 (1988), "sovereignty: An InstitutionaL Perspective"
in Comparative PoLiticaL Studies, 	 voL 21,	 (No.1),	 April	 1988,
p. p.66-94.
Krasnow E.G.	 and Lawrence D.L. (1973), The Politics of Broadcast
Regulation; New York: St Martin's Press.
Krieger J.	 (1986), Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline,
Oxford: BasiL BLackwell.
KubLer F. (1979), "Rechtsvergteichender GeneraLbericht" in
Rundfunkor g anisation and Kommunikations Freiheit, Martin Bulinger
- Kubter F. (1979), Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.
Kuhn	 R.	 (1983),	 Broadcasting	 and	 PoLitics	 in	 France	 in
ParLiamentar y affairs, vol 36, No.1, 1983, p.p.67-83.
Kuhn R. (1985), "The End of Government Monopoly" in Kuhn R. (ed),
The PoLitics of Broadcasting, London: Croom Helm.
Kuhn	 R.	 (1986),	 "France and the New Media" in	 Kuhn	 R.	 (ed),
Broadcasting and Politics in Western Europe, Bristol, Frank.
Kuhn	 T.S.	 (1972),	 The Structure of Scientific	 Revolutions,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kumar K.	 (1977), "Holding the Middle Ground: the BBC, the public
and	 the professionaL broadcaster" in Curran et at 	 (1977),	 Mass
Communication and Society, London, Arnold Limited, p.p.231-249.
Lacan	 J.F.	 (1983),	 "Le PLan de câblage Francais" 	 Le Monde,	 2
March 1983, pp.24.
Lacan	 J.F.	 (1984),	 "Les debuts difficules de Ia tLévision par
cabLe", Le Monde, 1 February 1984,p.p.26.
Lacan J.F. (1986), "La bataiLle de Ia production" in Le Monde, 29
October 1986, p-p-27.
Landes D. (1969), The Unbound Prometheus TechnologicaL Change and
Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1870 to the present,
London: Cambridge University.
Lankaster K.1.
	 (1978),	 Variet y . Eguity and Efficiency,	 Oxford:
Basil Blackwett.
La Porte T.	 (1975) (ed),	 Organised Social Complexity: chalenges
to Politics and Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lasswel U.D.	 (1971),	 A Pre-view of Policy Sciences, 	 New	 York:
American Elserier.
Lasswetl D.H.
	
(1968),	 "The future of the Comparative Method" in
Comparative Politics, vol 1, No.1, October 1968, p.p.5-15.
354
Lasswett	 D.H.	 (1951) "The Policy Orientation" in D. 	 Lerner and
Lasswelt	 H.D.	 (eds),	 The Polic y Sciences,	 Stanford,	 C.A.:
Standard University Press.
Lasswett D.H.	 and KapLan A. (1950), Power and Societ y , New Haven
C.T.; Vale University Press.
Lever H.	 (1986),	 Social Choice and Public Polic y , Oxford: Basil
BLackwel I
Lazarsfeld P. (1941), "Administrative and CriticaL Communications
Research in Studies" in Phitsophophy and Science.
Lazarsfetd P.	 (1975),	 "The PoLicy Science Mouxement" in Policy
Sciences, 6(3), p-p.211-22.
Ledos JJ.	 et at. (1986),	 Le Gachis Audiovisuel, 	 Misc au	 point
Audiovisuet; les Traditions Ouvriecs.
Lee	 H.	 (1987),	 "ITV - Shake-up will give major break to	 small
producers" in Dail y Telegraph: 23 ApriL 1987.
Lefort C. (1980), Droits de L'homme politigue, Libre, July 1980.
Lefort	 C.	 (1986),	 The Political Forms of Modern Society;
Bureaucracy. Democrac y and	 TotaLitarianism,	 Cambridge:	 PoLity
Press.
Lenin	 V.!.	 (1977),	 State and Revolution 1917, originally
published Moscow: Progress PubLishers.
Lerner D.	 (1985),	 The Passing of Traditional Society,	 Glencoe:
Free Press.
de Leon P.	 (1984),	 "Futures studies and the PoLicy Sciences" in
Futures: December 1984, p-P.386-394.
de Leon P. (1981), PoLicy Sciences: The discipLine and profession
in Polic y Sciences, 13 (1981), p-p.1-7.
Levacic R.	 (1984),	 "Do Mercantilist Industrial Polices Work? 	 A
ComParism	 of	 British	 and French TV manufacturing	 in	 National
Westminister Quarterly, May 1984, p.p.I+?-59
Lewis D.	 and WaLlace H.	 (1984), PoLicies into Practice, London:
Heineman.
Lindbtom	 C.E.	 (1977),	 Politics and Markets, 	 New	 York:	 Basic
Books.
Littlechild	 S.	 (1979),	 "Elements	 of	 TeLecommunications
Economics", London: Institution of Etectorial Engineers.
Llewelyn	 0.	 (1986),	 "The	 beam	 and	 the	 Law"	 in	 Cable and
SateLlite, September 1986, p.p.33-35.
Lockstey	 G.	 (1983),	 "Europe	 and	 the	 Electronics	 Industry:
Confercting	 Strategies in Positive Restructuring" 	 in	 D.	 March
(ed), Capital and Politics in W. Europe, London.
LocksLey	 G.	 (1985),	 "Information	 Technology	 and	 capitalist
Development" in Capital and CLass, Winter 1986, P.81-105.
Locksley	 G.	 (1987),	 "Direct Broadcast Satellites: 	 The	 media-
industrial	 complex in the UK and Europe" 	 in	 Telecommunicaions,
PoLicy, June 1987, p.p.193-2O?.
Lodge J.	 (1986),	 "Introduction" in Lodge J. (ed), "The European
Union, London: McMiLIan.
Lowi T.	 (1964),	 "American business, public policy, case studies
and politicaL Thery" in WorLd Politics, XVI (4), p.p.6677l5.
Lukas	 K.	 &	 Windram	 H. (1982),	 "Standards	 for	 broadcasting
sateLLites services" in I.B.A. Technical Review, 	 No.	 18,	 March
1982, p.p.l2-27.
Lughton	 R.	 (1987),	 "GuiLt .....is	 watching	 before	 launch",
355
Quardicx.p n: 5 January 1987, p.p.l8.
Lukes S. (1974), Power. A Radical View, MacMiLLan: London.
Lund	 S.	 (1988)	 "SatelLite	 Television and Media	 Research"	 in
European Journal of Communication, vol 3 (1988), p.p.345-53.
Luyken G.M.
	 (1987),	 "Debit Broadcasting by SateLLite" in
	
Cable
and Satellite, January 1988, p.p.32-3.
Luyken G.M.	 (1986),	 "Direct Broadcasting SatelLites:
	 a concept
for	 the	 future?" in Media, Culture and Society,
	
vol 8
	
(1986),
p. p.183-97.
Lyon D. (1988), The lnforamt ion Society, Worcester: Polity Press.
Lyon D. (1988), "Home truths about IT" in New Society, 15 January
1988, p.p.18-21.
MacAvoy	 W.P.	 (1977)	 (ed),	 Deregulation of Cable Tevision,
Washinghton D.C. American Enterprise for Public Policy Research.
MacCabe and Stewart 0.
	
(1986) (eds),
	
The BBC and Public Service
Broadcasting, Manchester: M.U.P.
Machin H. and Wright V. (eds) (1985), Economic Policy and Policy-
Makin g under the Mitterrand Presidency, 1981-84, New York, St
Martin's Press.
Machlup F.
	
(1962),	 The production and Distribution of knowledge
in the United States, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mackintosh International (1981),	 Satellite Broadcasting, 	 vol 3,
Mackintosh Consultants, London.
MacPherson C.B.	 (1973),	 Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval,
Oxford: Oxford University Group.p.
Macridis R.
	 (1977), "Groups and group theory" in R. Hacridis and
B. Brown (eds), Comparative Politics New York, Dorsey, p.p.322-7.
Maddox B.	 (1986), "Sky Kin g " in Channels, January/February 1986,
p. p.53-55.
Madge	 T.	 (1983)	 "IBA chickens home roost"	 in	 Media Reporter,
Summer 1983, p.p.20-21.
Mahle W.A.
	
and Richter R.
	
(1974), Communication Policies in the
Federal REpublic of Germany, Paris: Unesco.
Majchrzak A.
	
(1984), Methods for Policy Research, Beverly Hills:
Sage -
Marsh	 D.	 (1984),	 "French	 satellite rivals resit	 an	 arranged
Marriage" in Financial Times, 23 March 1984, p.p.2.
Marsh D. (1987), A bottle-neck to the heavens" in Financial Times,
15 September 1987, p.p.2.
Marsh	 1.	 (1987),	 Policy Makin g in a three party system:
Committees. Coalitions, an d Parliament, London, Metheun.
Martin	 L.J.	 and Chaudhary A.G.	 (1983),	 Comparative Mass Media
Systems, New York: Longman.
Martin	 M.	 (1981),	 "Les orphelins du giscardisme" in	 Politigue
aujoural 'hui, No.3-4, (new series), Summer 1981.
Marx K. and Engels F.: -
-(1935), Selected works, Moscow: Progress Publishers.
-(1977), Communist Manifest, Moscow: Progress PubLishers.
-(1974), The German ideology, London, Lawrence and Wishart.
Marx	 H.F.	 (1961),	 "Administative	 regulation	 in	 comparative
perspective in Law and Contemporary Problems, 26 (2), p.p.3O7-328.
356
Mattelart • et at (Detcourt X, Mattetart N.) (1984), international
Image Markets, London: Comedia.
Mattelart	 A.	 and	 Stourdze	 Y.	 (1985),	 TechnoLogy. CuLture and
Communication: A report of the French Mm
	 ister of REsearch and
Industry, Amsterdam: North-HolLand.
Matttelart A. and H. (1986),	 Penser Les Medias,	 Paris:
La Decouverte.
Mathews	 V.	 (1987),	 "Isn't that a dainty dish to set	 before	 a
fling?", in the Quardian, 13 October 1987, p.p.25.
Matthias	 G. (1987a) "Plus Ca chan g e?" in	 Cable and Satellite,
ApriL, 1987, p.p.16-ll.
Matthias G. (1987b), "At 	 sixes	 and sevens" in Cable and
Satellite, May 1987, p.p.21+-27.
Matthias G. (1986), "Cannes	 Product	 in sale" in	 Cable and
SatelLite, July 1987, p.p.43-44.
Maximin J. (1985), "CommerciaL opportunities in Cable", Cable 85,
On Line, p.p.ó-9.
May	 J.	 and WiLdavsky (1978),	 "the Policy Cycle",	 Beverly Hills:
Sage.
Maybury P.	 (1986),	 "A dish fit for TV pioneers"	 Observer,	 23
November 1986, p.p.34.
Mayntz	 R.	 and Scharpf	 F.	 (1975),	 "Policy-Making in the German
FederaL Buraucracy", Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Mazey S.	 (1986), "PubLic Policy-Making in France: The Art of the
Possible", in West European PoLitics, 1986 (2), p.p.412-28.
di	 Meana,	 Carlo-Ripa	 (1988), "The Situation in the European
audiovisual industr y and the urgent need for a Community
initiative", Text sent to the Ministers of CuLture on 27 May 1988:
B russet s
MeLtok W.H. and NansetL R.E. (1983), "The Debate Over Critical VS
Administrative Research: Circularity and ChalLenge in Journal of
Communication, Summer 1983, p.p.lO3-l17.
Metayer	 G.	 (1980), "La societe malade de ses communications",
Dunod; Paris.
Metclafle	 S.	 (1986),	 "Information	 and some economics	 of	 the
Formation	 revolutions"	 in	 Ferguson	 M.	 (ed)	 (1986),	 t)w
Technologies and the PubLic Interest, London: Sage.
MichaLowska	 A.	 (1984),	 "CanaP1us	 sees t(ie (fght of 	 day"	 in
Cable and Satellite, December 1984, p.p.4l-l..
Michaud P.	 (1986),	 "TV5's silent growth" in TV World, December!
January 1985/1986, p.p.Zl.
Micidleton	 J.	 (1980),	 "Images	 and action:	 theories in and	 of
communication	 planning" in Middleton J.	 (ed) (1980)	 "Approaches
to Communications planning", Paris, Unesco.
Miege 8.	 (1979),	 "The Cultural Commodity" in Media. Culture and
Society, vol 1, No.3, March 1979.
Miege	 B.	 et	 at.	 (	 Pajon	 P.	 and	 Sataun	 J.M.)	 (1986),	 L.L.
Industrialisation de l'Audiovisuel, Paris: Montagne
Miege	 8.	 (1987),	 "The	 Logics	 at Work	 in	 the	 new	 cultural
industries" in Media. Culture and Society,
	
vol 9, (1987), p.p.237-
89.
Miege	 B.	 and	 J.M.	 Salauri	 (1989),	 "France	 a	 Mixed	 System;
Renovation of an old concept" in Media. Culture and Society,
VoL. 11, (1989), p.p.55-66.
Miller J.	 (1983),	 "Telecommunications pLanning and the power of
357
expertise" in TeLecommunications PoLic y , June 1983, p.p.l37l46.
MilLer J.	 (1987),	 "Message for the Medium" in The Times: 	 March
23, 1987, p.p.C6.
MiLLer J.	 and SutherLand A. (1988), "How a "dead duck" started TV
big bang"	 in Sunday Times, 13 November 1988, p.p.16.
MitLiband R.	 (1969), "The State in Ca p italist Societ!..,	 London:
Weidenfeld and Nicotson.
Ministére	 d'Etat	 de	 Grand Duche	 du	 Luxembourg;	 Service
Information et Presse: 'Audiovisuel, Mai 1987.
Miquet P.(1984),	 "Histoire de La radio et de La tLvision",
Paris: Librairie Academique, Perring.
Missika J.L.	 andWottonD.	 (1982),	 "Ouva La teLevision?",	 inLe
Mond, 26 and 27 February and 1 March, p.p.22.
Missika	 J.	 L.	 and	 Wolton	 0.	 (1983),	 "La FoLtedu Logis: La
teLevision dans Les societês democrati g ues", Gall imard: Paris
Missika J.L.	 and WoLton D. (1986), "La politigue audiovisueLle en
France 1981-86", Paris: May 1986, unpubLished draft.
Missika	 J.L.	 (1987),	 "La dereglementation de l'audiovisuet 	 en
France"	 in Revue d'Economie Industriette,	 No.39,	 1cr trimestre
1987, p.p. 180-185.
Mission TV CabLe (1984),	 "Le reseaux cables tocaux: Conservoir -
Programmer - Financier", Editions du Moniteur: Paris.
Moisdon J.L. (1988), "L'Angoise du Maire face aux Incertitudes du
cabLe", in Medias Pouvoirs, June 1988, p-p.90-9.
Montaldo J. (1974), "Dossier ORTF: tous coupabtes", Albin MicheL:
Paris.
Moran	 M. (1985), "PoLitics and Societ y in Britain. An Introduction",
London: MacMiLLan.
MorranV.	 (1985),	 "IndustriaL PoLicy inH. MachinandV. Wright
(eds),	 Economic Policy and Polic y Makin g under the Mitterand
Presidency 1981-84, London: Frances Pinter.
Mosco	 V.	 (1988),	 "Toward	 a	 Theory of	 the	 State	 and
Telecommunications	 Policy" in	 JournaL of Communication, 	 Winter
1988, vol 38(1), p.plO7-124.
Mosco V.
	
and Herman A.	 (1980),	 "Communication,	 domination and
resistance", Media, Culture and Scoieti, 1980 (2), p.p.3Sl-365.
Mousseau	 J.	 (1986),	 "Les	 trois	 Ages	 de	 La	 ttvision"	 in
Communication et Langages, No.68, 2e trimeste 1986, p.p.lO2lO6.
Mousseau	 J.	 (1988),	 "La	 teLevision du matin	 dans	 Ic	 mond",
Communication et langages, No. 75, ler trimeste 1988, p.p.7O-8O.
MulLer	 J.	 (1987),	 "CabLe	 Policy	 in	 Europe:	 The	 role	 of
transborder	 broadcasting	 and	 its	 effects	 on	 CATV"	 in
Tetecomunications PoLicy, September 1987, p.p2S9-268.
Murdock G.	 (1986), "Nation-States and TrasnationaL Companies" in
Missika	 J.L.	 and	 VedeL	 1.	 (1986),	 La DeregLementation des
telecommunications et de L'audiovisueL, Paris: CNRS.
Murdock	 G.	 (1984),	 "The	 privatisation	 of	 British
TeLecommunications"	 in Mosco V.	 and Wasco J.	 (1984)	 eds,	 The
Critical Communications Review, vol II, New Jersey: Ablex.
Murdock G.	 and Golding P. (1977), "CapitaLism, Communication and
Class	 ReLations" in Curran et aL (1977), 	 Mass Communication and
Society, Hong Kong: Arnold and Open University Press.
Murphy B. (1983), "The World Wired Up", London: Comedia Series.
358
McCavitt E.W.	 (1981),	 "Broadcasting Around the WorLd", 	 USA,	 Tab
Books Inc.
McGhee	 G.	 (1984),	 "A Coronet for the Grand Duchy" in Cable and
Satellite, July 1984, p.p.lO-l2.
McKinsey	 (1983),	 "A Call To Action: The European Information
Technology Industry", Amsterdam: McKinsey and Company.
McKnight	 L.	 (1988),	 "TechnicaL	 standards	 and	 International
Telecommunications Regimes", Unpublished Draft
McQuail	 D.	 (1969),	 Towards a Sociology of Mass Communications,
London: MacMilLan.
McQuaiL D. (1983), Mass Communication Thery, London: Sage.
McQuaiL D.	 (1986),	 "Is media Thery adequate to the challenge of
new	 communications	 technologies"	 in	 Ferguson	 M.	 (ed),	 New
Communication TechnoLogies and the Public Interest, London: Sage.
McQuail and Siune (1986) (eds), Mew Media Politics, London: Sage
McQuait D. (1987a), "Telecommunications and Broadcasting Policy",
Paper	 for	 presentation	 in	 the	 Workshop,	 Informaiton and
Telecommunications Pot ic y in Europe,	 ECPR	 Joint	 Sessions,
Amsterdam, April 10-15, 1987.
Mcauail D.
	
(1987b), Mass Communications Theory: an Introduction,
London: Sage.
McQuait D.
	 (1987c),	 "Technologies:	 Barren Terrain or Promising
Arena",	 in	 Dutton et at	 (eds)	 (1987),	 "Wired Cities",	 London:
Cassel
Negrine R.
	 (1984),	 "From Radio Relay to Cable	 Television:	 The
British	 Experience"	 in	 Historical Journal of Film Radio and
Television, vol 4, No.1, (1984), p.p.294?.
Negrine R.
	
(1985a), "The end of the public service tradition" in
R.	 Kuh (ed),	 "The Politics of Broadcasting", Kent: Croom Helm.
Negrine R.
	 (1985b), "Cable	 telvision	 in	 Great	 Britain"	 in
Negrine	 R.	 (ed),	 "Cable	 TeLevision	 and	 the	 future	 of
broadcastin g ", London: Croom Helm.
Negrine R.
	
(1987a), "The New Information Technologies: Is there an
"aLternative strategy?" in Capital and 	 Class, Summer 1987, p.p.59-78.
Negrine R.
	
(1987b), "The Develepment of Cable Systems in the UK,
Research", Unpublished draft.
Negrine R. (1988), "New Media in Britain:
	 Is there a Policy?"	 in
Dyson K. and Humphreys P. (1988a).
Negrine R.
	
and Goodfriend A.
	
(1988), "Public perceptions of the
new media:	 a survey of British Attitudes" in
	
Media, Culture and
Society, vol 10(1988), p.p.3O3-321.
Neil S.C. (1988), "The politics of International Standardisation
Revised", paper presented at the International Telecommunications
Society Conference, June 29 - July 1, 1988, USA, MIT.
New	 Media Markets (1986),	 "Special Report UK DBS", 	 September	 3,
1986, p.p.l-15.
Nora	 S.	 and Minc	 A.	 (1978),	 "L'informatisation de Ia societe",
Paris, La Documentation Francaise.
Nordenstreng K.	 (1972), "Policy for News Tranmissioni in Mcauail
(ed) (1972), "Sociology of Mass Communications", London: Penguin.
Nordlinger E.A.	 (1981), "On the Autonomy of the Democratic State",
Cambridge Mass: Havard University Press.
O'Carrol	 1.	 (1987),	 "BSB-third	 time	 lucky?"	 in	 Cable and
Satellite, Februray 1987, p.p.436.
359
O'Connor C.	 (1988),	 "Super on the market", Cable and Satellite,
May 1988, p.p.33-34
Offe C. (1984), "The Contraditctions of the Welfare State", London:
Hutchinson University Library.
Oglivy	 and	 Mather Europe	 (1984),	 "The New Media Review 1984",
Ogitvy and Mather Europe: London.
Olsen M. (1965), "The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Goods", Mass: Harard University Press.
O'Malley 1. (1988), "The Debate Over Switchin g the Future Channels
of Broadcasting", London: Campaign for Press and Broadcasting
Freedom.
Ortega C.	 and Romero C. (1977), "Communications Policies in Peru",
Belgium: Unesco.
Ostry C.	 (1987),	 "Public Broadcasting A matter of Principle" in
lntermedia, November 1987, voL 15, No.6, p.p.36-37.
Palomaki	 M.	 (1987),	 "The	 Menu	 for encryptions"	 in	 Cable and
Satellite, April 1987, p.p.39-41.
Parrot M.	 (1985),	 "Monopoly or free for all?" in Broadcast, 	 15
February 1988, p.p.9.
Paterson	 P.	 (1987),	 "Beware the Trojan Horse of 	 Dregulation",
the Listener, 9 April 1987, p.p.9-1O.
Paulou	 B.	 (1967), "Radio and Television Broadcasting on the
European Continent",	 Mineapolis	 U.	 of Minnesota Press.
Paulou	 B.	 (1981),	 Television and Radio in the United Kingdom,
London, MacMillan
Peacock	 A.	 (1986),	 "Technology	 and the Political	 Economy	 of
Broadcasting" in Intermedia, November 1986, vol 4, No.6, p.p.35-37.
Peacock A.
	
(1987),	 "The Politics of Investigating
	
Broadcasting
finance" in Natwest QuarterLy, No.153, March 1987, p.p.3-l6.
Peacock	 Committee	 (1986),	 "Re p ort of the Committee on Financing
the BBC", HMSO, July 1986, Cmnd 9824.
PeLappat P.	 (1987),	 "La FA dix fois plus equipee que La France"
in	 Tetecoms Magaizine,	 No.11,	 February 1988,	 "Dossier Cable",
p.p.46-l+9.
Pelkmans J.	 (1980), "Economic Theories of Integration Revisited"
in JournaL of Common Market Studies, (June 1980), p.p.335-54.
Pelkmans J. (1987), "The New Approach to Technical Harmonisation
and Standarisation" in Common Market Studies, No.3, (March) 1987,
p.p.249-269.
Perrier J.
	 (1986), "Le nouveau visage de Ia TV apres Le 16 mars"
in Le Figaro: 19 March 1986, p.p.2.
Petersen	 et al	 (1965),	 the Mass Media and Modern Society,
	
New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Petit P.	 "Full employment policies in a long-run perspective" in
Cambrid g e Economic Journal, September/December 1986, p.p.4O2-4Oo.
Peyre P.	 (1984),	 "TVS:	 a French-Language satellite	 television
service" in EBU Review, vol XXXV, No.3, May 1984, p.p.22-26.
Phillip-Butt A. (1983), "Pressure Groups and Policy-Making in the
European Community" in Lodge J. (ed), Institutions and Policies
of the European Communities, London: Frances Pinter.
Pickles	 D.	 (1982),	 Problems of contemporary French Politics,
London Methuen.
Pierre	 E.;	 Chaguiboff J.;	 Chapelain	 B.	 (1982),	 Les nouveaux
telespectaters de 9 a 18 ans, Documentation Française: Paris.
360
Pige	 F.	 (1962),	 La Tétevisiondans leMonde. Organisation
Administrative et Financiere, 	 Paris:	 Sociétè	 Nationate	 des
Enterprises de Presse.
Pigeat H.	 (1983), La television p ar cable commence demain, PLon:
Paris
Pigeat H.
	
(1984),	 Saint Ecran: Un a g e nouveau	 television par
cable, Paris: Solar.
Pinder	 J.	 (1968), Positive	 and	 negative	 intergration:	 some
problems	 of economic union in the 	 EEC"	 in World Today, voL 24,
p. p.88-110.
Pinder J.	 (1986),	 "The	 PoliticaL	 Economy of	 Intergration	 in
Europe: PoLicies and Institutions in East and West"	 in	 Journal of
Common Market Studies, voL XXV, No.1, September 1986, p.p.1-15.
Pine R.	 (1987),	 "Broadcasting:	 Public or Private?	 A	 SurvivaL
Strategy for Dinosaurous", 	 Intermedia,	 JuLy/September 1987, voL
15, No.4/55, p.p.lY-2l.
Pineau G.	 (1984), "Trois ans de Communication Audiovisuelle 1981-
84", Paris, I.N.A. Department de La Recherche Prospective.
Ploman	 E.W.	 (1984a),	 "Communications	 Policy	 and	 Planning:	 A
Comprehensive	 Perspective	 with	 particuLar	 Emphasis	 on
Broadcasting in Teheranian et al (eds) Communincations Polic y for
NationaL Development: A Comparative Perspective, 	 London:
Rentledge and Kegan Paul.
Ploman	 E. W.	 (1984b),	 "Space, Earth, and Communications",	 London:
McGi IL.
PoLsby N.	 (1980), "Community Power and Political Theory: ProbLems
of Evidence and Inference", Vale: VaLe University Press.
PooL I.	 de Sola (1971),
	
"Communication. Computers and Automation for
Development", New York U.N. Institute For Training Research.
PooL	 I.	 de	 Sola	 (1974),	 "The Rise	 of	 Communication	 PoLicy
Research" in Journal of Communication, 24(2), p.p.31-42.
PooL	 I.	 de SoLa (1977),	 "The Governance of Mass Communication:
the Government, the Audience and Social Groups" in Teheranian, P4.
et	 al	 (1977)	 (eds),	 Communications Policy for National
Development: A Comparative Per
	
spective,	 London:	 Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
PolL I. de Sola	 (1983),	 Forecasting The Telephone: A
Retrospective Assessment of Telephone,	 Norwood,	 New	 Jersey:
AbI cx.
Porat	 N.U.	 (1976),	 "The Information Economy", 	 voL 1,
Ann	 Arbor: Micro Film InternationaL University.
Porat	 M.U.	 (1978),	 "Communication	 PoLicy	 in	 an
Information	 Society'	 in	 Robinson 6. (ed), "Communication 	 for
Tommorrow",	 New York: Praeser.
Potter J.	 (1988),	 "Consumerism and the pubLic sector:	 how well
does	 the coat fit?" in "Public Administration,	 vol	 66,	 (Summer
1987), p.p. 149-64.
Poulantzas N. (1978), "Political Power and Social Classes", London:
Verso	 Books,	 or	 Pouvoir PoLitigue et Classes Sociates,	 (1968
editions), Paris: Francois Maspens.
Powel P.	 (1982), "DBS transmission standards for the UK-propsals
from	 the	 IBA	 and	 the	 BBC"	 in	 International Broadcasting
Engineering, vol 13, No.184, July 1982, p.p.24-S.
Pragnell A.
	 (1985),	 "Television in Europe; Quality and Values in
Time of Change", Manchester: The European Institute for the Media.
Prat	 Report	 (1982),	 (Home Office and	 Departmentof	 Industry),
"Direct Broadcasting by SateLlite", Report of the Advisory Panel on
Technical Transmissions Standards, HMSO, November 1982.
361
Pressman	 J.L.	 and	 Witdavsky	 A.	 (1973),	 "Implementation",
California: University of CaLifornia Press.
Price L.	 (1985a),	 "The Latest Luxsat means business",
	 in CabLe
and Satellite, May 1985, p.p.2l-4.
Price L.
	 (1985b),	 "The year of Arinne" in Cable and SateLLite",
January 1985, p.p.42-44.
Puchata D.
	 (1972), "of the BLind Men ELephants and International
Intergration"	 in	 Journal	 of Common Market Studies	 10	 (1972),
p.p.267-84.
Querat	 J.	 (1985),	 "TV	 privées epreve de force" 	 in
Le Figaro, 20 November 1985, p.p.2.
Quatrepoint	 J.M.	 (1982),	 "L'Etat donne a t'industrie Françe
Les moyens d'acceder a La dimension modiaLe dans une
	 technoLogie
de pointe", Le Monde, 5 November 1982, p.p.l8.
Queyranne J.J.
	 (1986),	 "organiser La competition public-prive",
Medias et Bouvoirs, No.2, March 1986, p.p.83-93.
Raboy	 M.	 (1983),	 "Media	 and politics in Socialist France"
	 in
Media, CuLture and Society, (1983)5, p.p.303-20.
Rackoff	 S.	 and Schaefer	 G.L.	 (1970),	 "Politics,	 Policy	 and
PoLiticaL Science" in Politics and Society, 1(1970), p.p.S1-71.
Ramasastry	 J.	 (1988),	 "The	 Road	 to	 HDTV"	 in	 SatelLite
Communications, April 1988, p.p.33-5.
Rapoport	 C.	 (1988),	 "Japan	 Tunes	 in whiLe Europe	 talks"	 in
FinanciaL Times: 21 ApriL 1988, p.p.l6.
Rattiff P.A.
	 (1985), "The MAC debate" in Cable 85 Proceedings of
the International Confeence on SateLLite 	 and Cable TV,
	 On line:
Brighton: July 1985.
ReaL H.	 (1984),	 "The Debate on Critical Theory and the study of
Communcations",	 Journal of Communication, 	 Autumn 1984,	 vol 34,
No.4, p.p.72-81.
ReeveL	 P.	 (1986),	 "Jewels	 in	 the TV saLes games"	 in	 Times:
November 3,1986, p.p.28.
Renaud J.L.	 and Litman B.R.	 (1985),	 "Changing dynamics of	 the
overseas	 market place for TV programming" in
	
Telecommunications
PoLicy, 1 September 1985, p.p.245-61.
Rhodes H.	 (1988),	 "Industry and Modernisation:	 an overview" in
Gaffrey J. (ed), France and Modernisation, London: Abecombe.
RiceR,	 and Williams F. (1984), "Theories old and new: The study
of	 new	 media"	 in	 R.	 Rice	 et	 at	 (eds),	 "The New Media:
Communication research and technoLogy", Newbury Park; CA: Sage.
Richardson	 J.J.	 and	 Jordan	 A.G.	 (1983),	 "Overcrowed	 Policy
making:	 Some	 British	 and	 European	 Reflections"	 in	 Police
Sciences, 15(1983), p.p.247-268.
Richeri G.
	 (1985), "Television from service to Business European
Tendencies and the Italian Case" in Drummond p .	 and Paterson	 P.
(1985) (eds), "TeLevision in Transistion", London: BFI.
Riols	 Y.M.	 (1985a), "Libert	 ....	 practicabitit',	 viabité"	 in
Cable and Satellite, May 1985, p.p.57-59.
Riots Y.M
	 (1985b),	 "The	 "Plan Cable" stumbles"	 in	 Cable	 and
Satellite, March 1985, 20-23.
Robins	 K.	 and Webster F.	 (1986),	 "Broadcasting	 Politics	 and
Consumption" in Screen,
	
voL 27, No.3-4, (May-August) 1986, p.p.30-
44.
Robinson	 J.P.	 (1972),	 "Mass	 Communication	 and	 Information
Diffusion"	 inF.G.	 Kline	 and	 P.J.	 Tichenor	 (eds),	 "Current
Perspectres in Mass Communication Research", Beverly Hills: Sage.
362
Robinson T. (1980), "The Nature and Meaning of broadcastin g Policy
in the UK 1945-74", Unpublished PHD Thesis, London City
Universi ty.
Rodgers R. (1987), "Judged by its own strategy, the Government is
letting down Britain's space programme" in Quardian, 17 September
1987, p-p.25.
Roe K.
	 (1985),	 "The programme output of seven Cable TV channels",
Report No.5, Sweden: Department of Sociology.
Roerner J.	 (1986) (eds), "Anal y tical Marxism", Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Rogers E (1963),
	
"The Diffusion of Innovations" Glencoe: Free
Press.
Rohde E. (1983), "La gestion des reseaux: un enjeau des pouvoirs"
in Le Monde, 16/17 October 1983, p.p3
Roman J.W. (1983), "Cable Mania", New Jersey, Prentice Hilt.
Ronningen L.A.
	
(1987),	 "The three chip contender" in
	
Cable and
Satellite, May 1987, p.p.48-5O.
Rose R.	 (1973), "Comparing PubLic PoLicy, An Overview", European
Journal of Political Science Research, 1 (1973), p.p.67-94.
Rosembloom	 S.R.	 (1984),	 "The	 Continuing	 RevoLutions	 in
Communications TechnoLogy: Implactions for broadcasting business"
in Compaine,	 M.B.	 (1984a) (ed),	 "Understanding New Media",	 USA;
Ba IL i nger
Rosenberg	 N.	 (1982), " Inside the black box: TechnoLogy and
Economics", Cambridge, C.U.P.
Rosen.thal	 G.	 (1975),	 "The Men Behind the Decisions", 	 Lexington:
D.C. Heath.
Roussetet A. (1987), "L'Europe des tèespectateurs", in Le Monde,
15-16 July 1987, p.p.23
RowLand	 W.D.	 (1986),	 "American	 teLecommunications	 policy
research:	 its	 contradictory origins and infLuences" 	 in	 Media,
CuLture and Society, 1986, voL 8, p.p.159-182.
Rowland	 W.J.	 (1984),	 "Deconstructing	 American	 Communications
Policy	 Literature" in Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 	 1
(4), p.p.423-.35.
Rawsthow A.
	
(1985),	 "Art of the State", 	 in Marketing,	 4	 July
1985, p.p.14-17.
Roy	 E.	 (1988),	 "TV5	 - Satellite TeLevision in French" in 	 EBU
Review, No.1, (January 1988), p.p.3O-1
RTL (1986),	 RTL and the Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Téledifusion,
File, Luxembourg: Rh.
Ryan	 M.	 (1988),	 "Postmodern	 Politics" in	 Theory. Culture and
Society, voL 5, (1988), p-p.559-76.
Sabbagh K. (1987), "A declaration of independents" in Listener, 9
April 1987, p.p.1O-1.
Saunders P. (1981), Social Theory and the Urban Question, London:
Hutch i nson.
Scase R.	 (1980) (ed),	 The State in Western Europe, Introduction
Kent, Croom Helm.
Scharkansky	 I.	 (1981),	 "Intergovernmental	 relations	 in	 P.1.
Wystrom	 and	 W.H.	 Starback	 (eds),	 Handbook of Organisational
Design, Oxford, Oxford Uni Press.
Scharf F.W.	 (1978), "Comparative Policy Studies: Cases in search
of	 systematic Theory" in European Journal of Political Research,
6(1978), p.pl17-l25.
363
Scherer	 J.	 (1986),	 "Histoticat Analysis of
	
Deregulation,	 the
Europ(ean Case",
	 Paper presented in Cot Loque
	 InternationaL,	 La
DEregLementation des Teicommunications et de L'audiovisuel,
Centre National Rechercte Scientifique, Pans 27-28-29 May 1986.
Schitter	 H.I.	 (1969), "Mass Communications and American Empire",
New York: Augustus M. Ketey.
Schitter	 S.C.	 (1984),	 "Informatics and Information fLows:
	 the
Underpinings	 of Transnational Capatatism" in Mosco et
	 at	 (eds)
(1984), "Critical Communications Review II", New Jersey: Abtex.
Schramm	 W.	 (1964),	 "Mass Media and National DeveLopment",
	 Palo
Alto: Stanford University Press.
Schudson N. (1986), "The Menu of media Research" in BaLI-Ro-Keach
and Cantor N. eds), "Media. Audience and Social Structure", Beverly
Hilts: Sage.
Schumpeter	 J.A.	 (1975),"Capitatism, sociaLism and democracy",
London; G. AlLen and Unwin.
Scwartz	 1.	 (1985) "The Policy of the Commission of the European
Communities	 with respect to broadcasting	 in	 EBU Review,	 No.6,
March 1985, p.p.48-6O.
Scwartz I.V. (1988), "The Kabetregelins Judgement of the European
Court of Justice", Symposium of the Verening voor Media-en
Communicatierecht, Amsterdam, 16 May 1988.
Seaton J. (1986), "Politics, Parties and the Media in Britain" in
R. Kuhn (ed), "Broadcasting Politics in West Europe", London:
France Cass.
Seldon A. (1976), preface toG. Tutlock, The Vote Motive, London:
Institute of Economic Affairs.
Seymour-Ure	 C.	 (1982),	 "The SOP and the Media",
	 in	 Political
Quarterly, vol 53, No.4, October/December 1982, p.p.433-444.
Seymour-Ure C.	 (1987), "Media Policy in Britain: Now You See It,
Now	 You	 Don't	 in	 European Journal of Communication,	 vol	 2,
(1987), p.p.269-288.
Sfez	 L.	 (1979)	 (ed),	 "Decision et pouvoir dans Ia Société
Francaise", Paris: Union Cererale Editions.
Sharp M. (1985), "ConcLusions: Technology gap or management gap?"
in M. Sharp (ed) "Europe and the New Technolo g ies, London: Pinter.
Sharp N. and Shearman C. (1987), European Technological
Collaboration, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Chatham House Papers
No. 36
Sheridan p .	 (1986),	 "SatelLite TeLevision: The ambition but not
the means" in Communications, January 24, 1986, p.p.7-1O.
Sherman A. (1986), "Why the BBC needs its own monitors" Quardian:
8 December 1986, p.p.l8.
Sherman B.L. (1987), "Telecommunications Management: the Broadcast
and cable industries", New York: McCraw-Hill.
Sibile H.	 (1987),	 "TFI:	 Un Univers impitoyable" in Alternative
Economigues, March 1987, p.p.lO-11.
Shonfield P. (1965), "Modern Capitalism", Oxford: University Press.
Silj	 et	 at	 (1988),	 "East of Dallas? The European Challenge to
American Television", London: BFI.
Simon	 H.A.	 (1969), "The Sciences of the Artificial",
	 Cambridge
Mass: MIT Press.
SjoblomG.	 (1977), "The Cumulation problem in political science:
an	 esay on research strategies" in European Journal of Political
Research, 5(1977), p.p.l-32.
364
Smith	 G.	 and	 Jay H.	 (1980),	 "The artificial	 debate	 between
rationalist	 and	 incrementaL ist models of 	 decision	 making"	 in
Policy and Politys 8(2) ApriL 1980, p.p.237-2B7.
Smythe D.W.	 (1979), "Review of the "Media are American" in Media.
Culture and Scoiety, vol 	 , 1 January 1979.
Smythe D.W. and Van Dim 1. (1983), "On CriticaL and Administrative
Research" in Journal of Communication, Summer 1983, p.p.117-128.
Snider	 L.W.	 (1987),	 "Identifying The ELements of State 	 Power;
Where	 do we Begin?",	 in Comparative Political Studies, 	 voL 20,
No.3, October 1987, p.p.3l4-356.
Snoddy	 R.	 (1986),	 "UK	 Political	 Hesitation"	 in	 Intermedia,
JuLy/September 1986, vol 4, No.4/5, p.p.3435.
Snoddy R.
	
(1988),	 "Big studios to betess dominant" in Financial
Times:	 SpeciaL Section:	 Britain'S Broadcasting 	 Revolution;	 16
December 1988, PV1.
Sorbets C.	 and Palmer H.	 (1986), "France" in N.J. Kleinstember
et	 at	 (eds),	 "Electonics Media and Politics in Western Europe",
Euromedia Research, Campus; Frankfurt.
Souschon	 H.	 (1980),	 "Petit Ecran. Grand Public",	 Paris:	 La
Documentation Française.
Spence	 A.M.	 (1976),	 "Product Differentiation and	 Welfare"	 in
American Economic Review 66, 1976, p.p.4O7-414.
Starling	 G.	 (1983),	 "TechnologicaL	 Innovation	 in	 the
Communications Industry:	 An Analysis of the Goverments Roles" in
Havic	 (ed)	 (1983), "Communications Policy and the Political
Process", Westport: Greenwood Press.
Stempel	 G.H.	 III	 and	 Westley	 B.H.	 (eds)	 (1981),
"Research Methods in Mass Communications", 	 Engtewood:	 Prentice
Hall.
Stephane R. (1988), "The cinema and television in Europe; Present
situtaion and future prospects" in EBU Review, No.2, March 1988,
p.p. 14-20.
Steinfietd	 C.W.	 and FuLk J.	 (1987),	 "On the Role of Theory in
Research	 on	 Information	 Technologies	 in	 Organisations"	 in
Communications Research, voL 4, No.5, October 1987, p.p.479-49O.
Stevenson R.L.
	
(1983), "A Critical Look at Critical AnaLysis" in
Journal of Communication, Summer 1983, p.p.262-27O.
Stigler G.J.	 (1971),	 "The Theory of Economic Regulation",	 Bell
Journal of Economics and Management Science, Spring 1971, p.p.3-2l.
Stoddart	 P.	 (1987),	 "The Milne Mataisie" in	 Sunday	 Times,	 1
February 1987.
Stoffaes	 C.	 (1984)	 "French	 Industrial	 Strategy	 in	 Sunrise
Sectors"	 in A.	 Jaquemin	 (ed),	 European Industry: a Public and
Corporat Strategy, Oxford: UPO.
Sutherland A.
	
(1987), "Astra boost upsets DBS picture" in Sunday
Times, 15 March 1987, 16.
Sutton 5.	 (1981),	 "Spend,	 Spend,	 Spend:	 The Dramatic Rise of
Production	 Costs	 in	 Journal of	 the	 Royal Television Society,
March-April 1981, p.p.2-l8.
Svennening M (1987), "Viewers are People Too: A fresh look at the
Audience" in ESOMAR 1987.
Syfret	 T.	 (1983),	 Cable and advertising in the eighties, 	 J.
Walter Thomshon Co, London, Media Department.
Taishoff	 M.N.	 (1987), "State Responsibility and the Direct
Broadcast Satellite", London: Frances Pinter.
Tarl	 de	 A.	 (1986), "Dream	 factories	 go	 International"
in Intermedia, vol 4, No.4/5, Juty/ September 1986, p.p.79-8l.
365
TarL	 de	 A.	 (1979) "The Monopoly that	 Won't	 Divide"	 in
Smith, Antony (ed) (1979), "Television and Political Life, Studies
in Six European Countries", London: MacMiLLan Press Limited.
Taylor R.
	
(1983), "The Limits of European Inte g ration", Worcester:
Croom HeLm.
TechnicaL	 Advisory	 Committee	 (1972)	 (1973),	 Paper on the
technicaL sub committee, London, HMSO.
TeLesis (1986), "Competing for Prosperity: Business Strategies and
industriaL Policies in Modern France, London: PSI.
Tempest	 A.	 (1986),	 "The	 TeLevision Community?" 	 in	 CabLe and
Satellite, May 1986, p.p.46-7.
Thompson K. (1986), "Exporting Entertainment: America in the World
Film Market: 1907-1934", Champaign: University of ILLinois Press.
TisdaLL	 P.	 (1986),	 "ShouLd the BBC take the money?" in
	 Times,
November 3, 1986, p.p.l5.
Torsteensen F.
	 (1986), "C-MAC puts forward its case" in Cable and
SatelLite, May 1986, p.p.32-35.
Tourain A.	 (1971),	 "The Post-Industrial Society", New York/Random
House.
Tracey N.	 (1988),	 "PopuLar Culture and the Economics
	 of	 GLobal
TeLevision" in Intermedia", March 1988, p.p.31-46
Tracey N. (1987), "European Viewers: What Will they ReaLLy Watch?"
in Columbia Journal of World Business, FaLL 1987, p.p.7?-85.
Trethowan 1. (1977), "Broadcasting and Politics", London.
Tunstatt J. (1977), "The Media are American", London: Constable.
Tunstatt J. (1983), "The Media in Britain", London: Constable.
Tunstatt J.	 (1986a), "Great Britain" in KLeinstenber et al (eds)
(1986),	 "Electronic Media and Politics in Western Europe", Verlag:
Campus.
Tunstall J.	 (1986b), "Communications Deregulation: The Unleashing
of America's Communications Industry, Oxford: BasiL BtackweLL.
TunstalL J. (1987), "Deregulation: British Muddles, French Plans"
in Intermedia, July/September 1987, voL 15, No.4/5, p.p.34-7.
TunstaLl	 J.	 (1988),	 European Television with Bertusconi and
Without Frontiers, Unpublished draft.
Tydeman J.	 and Kelm H.
	 (1986),	 "New Media in Europe",	 London:
McGraw-Hi LL.
Tydeman J.	 (1987), European Market Forcasts for Cable, SMATV and
Direct-to-Home Reception, 1987-1996,
	 Luxembourg:	 SES	 October
1987.
Unesco (1974),	 "Report of the Meeting of Experts on Communication
Policies and Planning in Latin America";
	 Bogota, 4-13 July 1974,
Corn C74 CONF 617/4.
Valadares	 D.	 (1977),	 "The	 changing sound of	 Luxembourg"	 in
ADMAP, August 1977, p.p.356-357.
Vans	 1.	 (1985),	 "Flow	 of Television	 Programmes	 in	 Western
Europe";	 Tempere	 Peace	 Research	 Institute and	 University	 of
Tempere De partment of Journalism and Mass Communication.
Vaughan	 et al (1980),	 (Vaughan N.;
	 Kolinsky N,;	 Shernif	 P.),
"Social Change in France", Oxford, Martin Robertson.
VeLjanovski C.G. and Bishop W.D. (1983), "Cable by Choice. The
Economics of a New Era in Television", London, lEA, Hobarrt Paper
96.
366
Vernon P.. (1974) (ed), "Big Business and the state", Massachussets,
Havard University Press.
Vicard L.14. (1934), "Le Mythe de Ia Democracie", Paris.
Vogter J. (1981), "Technolocy and Change in InternationaL
ReLations: on the independence variable? in B. Buzan and R. Jones
(eds), "Change and the stud y of International ReLations"; London.
Wade L.L.
	 (1979),	 "PubLic Administration, public choice and the
pathos of concern" in Review of Politics, 41, p.p.344-74.
Wade P. (1986), "The DBS challenge" in Intermedia, vol 4, No.4/5,
July/September 1986, p.p.76-78.
WakshLog J.
	 (1983),	 "Channel 4:	 The Audience's Response", IBA:
London.
WaLden	 8.	 (1982),	 "Broadcasting and Politics" in Parliamentary
Affairs, vol XXXV, No.4, Autumn 1982, p.p.356-366.
WalLace	 H.	 (1980), Broadcasting Politics: the finances of the
Euro p ean Communities,	 London:	 AlLen	 and Unity.
WaLlace H. (1984), "ImpLementation across National boundaries" in
	 1.
Lewis;	 0.1.	 Wallace	 H.	 (eds),	 "Policies	 into	 Practices",
London:	 Heireman Educational Books.
Wallace H.	 (1983),	 "Negotiation,	 Conflict and Compromise:	 The
Elusive	 Pursuit	 of	 Common Policies" in Wallace
	 et	 al	 (eds),
"Policy-Making in the European Community", London: J. WiLley.
Walter	 A.	 and	 BrailLand	 P.	 (1985),	 "How	 wILL	 these	 extra
audiovisuaL	 channels	 be used?"	 in	 Intermedia,	 July/September
1985, vol 13, No.4/5, p-p.50.52.
WaLler A.
	
(1986), "France: hardware first" in Iritermedia, vol 4,
No.4/5, september/July 1986.
Wardropper J. (1986), "Time runs short as Europe thinks again" in
Computer Weekly, December 18/25, 1986, p.p.7.
Waterman D.	 (1988), "The economic effects of privatisation and
new technology" in Telecommunications Policy,	 June 1988,	 p.p.141-
151.
Waters G.	 (1986),	 "Broadcasting in Europe" in Combroad, No. 71,
June 1986, p.p.49-53.
Watson-Brown A.
	
(1988),	 "Towards The Triumph of the Matte Black
Box" in Intermedia, January 1988 (1), vol 16, p-p-21-24.
Waymark	 P.	 (1986),	 "Under	 siege	 for the	 jubIlee"	 in	 Times
November 3,1986, p-P-20.
Webb A. (1972), "Planning Enquiries and Amenity Policy" in Policy
and Politics, January (1972), p.p.6S-71+.
Webb	 C.	 (1983),	 "Theoretical	 Perspectives	 and	 Problems"	 in
Wallace	 et	 al	 (eds),	 Policy-Making in the European Community,
London: J. Wiltey.
Webber	 D.	 et al (1986),	 "Information Technology	 and	 Economic
Recovery	 in Western Europe:	 The role of the British French	 and
West	 German	 Governments" in Policy Sciences,
	 vol	 19,	 (1986),
p. p-319-346
Webster F.	 and Robins K.	 (1985),	 "The Revolution of the	 fixed
model:	 Information, technology and Social Taylorism" in Drummond
P.	 and	 Paterson	 R.	 (1985)	 (eds),	 "Television in Transition",
London: BFI.
Webster F. and Robins K. (1986), "Information Technology; A Luddite
Analysis", Norwood, New Jersey: Abtex.
Weddel G. (1968), "Broadcasting and Public Policy", London, Michael
Joseph.
367
Weddel E.G. (ed) (1970), "Structures of Broadcastin g : A Symposium",
Manchester: M.U.P.
Weddet G.	 (1983),	 "The end of media nationalism" in lntermedia,
vol 11, No.4/5, September 1983.
Weiler	 J.	 (1981),	 "Supranationalisrn revisited-retrospective and
prospective",	 European University Institute, 	 Working Paper No.2,
FL orence.
Weiss C.I(.	 (1977), "Research For Policy's Sake: the enliguterent
function of social science researcher" in Pot ic y Analysis,	 3(4),
p.p.53l -546.
Westergaard J.
	 (1977), "CLass, Inequality and Corporatism" in A.
Hunt	 (ed),	 Class and Class Structure,	 London:	 Lawrence
and Wishart.
White	 H.	 (1987),	 "Mass escape in broadayLight" in Guardian, 	 5
January 1987, p.p.6.
White Paper (1988)(Home Office), "Broadcasting in the '90s:
Com p etition.	 Choice	 and Quatity"(The Government's 	 Plans	 for
Broadcasting Legislation), London: HMSO, Gmd 517.
Wildavsky A.
	
(1979),	 "Speaking Truth to Power: the Art and Craft
of Policy Analysis", boston LittLe Brown.
Witdman S.S and Siwek S.E (1987), "The Privatisation of European
Television: Effects on InternationaL Markets for Programms" in
Columbia Journal of World Business, FaLl 1987, p.p. 71-6.
Wiley R.	 (1989),	 "American pipe fills thegap" in Broadcast, 	 10
February 1989 8
 PP167
Williams	 R.	 (1974),	 "TeLevision, technology and Cultural Form",
London: Fontana.
Williams	 R.	 (1972), "Marxist Theory and Literature",	 Oxford:
University Press.
WI IL i amson H. (1988) "Broadcasting by SatelL I te: Some
TechnicalCons j derations" in Negrine R. (ed) (1988) "Satellite
Broadcasting", London: Routledge.
Witmott N. (1986), "The Price of Pay TV" in Observer, 23 November
1986, p.p.32.
Winrdman M.D. et at. (Marcom R.; Hurley T.) (1983), "Extended-
definition-MAC" in I.R.A. Technical Review, No.21, November 1983,
p.p.27-41
Winston B.	 (1986), "Misunderstanding Media", London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Wober	 M.	 (1981),	 "P y ramids of Chariots-the satellite Question",
Secial Report, IBA, London.
Woodrow	 A.	 (1986),	 "Boom	 sur Ic march des programmes"	 in	 Le
Monds, 20 February 1986, p.p.27.
Wright C.R.	 (1986),	 "Mass comminciation Rediscovered; 	 Its past
and	 future in American Sociology" in Ball - Rokeach 	 and	 Cantor
(eds), "Media. Audience and Social Structure", Beverly Hills: Sage
Wright V.	 (1978), "The Government and Politics of France", London:
Hutch i nson
Young	 S.	 and	 Lowe	 A.	 V.	 (1974),	 "Intervention in the Mixed
Economy, London: Groom Helm.
Zechini L.	 (1982), "L'adoption du project sur I'audiovisuel par
t'Assemblée	 Nationale:	 Le	 countraintes	 de Ia liberté"	 in	 Le
Monde, 18 May, p.p.12.
Zysman	 (1983),	 "Government, Markets and Growth",
	 London:	 Oxford
Press.
368
